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As its title says, this book juxtaposes views of lit er a ture by two scholars 
who live and work on dif er ent continents. Ranjan Ghosh teaches En glish 
at the University of North Bengal, while J. Hillis Miller is an emeritus pro-
fessor of Comparative Lit er a ture and En glish at the University of California, 
Irvine.
Our book,  after an introduction by each author, is made up of ten inter-
woven chapters, paired in sequence, one by each of us on five topics: (1) 
What Lit er a ture Is and Why It Still  Matters  Today; (2) Poetry as a Literary 
Form; (3) The Prob lems of World Lit er a ture; (4) Teaching Lit er a ture; (5) 
Ethics and Lit er a ture. Though each of us was  free to write an essay of any 
sort on each of  these five topics, each chapter also includes dialogical com-
ments by its author on the matching essay by the other author. The ex-
plicit dialogical aspect of this book is crucial. It is a book that results from 
several years of vigorous interaction on our topics, across continents.
The two authors by no means, however, straightforwardly represent 
India or the United States. For one  thing, literary study, literary theory, 
and the teaching of lit er a ture are im mensely diverse in each country. Each 
of us speaks conscientiously for himself, represents himself, not the coun-
try or university where he teaches. One of the strengths of this book  will 
be to introduce Western readers who may know  little about it to the San-
skrit, Hindi, and Bengali concept of lit er a ture as Sahitya. Nevertheless, 
many of Ghosh’s citations and references come from Western theories of 
lit er a ture. His theory is the result of what he calls an (in)fusion from many 
sources. Many of Ghosh’s examples of lit er a ture are also Western. Miller’s 
commitments in literary study and teaching to rhetorical reading and to 
the use of speech- act theory are by no means universally accepted in the 
West. In the United States, any position on  these issues is likely to be strongly 
contested. Assumptions about literary study and the ways it  matters are 
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centers of much debate  these days in the United States, as in the West 
generally.
Our book, we hope, contributes to that debate not only by juxtaposing 
essays on our five topics, but by making explicit through the dialogical 
insertions the ways we difer from one another about what lit er a ture is, 
why it  matters, and how it should be written about or taught. I have cer-
tainly learned im mensely from Ranjan Ghosh’s parts of this book.
ranjan ghosh
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I love India, but my India is an idea and not a geo graph i cal expression. Therefore 
I am not a patriot— I  shall forever seek my compatriots all over the world.
— Rabindranath Tagore
So long as the seeing is something to see, it is not the real one; only when the 
seeing is no- seeing— that is, when the seeing is not a specific act of seeing into a 
definitely circumscribed state of consciousness—is it the “seeing into one’s self- 
nature.” Paradoxically stated, when seeing is no- seeing  there is real seeing; when 
hearing is no- hearing  there is real hearing.
— Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki
Turning outside to inside over and over, turning the inside out: what he is waiting 
for is not  there— visibly; that which is not, neither the outside nor the inside.
— Michel Deguy, “Catachreses”
In the context of Jean- Luc Nancy’s “Euryopa: Le regard au loin,” a short 
and baffling text written in 1994, Rudolphe Gasché explains how Nancy 
raises the philosophical question of Eu rope by investigating the question 
of the world, sense, finitude, and horizon— a pregnant and operative 
clutch of terms that our book prefers to  settle with by thinking across con-
tinents. Gasché explains:
Nancy’s starting point is the admittedly questionable etymological mean-
ing of Eu rope, Euryopa— originally an epithet of Zeus, meaning,  either 
wide- eyed, or far- sounding (i.e. thundering). Der Kleine Pauly renders it as 
“far- sounding and looking far into the distance” and goes on to mention 
another pos si ble but equally questionable etymology, to which Nancy 
also has recourse, namely the semitic pre- Greek ereb, obscurity. Accord-
ing to this origin, the name “Eu rope,” to cite Nancy, “would mean: the 
one who looks in the distance (or, as well, the one whose voice is 
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of the word, thus determining Euryopa’s glance as a “look far into the 
obscurity, into its own obscurity.”1
If Eu rope, as an idea, is looking into the distance, where the world is re-
alized by being world- wide, it is also a way of looking that problematizes 
finitude and infinity in our understanding of the world. Looking into ob-
scurity and into one’s obscurity is holding a position as the world, where 
infinite means “the infinity of finitude, of the infinitely finite.” Martta Heik-
kilä points out that  under such notions of finitude “ there is no idea that 
goes beyond the world by giving it any end, reason, or ground. A world is a 
space for the infinite of truth and existence: a world  free of a horizon. The 
world is made up beings that are infinitely exposed to existence as a non- 
essence. Thus they are singular or finite beings that make up the finite and 
horizonless world, a world which is infinitely finite, hence infinite.”2 This 
makes me think about Asia, the continent, the world, which I am writing 
from in a slightly dif er ent way. We  don’t have a consensus on the origin 
of the word Asia. It could have been derived from Ἀσία first attributed 
to Herodotus (about 440 bc), where we locate a reference to Anatolia, or 
the Persian empire. Perhaps more authentically, it emerges from Akka-
dian (“to go out, to rise”) with a borrowed allegiance to the Semitic root 
Asu, which is a reference to the rising sun. Asia then becomes the land of 
sunrise. But presently it is not what it used to be: it has drifted away as a 
geo graph i cal mass, got a new name, footprints of new cultures, marks and 
remarks of new thoughts and ideological formations. Also, with light, Asia 
becomes a land or a space that gets light first and loses light first. It first 
gets noticed and then allows  others to get noticed by withdrawing from 
prominence. Losing light is not losing sight but about sighting  others and 
sighting oneself. Losing light, then, is not darkness but no light, not pos-
session but a sharing with  others, a light that comes to it only to be dis-
tributed to  others. Again the light that it loses to its  others comes to it as 
its light and also the light of  others. That light dissolves and sublates itself. 
So the figure of Asia is always  behind the figure, the idea that hides to proj-
ect, retraces to reaffirm. Asia demarcates itself from its self ( light and no 
light, blind spots?) and also self- demarcation (it is the host to a light and 
then dispossessed to become, in the pro cess, both the guest and the host). 
Like the light that goes away and returns upon itself, Asia always has an 
Asia before itself. Sounding Nancyean, I would like to argue that when  there 
is light Asia sees itself. When light dis appears, Asia thinks, seeing changes 
to thought and discovering the power of invisibility. A real ity first ( light 
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 there is) and then a possibility, which is both self-demarcation and demar-
cation from  others. Asia, for me, thus, continuously doubles itself.
So our book, Thinking across Continents, speaks of no finite Asia or Eu-
rope or Amer i ca— self-contained, harmonically hermetic. This finitude, 
falling back on Nancy, “does not mean that we are noninfinite— like small 
insignificant beings within a  grand, universal, and continuous being— but 
it means that we are infinitely finite, finitely exposed to our existence as 
a nonessence, infinitely exposed to the ‘otherness’ of our own being.”3 We 
are caught in the across, not simply  going from one end to another (from 
Asia to Amer i ca) but an cros, in a crossed position (Anglo- French origin of 
across, literally “on cross”), subjected infinitely to finite spots of medita-
tive singularities. We restore and rejuvenate our across and cross positions 
through dialogue (regard, lending to  others, two minds in conversation 
and a host of thoughts across times and traditions). Our dialogues have 
evinced our presentness in a culture and tradition of thought and have 
also given “birth to presence” where we have begun without beginning and 
ended without having a beginning and an end that we can claim are just 
ours. This is  because we have thought about lit er a ture within a world and 
yet did not forget about its potential to go world- wide. Our positions and 
transpositions belong to us and to the other.
I approached the book as a deep victim of trans-habit. Trans, as a pre-
fix, means “across, beyond, to go beyond,” from the Latin trans- , from 
the prepositional trans “across, over, beyond,” prob ably originally the pres-
ent participle of the verb trare- , meaning “to cross.”4 This crossing,  going 
across, and staying perpetually crossed is what motivates and character-
izes my  doing of lit er a ture. Brought up in a  family of academics in which 
my  father taught physics and my  mother taught history, I submitted to 
the stirring liminality of getting curious about disciplines such as quan-
tum mechanics, Indian and Western philosophy, evolution, and the ram-
ifications of Indian history. Our library shelves  housed Richard Feynman 
and Albert Einstein, flanked by Satyajit Ray, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, 
Victor Turner, Mircea Eliade, J. S. Mill, and Vincent Smith. My early life 
amid a wide variety of knowledge regimes, macerated by training in Hin-
dustani classical  music and the Bengal school of painting, augmented the 
fecund frequencies that refused to stay confined to a border but became 
interference (- ference in the sense of “carry over, ferry across”).5 Deeper 
investments in lit er a ture in  later years, then, could not have come with-
out the crossaffiliation—my afair of ference— revealed in joyriding phi-
losophy, history, po liti cal and social theory, comparative aesthetics and 
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religion, cultural theory and criticism. I stood jauntily entranced. This 
book, then, comes with its own logic of manifestation ignited through an 
already embedded deposition and disposition, my across  factor.
My transposition is built around what I have called the (in)fusion ap-
proach, a philosophy of seeing, a hermeneutic desire, that difracts to in-
teract. Reflecting on the (in)fusion approach, John W. P. Phillips succinctly 
argues that the sense of “fusion (melting, liquefying by heat, and joining 
by, or as if by, melting), the infusion (the pouring of liquid over any sub-
stance in order to extract its active qualities) and the Latin (fundere, fusum) 
which can be  either to pour (the warm  water over the herbal mixture) or 
to melt (the wax before sealing a letter)” create the operative and dynamic 
spaces that perhaps “allow us to sidestep the normal institutional barri-
ers”; the (in)fusion approach, both as method and nonmethod, inspires us 
“to consider what it might mean for a scholar to be steeped in the minute 
intricacies of an idiom, patiently picking through its margins, and at the 
same time allowing this work to melt the bound aries of the idiom itself so 
that other idioms all of a sudden are efectively in play.”6 Staying “crossed,” 
rather acrossed, is what I would like to correspond with the “exteriority 
within phenomena” that difractively brings continents together, builds 
knowledge  houses whose relational win dows, as Karen Barad argues, are 
perpetually open and inviting.7 It is the space outside that works within, 
as not in its exteriority but as “folded in,” enfolded, unfolded, refolded. 
But  going across is not staying crossed in the perpetual whir and whirl: 
it develops an archive of thinking, a stratum of knowledge, creases and 
strategies of understanding without losing touch with the force of the 
across— Deleuze’s “new cartographer.”8 Being across breeds the plea sure 
of being “out of place,” a toss amid our “heretical geographies.”9
(In)fusion, then, can be considered an orientation, a kind of investiga-
tive spirit that re spects knowledge regimes, the bound aries of tradition, the 
sacrality of paradigms, but also dares to infringe on them. The infringement 
is difractive like an earthworm, as Karen Barad has illustrated resonantly: 
“Earthworms revel in . . .  helping to make compost or other wise being 
busy at work and at play: turning the soil over and over— ingesting and 
excreting it, tunneling through it, burrowing, all means of aerating the 
soil, allowing oxygen in, opening it up and breathing new life into it.”10 
Tunneling through a concept and then transposing it through the gamut 
of culture and time is what (in)fusion does, much to its productive joy. It 
assumes a cross- epistemic and transcultural entanglement in a concept 
or an idea making it “behave” with a diference and some travelling mo-
mentum. (In)fusion has a deep tendency to go across, crisscross, find the 
crossed point of delicate intersections to enable an epistemological expe-
rience gain a vein of life. All my chapters in the book, thus, walk across 
thoughts, between ideas from a variety of cultures and traditions, making 
for an experience of lit er a ture that is difractive, mostly, out of time, in 
the whirl of the “now”— the now that Barad argues “is not an infinitesimal 
slice but an infinitely rich condensed node in a changing field difracted 
across space- time in its ongoing iterative repatterning.”11 My (in)fusion- 
now is folded into “événement” and the now, in Deleuzian terms, becomes 
the “prehensions of prehensions,” where “echoes, reflections, traces, perspec-
tives, thresholds and folds” prehend and operate as conditions of possibil-
ity.12 However, (in)fusion, through its powers and strategies of melting and 
smelting, need not be misjudged as a debilitating carnivalesque. The zone 
of trans maps the efects of diference between communities of thought and 
paradigms of ideas without being oblivious of the diference, the specifici-
ties, the peculiarities that each thought through its own cultural parentage 
carries with it.
The trans- moment or trans- now is about enacting a communication— 
difficult and debatable— between apparently incompatible paradigms of 
thought and concepts. This conflict as communication is not easy to ex-
perience and execute  because one has to be sure that diference comes 
through as “diferencing,” made manifest through intra- activity, an entan-
glement which preexists our investigation into the forms and modes of 
diference. My emphatic point is that cultures of thought are intra- active, 
deeply meshed across dif er ent backgrounds, cultures of inheritance, and 
positionalities. (In)fusion- now is a way, a provocation, to look into the 
potency of such entanglement (a manifest demonstration of this critical 
spirit runs through chapter 3).
But (in)fusion- now generously concedes a kind of immanence whose 
workings might develop both deconstructive and difractive potential. I 
revise my earlier entrenched position to link (in)fusion with interdiscipli-
narity, for I can see the immanence of this approach, its inventive and yet 
viscous and involved workings within and outside the discipline and in def-
erence to the cardinal princi ples that disciplinary paradigms love to protect 
and have remained possessive about.13 It is not always mediatory, broker-
ing disciplinary dialogues: rather, it is committed to a subtle decrusting 
of sedimented thinking through conviction of the deep, intra- active, and 
involved transmediatory existence of lit er a ture and concepts and theories 
by which we try to make sense of lit er a ture. This is the power of the across, 
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clearing spaces and promoting and acknowledging forms of appearing and 
appearances or emergences. It announces events as ruptures, which Eliz-
abeth Grosz calls “nicks”: ruptures into our systems of thinking to figure 
out an issue and explore what possibilities a concept or an idea can be put 
to, inciting within limits a force of asystematicity.14 The untimely and the 
unaverage is what (in)fusion- now aspires for, an “open- ended cohesion, 
temporary modes of ordering, slowing, filtering.”15 (In)fusion- now creates 
frames that are its conditions of understanding and motors of the  across.
Infusion- trans- now is the refusal to see our intellectual  doing as simply 
“keeping up with lit er a ture,” as one of our “constantly shrinking fields,” 
and believing that “steady pro gress is being achieved simply  because, as 
the field gets smaller, the objects left in it look larger.”16 Our readings of 
lit er a ture usually come with footnotes: sites carefully cited to provide the 
institutionalized performatics of knowledge and its address. If lit er a ture 
has gone across borders, we are obligated to account for such movements 
through a method or a rule and enshrine such moves within a tradition 
and pattern that should sacerdotalize an inheritance. Not that I am bel-
ligerently opposed to such institutional keys that unlock our readings of 
lit er a ture. I am not disrespectful  either of the specificities that culture 
and tradition are highlighted with. But like Michel Serres, relishing a kind 
of nonanxiety of adversarial modes of knowledge formation (the hard as 
against the soft, as Serres argues in Five Senses) where frames, and hence 
borders, determine our sense of the world and world- meaning, I plunge 
into lit er a ture, most often without footnotes (endnotes, however, mate-
rialize to evince how my spirit of the across, staying footloose, has stayed 
afoot through the book!). Thinking lit er a ture saves itself from the “end 
of thought” by not merely avoiding footnotes but by not feeling their ne-
cessity. J. Hillis Miller and I thought across in ways that are varied and 
made allowance for lit er a ture to speak back to us; we dialogized on the 
literary, and eventually found ourselves on  either side of the fence without 
forgetting that “something  there is that does not love a wall.”17 We expe-
rienced the footnoted locality of our continent and again forgot what we 
 were “walling in” and “walling out.” Experience, excursus, energy  were our 
software of lit er a ture. Lit er a ture, I admit, exists without us.
We remember, with Serres, that a “cartload of bricks  isn’t a  house.”18 
Working out a reading of lit er a ture is also about mapping one’s worldview, 
abilities  toward world- making. Serres shows us how we are “as  little sure 
of the one as of the multiple.”19 Somewhere,  going across is also about 
believing in monadologies and letting them fall away through our ever 
mounting investigations. The (in)fusion- trans- now thesis throws us into 
the space where a unitary knowledge of cultures and traditions of thought, 
the collectivity and indivisibility of knowing and the understanding of life 
and lit er a ture, are  under question.  There is the confidence and commit-
ment to drop anchors across systems and orientations but not always 
with a rounded certitude in operations that would make the across a well- 
tested medium, a calculus to understand lit er a ture and literary thought. 
The now, as I have demonstrated in chapter 5, has both defined and un-
defined bound aries, something I have argued as the phenomenon of the 
“taking- place,” where the globality and locality of  doing lit er a ture become 
a pro cess that is viscous, “a lake  under the mist,” in the words of Serres: 
“The sea, a white plain, background noise, the murmur of a crowd, time. 
I have no idea, or am only dimly aware, where its individual sites may 
be, I’ve no notion of its points, very  little idea of its bearings. I have only 
the feeblest conception of its internal interactions, the lengthiness and 
entanglement of its connections and relations, only the vaguest idea of 
its environment. It invades the space or it fades out, takes a place,  either 
gives it up or creates it, by its essentially unpredictable movement.”20
I am happy to see the now as having Serres’s parasite: the noise, the 
perturbations, the disorder in a system of exchange.21 The now builds a 
turbulence that intercepts lit er a ture with an energy, new contracts, con-
tacts, and topologies. Lit er a ture stays healthy through such vio lence. My 
reading of “Dafodils,” in chapter 5, of “Birches,” in chapter 1, of Endgame 
in chapter 7, and of “The Scholar Gipsy,” in chapter 9, are all in some ways a 
parasitic imbalance in exchanges, the imperfect balance sheet in the opera-
tion of the now but not as emergences of  simple disorder but rigorous dis-
order. The parasitic now also has the character of Deleuze’s “series,” which 
is not simply the mechanism of resemblance and analogy but “multi- serial 
in nature,” an agencement (as the pro cess of “laying out”) and a structure 
for connections and dislocations.22 (In)fusion- now is in the character of 
a judgment that is not overpowering but a force, a “non- organic vitality” 
that works across thought- traditions, becoming combative among a vari-
ety of forces and leading to a “new ensemble.”23 It sponsors a growth of 
thinking and movement that produces a milieu (meaning an experience, 
 middle, and medium, in the French sense of the word). It is across, with-
out beginning or end, “but always a  middle (milieu) from which it grows 
and which it overspills.”24 The infusion- now is the rumeur (murmur) of 
assemblages, of afection across subjects and sources.25 Lit er a ture builds 
its afective accumulation in making potent investments in the now.
tHInkIng aCross ContInents  •  7
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What does this now map? It is multiplicitous and both strategic and 
imaginary, complex and curious. I am greatly tempted to see this mapping 
as akin to the “psycho- geographic” formations that the situationist the-
orist Guy Debord theorized from his walks across Paris. The thrust with 
Debord, as it is with my now, is about aspiring to hit detours, dare the de-
standardization of connections, and aim configurations through seeming 
aimlessness— the dérive, a drift of a meaningful flâneur, an experimental 
momentum. The now- as- derive seeks to find communication in interrup-
tion, making dialogues pos si ble across formally settled incompatibles. 
The now is naked but not without its own threads of chance, “redolent 
passageways, shocking landscapes, superimposing routes and spaces onto 
each other.” Now as “new cities” is our provocation to “détournement to 
monkey- wrench accepted behaviour, to create light, to disalienate.”26 So I 
have tried to meet lit er a ture half way: a sort of gathering-up of thoughts, 
concepts, par ameters from vari ous ends of culture and tradition into a 
poetics of relationality.
Remapped Asia, both as the epistemic site I am writing from and as an 
atopos, becomes the “being with” and is the continent that believes in the 
“taking- place” where light, no light, relight come together not in conti-
nuity (as it might appear) but works through contiguity. So my Asia (my 
sahitya- darshana, philosophy of lit er a ture) exists predominantly as an en-
semble, as in- betweenness, a fractal, an other wise than being. The  doing 
of lit er a ture has its center as a relation, most often, an inoperative rela-
tion working through reticulated and articulated singularities. My Asia 
exceeds itself to form another Asia, an other Asia; awareness of Asia 
is also about an awareness of being “out of Asia,” being with non- Asia, 
being without my Asia- log os. I invest my relation with Asia and non- 
Asia in the across, which is not about taking Asia beyond the local into 
the arms of the global (the non- Asia, Amer i ca, or Eu rope). Asia is out 
in the world, at large, has always been the world, has stayed world- wide 
(immanentism).27 It is my sahitya in the book. Thinking lit er a ture begins 
in destroying lit er a ture, an experience of the impossible through excess, 
singularity, and eccentricity. My thinking across continents, then, is de-
cartographized: geography becoming a vision, a topology, a thought in 
pro cess. In across as desire, I have lost my home (aAsia) but have surely 
found a world, my sahit with continents, forms of a worldling, found my 
finitude without horizons. Sahit is my across, “a crossover in attributes 
of another origin,” that thought the book to life, conceived lit er a ture as 
compatriot.28
Before I begin my introduction proper, let me say how much I have learned 
from Ranjan Ghosh’s part of this book, for example, his introductory essay 
above. His goal is much dif er ent from my own. He wants, if I understand 
him correctly, to develop, more or less, a unified, universal, and transna-
tional theory of lit er a ture. He  will then potentially use that theory to ac-
count for literary works of all sorts. This happens, in dif er ent chapters 
by him in this book, for Words worth’s “Dafodils” and Frost’s “Birches.” 
He calls his theory and methodology of studying lit er a ture “(in)fusion.” 
That word names the amalgamation of the ele ments that go into it, as tea 
is an infusion of tea leaves in boiling  water. Though many of Ghosh’s im-
pressively learned and diverse citations in support of his (in)fusion theory 
come from Hindi or Sanskrit sources, many are from Western sources, as 
in his citations from Jean- Luc Nancy or Gilles Deleuze in his part of our 
introduction or in the abundant etymological notations  there, as for the 
word Asia. Ghosh’s work in this book, both in his introduction and in his 
chapters, is an impressive example of “thinking (across) continents,” to 
borrow his name for what he does.
My own procedures in literary study are quite dif er ent from Ranjan 
Ghosh’s, as my introductory remarks  here demonstrate. I most often start 
from a literary work or some text, including, but not exclusively, theoreti-
cal and philosophical ones. My goal is to account inductively, as best I can, 
for what some text says and how it says it.  Those diferences between us 
generate the dialogical aspects of this book, in our comments along the 
way about one another’s chapters.
I Am Not a Deconstructionist
I am not a deconstructionist. Let me repeat that once more: I am not a de-
constructionist. Why do I begin this part of my introduction to this book 
with this sentence? To clear the ground to start with, so  there  will be no 
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misunderstanding. I say I am not a deconstructionist for two related rea-
sons:  because my work does not fit the widely accepted misunderstandings 
by academics and by the media of the work of Jacques Derrida (who coined 
the term deconstruction as a critique of Heidegger’s term Destruktion), or 
the work of Paul de Man, or my own work, such as it is, and  because I 
have discovered, to my sorrow, that the erroneous understanding of de-
construction, promulgated by the mass media and by many academics, as 
I have said, is almost impossible to correct, however carefully, patiently, 
and circumstantially, with many citations, you explain its wrongness. The 
word in its mistaken understanding is now used in all sorts of areas to 
name not destroying something totally but taking it apart, as in “first we 
deconstructed the building.” The prob lem begins when this meaning of 
the word is applied to a procedure of interpretation.
The almost universally believed, mistaken conception of so- called 
deconstruction as a reading method is a spectacular example of a deeply 
rooted ideological distortion. As Marx (in The German Ideology), Louis Al-
thusser (in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”), and Paul de Man 
(in “The Re sis tance to Theory”) have in slightly dif er ent ways asserted, just 
being circumstantially and persuasively shown that you are mystified by an 
ideological  mistake by no means cures you of your mystification.1 Climate- 
change deniers go right on denying humanly caused climate change in the 
face of rising  waters, fires, floods, droughts, and unpre ce dented storms.
I have a lot to say in my essays in this book about the uses of rhetorical 
reading to unmask ideological distortions. Therefore, I need not anticipate 
 those demonstrations in this introduction. Let me stress again  here, how-
ever, that I do not claim in this book or elsewhere that this unmasking  will 
cure  those  under the spell of an ideological  mistake. The  mistake about 
deconstruction as a reading procedure is a splendid example of this. I give 
two examples out of innumerable pos si ble ones in both the media and in 
academic writing.
A recent short essay in Scientific American by Michael Shermer is enti-
tled “Scientia Humanitatis,” with a subtitle as follows: “Reason, empiri-
cism and skepticism are not virtues of science alone.”2  Here is a scan of the 
essay as it appeared in the print version of Scientific American:
This essay is one in an ongoing series by Shermer identified, as you 
can see, at the top left- hand corner of the page as “Skeptic by Michael 
Shermer; Viewing the world with a rational eye.” Shermer’s one- page, two- 
column essay praises a recent book by Rens Bod.3 Bod advocates a return 
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Figure I.1  A scan of the essay Scientia Humanitatis as it appeared in 
Scientifi c American, June 2015.
to empirical methods in the humanities, for example, the use of lexical 
and grammatical methods to date documents, as Lorenzo Valla did in 
1440 to show that the famous Donation of Constantine was a fake and could 
not have been written in the fourth  century a.d.  because it uses Latin 
words and constructions not around in the fourth  century a.d. I’m all for 
the use of such methods. Th ey are indispensable. Th ey have their limits, 
however, as in the quite correct omission of rhe toric, in the sense both 
of the knowledge of persuasion and the knowledge of fi gurative language, 
from Shermer’s phrase “lexical and grammatical.”  Th ese words name two 
members, if you take lexical as involving logical argumentation, of the 
basic medieval trivium, grammar, logic, and rhe toric, but conspicuously 
leave out rhe toric.
Before beginning his praise of Bod and scientia humanitatis, however, 
Shermer opens his essay by saying: “In the late 20th  century the human-
ities took a turn  toward post- modern deconstruction and the belief that 
 there is no objective real ity to be discovered. To believe in such quaint 
notions as scientific pro gress was to be guilty of ‘scientism,’ properly said 
with a snarl.” This is a blatantly ignorant, robotic repetition of an ideo-
logical  mistake, with no evidence of skepticism about received opinion. 
I’ll bet, however, that no one could convince Shermer he is ignorant and 
wrong.
Let me look a  little at the rhe toric of Shermer’s byline, title, and open-
ing sentences. Shermer calls himself a skeptic, but “viewing the world with 
a rational eye” is not at all the same  thing as “viewing it with a skeptical 
eye.” A rational eye presumably knows what reason is and says, “What I 
see is a hummingbird. Any rational person can see that.” A skeptical eye 
would say, “That looks like a hummingbird, but I could be mistaken. Per-
haps my eyes are deceiving me.” In any case, the phrase “view the world 
with a rational eye” is a figure of speech. It is a figure so commonplace that 
its figurative quality likely passes most readers by unnoticed. But of course 
it is not the eye that is reasonable or skeptical, but rather the mind  behind 
that eye, or perhaps one should rather say “the brain  behind the eye,” with 
its training, its neurological structures, its memories, its language set, and 
its presuppositions about how to interpret the perceptual world. The  little 
bird is behaving like a hummingbird and is feeding at the hummingbird 
feeder, and therefore it is most likely actually a hummingbird. Seeing that 
it is or is not a hummingbird is not at all the same as reading in a rhetorical 
way, that is, with attention to the implication of the figurative language 
used to assert the results of perception, such as the words “viewing the 
world with a rational eye.” My use of the cliché “my eyes could be deceiving 
me,” by the way, is another figure, this time a personification of the eyes 
as like a deceitful person.
Between  those series- title words in small type in the upper left- hand 
corner of the page and the title proper (“Scientia Humanitatis”) comes an 
illustration of a nuclear  family ( father,  mother, and small son) looking in 
a museum at a large and at first inscrutable, medieval- looking painting. 
As the title  under the painting in the museum (Donatio Constantini) and as 
Shermer’s essay  later indicates, it is a (changed) painting of the forged 
Donation of Constantine, “by which,” says Wikipedia, “the emperor Con-
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stantine the  Great supposedly transferred authority over Rome and the 
western part of the Roman Empire to the Pope.” Sure enough, Shermer or 
the artist who devised the illustration in Scientifi c American, Izhar Cohen, 
most likely also used Wikipedia, since the Scientifi c American page repro-
duces, with signifi cant amusing changes, the same painting as the one in 
the Wikipedia entry.  Here is the original painting:
Th is is a thirteenth- century fresco in Santi Quattro Coronati, Rome, 
of Sylvester and Constantine, showing the purported donation. In the 
version cleverly presented as part of Shermer’s essay the theme of anach-
ronism detected by Valla’s rational analy sis of lexical and grammatical 
features of the Donation of Constantine is brilliantly represented by the 
airplane fl ying overhead that is being looked at ( unless my eyes deceive 
me) through a telescope by one of the men on the  horse. Th e art editors 
of Scientifi c American or Izhar Cohen himself prob ably designed the pic-
ture. As Paul de Man says, we must learn “to read pictures” rather than “to 
imagine meaning,” in this case by comparing the original fresco and the 
satirical parody of it.
I have not yet done with my reading of the opening of Shermer’s 
essay, however. To call it with a Latin name, Scientia Humanitatis, is a 
slightly pretentious way to claim to be a learned person, as is Shermer’s 
use  later in his essay of the  grand German word for the  human sciences, 
Figure I.2  “Sylvester I and Constantine,” by unknown medieval artist in Rome.
Geisteswissenschaften. The words tell the reader Shermer is in the know, so 
to speak. A good deal of rhe toric, both in the sense of persuasive language 
and in the sense of figurative language, characterizes Shermer’s first two 
sentences: “In the late 20th  century the humanities took a turn  toward 
post- modern deconstruction and the belief that  there is no objective real-
ity to be discovered. To believe in such quaint notions as scientific pro-
gress was to be guilty of ‘scientism,’ properly said with a snarl.” The first 
sentence turns on the meta phor “took a turn,” with its embedded notions 
of history as some kind of straight- line journey which in this case took a 
wrong turn. The ominous “his condition took a turn for the worse” is also 
echoed. No one is blamed for this bad turn. It just happened. The human-
ities took a turn. Suddenly  people just believed “that  there is no objective 
real ity to be discovered.” Nor is any evidence given from any scholar who 
represents this bad turn. Nor is anything said about the historical con-
ditions that might have been a context for this bad turn. The sentence 
just hangs  there in the air, uttered without evidence but with bland, ap-
odictic certainty. The implication is that every one knows this happened 
and that something so universally accepted as true no longer needs any 
proof or explanation. The bad turn happened, and every body knows it. 
The second sentence is a bit more openly polemical. It mimes the absur-
dity of postmodern deconstructionists by saying they hold that belief 
in scientific pro gress is a “quaint notion,” perhaps as quaint as believing 
walking  under a ladder brings bad luck. Shermer’s formulation imagines 
someone’s dismissing scientism as, in a power ful personification, a nasty 
person’s speaking “with a snarl.” The next sentence brings in the famous 
Alan Sokal nonsense parody, published in a major humanities journal, 
“chockablock full of postmodern phrases and deconstructionist tropes in-
terspersed with scientific jargon.” The implication is that postmodernists 
and so- called deconstructionists all write that way. I discuss below the way 
the publication recently of im mense numbers of fake and nonsensical sci-
entific papers could be used, falsely, to discredit science generally. Sokal’s 
paper is the only one I know of that parodies deconstruction, whereas the 
number of fake scientific papers is  enormous.
So- called deconstruction never says  there is no objective real ity to be 
discovered, nor that science does not pro gress. The scholars Shermer 
attacks would hold, however, that science progresses to a considerable 
degree precisely through correcting earlier  mistakes about “objective real-
ity.” Shermer could hardly disagree with that. Shermer gives no evidence 
whatsoever that he has ever read a word by Derrida, or de Man, or even 
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me. He is relying, it appears, only on second- hand mistaken accounts in 
the media or on distorted academic accounts.
Shermer goes on to say, “I subsequently gave up on the humanities.” 
This is as stupid and ignorant as if I  were to say, “I gave up on science when 
I heard about the uncertainty princi ple, Gödel’s incompleteness or ‘unde-
cidability’ theorems, physicists’ inability to identify what dark  matter and 
dark energy are, and all  those fake scientific papers published in reputable 
scientific journals.”6 Every one would think, correctly, I was an idiot if I 
 were to give up on science for  those reasons.
Shermer’s error about deconstruction is a good example of a blithely 
believed ideological  mistake repeated as a universally acknowledged fact 
needing no empirical evidence. Such  mistakes are more or less impossible 
to root out, as Marx, Althusser, and de Man, among many  others, assert. 
It is therefore, I conclude, best for me not to use the word deconstruction at 
all to name something I do, but to name it “rhetorical reading.”
I have just, dear reader, given an example of such a reading in my brief 
investigation of the rhe toric of Michael Shermer’s Scientia Humanitatis.
Another example of the re sis tance to the unmasking of ideological 
 mistakes comes from China. Ideology, by the way, has, I long ago discov-
ered on my first visit to China, in 1988, a quite dif er ent valence in China 
from what it has in the West. For us, the word names a prejudiced  mistake, 
as in my usage in this introduction. For the Chinese, ideology tends to 
mean something good the authorities must persuade you to believe. That 
is, in my judgment, by the way, a profoundly un- Marxist use of the word. 
The Chinese appear, to echo Paul de Man’s phrasing, to be “very poor read-
ers of Marx’s German Ideology.” I have visited China many times and have 
given over thirty lectures at conferences  there, though I still consider my-
self an innocent when I am in China. I remain someone who is never quite 
sure what is  going on, to a considerable degree  because I do not know Chi-
nese. Many of my essays and books, however, have been translated into 
Chinese and published in China. I have often been interviewed in China, 
have had a number of dissertations written  there on my work, and keep 
close contact with many Chinese colleagues. For the most part, my work 
seems to have been correctly read and well understood in China. I greatly 
value that.
Nevertheless, a recent interchange of e- mail letters indicates that a 
quite highly placed Chinese academic holds stubbornly to something like 
Shermer’s ideological  mistake. “In the mentality of Chinese scholars,” as-
serts my Chinese correspondent, “deconstruction is a power ful trend of 
thoughts which rejects reason, doubting about truth and trying to subvert 
order. Its manifestation in literary criticism is denying all the previous 
criticism, advocating decentralization and anti- essentialism, and decon-
structing the fixed meaning, structure and language of a given text, or 
to use your own words, it’s ‘something that could be separated into frag-
ments or parts, suggesting the image of a child’s dismantling his  father’s 
watch into parts that cannot be reassembled.’ ” My Chinese correspondent 
does not mention which or how many Chinese scholars share this men-
tality. This is Shermer’s mentality too, spelled out in much more detail in 
my email from China. As anyone knows who has read with care any work 
by Derrida or de Man, this is at  every point a caricature of so- called de-
construction. In par tic u lar, that passage about a child’s dismantling his 
 father’s watch is used to make me say the exact opposite of what I actually 
said, so power ful in this case is the force of ideological (in the Marxist 
sense) misconceptions.
 Here are the two sentences in their entirety in my original text: “The 
word ‘deconstruction’ suggests that such criticism is an activity turning 
something unified back to detached fragments or parts. It suggests the 
image of a child taking apart his  father’s watch, reducing it back to useless 
parts, beyond any reconstitution.”7 The passage, when returned to its con-
text in my essay, by no means says deconstruction  really is like a child’s 
taking his  father’s watch apart, in an act of rebellion against the  father, or 
against a paternalistic tradition. It says, on the contrary, that the word de-
construction misleadingly and falsely suggests such an image. The sentence 
is ironically contrary to fact. When I tried to explain this to my Chinese 
correspondent, he replied, in the translation another scholar supplied, 
since he does not know En glish, just as I, to my shame,  don’t know Chi-
nese: “On receiving your letter, I re- examined your original sentence in its 
context and found that if the sentence was read by itself separately,  there 
could be misunderstanding.  After this sentence, you immediately ex-
plain that deconstruction is for construction. [Not  really quite what I said. 
I said the two prefixes de and con must both be taken into account when 
parsing the word.] This once again proves that our dialogue  will promote a 
more accurate understanding of your academic positions.” He  doesn’t say 
that  there is misunderstanding, but that  there could be misunderstand-
ing. Nor does he by any means say that the “mentality of Chinese scholars” 
is an ideological  mistake, similar to the one American scholars such as 
Michael Shermer make.
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I therefore conclude that it is best not to use the word at all any more, 
since it has such a distorted meaning in the mentality of even highly educated 
 people in both China and the West. As a result I say, “I am not a decon-
structionist.”  Whether or not Chinese textbooks, as my correspondent 
says, actually have so- called deconstruction so categorically wrong could 
only be ascertained by looking at them, which my ignorance prevents me 
from  doing. Nor do I know why it is that so many of my Chinese academic 
acquaintances seem to have escaped being bewildered by such  mistakes 
about deconstruction. Nor do I know what the relation is between what 
the “Chinese mentality” is said to believe about deconstruction and the 
Chinese campaign by Minister of Education Yuan Guiren, enunciated on 
January 29, 2015, and reported on January 30, 2015, in Western media, 
to ban in China all university textbooks that promote “Western values.” 
Is their parody of so- called deconstruction taken by them as a Western 
value?  These pos si ble connections would be well worth investigation by 
someone who is more learned than I in  matters Chinese, not to speak of 
having the indispensable knowledge of the Chinese language.
He who would make a pun would pick a pocket, as the proverbial saying 
goes. It is now attributed to John Dennis. Now that I have, I hope, cleared 
the air a  little about so- called deconstruction, though I am not dumb enough 
to assume that I have cleared the fog completely, I turn to a brief introduc-
tory account of my presuppositions in the chapters by me in this book.
As opposed to Ghosh’s apparent desire, if I read him right, to affirm a 
universal system of literary theory and then turn to read  actual literary 
works, my deeply rooted procedure is to go the other way, that is, from 
specific literary works through their detailed reading to what ever tenta-
tive generalizations I can make on that basis about lit er a ture in general. 
The generalizations are only as good as is the empirical evidence acquired 
from trying to read individual works. Citations from  others’ theories are 
only useful to me as ways of helping me formulate what I have found in 
what ever par tic u lar work I am trying to read.
My fascination with lit er a ture began when I was five years old and 
taught myself to read so I could read Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland for 
myself, rather than having to depend on my  mother to read it to me. Two 
 things absorbed me about the Alice books: first, their ability to transport 
me into an imaginary world, as if I had gone down a rabbit hole or through 
a looking- glass. Even the most “realistic” novel, such as any one of Anthony 
Trollope’s novels, does that. It is a basic feature of any literary work, for 
example of Johann David Wyss’s The Swiss  Family Robinson, which ab-
sorbed me in the same way as Alice in Wonderland, though a few years  later 
on in my childhood. Second, the wonderful puns and wordplay in the Alice 
books, which I found, and still find, hilarious. The puns in Alice  were my 
introduction to the figurative dimension of language in one of its most 
power ful forms.8 Many other kinds of wordplay besides the pun are rep-
resented in the Alice books, but all in one way or another depend on fig-
urative displacements. The rhetorical reading I have practiced as an adult 
stems directly from what I learned about language from Lewis Carroll. 
Growing up, for Alice, means learning to understand that a single word or 
word sound may have wildly dif er ent meanings. Both of  these features of 
Alice’s experience with language are named by her with the word curious. 
What she experiences is said to be “curiouser and curiouser!”9 That word is 
Alice’s version of what I have called the “strangeness” of lit er a ture.
I give just one example. Alice has been listening to the mouse’s tale, but 
she imagines it as having the shape of the mouse’s tail. The book shows 
graphically what the mouse says as curving back and forth down the page 
like a tail.
“Mine is a long and sad tale!” said the Mouse, turning to Alice and sighing.
“It is a long tail, certainly,” said Alice, looking down with won der at 
the Mouse’s tail; “but why do you call it sad?” And she kept on puzzling 
about it while the Mouse was speaking, so that her idea of the tale was 
something like this:
“You are not attending!” said the Mouse to Alice, severely. “What are 
you thinking of?”
“I beg your  pardon,” said Alice very humbly: “You had got to the fifth 
bend, I think?”
“I had not!” cried the Mouse, sharply and very angrily.
“A knot!” said Alice, always ready to make herself useful, and looking 
anxiously about her. “Oh, do let me help to undo it!”
“I  shall do nothing of the sort,” said the Mouse, getting up and walk-
ing away. “ ”You insult me by talking such nonsense!”
“I  didn’t mean it!” pleaded poor Alice. “But  you’re so easily ofended, 
you know!”
The Mouse only growled in reply.10
In my considered judgment, anyone who does not find this extremely 
funny as well as disquieting does not have much talent for lit er a ture. I 
learned also from such passages, without at all being able to articulate 
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what I had learned, how impor tant irony, that trope that is not a trope, is 
in lit er a ture. The irony arises in this case, as is usual in lit er a ture, from the 
discrepancies among what the characters know and understand, and what 
the narrator, the author, and the reader may understand. Readers in this 
case can see that Alice is not yet grown up enough to understand word-
play, but the mouse is no better. He is only made more and more angry by 
what Alice says, while Alice does not understand the linguistic  mistakes 
she has made, just as I surely missed some when I first read the Alice books. 
Alice can only plead, “I  didn’t mean it,” when she ofends the mouse, in 
anticipation of Stanley Cavell’s Must We Mean What We Say? That issue 
comes up explic itly  later in Alice in Wonderland and may be Cavell’s source 
for his formulation.11 Only the narrator, author, and reader, in dif er ent 
ways and degrees, can be presumed to “understand irony” (if we can indeed 
speak of understanding it, a dangerous assumption), and to get the joke.
I resist the temptation to turn aside and continue my reading of the 
Alice books. I give, however, two more examples of word play that are not 
exactly puns but examples of the tropes buried in ordinary language that 
lead to absurdities if taken literally, like Shermer’s “took a turn.” In one, 
from Through the Looking- Glass, Alice finds herself in a shop run by a knitting 
sheep, who asks her, “What is it you want to buy?” Alice answers politely, 
in perfectly idiomatic En glish, “I should like to look all round me first, if I 
might,” to which the Sheep replies, “You may look in front of you, and on 
both sides, if you like, . . .  but you  can’t look all round you— unless  you’ve 
got eyes at the back of your head.” On the next page, Alice finds herself 
rowing a  little boat with the Sheep as passenger. The sheep cries repeat-
edly, “Feather! Feather!” and “You’ll be catching a crab directly.” Neither 
Alice nor I, when I first read the Alice books, knew that “feathering” is 
the name (a catachresis, in fact, since it does not substitute for some more 
literal word) for turning your oars sideways when you take them out of the 
 water so they  don’t catch the wind. She also does not know, nor did I, that 
“catching a crab” is the name for getting your oar stuck in the  water through 
digging it too deeply (another catachresis). But I could go on and on, and 
must resist temptation.
My experience with lit er a ture has taught me that literary works (and 
philosophical or theoretical works, too) are each sui generis, unlike all the 
 others. Each therefore demands its own procedure of being read and ac-
counted for. Moreover, each reading of a given work by a given reader  will 
difer from all the  others, as  will dif er ent readings at dif er ent times by 
the same reader. As Heraclitus said, “You  can’t step twice into the same 
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river, for other  waters are continually flowing in.” The plea sure, intel-
lectual excitement, and benefit of reading literary works,  really reading 
them, comes from  these perpetual diferences.  These diferences mean, 
among other  things, that a given reader can always return to read once 
more a given work with the expectation of new plea sure, new intellectual 
excitement, and new benefit. My de cades of literary study are, in short, 
empirical and inductive, not deductive from general presuppositions. I do 
take for granted that literary works are made of language, including figu-
rative language, so that investigating a literary work is always an investi-
gation of linguistic constructions. Language is the  matter to be empirically 
investigated, not consciousness, or history, or society, or nature, or inter-
subjectivity, although  these may be referred to in the language of this or 
that literary text.
The consequence of  these assumptions, or, rather, of my ingrained ex-
periences of trying to account for literary works, is that each of my five 
chapters is centered on the attempt to read some specific work, including 
in one case a philosophical or theoretical work: Tennyson’s “Tears, Idle 
Tears,” for chapter  2; Wallace Stevens’s “The Motive for Meta phor,” for 
chapter 4; Nietz sche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (The 
birth of tragedy), for chapter 6; Yeats’s “The Cold Heaven,” in chapter 8; 
and Anthony Trollope’s Framley Parsonage, for chapter 10.  These readings 
are not meant to support theoretical propositions I have initially put 
forward in a given chapter. They are what the chapters are centrally about, 
that is, the attempt to read this or that work, with a given topic in mind 
in each chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on why lit er a ture  matters. Chapter 4 
is about the lyric. Chapter 6 centers on the prob lems of world lit er a ture. 
Chapter 8 investigates the justification of literary study in  today’s world. 
Chapter 10 is about the ethical dimensions of lit er a ture. The works I read, 
one in each chapter, are chosen as exemplary from among the many works 
that I admire. Several chapters are fairly elaborate revisions of previous 
essays I have published or  will publish.  Others are newly written for this 
book.  These are part of my current investigation of what actually happens 
when I read a poem or a novel. I claim that what happens is stranger than 
one might think. It is dif er ent for  every reader or even dif er ent for dif-
fer ent readings by the same reader. I have put my chapters explic itly in 
dialogue with Ranjan Ghosh’s matching chapters and have made them fit 
better my current convictions about the topics of the five sections. My 
part of this book is a fairly elaborate rethinking of my positions on  these 
topics.
A good bit of each of my chapters, however, is made up of contextual 
assertions that try to establish the circumstances within which lit er a ture 
is read, taught, and written about in the West  today.  These contexts some-
what dismayingly suggest that literary study  faces some obstacles  today, 
to say the least. I now identify the most con spic u ous ones as a conclusion 
of this brief introduction. Each is in one place or another, or in several 
places, discussed in more detail in my chapters, especially in chapter 8. My 
claim is that the rhetorical reading I advocate and try to practice  will help 
us at least to understand what is happening to us and what is making lit-
erary study more and more marginal for most  people: The overwhelming 
threat of catastrophic climate change, along with its widespread denial by 
many  people, threatens us, even now. The epochal shift from a print cul-
ture to a digital culture looms, as does the marginalization of the human-
ities in our universities as they are transformed more and more into trade 
schools teaching primarily stem subjects (science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathe matics) to prepare students for work in a technologized, 
digitized, and commoditized society. An almost unheard of discrepancy 
in the wealth and income of the rich and poor accelerates dangerously, as 
between the 0.01  percent or 0.001  percent and the rest of us. The result is 
that elections, in the United States at least, are more and more bought by 
the rich, to a considerable degree through the manipulation of the mass 
media that are a result of new teletechnologies, as is the ubiquitous adver-
tising that keeps us in thrall to commodity fetishism. And we are beset by 
globalization ( brought about by new teletechnologies, such as the Inter-
net), with a paradoxical increase in isolationisms and commercial as well 
as military conflicts among nations.
Reading, teaching, and writing about literary works  today must be 
carried on, if at all, in  these not entirely cheerful contexts. Most  people 
 these days, in the United States at least, let’s face it, spend much time 
using iPhones, Facebook, or Twitter, watching Fox News, or playing video 
games, not reading Trollope’s Framley Parsonage or Tennyson’s poetry. 
That is the case even though Trollope’s novel and Tennyson’s poetry, like 
so much of the rest of old- fashioned print lit er a ture, are easily available in 
 free Guttenberg e- text form to be read on any laptop, iPad, or iPhone with 
an Internet connection.
As Tom Cohen has demonstrated in a brilliant essay, “material inscrip-
tion,” in the de Manian sense, plays a crucial role in all five of my contextual 
situations, as well as in all the literary texts I try to read.12 Just what is ma-
terial inscription in the de Manian sense?  Here is the crucial formulation 
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at the end of de Man’s “Hypogram and Inscription: Michael Rifaterre’s 
Poetics of Reading.” De Man’s target is Rifaterre’s reading of a short poem 
by Victor Hugo:
 Every detail as well as  every general proposition in the text [Hugo’s 
poem] is fantastic except for the assertion that it is écrit, written. That 
it was supposed to be written, like Swift’s love poem to Stella, as words 
upon a win dow pane, is one more cliché to add to  those Rifaterre has 
already collected. But that, like Hegel’s text from the Phenomenology, 
it was written cannot be denied. The materiality (as distinct from the 
phenomenology) that is thus revealed, the unseen “cristal” whose ex-
istence becomes a certain  there and a certain then which can become a 
 here and a now in the reading “now” taking place, is not the materiality 
of the mind or of time or of the carillon [a topic in Hugo’s poem]— none 
of which exists, except in the figure of prosopopeia— but the materi-
ality of an inscription. Description [de Man means the naming of the 
 things, events, and actions, such as the carillon, in Hugo’s poem], 
it appears, was a device to conceal inscription. Inscription is neither 
a figure, nor a sign, nor a cognition, nor a desire, nor a hypogram, nor 
a matrix, yet no theory of poetry can achieve consistency if, like Rifa-
terre’s, it responds to its [inscription’s] powers only by a figural eva-
sion which, in this case, takes the subtly efective form of evading the 
figural.13
Investigation of what happens to the materiality of inscription in the 
new digital media is approached indirectly  here and  there in my chapters 
of this book, but I claim, with Cohen, that the materiality of inscription, in 
vari ous forms, operates as much in climate change, in the financial world, 
in the new media, in politics, and in globalization, as in printed poetry 
or fiction. Though in the citation I have just made de Man mostly tells 
the reader all the  things the materiality of inscription is not, the figure of 
the invisible glass on which a poem might be scratched gives the reader a 
glimpse of why it is that the materiality of inscription is “unseen,” non-
phenomenal. In de Man’s figure, borrowed from Hugo, we cannot see the 
materiality of the glass  because the mind attends not to the invisible “cris-
tal” but to what is scratched on it, something phenomenally vis i ble and 
instantly read as interpretable language. It is a case of description’s con-
cealing the materiality of inscription. The reader must remember, how-
ever, that de Man’s figure of the words upon the windowpane is another 
“figural evasion.” By no means is it a direct confrontation of the materiality 
of inscription. That materiality is not phenomenally vis i ble. It cannot be 
confronted (another prosopopeia).
I must end  here by encouraging you to read carefully de Man’s “Hy-
pogram and Inscription” and his “Anthropomorphism and the Lyric,” the 
first in The Re sis tance to Theory, the second in The Rhe toric of Romanticism.14 
I also encourage you to read Cohen’s wonderful essay, mentioned above. 
That essay is, among many other  things, a long gloss or rif on de Manian 
materiality of inscription, as it might help us to understand where we are 
now, “in the twilight of the anthropocene idols.”
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The  Matter and 
Mattering of Lit er a ture
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The most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a system.
— Third Earl of Shaftesbury
No biases are more insidious than  those leading to the neglect of  things every one 
knows about in princi ple.
— Stephen Jay Gould
Rabindranath Tagore (1860–1941), the Indian poet- thinker, describes a 
delightful experience on the river Padma:
It was a beautiful eve ning in autumn. The sun had just set: the silence 
of the sky was full to the brim with inefable peace and beauty. The vast 
expanse of  water was without a  ripple, mirroring all the changing 
shades of the sunset glow. Miles and miles of a desolate sandbank lay 
like a huge amphibious reptile of some antediluvian age, with its scales 
glistening in shining colours. As our boat was silently gliding by the pre-
cipitous river- bank, riddled with the nest- holes of a colony of birds, sud-
denly a big fish leapt up to the surface of the  water and then dis appeared, 
displaying on its vanishing figure all the colours of the eve ning sky. It 
drew aside for a moment the many- coloured screen  behind which  there 
was a  silent world full of the joy of life. It came up from the depth of its 
mysterious dwelling with a beautiful dancing motion and added its own 
 music to the  silent symphony of the  dying day. I felt as if I had a friendly 
greeting from an alien world in its own language, and it touched my 
heart with a flash of gladness. Then suddenly the man at the helm 
exclaimed with a distinct note of regret, “Ah, what a big fish!” It at once 
brought before his vision the picture of the fish caught and made ready 
for his supper. He could only look at the fish through his desire, and thus 
missed the  whole truth.1
The poet was disappointed to see this disconnect with nature. For the 
helmsman, greed and utility eclipsed a glimpse of the other world. What 
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is this other world? Which world had the poet seen that the boatman had 
missed?
An incident related to one of Chuang- tzu’s (an impor tant Chinese phi-
los o pher who lived around the fourth  century bc) revealing walks echoes 
Tagore’s  experience.
Chuang- tzu was walking on a mountain, when he saw a large tree with 
huge branches and luxuriant fo liage. A wood- cutter was resting by its 
side, but he would not touch it. When he was asked about the reason, 
he said it was good for nothing. Then Chuang- tzu said: “This tree,  because 
of its uselessness, is able to complete its natu ral term of existence.” Hav-
ing left the mountain, Chuang- tzu lodged in the  house of his friend. The 
friend was glad and ordered his waiting lad to kill a goose and boil it. The 
lad said: “One of our geese can cackle, and the other cannot; which of 
them  shall I kill?” The host said: “Kill the one that cannot cackle.” Next 
day, his disciple asked Chuang- tzu , saying: “Yesterday we saw the moun-
tain tree that can complete its natu ral term of existence  because of its 
uselessness. Now for the same reason, our host’s goose died. Which of 
 these positions would you, master, prefer to be in?” Chuang- tzu laughed 
and said: “I would prefer to be in a position which is between the useful 
and the useless. This seems to be the right position, but is  really not so. 
Therefore, it would not put me beyond trou ble.”2
 There is a uselessness that is celebrated in both the events. The boat-
man found the fish useless  because it could not be caught right then, and 
the fish could not complete its natu ral term of existence  because it was 
useful as food. What then do we say of a world that resides in the liminal-
ity of the useful and the useless? What does it mean to say, like Chuang- 
tzu, that succeeding in the useless comes to be of greatest use? This takes 
us beyond the acquisitive and the rational (events) to choose sahit (con-
nection and communication) with the useless leaping of the fish, the fad-
ing beauty of the setting sun on the river, the value of the useless goose, 
and the nonutility of the luxuriant tree for the woodcutter.  These can be 
termed as nonevents that combine, as I  shall argue in the course of this 
chapter, with events to produce the sacred of sahitya.
In Sanskrit, sahitya is derived from the word sahita, “united together.” 
V. Raghavan argues:
The concept of Sahitya had a grammatical origin. It became a poetic 
concept even as early as Rajasekhara [an eminent Sanskrit dramatist, 
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poet, critic]; as far as we can see at pres ent, the Kavyamimamsa [880–
920 ce] is the earliest work to mention the name Sahitya and Sahitya- 
vidya as meaning Poetry and Poetics. Even  after Rajasekhara, grammat-
ical associations  were clinging to the term up to Bhoja’s time. Kuntaka 
[950–1050, Sanskrit poetician and literary theorist], about the time of 
Bhoja himself, was responsible for divesting Sahitya of grammatical 
associations and for defining it as a  great quality of the relation between 
Sabda [word] and Artha [meaning] in Poetry. Sometime afterwards, 
Ruyyaka or Mankhuka wrote a work called Sahitya- mimamsa, which was 
the first work on Poetics to have the name Sahitya. Afterwards, Sahitya 
became more common and we have the notable example of the Sahitya- 
darpana of Visvanatha [a famous Sanskrit poet, scholar, rhetorician 
writing between 1378 and 1434].3
The word sahitya retains its Sanskrit origin but is now commonly under-
stood as lit er a ture encompassing poetry, plays, poetics, and other forms 
of creative writing. Although sahita means “united together,” this does not 
point to fusion or intermelding but connection (the across- momentum), a 
kind of being- with. By sacred I mean a mystery and a meaning, a substance 
and a secret. I have used the word sacred in a sense that is completely dif-
fer ent from what we commonly understand (holy, consecrated, pertaining 
to or connected to religion). The sacred of sahitya is the substance that 
stays withheld, a kind of withdrawal from its readers, a febrile anxiety to 
see itself exhausted at the hands of its readers. What kind of sahit does 
sahitya create? How does this sahit  matter in helping sahitya  matter mean-
ingfully? With what  matters does sahitya concern itself, to help us under-
stand its mattering? Do the complexities of sahit confer upon sahitya the 
status of being sacred? Is sahit the troubling feature that has never deserted 
the attempt to understand sahitya? Is  there a way of completing the natu-
ral pro cess of sahitya, just as Chuang- tzu’s tree was allowed its full lifespan 
 because it was useless?
Sahitya and the Sacred
Paul Hernadi rightly observes that  there inevitably has to be a vigorous 
dissensus over “ whether or not the question ‘what is lit er a ture?’ should 
be answered. Given the multiplicity of ways lit er a ture has been intended, 
produced, transmitted, stored, and mentally pro cessed since prehistoric 
times, it is hardly surprising that no definition commands widespread ac-
cep tance.”4 Lacking a fixed definition, and hence a constant, the Dao of lit-
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er a ture, I would contend, is puzzling. To borrow figures from the Chinese 
text Tao Te Ching (a Chinese text ascribed to Laozi, an ancient Chinese 
phi los o pher and poet usually dated to around the sixth  century bc and 
reckoned a con temporary of Confucius), sahitya can be described to turn 
within itself to emerge and prance backward to establish a solid ground for 
moving forward. The Dao, or the sacred, is amenable to being named, iden-
tified, and discoursed about (daokedo), but that naming exists in a creative 
opposition to being considered unnamable, inefable, and infinite (chang-
dao). This begets both a re sis tance ( guarding the secret) and a surrender 
(exposed to or making allowance for meaning) in sahitya, as it submits to 
the realities of  human understanding and also to our troubling anxiety 
about the incomprehensibility of experiences.  Here are a few lines from 
Tao Te Ching. It must be pointed out that this Chinese text does not talk 
about what lit er a ture should be. But frameworked within my understand-
ing of across poetics of reading, where varied sources come into making 
unlikely and yet productive correspondences, my arguments  here appro-
priate (in)fusionally a few concepts from this Chinese text to make a dif-
fer ent sense of sahitya.
The way that can be spoken of
Is not the constant way;
The name that can be named
Is not the constant name.
The nameless was the beginning of heaven and earth;
The named was the  mother of the myriad creatures.
Hence always rid yourself of desires in order to observe its secrets;
But always allow yourself to have desires in order to observe its 
manifestations.
 These two are the same
But diverge in name as they issue forth.
Being the same they are called mysteries,
Mystery upon mystery— 
The gateway of the manifold secrets.5
The way of sahitya results in two kinds of desires: one makes sahitya 
express itself in forms, images, and thoughts, and the other is the desire 
to stay unnamed and avoid making itself a desire machine of theoretical 
formulations.  These two forms of desire are not incompatible and diver-
gent but dialectical. Sahitya cannot be an experience in explorative desires 
alone— the fierce urge to investigate what it  really means, establishing the 
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institution of sahitya as something that is constant. But sahitya’s sacred-
ness is its power to avoid being named always; it is a desire that sahitya has 
about keeping up with its regenerative abilities.  These are the mysteries: 
the meaning generated through desires (the assigned, the assertive, and 
the ascribed, the Chinese you) and the meaning sans desires (the sur-
prise and seduction, “follow a way that cannot be walked,” the wu, which 
has no somethingness, no conscious design or prejudice): “Mystery upon 
mystery— / The gateway of the manifold secrets.” I choose to implicate the 
nonaction of sahitya (this is another dimension of sahitya’s sacredness), 
where
Something and Nothing ( you and wu) produce each other;
The difficult and the easy complement each other;
The long and the short of- set each other;
The high and the low incline  towards each other;
Note and sound harmonize with each other;
Before and  after follow each other.
Therefore the sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking nonaction and 
practices “the teaching that uses no words.”6
Sahitya is deeply invested in words and yet speaks and teaches beyond 
words. The sacredness of sahitya holds and proj ects “manifold secrets” that 
involve what language can represent (events), the failure of language, the 
rationalization of meaning and repre sen ta tion (events), and spaces that 
do not listen to the strictures of language, formulation, and theorization 
(the nonevents). It is beholden to a variety of sahit, to what we under-
stand and benefit from, to what refuses our categories of understanding 
and, consequently, contributes to the development of a dif er ent aesthetic 
of meaning and afect.
The sacredness of sahitya creates the ability to fraternize intimately (the 
desire to network, sahit) with— and to extend bound aries to include— 
whatever it engages. In fact, the plea sure and puzzlement that Miller 
points out in the next chapter are owed, in my opinion, to the imaginary 
that lit er a ture is able to generate and inhere within. Tennyson’s “Tears, Idle 
Tears” bears out the dialectical dimension of sahitya’s sacredness. Miller 
experiences the poem both in its constancy and inconstancy of meaning. 
The sacredness of the poem becomes on one hand the power (the herme-
neutical strength) that enables Miller to make sense of the poem, and on 
the other hand it generates a secret (the levels that the poem did not allow 
Miller to touch and experience) that makes him undertake several visits 
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to garner more meaningful experiences. Miller, in my reading, has grown 
a dif er ent kind of sahit with the poem.
The sahit comes to  matter diferently when Miller tries to demonstrate 
our experiences of lit er a ture through the intricate exchanges between 
man and machine. Tennyson’s poem read on a Kindle, or imagine Tagore’s 
typing his poems on an iPad, cannot just qualify as an exciting event. It 
is predominantly about changing the dynamics of experiencing lit er a ture 
by encountering it through a dif er ent material medium. Caught in such 
“prestidigitalization” when something speaks— “some impersonal inner 
voice”—to Miller through the medium, we encounter an excess. This is 
what I see as the surplus that lit er a ture in its complicated matrices, with 
a newfound medium, is able to deliver to us. This is another level of mys-
tery, somewhat spiritualist and spooky, that makes lit er a ture transmit 
telepathically. Miller’s idea of prestidigitalization, the “migration of the 
literarity” to digital media, sees new modes of finding sahit between 
the reader, his body, his mind, his understanding, and his emotions.  There 
is, thus, an excess that  things bring to our understanding of lit er a ture: the 
materiality of  matter that is how the dravya ( things) contribute to the visaya 
(the subject of sahitya), about which I have spoken at length in my discus-
sion of ethics of sahitya in chapter 9.
Rabindranath Tagore observes that “man daily extends in lit er a ture the 
field of what is dear to him, that is, the field of his clear realisation. Lit er a-
ture is the realm of his unresisted, strange and vast play ( lila).”7 The lila (it 
can also be interpreted as a pervasive kinetic energy, an unpredictability 
that makes something happen with surprise and excess) of sahitya is its 
norm, the quin tes sen tial paradigm to achieve its natu ral pro cess, whereas 
hermetic entrapments of meaning resemble, meta phor ically, the wood-
cutter’s chopping a useful tree and the goose’s being served for dinner. For 
Tagore, when art focuses on nature, it is a humanized nature whose relation-
ship with man is touched by  human emotions that constitute its content. 
For him, sahitya has never gone beyond man. Yet the nonprivate self, the 
surplus in man (Kant’s “supersensible substratum” and Schiller’s ästhetische 
Zugabe, the aesthetic supplement) is the source of creation.8 The deepen-
ing of world consciousness is coterminous with self- consciousness. Sahi-
tya owes its origin and texturing to a connection between the artist’s self 
and the Greater Being or the  Great Further. ( These are Tagore’s words for 
the Infinite self; Infinite is not God or divinity. Rather, it is a spirit of cre-
ation that exists beyond the realm of our creaturely and material needs.) 
This is a pro cess that is more invested in becoming (a sense of the not- yet) 
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than knowing. Meta phor ically speaking, it is not the fish that leaped out 
of the  water, but the greater world beyond the fish, which is always allur-
ingly yet to be.
Sahitya is about knowing man, the world, and knowing beyond man 
and the world. In sahitya, man is engaged in the “work of knowing him-
self,” and “the truth of his knowing rests on his  actual realisation and not 
on the verity of any objective fact.”9 The poetic truth is truer than factual 
truth; the poet’s imagination is truer than Ayodhya, as Tagore notes in 
his poem “Balmiki.” (Ayodhya is the birthplace of Lord Rama in the Hindu 
epic Ramayana and a small town in the state of Uttar Pradesh, in India; 
 here it becomes an aesthetic imaginary beyond the geography of the 
place.) To know about the  rose is one  thing, and to feel something about 
it is another. In one case, we have a truth- value, in another the issue is 
taste- value. The truth about the  rose comprises both  these values: “We 
must not merely know it, and then put it aside, but we must feel it  because 
by feeling it, we feel ourselves.”10 Tagore argues that rocks and crystals 
are “complete definitely in what they are and keep a kind of dumb dignity 
in their stolidly limited realism. But  human beings are teased by their cre-
ative ideal, and if divested of it, they are turned into a rock or crystal like 
being. In fact, God has decorated the peacock in a wide range of quaint 
colours. He has not done so to man; rather, has installed a bowl of colour 
inside him and said, ‘you have to deck yourself in your own hues.’ He has 
said, ‘I have put every thing in you, but with all  those ingredients you have 
made yourself strong, beautiful and wonderful. I  shall not prepare it for 
you.’ ”11 Sahitya is the manifestation of  those ingredients inside man. Con-
sequent upon its creation, sahitya builds its own sacredness, its own bowl 
of colors, which starts to color the mind of the readers. Readers are often 
successful in identifying the colors of sahitya but, with the bowl of color 
inside it, sahitya can deliver a new set of colors, resulting in fresh experi-
ences for the readers.12
Pointing to an inner power of creativity, the force that is less vis i ble or 
rationalizable, Tagore writes in “The Wakening of Shiva”:
By the force that drives my feelings, roses open;
By the impulse of ecstatic discovery that opens new leaves,
I hurl forth my songs.13
The sacredness of the songs lies in the force that does not merely help 
us to see the roses and the leaves, but makes us a part of their opening. 
This likewise makes us a part of both the natu ral pro cess of the fish, and 
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its termination as envisioned by the boatman. Poetic real ity embodies a 
vision that encompasses  matter and spirit, being and nonbeing. This vi-
sion is due to a superabundance that is  free from Platonic doubt and able 
to perform beyond “the claims of necessity, the thrift of usefulness.”14 For 
Tagore, utility is just a state of dark heat. The excess of pure utility is like 
white heat that is expressive. The excess feeds the disclosive power of art 
and translates into ananda, “the power of feeling delight”15 in sahitya. So 
ananda is experienced in submitting to an Infinite, revealing that “aspect 
of our personality which overflows in excess of all our creaturely needs and 
[is] exhausted by all pressures of practical living. It is this excess in which 
man is most truly revealed.”16 The Infinite is love. It is the unnameable 
and a power. Our finite self connects with it to generate more meaning 
and keep up its liveliness. The presence of the Infinite implicates the in-
completeness of the finite ways of existence. The sense of incompleteness 
does not change the real ity of life to a  great extent, but the real ity of poetic 
truth and truth in art keep changing their form and expression. Creativity 
becomes a continual reconstruction of the artist’s personality— the “en-
croachment of man’s personality has no limit.”17 So the conflict and con-
flation with the Infinite result in the giving, which, as Tagore notes, is a 
pro cess that “can be classified and generalized by science” but is itself “not 
the gift.”18 Sahitya’s sacredness shows the significance of the giving (the 
named, the useful) and also the importance of not being overpowered by 
the gift. This is another invitation to the useless.
Sahitya is our sadhana to unbind ourselves (sadhana is about accom-
plishing something through a meditative commitment; the word is used 
 here not in the religious sense but in a performative sense that approxi-
mates the combined efect of abhyasa, practice through reflection and ob-
servation, and kriya, action). Tagore writes: “What then is revealed through 
lit er a ture? It is our wealth, our plenitude, that part of our being which 
overflows in excess of our  actual needs, which has not been exhausted in 
the pro cess of practical life. In such excess is humanity truly expressed. 
That man hungers is true, but that he is brave is still more. The superman, 
the ideal  toward which man is progressing, is being evolved by his lit er a-
ture, and such permanent ideal is being accumulated therein as a guide 
for each succeeding generation.”19 On most occasions, the excess emerging 
from the useless goes untapped, resulting in sahitya’s being understood as 
an “artificial product” (in Tagore’s words) incarcerated within certain codes 
and modes. Consequently, sahitya is limited to becoming a tree that the 
woodcutter always finds useful or a fish that the boatman would always 
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enjoy eating. Tagore observes that “art and lit er a ture belong to that revo-
lutionary region of freedom where need is reduced to unimportance, the 
material is shown to be unsubstantial, and the ideal alone is revealed as 
the truth;  there all burdens are lightened, all  things are made man’s very 
own.”20 Indeed, the value of uselessness prevents sahitya from performing 
as a moral teacher. Sahitya cannot just take up the “job of school mas-
ters.”21 Tagore notes: “What I have to remark is, that it does not amount 
to the  whole truth to say that the Good pleases  because of what it does for 
us. That which is  really good is both useful and beautiful, that is to say, it 
has a mysterious attraction for us over and above that of such purposes 
of ours as it may serve. The moralist declares its value from the ethical 
standpoint, the poet seeks to make manifest its unutterable beauty.”22 The 
sacredness of sahitya produces the unutterable quotient that exists out-
side the par ameters of pragmatism and didacticism.
The strug gle to connect with the Infinite, the bountiful other world 
that the fish reveals in a glimpse, is endowed with a surplus of imag-
ination that Tagore considers love. This love is transformative and en-
abling, exhausting and fulfilling. Therein lies an extinction and an exfo-
liation, a loss “which leads to greater gain.” It “turns the emptiness of 
renunciation into fulfilment by his own fullness” and upholds the com-
plexities invested in “what is in us and what is beyond us; between what 
is in the moment and what is ever to come.” Loving, as joy, becomes the 
means of loving more, of finding “abounding joy” and ways of enhanc-
ing love. This love has a rhythm that does not encourage the knowl-
edge of a  rose by merely learning about the constitutive chemistry of 
its petals; rather, it espouses the  rose as maya, an image, an experience 
that is not confined to what we merely see and materially experience, 
whose “finality has the touch of the infinite.”23 For Tagore, the rhythm, 
the finding of proportion in apparent irrelevancies, is a kind of manifes-
tation of surplus. This rhythm in lit er a ture is like the “stars which in 
their seeming stillness are never still, like a motionless flame that is 
nothing but movement.”24
Sahitya has survived by expressing itself and also by continually guard-
ing and extinguishing itself. This guarding attests to a continuity, the lila 
about which I have spoken extensively in chapter 5. However, sahitya does 
not exhaust itself to a point where love of the Infinite ends. The Infinite 
transcribes the everyday, wherein repetition (say, watching the sun rise 
 every day) is not without infinite possibilities. Tagore observes that forms 
must always move and change and that “they must necessarily die to 
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reveal the deathless.”25 What is the deathless in lit er a ture, then?  Isn’t this 
what Miller expresses when he writes about the endless approach to the 
unapproachable imaginary? Do we exhaust our uses of sahitya to reveal 
the useless, a category that leads us to interact with the Infinite? The fish 
has to be useless to the boatman to become deathless in its interface with 
the Infinite. The tree has to die in the woodcutter’s view in order to emerge 
in its deathlessness.
The surplus, or the deathless, in sahitya comes close to being expressed in 
an idea of the early Chinese painter and art theorist Gu Kaizhi ( 346–407) 
concerning the “blank eye pupil.” Ming Dong Gu explains that long before 
Gu Kaizhi’s time, the eye was viewed in the Chinese tradition as “the 
win dow to a person’s inner spirit.”26 According to a legend, Gu Kaizhi left 
the pupils of a portrait unpainted for years, so that he might have ample 
time to contemplate how to paint them. This notion of the eye as the ele-
ment that transmits the spiritual essence of the represented person or 
animal has persisted in Chinese aesthetic thought. In the sixth  century, Em-
peror Wu, of the Liang dynasty, erected many Buddhist  temples. A famous 
artist painted four dragons on the wall of Anle  Temple, in Jinling, but 
left their pupils unpainted. When queried, he responded that if he had 
painted the pupils, the dragons would have flown away.  Under pressure, 
he  later added pupils to two of the four dragons. Almost immediately a vi-
olent storm struck the wall. The two dragons with pupils flew away, while 
the other two remained. Thereafter the expression “to bring the painted 
dragon to life by adding the pupils” came to refer to the finishing touch 
that brings a work of art to life.27 Sahitya can at times be left with an eye 
painted without pupils. If painting the dragon’s pupils made it fly, this 
demonstrates how sahitya’s sacredness lies in securing an eye without 
pupils. It invites us to make sense of waste, which is the other name for 
excess. The blank eye of sahitya is its mystery, the restless sacredness in 
both the daokedo (the finite) and changdao (infinite).
Sahitya’s Mattering
Understanding the sacred brings me closer to the Su P’u, the Uncarved 
Block ( p’u, or pu, literally translated, means “uncut wood”). Wai- Lim Yip 
argues:
When Lao- tzu said, “Tao, told, is not the constant Tao. Name, named, is 
not the Constant Name” and proposed to return to the Su P’u (Uncarved 
Block) or the “ Great Undivided Institution” he intended to implode the 
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so- called kingly Tao, the heavenly Tao, as well as the naming system of 
the feudalistic ideology of the Chou Dynasty, so that memories of the 
repressed, exiled, and alienated natu ral self could be fully reawakened. 
The Taoist proj ect, from the point of view of the naming system, is a 
negating, abandoning, and even an escapist act; but from the point of 
view of “no naming” (that is, before the territorialisation of power) and 
that of the Uncarved Block, it helps to break the myth of the reductive 
and distortive naming activities, affirm the concrete total world that is 
 free from and unrestricted by concepts, and move  toward reclaiming 
the natu ral self as well as Nature as it is. Thus we can say that the Taoist 
proj ect is a counterdiscourse to the territorialisation of power, an act 
to disarm the tyranny of language; it is not, as most superficial readers 
believe, a passive philosophy.28
Uncarved wood, in its totality, unrestricted by pregiven concepts or 
sanctioned structures of use, comes with all possibilities. Each piece ter-
ritorializes, rather, canonizes a certain advantage or a use. The apparent 
passivity of the Uncarved Block conceals radiant and vibrant possibilities 
of creation made pos si ble through negating and abandoning. While ne-
gating creates the possibility of sahitya to name the nameless (profaniza-
tion) and make naming a continuous game, abandoning, holding the noun 
abandon within it, foregrounds acts that lack inhibition and restraint. This 
keeps the naming game alive. Arthur Danto observes that “to treat the 
work of art as Leonardo treated his spotted wall as an occasion for critical 
invention which knows no limit” is not to say that lit er a ture is about peren-
nial unmasking or unveiling.29 But eforts to unwrap sahitya concern both 
meaning that we create out of lit er a ture, and the meaning that lit er a ture 
imperceptively creates in us. Sahitya’s use is not merely what readers sub-
jectively create, not the blasé ac cep tance of “Yes- Yuh,” like Zarathustra’s 
ass. Sahit is inscribed in a kinesis, in a consciousness of something waiting 
to appear and waiting to be found.
It is in the intricacies of coming together that the sacredness of sahitya 
lies. Sahit performs itself in ways that remind us of what Jacques Rancière 
calls the paradox of the mute pebbles. In speaking of the new democracy 
of lit er a ture that blossomed in the nineteenth  century, Rancière writes:
Lit er a ture is this new regime of writing in which the writer is anybody 
and the reader anybody. This is why its sentences are “mute pebbles.” 
They are mute in the sense that they had been uttered long ago by Plato 
when he contrasted the wandering of the orphan letter to the living 
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log os, planted by a master as a seed in the soul of a disciple, where it 
could grow and live. The “mute letter” was the letter that went its way, 
without a  father to guide it. It was the letter that spoke to anybody, 
without knowing to whom it had to speak, and to whom it had not. The 
“mute” letter was a letter that spoke too much and endowed anyone at 
all with the power of speaking.30
Rancière’s “demo cratic disorder of literariness” is closely connected with 
the “uncanny.”31 Mute pebbles are the uncanny that haunt lit er a ture to speak 
across time periods and cultures. Experiences of lit er a ture become ways 
of appreciating the fraught relations between literary influences, liter-
ary history, and a transcultural poetics of reading. The disorder speaks 
through reiteration, repression, and the reanimation of meaning.  These 
are separate pro cesses that make lit er a ture speak beyond the already 
spoken, clearing spaces across dif er ent contexts, backgrounds, eras, 
and cultural specificities. Literary texts, then, are both part of a histor-
ical, literary continuum and a disorder that lives and flourishes outside 
it. They acknowledge their moment of composition, their background 
and time- sense, but cannot forget that they have a life outside  these 
coordinates.
In “What Does Poetry Communicate?” a reading of Herrick’s “Corri-
na’s  Going A- Maying,” Cleanth Brooks writes: “I think our initial question, 
‘What does the poem communicate?’ is badly asked. It is not that the poem 
communicates nothing. Precisely the contrary. The poem communicates 
so much and communicates it so richly and with such delicate qualifica-
tions that the  thing communicated is mauled and distorted if we attempt 
to convey it by any vehicle less subtle than that of the poem itself.”32 
Sahitya becomes the frissive point of exhaustion and subtlety. Tagore sees 
the leaping fish and the fish becomes a desiring machine. But this desire 
is not about trying to exhaust and maul the fish but is a sahit with every-
thing that exists beyond its species- state. The lumber that the woodcutter 
chops out is meant for use and profit. But to leave the living tree to fulfill 
its cycle is to find communion with the mystery of its other side, the 
love of the Infinite. The tree found useless by the woodcutter can also be 
a useful site for nesting birds, blooming flowers, a tangled kite, a pos si ble 
lightning strike, the shadows of clouds, or a climbing boy. Of what use are 
 these for the woodcutter? The woodcutter’s indiference makes the tree 
manifest with a diference. The birch trees in Robert Frost’s “Birches” are 
not meant and willed for firewood, nor desired to be used to make fences 
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and furniture. They exist for swinging, a carefree and useless activity. But 
this swinging inheres in a power that efectuates a variety of sahit. So a 
string of questions disturbs the poem from within: What is the “truth” 
and “love” in the poem? What is this  going and coming back? How can 
earth be the right place for love? What does it mean to keep one’s poise 
and yet be a swinger of birches? How can one learn that learning is about 
not launching out too soon? What does it mean to ask, “Am I  free to be 
poetical?”
Frost’s “Birches” and Uselessness
Early editions of Robert Frost’s “Birches” included this question, set apart 
by parentheses like an ironic aside: (“Am I  free to be poetical?”) It followed 
line twenty- two, introducing the transition from the factual account of ice 
storms to the evocation of his boyhood swinging. The poet chose to delete 
it from subsequent editions of the poem.
I was  going to say when Truth broke in
With all her  matter- of- fact about the ice- storm
(Am I  free to be poetical?)
[ . . .  ]
So was I once myself a swinger of birches.
And so I dream of  going back to be.
It’s when I’m weary of considerations,
And life is too much like a pathless wood
Where your face burns and tickles with the cobwebs
Broken across it, and one eye is weeping
From a twig’s having lashed across it open.
I’d like to get away from earth awhile
And then come back to it and begin over.
May no fate willfully misunderstand me
And half grant what I wish and snatch me away
Not to return. Earth’s the right place for love:
I  don’t know where it’s likely to go better.
I’d like to go by climbing a birch tree,
And climb black branches up a snow- white trunk
 Toward heaven, till the tree could bear no more,
But dipped its top and set me down again.
That would be good both  going and coming back.
One could do worse than be a swinger of birches.33
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The birches swing into play what is seen and what is seen as, which 
is the Heideggerian way of trying to see the poem as a faceof between 
undiferentiated contemplation and a diferentiated experience. “Birches” 
addresses a system of thought and is also a contemplation that cannot be 
compartmentalized conceptually. It speaks of an act of conceptualizing or 
an act of perception that is useless, an experience without understandable 
direction. Such moments of uselessness, in fact, precede grounding in his-
tory. We cannot ignore the experience that precedes historical exegesis and 
our surrender to taxonomic frames of real ity and existence. The poem also 
has a strategy of clear expression to boost its place within the canons of 
readerly ac cep tance. Sahitya’s sacredness does not always reside in blocks, 
however; rather, it is in the continuity and discontinuity (“ going and com-
ing back”) of the natu ral pro cess of meaning. Hence the lines “Earth’s the 
right place for love” and “(Am I  free to be poetical?)” can be seen to have 
moved out of the contextual immediacy of the poem, to have moved 
beyond any kind of block of understanding (in both senses of the word). 
Frost anxiously questions the  wholesome efficacy of being poetical. The 
word  free suggests that freedom can lead to an exciting and intense activ-
ity of the poetic mind, expressing thereby the strug gle between life and 
art. Freedom  here is also about self- interrogation; the anxiety to be poet-
ically  free is vexatiously related to Earth (the “right” place for love), to a 
faith in life as represented by Earth, and to a desire to be poetical that goes 
beyond Earth. The query that hangs over the freedom to be poetical leads 
us to the ambiguity of the poetic mind in its ways of creation.
Frost’s creative mind is like the boy whose movements are si mul ta-
neously creative, destructive, and deformative. Creation comes with cau-
tion, care, and cheer. So how much daring can the boy aford? The birches 
 under the swinging impact of the boy are a part of the transmutative every-
day. They participate in the ideal of rebeginning, coming back and be-
ginning again, a combination of pragmatism and metaphysics. The boy 
is both a captive of the birches and a swinger who seeks liberation from 
them. The sacredness of the birches is in the swinging that only the boy 
can efect. He tries to conquer the alienation that the birches in their real-
ity bring, their stifness and the snow crust. At the beginning of the poem, 
the boy interacts with the birches as a  human would traditionally meet a 
nonhuman, a tree. But we see a change as the poem progresses. The boy 
becomes the poet and the trees are transformed into art. This transfor-
mation resembles the way Stephen Dedalus, in A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man, describes a transition: “Out of the sluggish  matter of the earth 
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a new soaring impalpable imperishable being emerges.”34 Swinging renews 
the apparently unchanging earth as much as it revisions the stif and stern 
heaven— “alchemistically enhanced.”35 This is not conjunctio oppositorum 
but is about questioning the eternal good of flying away from earth, as 
well as the goodness of staying rooted to it, the problematic of subjecting 
imagination to truth. Is swinging an achievement in  wholeness or does it 
have the undertow of skepticism? Does the boy, through the urge to be po-
etical, become part of a romantic ideal, or is he a skeptic who strug gles to 
occupy fixed positions? Life, as a pathless wood, is a skepticism that does 
not expire in disappointment but expresses the dialectical merit of being 
 matter of fact and at the same time being poetical. The swinging suggests 
a skepticism about receiving life at the level of the plain, the ordinary.36 
The birches resist being ordinary and soar out of the sluggish  matter of the 
earth into a new being, becoming poetical.
The birches and swinging bid certain thoughts into existence. The boy 
“whose only play was what he found himself” combines what has been 
with what awaits to be. He engages nearness by being afar; the swinging 
gives him more spaces to explore the now and the  after and then return 
with a certain openness. In fact, the swinging confuses the point of origin 
and telos, in that it becomes a continuity. This continuity does not allow 
anyone to understand the swinging in the form of a narrative that has an 
exclusive point of origin, followed by the next point of pro gress, before a 
series of points leads to the end. With poetic creativity understood as a 
continuity, the boy- poet meaningfully makes the connection among the 
poetical, earth, place, and love. The boy “learned all  there was / To learn 
about not launching out too soon” and swings in communication (near-
ness, proximity to meaning) and muteness (afar, the unnamed and inde-
terminateness of meaning) in uncertain ways of being and acting that I 
would call, in mock solemnity, the metapolitics of swinging. Coming close 
is not always about coming near. The sacredness of lit er a ture regulates its 
closeness and nearness with readers and reception.
The birches, in their transformation into art, ofer moments of revealed 
truth that the boy communicates through the nearness he creates in swing-
ing. This enables the birches to speak.37 The swinging enables the birches 
to break their silence  because the boy, through his imagination and craft, 
attends to their silence. In the pro cess, he learns from the birches the art 
and the plea sure of becoming poetical. Annie Dillard notes that “we have 
drained the light from the boughs in the sacred grove and snufed it in the 
high places and along the banks of sacred streams. We as a  people have 
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moved from pantheism to pan- atheism. Silence is not our heritage but 
our destiny; we live where we want to live.”38 The birches, like Tagore’s fish 
and the tree the woodcutter chose to ignore, achieve, on the contrary, the 
status of the deathless. They have sublated into new spheres of meaning.
The analy sis I have provided does not come anywhere close to the ca-
nonical codes of understanding the poem. Settled and structured forms of 
understanding (the useful) include the autobiographical, like, say, Frost’s 
own childhood experiences with swinging on birches, a popu lar game for 
 children in rural areas of New  Eng land during his time, and his own 
 children  were enthusiastic about it (see  daughter Lesley’s journal). The 
established understanding also includes the thematic, like the notion of 
“borders” (one can trace this in many of his other poems, such as “ After 
Apple Picking”), where the trees serve to provide the link between earth 
or humanity and the sky or divine. The stylistic is also widely agreed and 
structured: as when the poem is read through what Frost calls the “sound 
of sense.” The psychoanalytic is settled in the dominant sexual connota-
tions of the poem. The philosophical is understood in the dialectic (we may 
term this as “swinging”) between youthful innocence (the imagination to 
reach beyond Earth) and adult responsibilities (the truth being that Earth 
is the right place for love), the worries over aging and loss pitted against 
a carefree youth— the “ going and coming back.” But do such paradigms 
of reading exhaust the poem of all it can deliver? Would my reading have 
helped Frost to come closer to his intended meaning in the poem? Does it 
give the reader easy access to the center of the poem, making her enjoy-
ment memorable? The answers are not encouragingly positive. However, 
 these negatives, the points of extinguishment, bring us to the use of the 
useless and render the encouragements to configure the completion of its 
natu ral pro cess.
The Mattering and the  Matter
The swinger of birches fabulizes, arriving at truths that make us undergo 
a kind of self- forgetfulness, what Hans- Georg Gadamer calls “being out-
side oneself.” This state is a prelude to connecting “wholly with something 
 else.” The self- forgetfulness that sahitya produces in us is a state in which 
the real ity of our understanding comes into question, since, as Gadamer 
points out, “what we experience in a work of art and what invites our 
attention is how true it is— that is, to what extent one knows and recog-
nizes something and oneself.”39 Sahitya creates the perceiver’s space, where 
the ordinary breaks into an aesthetic that revises our understanding of 
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the ordinary. Perhaps sahitya does not make  things happen all the time. 
Most often it leaves  things at the point of happening, on the edge of pos si-
ble multiple happenings. Experiences emerging out of such happenings are, 
on most occasions, beyond our  actual realizations of life experiences. “It 
[lit er a ture] creates  after the finite,” as Laurent Dubreuil notes, “in order to 
signify in spite of all. For our joy.”40
Heidegger considers poetry the “most innocent of occupations,” lan-
guage the most dangerous of possessions, and the foundation of being 
poetic.41 I am tempted to replace poetry with sahitya. Arguably, sahitya’s 
sacredness is poetic. It affirms its own existence and upholds an intimacy 
in which the writer, the text, and the reader grow in a relationship of pos-
session, communication, and contradiction.  There is a contradiction in 
what the reader wants from sahitya and what she gets in the end, making 
for a conversation involving both the outside (stylistics, imagery, words, 
figures of speech, background, biography,  etc.) and the inside (silence, 
waste, and uselessness) of sahitya. The profanization of the sacred is what 
makes sahitya continue with its meaning and worth and yet preserve its 
own enticement, a deep intimacy with language, resulting in what Heide-
gger calls “opening.” Heidegger writes: “Without this relation an argument 
too is absolutely impossible. But the one and the same can only be mani-
fest in the light of something perpetual and permanent. Yet permanence 
and perpetuity only appear when what persists and is pres ent begins to 
shine. But that happens in the moment when time opens and extends. 
 After man has placed himself in the presence of something perpetual, 
then only can he expose himself to the changeable, to that which comes 
and goes; for only the per sis tent is changeable.”42
The sacred is perpetual and, on occasion, is the apo liti cal in literary ex-
periences. The sacred evokes the before and  after of lit er a ture. “Lit er a ture 
each time says,” as Dubreuil argues, “all lit er a ture again; so, it is never ‘the 
same.’ ”43 Caught in the across, “Birches” is surely presence and opening, 
corroborating Heidegger’s observation: “Poetry rouses the appearance of 
the unreal and of dream in the face of the palpable and clamorous real ity, 
in which we believe ourselves at home. And yet in just the reverse manner, 
what the poet says and undertakes to be, is the real.”44 “Birches” has this 
unreal yet near- tangible real ity to it. It exemplifies how poetry creates a 
real ity that we strug gle to control, a fulfillment that in real ity has always 
eluded us. It embodies a kind of mute writing that Rancière says “would 
no longer be the  silent language engraved in the flesh of material  things.” 
Rather, the birches have the “radical muteness of  things.”45 They express 
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not only meaning and  will but nonsense too, an indiference to our clock-
work life lived in partitions of the sensible, the vis i ble, and the sayable.
Too much thought has perhaps been expended on what sahitya is ca-
pable of  doing. Not enough leeway is allowed for sahitya to be left, as it is 
hanging in the sacredness of its existence, in the swinging between the 
event and the nonevent. The Zen way of life, qualifying the nonevent, 
would say, “The moon is reflected deep inside the lake but the  water shows 
no sign of penetration.”46 We continue to brush up against and miss the 
sacred, the event that is a nonevent. Although the frisking fish exists both 
as a material and an aesthetic object, it can also open a mode of experience 
where  these identities collapse into each other. The fish can be perceived 
beyond both  these approaches, which is its closeness to the Infinite. It is 
at this point that Frost’s query, “Now am I  free to be poetical?” can be an-
swered in the affirmative.
Ranjan Ghosh and I have agreed to add within our paired essays com-
ments by each of us on the other’s essay of a given pair. This initial pair 
(chapters 1 and 2) consists of somewhat programmatic statements by each 
of us about the nature and function of lit er a ture as we see it. Ghosh’s essay 
is challenging in a number of ways. I have read it repeatedly in order to get 
the hang of it as best I can. I have learned much from it, for example, about 
Sanskrit or Hindu literary theory and also about Rabindranath Tagore. I 
also have a new understanding of Ranjan Ghosh’s own theory of lit er a-
ture. Of  these three  things I had been only partially informed. Now some 
further light has dawned.
I begin this chapter by stressing, as I have in the preface, that neither 
of us speak for a  whole culture, Ghosh for Indian culture, I for U.S. culture. 
Both  those cultures are im mensely diverse. Many dif er ent conceptions of 
lit er a ture abound in each. Simona Sawney, for example, in The Modernity 
of Sanskrit, has argued for the heterogeneity both of modern Indian lit er-
a ture in Hindu and of the Sanskrit tradition that has so deeply influenced 
it.1 My conception of lit er a ture is only one among the many dif er ent ones 
that are salient in the United States  today. To some of my compatriots, 
perhaps to many, my position may seem idiosyncratic. Ghosh and I speak 
for ourselves, though each is a representative, on the one hand, of one 
Indian way to define lit er a ture, or, on the other hand, of one U.S. way.
Nevertheless, something of cultural or national diference may lie  behind 
the way the two essays are strikingly dif er ent in their conceptions of what 
lit er a ture is and why it  matters. Their stylistic and methodological proce-
dures also difer. I  shall insert some dialogical observations about  these 
two forms of diference  here and  there in my chapter. In spite of  these dif-
ferences, however, an unexpected consonance between our two views of 
lit er a ture ultimately emerges. It was unexpected by me, at least.
chapter 2 • j.  hillis miller
L IT  ER A TURE  MATTERS  TODAY
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Why and How Lit er a ture  Matters to Me
 Matters! This is an odd word when used as a verb. Of course we know what 
it means. The verbal form of  matter means “count for something,” “have 
import,” “have efects in the real world,” “be worth taking seriously.” Using 
the word as a noun, however, someone might speak of “lit er a ture  matters,” 
meaning the  whole realm that involves lit er a ture. The newsletter of the Maine 
chapter of the Appalachian Mountain Club is called Wilderness  Matters, 
punning on the word as a noun and as a verb. We might say, analogously, 
“Lit er a ture  Matters,” as my title does. In medieval Eu rope, learned  people 
spoke of “the  matter of Rome,” “the  matter of Arthur,” “the  matter of 
Greece,” meaning the  whole set of stories that lay  behind Aeneas’s story, 
the Arthurian romances, or Odysseus’s, Achilles’s, and Oedipus’s stories. 
The verb  matter resonates with the noun  matter. The latter means sheer, 
unor ga nized physical substance. Aristotle opposed unformed  matter to 
form. This suggests that if something  matters its import is not abstract. 
What  matters is not purely verbal, spiritual, or formal. It has concrete 
efects on materiality, in the form perhaps of  human bodies and their be-
hav ior. Does lit er a ture  matter in that sense  today?
It  matters quite a bit, however, what we mean by “lit er a ture” when we 
ask  whether lit er a ture  matters  today. I am assuming that lit er a ture means 
printed books that contain what most  people ordinarily think of  these 
days as lit er a ture, that is, poems, plays, and novels. Just what is literary 
about poems, plays, and novels is another  matter, to which I  shall return. 
I  shall also have something to say in other chapters about the migra-
tion of the literary to new digital media. I call this magic transformation 
prestidigitalization.
It is often taken for granted that what most  matters about lit er a ture, 
if it  matters at all, is the accuracy with which it reflects the real world or 
functions as a guide to conduct for readers living in that world. The mimetic 
paradigm, two and a half millennia old,  going back to the Greeks, in its mul-
titude of permutations, has had, and still has,  great power, at least in the 
Western world. A  little reflection, however,  will show that this paradigm is 
extremely problematic. It is easily contested or easily made more compli-
cated, as I  shall  later on briefly show.
The reader  will also recognize that adding  today to lit er a ture  matters is 
a move that  matters. Lit er a ture’s import difers in dif er ent times, places, and 
socie ties. My interest is in the question of  whether lit er a ture  matters now, 
 today,  here in the United States of Amer i ca (since I know that best). I am 
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also interested in the global  here and now, within which all we  human 
beings, Americans and the rest, more and more live from moment to mo-
ment  today. I note from the outset that the multitude of books and essays, 
such as this book, on  whether or not lit er a ture  matters any longer would 
not be necessary if the mattering of lit er a ture  today  were not in doubt. All 
who love lit er a ture are collectively anxious  today about  whether lit er a ture 
 matters. No such books and essays would likely have seemed necessary 
in Victorian  Eng land, for example, my original field of specialization. To 
literate Victorians, both  middle class and upper class, the assumption that 
lit er a ture mattered quite a lot was so much taken for granted as almost 
never to be a  matter for interrogation.
Literate and lit er a ture have the same root, meaning written letters. You 
are literate if you can make sense of written letters. You are then “let-
tered.” Lit er a ture is made of letters, marks made on paper by some writing 
technology or other. The primary technology was printing presses, in the 
epoch from the seventeenth  century to the pres ent. That was the period of 
what we Westerners generally mean by lit er a ture. Most Victorian readers 
took it for granted that printed lit er a ture, especially in the form of nov-
els, reflected back to them the everyday social world they lived in. Novels, 
moreover, taught them how to behave in courtship and marriage, as well 
as in many other regions of everyday life. That way of assuming that lit-
er a ture  matters may explain the continued power, even  today, of the mi-
metic, realist paradigm.
Lit er a ture, however, was also the chief way Victorians could enjoy the 
pleasures of entering into an imaginary world in ven ted for them by some-
one more gifted than they in manipulating language.  Those pleasures  were 
often seen as guilty and dangerous, especially for young  women, but also 
for young men. Think of Catherine Morland, the heroine of Jane Austen’s 
North anger Abbey, or of Conrad’s Lord Jim. Flaubert’s Emma Bovary is the 
paradigmatic example of fictional characters corrupted by reading lit er a ture.
 These two assumptions about why lit er a ture  matters  were in tension 
in Victorian culture and in Eu ro pean culture generally. That tension de-
fined the social role literate Victorians, of the  middle class and the upper 
class, assumed lit er a ture to have. Think of it! The Victorians had no film, 
no radio, no tele vi sion, no video games, no dvds, no Internet, no iPhoto, 
no Kindles, no iPads, no smartphones, no Facebook. Such technological 
impoverishment! They had only printed books, newspapers, and magazines 
to satisfy their needs both for reflective mimesis and for enjoying the 
imaginary.
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The reader  will note already how dif er ent, both in style and in concept, 
this chapter is from Ranjan Ghosh’s “Making Sahitya  Matter.” On the one 
hand, my chapter is relatively cool, rational, and objective, with only a per-
vasive evanescent scent of irony to distinguish it from some forms of stan-
dard academic discourse in the United States. My instinct is to begin with 
somewhat ironic comments on the complexity of everyday words in En-
glish, such as  matter. This, like irony in general, is a way of being both in-
side and outside at once. Ghosh, on the other hand, does not refrain from 
writing poetically, nor from appropriating the poetic writing of  others, for 
example, passages from Tagore and Chuang- tzu, as the best way to com-
municate what he wants to say. His references to a Hindu or Sanskrit con-
cept of poetry is buttressed by reference to Chinese analogues. By “writing 
poetically,” I mean appropriating the language modes of his examples for 
his own discourse. He assumes that explaining lit er a ture can only be done 
to some degree poetically, or, to use one of his words, by “fabulizing” it. I 
would be more likely to use the term parable (as in the parables of Jesus 
in the New Testament of the Christian Bible) or the term catachresis (the 
Greek name for a word that is not literal but does not substitute for any 
literal word, such as “leg of a  table” or “face of a mountain”). But a fable, 
too, speaks by indirection about something that cannot be spoken of di-
rectly. Ghosh uses Tagore’s stories of the fish and Chuang- tzu’s story of 
the tree and two geese and Frost’s poem “Birches” (the last in an extended 
discussion) as parabolic, catachrestic, or fabulist exemplifications of what 
lit er a ture does. For Ghosh, lit er a ture indirectly names, through its sacred-
ness, the unnamable other world that orients lit er a ture.
Ghosh also frequently uses poetic or alogical linguistic devices like par-
adox or the simultaneous affirmation of opposites. The implication is that 
sahitya is not open to exposition in strictly logical language only. The 
sacred, as Ghosh argues, is both about the meaning that sahitya’s util-
ity generates and the meaning that emerges beyond its utility. On the one 
hand, Ghosh gives much allegiance to the Sanskrit concept of lit er a ture 
as sahitya, even though he gives Western formulations equal allegiance. 
The term sahitya is formed from the word sahit, “ union.” It names  union 
with the Dao (the sacred), that is, with the hidden world that lit er a ture 
expresses indirectly. I, on the other hand, would hesitate to use the word 
sacred to characterize secular lit er a ture, that is, printed novels, poems, and 
plays in Western languages. In my tradition, that is, broadly speaking, in the 
Western tradition, the only texts that are widely assumed to be sacred are 
the Bible, both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Bible, and the Koran. 
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Secular texts, for example Dante’s La Divina Comedia and many  others, 
may be religious through and through, or register religious experience, but 
they do not have the sacred authority the West ascribes to the Bible. Ghosh 
uses the word sacred in a way quite dif er ent from my habitual usage. In a 
lucid note to me, Ghosh explains just what he means by sacred: “I am using 
the word ‘sacred’ to mean a part of lit er a ture which is ‘untouched,’ some-
thing that does not give easy access to its readers. This has nothing to do 
with ‘divine’ or sacramental authority. Sacred is the secret power of lit er a-
ture to generate more meaning when conventional understanding of lit er-
a ture becomes aporetic.”
I  shall now dare to speak briefly about why lit er a ture has mattered to me. 
 Here is another impor tant diference between my position and Ghosh’s. 
Ghosh makes many references to Western texts (Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Rancière,  etc.) that are in resonance with Sanskrit sahitya. His bottom line 
is the assumption that the Sanskrit concept of poetry is just one version of 
a worldwide theory of lit er a ture, perennially true, that has much diversity 
and complexity. This theory is not limited in time, culture, or language. I, 
on the contrary, claim that my theory of lit er a ture’s nature and uses has 
validity only for me, even though  others (I hope) may agree with me.
In spite of my many years of studying lit er a ture, teaching it, and writ-
ing about it, I remain to this day puzzled by literary works. I remember 
the poem that exemplified my puzzlement and still does so. This is a short 
poem by Tennyson, one of the songs in The Princess, called “Tears, Idle 
Tears.” It is a wonderful poem. I read this poem when I was still majoring 
in physics as an undergraduate at Oberlin College and found it an exceed-
ingly strange use of language. In my science courses, I was taught to say the 
truth straightforwardly, to explain anomalies, and to use language in as 
uncomplicated a way as pos si ble. Tennyson seemed to me to do no such 
 things. The poem begins:
Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean,
Tears from the depth of some divine despair
Rise in the heart, and gather to the eyes,
In looking on the happy Autumn- fields,
And thinking of the days that are no more.2
I asked myself, what in the world does this mean? What does Tennyson 
mean by calling his tears idle? In what sense are  these tears idle? Why did 
he write, “I know not what they mean?” I did not know what they mean, 
 either. The poem is very beautiful.  There is no doubt about that, but so 
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what? And “tears from the depth of some divine despair?” What does “di-
vine despair” mean? It might mean despair of some god. What god? Gods 
are not supposed to despair. What is this god in despair about? Why are 
the autumn fields happy? I thought they  were just inhuman  matter. In 
short, I had dozens of questions about just  these few lines. It seems to 
me that simply to read the poem out loud to students, as teachers often 
used to do, and to say how beautiful it is, is not enough. Yes, I agree. It is 
beautiful. But what does it mean? I think we are justified in demanding a 
high degree of explicability from literary works and in demanding that our 
teachers help students in this hermeneutic work.
Why, I continued to won der, should it  matter to me  whether I read 
and understand this poem or not? I wanted to figure out answers to  these 
questions, to account for the poem in the way astrophysicists account for 
data from outer space. De cades  after my shift from physics to lit er a ture, 
I wrote an essay trying, belatedly, to answer  those questions I had about 
“Tears, Idle Tears.”3 What was wrongheaded about my original proj ect 
took me some years to discover. I am still discovering, that is, still trying 
to come to terms with what de Man identifies as the irreconcilability of 
hermeneutics and poetics, meaning and the way meaning is expressed.4 
I  shall discuss what de Man says in chapter  4. A shorthand description 
of my  mistake would be to say that data from the stars and the linguistic 
 matter that makes up poems require fundamentally dif er ent method-
ologies of “accounting for.” I have spent my  whole life trying to account 
for vari ous presumptively literary works. That is my vocation: reading, 
teaching, lecturing, and writing about print lit er a ture. Lit er a ture  matters 
a  great deal to me.
My citations from lit er a ture, as opposed to Ghosh’s, for example, my 
quotation from “Tears, Idle Tears,” are used to exemplify my puzzlement 
about just what literary works in the Western tradition mean, say, or are 
meant to do to their readers. Ghosh’s citations are meant to exemplify the 
way lit er a ture’s sacredness is mostly inscribed in the unnamed and the un-
structured. I am more interested than Ghosh is in making rhetorical, for-
mal, or stylistic analyses of literary works. I am more willing than he is to 
consider positively lit er a ture’s contribution to empirical knowledge about 
the social world and its role in the formation of ethical norms, whereas 
he stresses the sacredness of lit er a ture’s “uselessness” in the everyday 
world of getting enough to eat or keeping warm in cold weather. I am also 
much more concerned than he is with the medium of poetry, in par tic u lar 
the epochal change  going on right now throughout the world from print 
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culture to digital culture, from printed books to computers, Kindles, and 
iPads. Ghosh says nothing about this in his chapter 1. For Ghosh, in his 
chapter 1 at least, lit er a ture as sahitya apparently remains lit er a ture, when 
expressed in what ever medium. For him, to recall H. Marshall McLuhan’s 
famous formulation, the medium is not the message. The message is in the 
words in what ever medium.
Well, how much does lit er a ture  matter in the world in general  today? It 
is easy to see that lit er a ture, in the sense of printed poems, plays, and nov-
els, is mattering less and less. We are in the long, drawn- out twilight of the 
epoch of print lit er a ture, an epoch that began less than four centuries ago 
and could end without bringing about the death of civilization. Though, of 
course, literary works are still widely read all over the world, in dif er ent 
degrees in dif er ent places, lit er a ture  matters less and less to many  people, 
including highly educated ones. Recent statistical studies have shown that 
fewer and fewer young  people read books of any sort for plea sure. The 
double role of allowing the pleasures of entering imaginary worlds and of 
learning about the real world and how to behave in it are more and more 
shifting to new technological devices of telecommunication: films, video 
games, tele vi sion shows, popu lar  music, Facebook, and so on. I include 
tele vi sion news broadcasts as forms of the imaginary. They have almost 
as much interpolated advertising as news. Advertising is another form of 
the imaginary. The ability or the need to create imaginary worlds out of 
words on printed pages is less and less an impor tant part of most  people’s 
lives. Prob ably  people are becoming less  adept at  doing it. Why go to all 
the bother to read that extremely difficult novel, Henry James’s The Golden 
Bowl, for example, when you can so much more easily watch the splendid 
bbc tele vi sion version?
The new telecommunications devices have made a fantastically rapid 
change worldwide in  human culture. Lit er a ture, too, has been radically 
and irreversibly changed. Downloading and reading on a computer screen, 
or on a Kindle, or on an iPad, George Eliot’s Middlemarch or any of the 
hundreds of thousands of other literary texts now floating in cyberspace 
is in obvious ways, and in more subtle ways, too, greatly dif er ent from 
reading a literary work in a printed book. This is partly  because the digital 
version is searchable and can be cut and pasted, partly  because its mate-
rial base, its  matter, its subjectile, as Derrida calls it, is so dif er ent.5 A digital 
text has a radically dif er ent surrounding context. That new context is all 
the unimaginable heterogeneity of cyberspace as against the neat rows 
of alphabetized books in a library. Each context has a dif er ent form of 
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portability and a dif er ent location, or nonlocation. The nonspace of cy-
berspace accessed by  those ghostly letters on a computer screen is strik-
ingly dif er ent from a printed book in a private or public library. A printed 
book is a solid object you can hold in your hands, not evanescent letters 
on an electronic screen.
The pro cess of inventing literary works has also been radically changed. 
The under lying  matter of lit er a ture, its material base, has been revolution-
ized. For most poets or novelists, no more writing successive drafts by 
hand on paper with a pen or pencil, then laboriously typing and retyping 
the text to get a final draft ready to be typeset. This typesetting happened 
at first, during the early print epoch, letter by letter. Subsequently it was 
done by linotype, with successive proofs to be read and marked by hand. 
 These  were set and then reset again when the second proofs had been 
checked. That was still the case when I began my scholarly work.
The composition of literary works on the computer has changed all 
that. The ease of revision of a computer file means that a new literary text 
is never  really finished. It can always be further revised, as I am revising 
this essay at this moment (5:56 pm, April  16, 2016), and have revised it 
repeatedly in the past several years. The successive drafts of computer files 
are, for the most part, lost forever. That puts a  whole scholarly industry 
out of business: the study of early drafts of a given text. This new form of 
lit er a ture exists from the beginning in a quasi- disembodied form, as zeros 
and ones on a hard drive or in some cloud memory. Though the file may 
ultimately take print form, that printing is now done flawlessly from a 
computer file. That file often exists as a pdf. More and more, literary works 
come out si mul ta neously in print form and as e- texts.  People who read lit-
er a ture at all anymore often choose to read it on line, in another form of 
the prestidigitalization of lit er a ture.
As I said in a book title, The Medium Is the Maker: Browning, Freud, Der-
rida and the New Telepathic Technologies,6 the mode of materialization of 
a given literary work fundamentally determines its meaning and its per-
formative force. The  matter of lit er a ture  matters. The new computer me-
dium makes lit er a ture radically dif er ent from its old self, dif er ent, that 
is, down to its roots, which is what radical etymologically means. Medium 
must be taken  here in the sense both of a new material base and of a seem-
ingly, but of course not actually, somewhat spooky, spiritualist, medium-
istic, telepathic means of transmission. Something speaks to me through 
the medium, for example, from the computer screen, but by an entirely ex-
plicable technological pro cess. Ranjan Ghosh is much less concerned than 
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I am with the efect of the medium on meaning. At least he writes  little 
about it. For him, just as “the Sacredness of Lit er a ture” is perennially valid 
as a concept of what lit er a ture is and what it does, so it does not seem to 
 matter in what medium a given work is encountered. Frost’s “Birches” re-
mains Frost’s “Birches,”  whether we read it in printed book or on an iPad, 
in a digitized version. That is a plausible assumption, but I am arguing 
other wise. For me, the medium is an impor tant determinant of meaning.
Strangely enough, one thinks with one’s fin gers when writing. I am not 
a creative writer, just someone who writes about, and roundabout, lit er-
a ture, in endless circumlocution. Nevertheless, I have gone through the 
difficulty of changing from inventing words with a pen in my hand, as I used 
to do, to inventing them with my fin gers on a computer keyboard, as I do 
habitually now. The latter is happening right now, with the words that are 
at this moment flowing through my fin gers from who knows where in my 
ner vous system, onto the keyboard and then magically appearing on my 
computer screen. Some impersonal inner voice seems to speak them as 
they are keyed in. They come into being by an inventive bodily pro cess that 
is more discovering than deliberately making up, to recall the bifurcated 
meaning of invention.
Derrida long ago identified lit er a ture, in our modern Western sense, 
with the several centuries of print culture and its attendant technolo-
gies, with the appearance of modern democracies and modern capitalism, 
and with the concomitant rise of a literate  middle class granted nominal (I 
stress nominal) freedom to say and write anything in a literary work and 
not be held accountable for it.7 An author could always say, for example, 
of the narrator of a novel or of the speaker of a lyric poem she or he has 
written, “That is not me speaking but an imaginary person created out of 
words.” Derrida also long ago prophetically foresaw, in a notable passage 
in the “Envois” section of La carte postale: De Socrate à Freud et au- delà, 
that computer technology would bring lit er a ture, along with a number of 
impor tant other cultural institutions, to an end. One of Derrida’s imag-
inary postcard writers asserts: “An entire epoch of so- called [ladite] lit-
er a ture, if not all of it, cannot survive a certain technological regime of 
telecommunications (in this res pect the po liti cal regime is secondary). 
Neither can philosophy, or psychoanalysis. Or love letters.”8 I use this pas-
sage as the epigraph for my chapter 8 in this book and discuss it further 
 there. The technological regime, for Derrida, overpowers any po liti cal 
regime, as we can see in the transformations in North Africa of repressive 
regimes.  These transformations have been made pos si ble, to a considerable 
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degree, by mobile phones. Derrida elsewhere writes in “Envois” about how 
psychoanalysis, as a quasi- science and as a social institution, would have 
been radically dif er ent if Freud and his associates had been able to com-
municate by e- mail rather than having to depend on the postal system and 
the telephone.9 The same  thing can be said of lit er a ture. Suppose Shake-
speare or Fielding, Words worth or Dickens, had been able to compose on 
the computer and self- publish an e- text version on a personal website or 
on Facebook! The mind boggles at the thought!
The signs that Derrida was right, that is, the signs of a gradual vanish-
ing of print lit er a ture as a cultural force, are everywhere vis i ble, in dif er-
ent degrees and in dif er ent ways in each country. I discuss  these in some 
detail in my chapter 8. We do not have time,  today, it might well be argued, 
to worry about  whether lit er a ture any longer  matters. Who cares? How 
can we justify taking time to care about something so trivial, something 
that  matters so  little, when we have such big prob lems?
I have elsewhere argued for an anachronistic reading of older literary 
works. I mean by anachronistic a reading of lit er a ture in the context of our 
situation  today, not by way of some attempt to put oneself back inside the 
mind- frame of a Re nais sance man or  woman in order to read Shakespeare, 
or of a  middle- class Victorian to read Dickens or George Eliot.10 The con-
cept of a uniform period mindset, as in The Victorian Frame of Mind, or The 
Elizabethan World Picture, is in any case extremely problematic.11 Victorian 
and Elizabethan frames of mind, the evidence shows,  were quite hetero-
geneous. Even if a uniform period mindset existed, why would identifying 
oneself with it be an attractive  thing to try to do, except for literary his-
torians,  those putatively impersonal and objective scholars? Why pretend 
we are still Victorians or Elizabethans? The answer, I suppose, is that it 
 will make us better readers of Middlemarch or of Tennyson’s The Princess, 
but literary works create their appropriate frames of mind in their read-
ers, a dif er ent one for each text, however much explanatory historical 
footnotes may help. In place of the virtues claimed for the so- called histor-
ical imagination, I argue in some detail in chapter 8 that lit er a ture  matters 
most for us if it is read for  today, and read rhetorically, to some degree as 
training in ways to spot lies, ideological distortions, and hidden po liti cal 
agendas such as surround us on all sides in the media  these days.
I give  here one example: nbc eve ning news, on tele vi sion in the United 
States, ends almost  every day with another “Making a Diference” seg-
ment.  These are typically moving  human- interest stories about how some 
person,  family, or group is helping neighbors. One typical segment told 
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the story of a  family in Texas that is sending $2,000 a month to a  family in 
Alabama in which the breadwinners have lost their jobs and have had their 
mortgage foreclosed. They  were about to lose their home  because they 
could not make the monthly mortgage payments. The  father is also being 
aided in his job search. Who would not admire the charity, the  human 
sympathy, of that  family in Texas? The hidden po liti cal message, however, 
drummed in implicitly day  after day by ever new versions of such stories, 
is that we do not need to have higher taxes on rich  people and large 
corporations, better education, regulation of banks, other financial insti-
tutions, and credit card companies, and stimulus spending by the Federal 
government to create jobs, universal health care, control of carbon dioxide 
emissions, and so on. We do not need  these  because charitable families in 
Texas or elsewhere  will always save the needy. It is an attractive fantasy.
Teaching  people how to read rhetorically  those old poems, plays, and 
novels could make studying lit er a ture concentrated training in reading the 
media. By rhetorically I mean teaching lit er a ture by way of a distinction be-
tween hermeneutics and poetics, what is meant and the way that meaning 
is expressed. I borrow  these terms from Paul de Man, who borrows them 
from Walter Benjamin and from the Hermeneutik und Poetik series of con-
ferences and conference books from the University of Konstanz.12 De Man 
claims, correctly, that hermeneutics and poetics are incompatible.
Of course this incompatibility can also be taught by way of items in 
the new media, for example, by explaining the hidden message in the 
way the spokespersons in tele vi sion commercials for oil, gas, and coal are 
consistently briskly attractive  women, or minorities, or bearded intellec-
tuals, not the more or less ruthless and greedy white men who actually 
run Chevron, Halliburton, the fracking companies, and the rest. Many of 
the best and most exemplary rhetorical readings, however, are of literary 
works, or of philosophical and theoretical texts, for example, readings by 
de Man and Derrida. Literary works, moreover, ofer more concentrated 
and complex examples.
Teaching students how to read in the light of the distinction between 
poetics and hermeneutics is a way lit er a ture can still be brought to  matter. 
This way of teaching students how to read lit er a ture is, alas, unlikely to 
become a widespread program. It is a Utopian dream. This dream may 
become real ity in isolated cases, but most teachers of lit er a ture are not 
taught to teach in that way. Lit er a ture, as I have said, is in any case taught 
less and less in any way at all, at least in the United States. To many  people 
 here, lit er a ture does not  matter.
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Now it might be argued that the satisfaction of  human beings’ insatia-
ble desire for the literary, for the imaginary, that is, for a certain figurative 
or fictive use of words or other signs, has simply migrated to other media, 
for example, to films, including animated films, or to video games, or even 
to punning newspaper headlines, or to tele vi sion advertising. “A certain 
figurative or fictive use of words or other signs” is an extremely problematic 
definition of the literary, by the way, warranting extensive commentary. 
Derrida is right, I believe, to assert, in his interview with Derek Attridge in 
Acts of Lit er a ture, that “ there is no text which is literary in itself. Literarity 
is not a natu ral essence, an intrinsic property of the text. It is the correla-
tive of an intentional relation to the text, an intentional relation which in-
tegrates in itself, as a component or an intentional layer, the more or less 
implicit consciousness of rules which are conventional or institutional— 
social, in any case.”13 Intentional,  here, is a Husserlian or phenomenolog-
ical word naming the orientation of consciousness  toward something or 
other. Newspaper headlines and tele vi sion ads are often conspicuously 
witty and imaginative. If Derrida is right, we might well be justified in in-
tending them as manifestations of literarity, that is, taking them as lit er-
a ture. A tele vi sion commercial often takes the viewer or listener instantly 
into a conspicuously wacky or slapstick imaginary world, as in the one that 
shows a  little dog rushing back and forth trying to find a safe place to hide 
a bone. This is an analogue, it turns out, for  human beings’ search for a 
safe place to put their money. It is an ad for an investment firm.
Such ads employ an extremely sophisticated set of conventions. They 
often use animations and other advanced cinematic devices. Most such com-
mercials, by the way, have a large component of outright lies or at least of 
ideological distortions, as in my example of nbc’s “Making a Diference” 
series, or in the many ads on behalf of oil, gas, and “clean” coal companies. 
Lies are a potent form of the imaginary. If Shakespeare  were resurrected 
 today, he might be creating video games or advertising spots, not writing 
plays. The digital world is where the big money is.
This migration of literarity is certainly happening, but this movement 
happens at the expense of lit er a ture in the traditional sense. Printed lit er-
a ture is, in the West, gradually becoming a  thing of the past.
Let me now get serious and ask again why lit er a ture (in the old- 
fashioned sense of printed poems, plays, and novels)  ought still to  matter 
even in  these dire times. In order to be more specific, to get closer to the 
 actual  matter of lit er a ture, let me give a series of citations from the open-
ings of several works, all in En glish (with one exception) that I claim are 
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lit er a ture. Most  people worldwide would prob ably agree that my citations 
are examples of what is commonly meant by lit er a ture. I take openings 
 because they strikingly reveal the way each work shows itself to be dif-
fer ent, unique, even within the oeuvre of a given author. The opening of 
each work instantly takes the reader into a distinctive imaginary world 
cut of from the real world, though a transformation of it. Entering such a 
world is what I mean by the “pleasures of the imaginary.” And an intense 
plea sure it is! That plea sure is a good in itself. I postpone, for a moment, 
explaining what I mean by “the imaginary,” a phrase so far taken too much 
for granted in this chapter. In order to illustrate one of my points, I  shall 
call down all my opening lines from cyberspace, downloading each by way 
of an almost instantaneous Google search:
Elsinore. A platform before the  castle.
FRANCISCO at his post. Enter to him bernardo
bernardo: Who’s  there?
francisco: Nay, answer me: stand, and unfold yourself.
bernardo: Long live the king!
francisco: Bernardo?
bernardo: He.
francisco: You come most carefully upon your hour.
bernardo: ’Tis now struck twelve; get thee to bed, Francisco.
francisco: For this relief much thanks: ’tis  bitter cold,
 And I am sick at heart.
—Shakespeare, Hamlet14
of mans first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal tast
Brought Death into the World, and all our woe,
With loss of EDEN, till one greater Man
Restore us, and regain the blissful Seat,
Sing Heav’nly Muse
— John Milton, Paradise Lost15
 IT is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession 
of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.
— Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice16
A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no  human fears:
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She seemed a  thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
— William Words worth, “A Slumber Did My Sprit Seal”17
Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean,
Tears from the depth of some divine despair
— Alfred Lord Tennyson, “Tears, Idle Tears”18
 Call me Ishmael. Some years ago— never mind how long precisely— 
having  little or no money in my purse, and nothing par tic u lar to interest 
me on shore, I thought I would sail about a  little and see the watery 
part of the world.
— Herman Melville, Moby- Dick19
“I can never bring myself to believe it, John,” said Mary Walker,
the pretty  daughter of Mr. George Walker, attorney of Silverbridge.
Walker and Winthrop was the name of the firm, and they  were
respectable  people, who did all the solicitors’ business that had
to be done in that part of Barsetshire on behalf of the Crown,  were
employed on the local business of the Duke of Omnium who is  great in
 those parts, and altogether held their heads up high, as provincial
 lawyers often do. They,— the Walkers,— lived in a  great brick
house in the  middle of the town, gave dinners, to which the county
gentlemen not unfrequently condescended to come, and in a mild way
led the fashion in Silverbridge. “I can never bring myself to believe
it, John,” said Miss Walker.
“You’ll have to bring yourself to believe it,” said John, without
taking his eyes from his book.
“A clergyman,— and such a clergyman too!”
— Anthony Trollope, The Last Chronicle of Barset20
Suddenly I saw the cold and rook- delighting heaven
That seemed as though ice burned and was but the more ice . . .  
— W. B. Yeats, “The Cold Heaven”21
Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure. Parfois, à peine ma bou-
gie éteinte, mes yeux se fermaient si vite que je n’avais pas le temps de 
me dire: “Je m’endors.”
— Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu22
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In Hydaspia, by Howzen
Lived a lady, Lady Lowzen,
For whom what is was other  things.
— Wallace Stevens, “Oak Leaves Are Hands”23
Well,  there is lit er a ture for you, the real right  thing! I could extend the list 
in defi nitely, in a litany of remembered literary pleasures. Do  those plea-
sures  matter? What makes reading them pleas ur able? Is it a guilty plea-
sure? I stress seven features my examples share:
*Each is markedly dif er ent from all the  others. Each is unique, incom-
mensurable with the  others, even though each in one way or another 
uses perfectly ordinary words that name  things and actions familiar in 
the real world.  Those words are, nevertheless,  here transformed. They 
are appropriated to name imaginary worlds that have no referential 
correlates in the real world. You can meet Lady Lowzen and visit 
Howzen only in Stevens’s poem, even though “by Howzen” is a play on 
the German or Pennsylvania Dutch phrase bei Hausen, meaning “next 
door.” The imaginary is next door to the real. All the informative, 
realist specificity of The Last Chronicle of Barset’s masterly opening 
lines is a sham, and readers know it is a sham. No Walker  family and 
no apparently felonious Rev. Josiah Crawley exist anywhere but in the 
pages of the novel, or, rather, in the imaginary realm to which  those 
words on the page give the reader access.
*Each citation provides entrance into a distinctive imaginary world by 
the magic “open sesame!” of a few inaugural words.  These words work 
like Alice’s passing through the big mirror into the looking- glass world 
at the beginning of Carroll’s Through the Looking- Glass, and What Alice 
Found  There.
*This entry into the imaginary happens “suddenly,” to borrow Yeats’ word. 
It happens in an instant, in a decisive break with what ever may have 
preceded the reading of  these par tic u lar words, for example, the reading 
of a previous example. It is a plunge in medias res, but into strange and 
alien  things, like finding oneself suddenly in a foreign country.
*Each opening passage, in one way or another, conspicuously uses 
figurative transfers or plays on words, though not in any predictable 
or uniform way.
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*The efect on the reader, on me as reader, at least, is to create an al-
most irresistible compulsion to go on reading in order to find out what 
happens next.  These inaugural instants are each, in one way or an-
other, enigmatic, puzzling, partly  because leaping into the  middle of 
 things seems in each case to presuppose all sorts of  things the reader 
does not yet know, for example, the name of the presumably felonious 
clergyman, Josiah Crawley, in the opening of Trollope’s Last Chronicle. 
You want to go on reading to find  those  things out, to orient yourself. 
Each example, moreover, is, in a dif er ent way in each case, clearly the 
beginning of some kind of narrative, a story.  Human beings, we know, 
love stories.
*Though the reader knows perfectly well, or thinks he or she knows, 
that each fictive realm is created by the language that tells of it, never-
theless, it seems, in my experience at least, but only seems, that each 
realm has been  there all along. It seems to have been waiting some-
where to be entered and described with the open sesame of so- called 
literary language. Invention, as making up, seems, fallaciously, to be 
invention as discovering, as the antithetical Latin word, inventio, can 
also mean.
*Each inaugural passage, though, in a dif er ent way in each case, 
even Shakespeare’s Hamlet, by way of its stage directions, creates the 
illusion of a speaking or writing voice, a storyteller. Nevertheless, 
even when, as in many of my examples, that voice speaks explic itly as 
an “I” the narrative voice is characterized by a certain strange imper-
sonality. This speaking or writing enunciator is like that strange voice 
that speaks within me, to a considerable degree out of my control, the 
words I am writing down at this moment. The words come from who 
knows where and are spoken within me by who knows what imper-
sonal linguistic power. I take responsibility for them, but they are not 
me speaking, any more than the real person Herman Melville speaks 
or writes, “Call me Ishmael.”
Maurice Blanchot, in a notable essay, called this strangely alien voice, a 
voice already coming from a fictive or imaginary world, “La voix narrative 
( le ‘il,’ le neutre)” (The narrative voice, the “he,” the neutral).24 I  shall re-
turn  later in this chapter to a more extended discussion of Blanchot’s the-
ories of narrative. Blanchot is, in my judgment, one of the greatest literary 
critics and theorists of the twentieth  century. His work has had a consid-
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erable influence over the years on my own conceptions of literary theory 
and of literary criticism. Hegel, Émile Benveniste, Paul de Man, and, most 
recently, John Namjun Kim have in dif er ent ways brought into the open 
the abyssal ambiguity, duplicity, or, better, “ironic undecidability,” of the 
words for the ego in dif er ent Western languages. This especially so when 
they are used in openly literary texts, as in so many of my examples.25 
One con spic u ous example is Yeats’s “Suddenly I saw.” The “I” who speaks 
in a literary text seems at first to be a person, a self, perhaps the self of 
the author, but reveals itself to be at the same time an empty placeholder 
(“eine leere Flasche”) for anybody, in the end for nobody but an impersonal 
power of literary speech, Blanchot’s “neutral.”
To develop this line of thought adequately would take another long 
essay, but I break the line now by citing the two wonderfully vertiginous 
passages de Man cites and comments on from Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften in “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics”: 
“So kann ich nicht sagen was ich nur meinen,” which de Man translates as 
meaning, among other  things, “I cannot say what I make mine,” “I cannot 
say what I think,” and “I cannot say I.” I add: “So I cannot say what I only (or 
simply) mean.” The other passage from Hegel de Man calls a “quite aston-
ishing sentence,” as indeed it is: “Ebenso, wenn ich sage: ‘Ich,’ meine ich 
mich als diesen alle anderen Ausschließenden: aber was ich sage, Ich, ist 
eben einen jeder” (‘When I say “I,” I mean myself as this I to the exclusion 
of all  others; but what I say, I, is precisely anyone; any I, as that which 
excludes all  others from itself ’).26 The  great Hegel, master of pure reason, 
has  here stumbled into the abyss that lies beneath the innocent word I, as 
well as into the way repeated phonemes call attention to themselves as pure 
sound: “Wenn ich sage: ‘Ich,’ meine ich mich.”
It is a universal feature of so- called literary texts, or of any piece of 
language taken as lit er a ture, intended as lit er a ture, read as lit er a ture, dif-
fer ent from one another as they all are, that in them the I of the author is 
transformed into an impersonal, anonymous, neutral, neutered power of 
language, an empty flask. An everyday and seemingly innocent example 
of this transformation is the familiar omniscient, or, better, telepathic, 
narrator of canonical En glish novels.27 Among my examples, the narrators 
of Austen’s Pride and Prejudice and of Trollope’s The Last Chronicle of Barset 
illustrate this. Trollope’s Framley Parsonage, discussed in chapter 10  here, 
is another example. The anonymity and undecidability of such language is 
evident in the pervasive irony of fictional narrative voices. “Was ich sage, 
Ich, ist eben jeder.” (“What I say, I, is precisely anyone.”)
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Of just what kind of  matter are the imaginary worlds entered by this 
strange literary use of language made? Why does crossing a border and 
entering them  matter? I have so far used the words fictive and imaginary 
interchangeably. Most  people, even literary theorists from Aristotle on, 
assume that a fictive text takes words from the everyday real world and 
uses them to name, by imitation (mimesis), a virtual real ity that has no 
referential counterpart, even though real persons, places, and events may 
often be transposed into the fictive.
 Matters are not quite so  simple, however. Just  here, work by two un-
likely theoretical bedfellows, Maurice Blanchot and Wolfgang Iser,  will 
help my formulations. I have in mind Blanchot’s Les deux versions de l’imag-
inaire (Two versions of the imaginary) and his “Le chant des Sirènes” (The 
Song of the Sirens”).28 For Iser, I  shall focus on a late work, Das Fiktive und 
das Imaginäre (The Fictive and the Imaginary).29 Both Blanchot and Iser, in 
dif er ent ways, but in ways that are in unexpected resonance, propose a 
triad rather than a doublet of just two terms, real and fictive. Iser names 
the ele ments of this triad: the real, the fictive, and the imaginary. What 
Iser says in the preface and in the first chapter, “Fictionalizing Acts,” of 
The Fictive and the Imaginary is complex. It is at a high level of abstraction. It 
may, however, be summarized as follows: Iser contests the long tradition, 
with its many permutations  going back to Aristotelian mimesis, defining 
the fictive more or less exclusively in terms of its oppositional or dialec-
tical relation to the real. Iser asserts that a third term, “the imaginary,” 
must be invoked. The imaginary, he says, “is basically a featureless and 
inactive potential” in  human beings for dreams, “fantasies, projections, 
daydreams, and other reveries,” as well as for activating fictions. The 
imaginary is, in a phrase not translated into the En glish version, “diffus, 
formlos, unfixiert und ohne Objektreferenz”: difuse, formless, unfixed, and 
without objective reference.30 Iser’s imaginary must not be thought of as 
in any way a transcendent entity, a divine realm of potential forms. Iser’s 
thinking is resolutely areligious, anti-idealist. In spite of Ghosh’s some-
what unusual use of the word “sacred,” what Iser says is, somewhat unex-
pectedly, not altogether dif er ent, at least according to my understanding, 
from Ghosh’s definition of “the Sacred of Lit er a ture.” For Iser, the imagi-
nary is an exclusively  human potential. Ghosh insists that his sacred of 
lit er a ture is not religious in the usual sense. In a note to me, Ghosh ex-
plains this clearly: “For me ‘sacred’ is the unique imaginary that lit er a ture 
keeps close to its heart. We read lit er a ture, interpret it, make sense of it 
and yet  there is something to which lit er a ture does not allow easy access. 
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This is the ‘sacred’ which keeps our interest in lit er a ture alive and endows 
lit er a ture with the power to attract us forever. So  every time you read Ten-
nyson’s poem the text ‘puzzles’ you; this puzzlement comes from what I 
call the ‘sacred’ of the poem. The poem always leaves something  behind 
for you  every time to seek to ‘resolve’ your puzzlement. The ‘sacred’ of the 
poem is its ‘comeback power’!”
Nor are the real, the fictive, or the imaginary thought of by Iser as 
purely linguistic entities. Though he recognizes that literary texts, as em-
bodiments of the fictive, are made of words, and though he talks a lot about 
“semantics,” Iser appears to have a prejudice against language- based liter-
ary theories. He says firmly and categorically: “Wer Sprache verstehen  will, 
mehr als nur Sprache verstehen muß” (“Whoever wants to understand 
language must understand more than just language”).31 That sounds plau-
sible enough, but it tends to lead Iser to downplay the constitutive role of 
language in generating fictions. He says, for example: “Daraus ergibt sich 
die für jeden fiktionalen Text notwendige Selektion aus den vorhandenen 
Umweltsystemen, seien diese sozio- kultureller Natur oder solche der Lit-
eratur selbst” (“ Every literary text inevitably contains a se lection from a 
variety of social, historical, cultural, and literary systems that exist as ref-
erential fields outside the text”).32 The literary text, however, it is easy to 
see, does not contain items from  those systems as such. It uses, rather, the 
names for them, as Iser’s phrases literary systems and referential fields do, 
 after all, imply.
Iser, in the German original cited above, calls  these referential fields 
the Umweltsystemen, a word not easily translated into En glish. “Contextual 
systems” misses the force of Umwelt as “surrounding world.” “Surrounding- 
world- systems” is a more literal translation of Umweltsystemen, but is not 
good En glish. The fictive set of borrowings from the surrounding world 
systems, however, does not simply provide new critical perspectives on 
the real, though Iser allows for the importance of that function of lit er a ture. 
Lit er a ture brackets and outstrips real ity by using ele ments from it to give 
form to the formless imaginary. That is its chief function. “Real ity, then, 
may be reproduced in a fictional text, but it is  there in order to be outstripped, 
as is indicated by its being bracketed.”33 The essential function of the fictive 
“as if” is to give quasimateriality to the difuseness of the imaginary: “Our 
subsequent journey to new horizons translates the imaginary into an 
experience—an experience that is  shaped by the degree of determinacy 
given to the imaginary by the fictional ‘as- if.’ ”34 The literary text, as defined 
by Iser with another quasitechnical term, is “the pragmatization of the 
64 •  CHaPter 2
imaginary.”35 The matrix of the literary text is not the real and it is not 
fictive language. It is rather “the multiplicitous availability of the imagi-
nary.”36 In giving pragmatic embodiment to the formless imaginary, the 
fictive outstrips language.  Here is another example of Iser’s suspicion of 
language- based theories: “Thus the cardinal points of the text defy ver-
balization,” says Iser in the final sentences of “Fictionalizing Acts,” “and 
it is only through  these open structures within the linguistic patterning 
of the text that the imaginary can manifest its presence. From this fact 
we can deduce one last achievement of the fictive in the fictional text: It 
brings about the presence of the imaginary by transgressing language it-
self. In outstripping what conditions it, the imaginary reveals itself as the 
generative matrix of the text [als den Ermöglichungsgrund des Textes].”37 
Generative matrix, as a name for the imaginary, must be read with the full 
force of the obstetric image in matrix as “mothering source.” I have given a 
 little of the original German for my citations from Iser  because the En glish 
translations, accurate though they are, do not give the distinctive idiomatic 
flavor of Iser’s German terms.
This all makes perfect sense. It is a magnificently persuasive and original 
theory of the imaginary, one that, so far as I know, has no close parallels 
 either in work by other scholars  today or in the long Western tradition of 
wrestling to define the fictive as-if. It does, however, resonate to a consid-
erable degree with Ghosh’s transcultural and transcontinental (in)fusionist 
approach to lit er a ture. I stress “to a considerable degree”  because both Iser 
and Ghosh have distinctive ways of expressing what they want to say. Iser’s 
“imaginary” and Blanchot’s “image” (discussed below) are not quite the 
same as Ghosh’s “sacredness,” but all three do resonate.
Just what  human good is achieved by the fictive? Why do  human beings 
need fictions? Iser’s answer is unequivocal. Though the fictive may give us 
new critical perspectives on the real, and though it may also be a plea sure 
in itself, its most impor tant function is to expand the number of “pragma-
tizations” of that basic  human “plasticity” Iser calls “the imaginary.” That 
 human beings are essentially to be defined by their plasticity is Iser’s fun-
damental anthropological assumption. “If the plasticity of  human nature 
allows,” he avers in his preface, “through its multiple culture- bound pat-
ternings, limitless  human self- cultivation, lit er a ture becomes a pa norama 
of what is pos si ble,  because it is not hedged in by  either the limitations 
or the considerations that determine the institutionalized organ izations 
within which  human life other wise takes its course.”38 Fulfilling as many 
as pos si ble of the limitless ways to be  human is a good in itself. Using fic-
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tionalizing acts as a means of giving form to the formless plasticity of the 
imaginary is the best way to do that.
This gives one answer to the question of  whether lit er a ture  matters. 
We should read lit er a ture now and at any other time  because  doing so is 
the best form of limitless  human self- cultivation. How should we read 
lit er a ture? By opening ourselves to the imaginary worlds literary works 
make available. For Iser, the chief value of lit er a ture, the reason lit er a ture 
 matters, is the plea sure of the fictive as a pragmatization of the imaginary. 
It has its source (its generative matrix) in the imaginary, but enjoying it 
and being influenced by its perspectives on the real can become additional 
ends in themselves. Iser investigates a signal example of this in the second 
chapter of The Fictive and the Imaginary: the Eu ro pean Re nais sance pasto-
ral, as both social critique and a plea sure to read.
The closest  thing that I know in Western literary theory of the twenti-
eth  century to Iser’s idea of the imaginary is Maurice Blanchot’s concept 
of the imaginary in the essays I have mentioned, and in many other of 
his essays, too. A full reading of Blanchot’s idea of the imaginary would 
take many pages, no doubt a long book. I limit myself to brief and some-
what oversimplifying remarks. In place of Iser’s more or less unproblem-
atic word fictive, as a name for the nature of literary language, Blanchot 
puts a subtle theory of “the image.” This is his name for the essence of the 
imaginary as embodied in literary language. For Blanchot, the imaginary 
is made of images or glimpsed through images. Speaking, for example, in a 
characteristic torrent of paradoxes, of Proust’s breakthrough when two sen-
sations coincided in a time out of time that made it pos si ble for him to be-
come a writer at last, Blanchot says: “Yes, at this time, every thing becomes 
image, and the essence of the image is to be entirely outside, without inti-
macy, and yet more inaccessible and more mysterious than the innermost 
thought; without signification, but summoning the profundity of  every pos-
si ble meaning; unrevealed and yet manifest, having that presence- absence 
that constitutes the attraction and the fascination of the Sirens.”39
As opposed to Iser’s cheerful cele bration of fictive pragmatizations of 
the imaginary as benignly fulfilling limitless  human plasticity, Blanchot’s 
imaginary is a dangerous vanishing point within which one might be swal-
lowed up and dis appear. This danger is figured in the threat to Ulysses of 
the Sirens’ song. Blanchot tends to indentify the imaginary with death or 
with an often- repeated motif in his work: the endless pro cess of  dying.40 
The imaginary also exists as le récit [the narrative], as opposed to the eva-
sions of the novel. Blanchot’s examples in the essays I have cited are Ulysses 
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in his approach  toward, or refusal to approach, the real song  behind the 
Sirens’ infinitely luring song, Proust’s Marcel in his search for lost time, 
and Ahab’s pursuit of the white  whale in Moby- Dick.  Here I let Blanchot, 
now a voice from the grave, speak, mostly in En glish translation, for him-
self, or itself:
The narrative begins where the novel does not go but still leads us by 
its refusals and its rich negligence. The narrative is heroically and pre-
tentiously the narrative of one single episode, that of Ulysses’ meeting 
and the insufficient and magnetic song of the Sirens. . . .  Narrative is 
not the relating of an event but this event itself, the approach of this 
event, the place where it is called on to unfold, an event still to come, 
by the magnetic power of which the narrative itself can hope to come 
true. . . .  Narrative is the movement  toward a point— one that is not 
only unknown, ignored, and foreign, but such that it seems, even before 
and outside of this movement, to have no kind of real ity; yet one that 
is so imperious that it is from this point alone that the narrative draws 
its attraction, in such a way that it cannot even “begin” before having 
reached it; but it is only the narrative and the unforeseeable movement 
of the narrative that provide the space where the point becomes real, 
power ful, and alluring.41
The reader  will note how Blanchot’s point, like Iser’s imaginary, is not 
entirely unlike Ghosh’s sacredness of lit er a ture. One might add as further 
examples of récit (narrative) given by Blanchot the ambiguous ending of 
Proust’s  great novel and Ahab’s climactic death- dealing reencounter with 
Moby-Dick in Melville’s masterwork. You  will see how close Blanchot is to 
Iser, and yet how far away from one another they are in tone and valence. 
What is for Blanchot a somewhat sinister attraction to a vanishing point 
that he identifies with death is for Iser a happy materialization of lim-
itless  human plasticity. For both, however, a third realm, the imaginary, 
must be added to the real and to the fictive transposition of that real. For 
both, the true function of lit er a ture is to put the reader in relation  either 
to Iser’s imaginary as a “potential” that is “formless and difuse, unfixed, 
and without objective reference,” “featureless and inactive,” or in relation 
to Blanchot’s unknown, obscure, foreign, dangerous point from which the 
récit begins.
Both Blanchot and Iser, however, allow, in spite of their diferences, 
for two other ways in which lit er a ture  matters. First, lit er a ture gives the 
reader critical perspectives on the real (including the most urgent po liti cal 
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and social realities: dangerous income in equality, prolonged global reces-
sion and catastrophic climate change  today, for example). Lit er a ture does 
this by means of transposing the real into the fictive. Second, lit er a ture 
gives an irreplaceable plea sure in itself, a plea sure Blanchot identifies with 
the novel: “With the novel, the preliminary voyage is foregrounded, that 
which carries Ulysses to the point of encounter. This voyage is an entirely 
 human story; it concerns the time of men, it is linked to the passions of 
men, it actually takes place, and it is rich enough and varied enough to 
absorb all the strength and all the attention of the narrators.”42 The won-
derful specificity of Homer’s Odyssey is Blanchot’s example  here. I might 
well have cited its opening invocation myself except that it was hardly a 
printed book in its original form.  Today all but a few lucky  people, more-
over, know the Odyssey only in modern printed translations. The epic in-
vocations at the beginnings of the Odyssey and of Paradise Lost are striking 
examples of the way another voice is experienced as speaking through the 
author in literary texts. So  here is one more open sesame. Homer begins 
the Odyssey, in Robert Fitzgerald’s translation, with  these words: “Sing in 
me, Muse, and through me tell the story/of that man skilled in all ways of 
contending.”43 The Odyssey is not Homer speaking. It is the Muse speaking 
through him, ventriloquizing him, making him its medium.
I am greatly attracted by Iser’s and Blanchot’s forceful articulation of 
their triads, though with awareness of their not- quite- perfect congruence, 
and with some lingering anxiety about affirming something so far out-
side everyday assumptions, even by teachers of lit er a ture, not to speak 
of journalists, about why lit er a ture might  matter  today. I have expressed 
my re sis tance to Ghosh’s use of the term sacred to characterize lit er a ture, 
since my own usage of the word is so dif er ent. I have recognized, however, 
somewhat to my surprise, that Iser and Blanchot, neither greatly influenced 
by Hindu thought about sahitya, so far as I know, affirm something not 
entirely unlike Ghosh’s transcultural concept of lit er a ture. Sacred is a word 
for secular lit er a ture that neither Iser nor Blanchot nor I would use. What 
they say is nevertheless undeniably in resonance with what Ghosh says. I 
leave the reader of our two chapters to work out the larger implications of 
this resonance.
I have stressed in this essay, as does Ghosh, the sheer pleasures of 
reading lit er a ture, along with pres ent dangers to the survival of printed 
lit er a ture. Lit er a ture  matters  because it serves three essential  human 
functions: social critique, the plea sure of the text, and a materialization of 
the imaginary or an endless approach to the unapproachable imaginary. 
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Though  human civilization would not come to an end if lit er a ture in the 
old- fashioned sense of printed books  were to vanish in an age of prestidig-
italization, much would be lost that video games, films, tele vi sion, popu lar 
songs, and Facebook can hardly replace. That is so even though  these new 
media are also, in their own ways, alternative forms conjoining in their 
dispersal the real, the fictive, and the imaginary.
•  PART I I  •
Poem and Poetry
This page intentionally left blank
You have imposed the rules of your logic upon us; lying in poetry supersedes 
 truthfulness.
— al- Buhturi
Why  don’t you study The Book of Poetry? Poetry can serve to inspire (xing), to 
reflect ( guan), to communicate (qun) and to admonish ( yuan).
— Confucius to his disciples
 There is a scene from a film whose director I cannot remember, a boy is chasing his 
girl friend in a cab, racing alongside the train where the girl sits. Her hair blowing 
in the wind, and then the cab has a puncture. The boy gets out, closes the cab door 
and starts  running. And he outruns the train,  running straight into the horizon, 
while the train chugs along  behind. The speed of his need was faster than any 




The story begins on a note of anxiety, not particularly on a crest, for one 
cannot deny the  career of the poem as having hit an undulation in our 
times, when speed is the cult of living and uptight alertness is preferred 
over sensitivity. Christopher Clausen points out that poetry “is widely 
distrusted for two contradictory reasons: it is at once too  simple in its 
language to be very impor tant, and too difficult in its figurative qualities to 
be understood.”1 Riding the cyber revolution, we now have increased acces-
sibility to major poetic writings, accessed through poetry archives that 
have, consequently, improved the visibility of poetry in the public space. 
Dana Gioia observes that “although conventional wisdom portrays the rise 
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of electronic media and the relative decline of print as a disaster for all 
kinds of lit er a ture, this situation is largely beneficial for poetry. It has 
not created a polarized choice between spoken and printed information. 
Both media coexist in their many often- overlapping forms. What the new 
technology has done is slightly re adjust the con temporary sensibility in 
 favor of sound and orality.”2 I concur with Gioia about the possibility that 
electronic media has generated far greater nonspecialist encounters with 
poetry, both in and out of the acad emy. Gioia finds “an opportunity of 
recentering the art on an aesthetic that combines the pleasures of oral 
media and richness of print culture, that draws from tradition without 
being limited by the past, that embraces form and narrative without re-
jecting the experimental heritage of Modernism, and that recognizes the 
necessary interdependence of high and popu lar culture.”3 Despite a life in 
the new aesthetic, a fresh tradition of reading and experiencing poetry, 
I am not very ecstatic about the  future of serious meditative poetry in the 
Indian subcontinent. A good poem is a serious art, complex and compelling. 
Patience and taste for a good poem are at a premium, but the consternation 
over its complete extinction does not look a real ity yet.
Clausen notes that technical innovation and consequent spaces of rec-
reation and experimentation have hit our concept of literary generation 
hard where “each poetic cell” is “jealously isolated from  every other cell,” 
giving “birth to new cells through mitosis.”4 I  don’t agree with the thought 
that  there is a dramatic decline of interest in poetry but surely pitch my-
self with the lugubrious note that underpins the collective disinterest for 
serious poetry and the hollowing out of a sensibility and fine patience that 
poetry has always demanded from its readers and has needed for its own 
survival. The pos si ble ambit of the audience for poetry has extended, but 
the committed poetry- reading community has shrunk. Poetic sentiment 
has been struggling to find its real home. Its generic importance has con-
spicuously downsized.
Poetry in the Indian subcontinent is largely confined to departments of 
lit er a ture and other regional language publications. It has somewhere lost 
its touch with our soul, with our readerly curiosity and habitation. It shows 
a kind of disconnect with the life that  people ordinarily live,  because what 
is poetry  today is mostly elitist, self- indulging, subculturish, and cryptic 
to the general reading public. Poetry readership is sharply divided among 
the curious and ce re bral institutional minority as against a sneering and 
restless majority.  People have no time to join readings, appreciate the rare 
occasions when such functions are or ga nized. A poem demands a separate 
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kind of thought, a dif er ent rhythm of thinking, a distinct strain of sensi-
bility and perseverance with language. Is a poem beautiful only  because it 
is commonly understood and generally intelligible?
Poetry does not receive its due share of institutionalized love during 
the years when it  ought to: students in high school in India read a poem 
as efectively as reading Alexander’s invasions in India or Newton’s laws 
of falling bodies. A poem is preponderantly treated as a mechanism to be 
understood, committed to memory, and competently ventilated through 
examination modules. Undergraduate courses in Indian colleges make po-
etry a segregated domain within lit er a ture departments. A poem, most 
students think, is  either too easy (for instance, William Blake’s “The 
Lamb”) or so disturbingly challenging ( like T. S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land”) 
that reading becomes routine and no longer fun. Most of us lost the fun 
with poems quite early in our lives.
The prob lem that I find in most good poetry written  today is the imbal-
ance between world consciousness—be it cultural, po liti cal, or social— and 
a peculiar penchant to be idiosyncratic and convoluted. This has generated a 
disconnect with the common understanding of poetry, washing it away 
from the common currency of reading into a world where most readers 
balk at the threshold. The Indian part of the poem’s story is mostly about 
struggling to join the two ends, the diversity of the content in the larg-
est democracy of the world and the overly private and entangled form in 
which a poem is created. Subject and expression often do not harmonize, 
resulting in most poems being written without readers. A poem is not for 
the poet alone but is surely an art that enriches in sharing, vitalizes in 
communication, sustains in readerly revisits. Not that all poetry written 
in the subcontinent is soft in the center and is mere expression of a poetic 
afect. Good poetry has become rare and bad poetry in its profusion and 
permeability has made poetic experience avoidable; it has prevented the 
formation of a sensible readership. A poem cannot be read with literacy 
alone. A poem needs education, a cultivation of a dif er ent kind of mind 
and taste. Regretfully, the nation that can take pride in Kalidasa, Rabin-
dranath Tagore, Jibananda Das, Agha Sahid Ali, A. K. Ramanujan, Jayanta 
Mahapatra, and many  others— the list can be long and illustrious— has 
more readers than ever before but has lost the taste of living with a poem.
So poetry is produced at the expense of a poem. Writing a poem is not 
like writing a dissertation accented on a specific discourse. A poem has 
its laws and also a life in lawlessness. Are publishers looking for poems 
written in a par tic u lar way? Is publishing poetry close to being a predestined 
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proj ect? I won der how much of public and private funding, writers in res-
idence programs, creative writing fellowships, exist for the poets in India 
 today. Apart from a  couple of private universities and Jadavpur University, 
 there is no creative writing faculty: no professional appointments in lit er-
a ture departments  will consider the candidate’s profile in creative writing 
 because, unfortunately, an essay published in a  middle segment academic 
journal  will always be privileged over writings published in magazines like 
Granta. Unlike the American poetry scene, the issue of reading poetry in 
India is spread and operated across regional languages— a country which 
has a huge population of bhasakabita ( language poets, i.e., poets who do 
not have polylingual presence). Regional languages can sometimes pre-
clude poems from leaping over fences of culture and communities. I am 
not talking in the sense of globalizing a poem. But the anxiety of na-
tivism, at times, may prove inhibitive by way of a certain ideological em-
bargo. Consequently, the reading of poetry becomes a part of a subculture, 
a minority act, restricted and sectarian. English- language poets have their 
visibility but a restricted readership  because poets read poets and so do 
scholars, forming a select and specialized community. A poem has more 
means to reach the public now but attention to poetry has not altered 
significantly.
Dana Gioia notes that “for most newspapers and magazines, poetry has 
become a literary commodity intended less to be read than to be noted 
with approval. Most editors run poems and poetry reviews the way a pros-
perous Montana rancher might keep a few bufalo around— not to eat the 
endangered creatures but to display them for tradition’s sake.”5 Poems are 
for poets, friends of the poets, for a minority claiming sensitivity to po-
etry: a  great poem rarely speaks to the common man. Perhaps educated 
readership is also shying away from poetry,  because, strangely, patience 
with poems is a casualty before the cult of speed in our age. Why do not 
 people try to rethink what a poem has to say? If a computer has its own 
language, if a book manuscript has its own negotiations with a style sheet 
for a camera- ready copy, by what logic should a poem dumb its expres-
sive powers down to a level where getting the readers’ attention becomes 
more its responsibility than the commitment of its readers? But I refuse to 
admit that all poetry has become irrelevant; perhaps, the decline is more 
in the neglect that the mainstream metes out to poetry. The story of the 
novel is more attractive  today than the story of the poem.
Edwin Muir, in The Estate of Poetry, looks into the role of the poets 
to make their poems less obscure, espouse  great themes and have them 
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treated clearly. But clearness in a poem is a dif er ent kind of clearing; a 
poem is not a documentation of experience, not necessarily a discursive 
treatment of a subject. Its alethic and disclosive power can be reasons for 
its excellence and subsequent alienation. Muir warns that “ there remains 
the temptation for poets to turn inward into poetry, to lock themselves 
into a hygienic prison where they speak only to one another, and to the 
critic.”6 But does not a poem also generate its own relish through inward-
ness? Wendell Berry’s observations are too apposite to ignore:
We would be ungrateful and stupid to turn our backs on the work of 
inward- turned poets. That work contains much of value that we need 
to cherish and learn from. It is only necessary to understand that that 
work has flourished upon, and has fostered, a grievous division be-
tween life and work, as have virtually all the other specialized disci-
plines of our time, and that that division has made it pos si ble for work 
to turn upon and exploit and destroy life.  There is in real ity no such 
choice as Yeats’s “Perfection of the life, or of the work.” The decision 
to sacrifice  either one for the sake of the other becomes ultimately the 
fatal disease of both. The division implied by this proposed choice is 
destructive  because it is based upon a misconception of the relation be-
tween work and life. The perfections of work rise out of, and commune 
with and in turn inform, the perfections of life—as Yeats himself knew 
and as other poems of his testify. The use of life to perfect work is an evil 
of the specialized intellect. It makes of the most humane of disciplines 
an exploitive industry.7
Poetry, then, is “an empty basket: you put your life into it and make 
something out of that.”8 The poet’s feeling the world makes the poem 
worldly, that is, closer in themes to the taste and preferences of its readers. 
When poetry was a tribal business and an integral part of religious ceremo-
nies (poetry festivals  were funded, fostered, and feted) the poem had more 
 people to acknowledge its stories and its existence was far more intensely 
materialized. Living with a poem was a soothing option, a recreational al-
ternative to existential encounters. However, caught in the “pranks and 
easements of technology,” the poem no longer disturbs: indeed, its distur-
bance is scarcely given its worthy dues. But in our times, we need a poem 
 because technology has, unfortunately, touched our body but never much 
our emotions, the inner recesses of our thinking, the epiphanity of our 
daily wear and tear. Mary Oliver has her fin gers exactly on the nerves 
I am alluding to: “We need  those orderings of thought,  those flare- ups of 
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imagination,  those sounds of the body and its feelings, proclaiming our 
sameness, calling the tribal soul together. The man out  there, cutting the 
grass, is more astute than we give him credit for. He knows that the poem 
must transcend its par tic u lar origin and become a poem about his life. 
He goes on, cutting the straight rows, apparently not listening. But when 
the poem is his, he  will fall headlong into it and be refreshed and begin 
listening for more.”9 The transcendence, the plunge, the dream, the trans-
mutation, and the listening aestheticize a poem’s calling. It is a story or 
stories that might make the common audience shrivel but that should not 
in any way discourage us from the retelling. The tale told in the following 
pages is not a repeat of what got told in the past: the story unfolds, grows, 
and stops but only to carve another beginning.
Act I
A poem is never lost. Finding a poem permanently is difficult, too. Shrink-
ing readership and dwindling publishing interests influence but cannot 
configure the essential story of the poem. A poem is no hermetic posses-
sion of a culture and nation alone. Rasa- experience can let the story of 
the poem overflow traditions, thoughts, and theories to make sense of its 
exemplarity.10 What follows is my experience and understanding of a story 
told dialogically, across cultures and traditions whose dimensions are var-
ied and vibrant, delicate and disturbing. How can the story of a poem be 
made to unfold so that reading poetry is not determinatively judged with 
the economy and commerce of production, with the collaborative indis-
pensability of a  career with the printing press, and the visibility granted 
by an acknowledging multitude?
Lu Ji writes:
At the beginning of the pro cess of writing,
The poet closes himself to sight and sound,
Deeply he contemplates, widely he enquires in spirit;
His spirit roams in the eight directions,
His mind traverses a distance of thousands of ancient yards.
When the opportune moment to write arrives,
The poet’s feelings gradually dawn to increasing clarity,
And objects become clear and pres ent themselves to him
in a stable order.11
 Here begins the story, a very complicated, delectable, and fine- spun story 
of inspiration, skill, and mystery, touching unusual elegance and depth. 
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When Jibanananda Das (1899–1954), one of the most prominent modern 
Bengali poets in the post- Tagorean era, writes, “All are not poets: only a 
few are,” in his Kobitar katha (The story of a poem) the exemplarity of a 
poem’s coming into being is boldly vindicated.12 I would add to that by 
saying that all of us cannot be readers of poetry; some are and it is  because 
of such readers that poetry has survived. A  great poem is not for all. (Syl-
via Plath writes: “Surely the  great use of poetry is its pleasure— not its 
influence as religious and po liti cal propaganda. . . .  I am not worried that 
poems reach relatively few  people. As it is, they go surprisingly far— 
among strangers, around the world, even.)13 A  great poet speaks to all but 
is not understood by every one. Das points out that a poem is more than 
an inspiration, certainly more than a divine inspiration. A poem is not 
just about writing poetry.  People who think that a poem can be best writ-
ten  after one has educated herself in the native traditions and in the past 
and pres ent of his or her poetic culture are destined to be on a wrong path. 
A poem is a moment, a flicker of the candle light against a world in frag-
ments and disarray, a pause where the experience of it gradually moistens 
the heart and wells up in the head. Any desertion of this experience for-
bids the birth of a poem; it does not forbid the writing of poetry, though. 
It initiates the debates and arguments that poetry can bring through its 
deeply encompassive association with the world. A poem cannot always be 
discouraged from engaging with the circumambient world of politics, ide-
ologies, thoughts on culture, religion, and society. Many  great poems have 
constituted themselves through such investments. However, Das believes 
in a method where the poet cannot begin with a conscious submission to 
congeries of thoughts and discourses, a decisive devotion to established 
patterns of thinking; even if the poet does begin with conscious submis-
sion, it is the radiance of imagination that redeems such prefabricated, 
thoughtful drive. Allegiance to such strains of thought must hide the 
dominant beauty of a poem like blood corpuscles, veins, and arteries. A 
poem can unveil the prob lems and issues of life, but the unveiling is not 
conducted as if by a social scientist but in beauty, through satisfactions of 
the desires of imagination. Eliseo Vivas notes that “what the poem says or 
means is the world it reveals or discloses in and through itself, a new world, 
whose features, prior to the act of poetic revelation,  were concealed from 
us and whose radiance and even identity  will again be concealed from us 
the moment our intransitive attention lapses and we return to the world 
of afairs and of  things in which we normally live.”14 This is the kavya rasa 
(the rasa generally associated with poetry) that is to be distinguished from 
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the emotive experiences generated out of mere studious encounters with 
culture, science, and history.
Visvanatha, in Sahityadarpana (one of the most impor tant treatises in 
Sanskrit poetic theory, written in the late  fourteenth  century) considers 
poetry the soul, a kind of ordered, harmonious organism that can be under-
stood through the congruence and consonance of parts to the  whole and 
also through the  whole itself. Poetic composition is both a pro cess and 
a proj ect for closer (functional) examination that eventualizes in the 
production of rasa. Bharata, in Nāṭya Śāstra, written during the period 
between 200 bce and 200 ce, in classical India, points out that without 
rasa  there is no artha (meaning). A poem without rasa is unthinkable. Vis-
vanatha considers the existence of rasa equivalent to the experience of 
rasa; a poem builds its own taste much the way it is appreciated by a 
“man of taste” with his learning, experience, and understanding of jibon 
( life) and sahitya. Rasa ensures that the poem has a life in its readers. 
 Understanding rasa is synonymous with the understanding of a poem. 
Visvanatha identifies certain features for rasa: heightening of sattva 
(truth, goodness), its self- revelatory power, its ability to produce joy, 
thought, and won der. Rasa, thus, inculcates a kind of intelligibility, the 
poetic intelligibility. Honeywell argues that “in terms of the distinction 
between potentiality and actuality, the parts of a poetic composition fall into 
a hierarchy. The sentences, in both their repre sen ta tional capacity and 
their stylistic forms, are necessary conditions for the repre sen ta tion of 
conditions, consequents, and transitory feelings;  these three parts are 
necessary conditions for the repre sen ta tion of a dominant emotion; and 
the dominant emotion, in turn, is the necessary condition for the experi-
ence of rasa. It is as the ultimate member of this hierarchy that rasa is said 
to exist as the actualization of the full potentiality of the poetic compo-
sition.”15 Rasa is indivisible and contributes to the unification of the po-
etic experience. But it is a unity that is difficult to analyze  because rasa is 
considered indivisible. Parts of a poem, Visvanatha argues, are analyzable 
where each part contributes to the experience of the  whole. But the  whole 
is a rasa experience that exceeds analyzability and yet makes for the or ga-
ni za tion of the poem, its princi ple of order and orientation. Artha (mean-
ing), as Bharata has argued, is deeply  housed in rasa, which then functions 
as a poetic necessity. A  great poem, as Ramaranjan Mukherjee points out, 
 will have five ele ments: rasa, dhvani (suggestion, resonance), aucitya (pro-
priety), vakrata (poetic deviance), and aesthetic unity.16 Mukherjee works 
this out through a reading of Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” demonstrating 
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how the adbhuta (marvelous) leads to vibhava (development of a par tic u lar 
state of mind), then to anubhava (direct perception or cognition), and fi nally 
to the experience of the quietistic (santarasa). Working through profound 
suggestiveness, the poem, in the end, provides an aesthetic relish in san-
tarasa (the calm, the poise), an equanimity provided through the coming 
together of beauty and truth. The  whole poem, Mukherjee points out, “has 
emerged as a single aesthetic entity and when the appreciative reader gets 
absorbed in the Ode he neither remains conscious of the division of the 
poem into parts nor of the exact distinction between the explicit and the 
implicit.”17 So poetic meaning is a compound experience that cannot al-
ways remain open to the common minds. The immediate meaning is not 
enough to make the ultimate sense of a poem. This rasadi (the rasa mode) 
is integrally connected with kavi- vyapara (creative workings of the poet’s 
mind).
To what kavyarasa are Lu Ji (261–303), Tao Qian (365–427), and Liu Xie 
(465–522), the major poets and thinkers on poetics in Chinese lit er a ture, 
referring to when they try to figure the way meaning, words, expression, and 
emotion are bound together in a poem? Lu Ji describes poetic inspiration 
but fails to understand “the  causes of its ebb and flow.”18 Tao Qian, echo-
ing Zhuang Zi’s paradox, believes that “ great eloquence does not speak.” 
Liu Xie strug gles to clarify the harmony between yi (idea) and si (intuitive 
thought). In  these Chinese writers, kavyarasa is generated out of the par-
adoxical nature of poetry. Playing on the polysemy of the word jin, which 
can mean “fully express,” or “depleted,” or “finish,” Jiang Kui (1155–1221, 
Baishi Daoren shishuo, the white- stone Daoist’s discourse on poetry) in-
dicates that “if one can fully put into efect (jin) his discourse on poetry, 
one  will be able to write poetry, but if one thinks that this discourse has 
exhausted (jin) all the secrets of poetry, one  will not be a true poet.”19 This 
reminds me of how Confucius, in his reference to Shi jing (The book of 
poetry), looks into the four aspects of poetry: xing (to inspire), guan (to re-
flect), qun (to communicate), and yuan (to admonish). Wang Fuzhi’s com-
mentary is appreciatively cogent: “What is inspiring (xing) can be reflected 
( guan), thus making xing more profound; what is reflected ( guan) can be 
inspiring (xing), thus making guan more manifest; what is communicated 
(qun) leads to admonition ( yuan), thus making yuan more unforgettable; 
what is admonished ( yuan) leads to communication (qun), thus making 
qun more sincere and au then tic. . . .  There arises a natu ral flow of emo-
tions and feelings. The poet expresses his thought or message with consis-
tency whereas the reader undergoes an individual experience of diversity 
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due to his own emotions or mood.”20 Perhaps a poem invites us to read 
 after it has been understood. Yang Wanli (1127–1206) writes:
“Now, what is poetry about? [You may say] “Esteem its words; that is 
all.” But I say, “One who is good at poetry gets rid of the meaning.” “If 
so, then, having got rid of the words and the meaning, where would 
poetry exist?” I say, “Having got rid of the words and the meaning, then 
poetry has somewhere to exist.” “If so, then, where does poetry  really 
exist?” I say, “Have you ever tasted candy and tea? Who is not fond 
of candy? At first it is sweet, but in the end it turns sour. As for tea, 
 people complain of its bitterness, but before its bitterness is over, one is 
overcome by its sweetness. Poetry is also like this; that is all.”21
A poem ends and ends in a nonending, too, an exhaustion of words and 
an inexhaustibility of meaning. Yan Yu (1195–1245) believes in the con-
struction of a poem, but the act of piecing it together into a singular  whole 
might not always be pos si ble. A poem can be “like sound in the air, color in 
appearance, the moon in  water, or an image in the mirror; the words have an 
end, but the meaning is inexhaustible.”22 So a poem is “impure,” as Charles 
Simic astutely notes: a poem “is an attempt at self- recovery, self- recognition, 
self- remembering, the marvel of being again. That this happens at times, 
happens in poems in many dif er ent and contradictory ways, is as  great 
a mystery as the mystery of being itself and cause for serious thought.” I 
agree with Simic that a poem can, sometimes, be smarter than the poet.23
Act II
A poem immured to its cultural conditions of emergence is an act of unac-
ceptable reductionism. It is more than the culture that it springs from; 
rather, it is a culture by itself. Brett Bourbon argues that poems are “odd, 
funny kinds of  things— and that is both their danger and their promise 
and a further reason for the dependence of our interpretations on our 
judgments about the kind of  thing a poem is.”24 A poem is not like a chair. 
Bourbon notes, “When we want to cast poems or art as like chairs or such-
like objects, we ascribe functions to art, including the function of having 
no function. Such functions are stipulations.  There is no nontendentious 
way to establish a link between the posited function and the  thing the 
poem is.”25 So a poem is a source for worry, the unflappable worry of try-
ing to make use of it in much the same way a chair is used and pinned 
down to a par tic u lar function. A chair has a logic, a science of construct-
edness, a pattern of comprehension and completeness; a poem performs 
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its best when it surpasses the logic of everyday use and efectiveness. Lan-
guage is what becomes the vehicle of poetic thought and it is language 
again that aggravates the worry over a poem’s failure to produce a chairlike 
completeness and efficacy. Bourbon’s observation that “poems are radically 
dependent on ideas of poetry and that they do not constitute a par tic u lar 
kind of  thing” is quite in ter est ing.26 He argues that we eat the cake but we 
do not eat the concept; but, analogously, when we eat poems we also eat 
the concept of a poem. He argues: “It is not just that a par tic u lar poem 
is dependent on the concept of a poem in a particularly intimate way but 
that poems are funny kinds of  things that are always concepts of poems 
and never just poems. Hence  there is always an idea of poetry as such being 
expressed in a par tic u lar poem— and if we deny that, we turn the idea of 
poetry into something else— like the idea of culture or desire or of mind or 
of language.”27 Perhaps my exegesis on Words worth’s “Dafodils” in chap-
ter 5 of this book is a challenging rejoinder to a poem’s overcoming of the 
superintending power of the idea of poetry, Romantic poetry in par tic u lar. 
A poem makes its own place, makes itself out of place, is found, is lost, is dis-
covered, is nothing, is ignored. It scarcely has the logic of a novel and a play.
Kavyarasa can have its own logic; it is, on one hand, drawn from the full- 
bodied, structured, and familiar world and yet is not only facts. Charles 
Pierce considers any thought that ascribes what is not fact as poetry as 
“nonsense.” A poem is not just a fact alone.28 Kavyarasa emerges out of 
the poem’s ability to “repair to the material of experience,” as Santayana 
argues, “seizing hold of the real ity of sensation and fancy beneath the sur-
face of conventional ideas, and then out of that living but indefinite mate-
rial to build new structures, richer, finer, fitter to the primary tendencies 
of our nature, truer to the ultimate possibilities of the soul.”29 So the poem 
is a poem in its analyzability (I would argue, as the facts or the logic of 
a poem), within the summation of understanding that individual parts 
provide and yet how it is a “poem beyond a poem” in its surplus. William 
Poteat writes:
What we have to say, then, is that the poem in one sense is “about” 
the poem in another sense; that as having analyzable parts it is about 
an unanalyzable totality; and that no behavioural test— linguistic or 
other wise— can be used to determine that the poem as being about itself 
has been grasped. Or we may put it thus: the poem in itself as a totality 
is an aesthetic object, and, if anyone asks to be told what this is, nothing 
can be said except that it is that to which the poem in its analyzable parts 
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refers; it is the plus which is more than the analyzable parts and about 
which nothing  else can be said, other than that  there is something which 
the poem is “about” concerning which nothing can be said.30
The “plus” is what, most often, makes a poem. The plus is a poem, too. 
Poetry often builds its own knowledge, a consciousness of itself, without 
being aware of an activity outside itself. It is a world to itself, commits 
a deep faith in “worlding” and has its own mysteries— its own unique ways 
to awaken to itself, the poetic state; but, it also is not merely mysterious and 
enigmatic. Inwardness is not just poetic knowledge. Maritain writes 
beautifully:
It is surely true that one can be a poet without producing— without 
having yet produced— any work of art; but if one is a poet, he is virtu-
ally turned  toward operation: it is essential to poetry to be in the line 
of operation just as the tree is in the line of the fruit. But in becoming 
self- conscious, or aware of itself, poetry releases itself in some mea sure 
from the work to be done. For knowing itself means turning back upon 
itself, upon its inner sources. Thus poetry enters into conflict with art, 
though by nature poetry is bound to follow the way of art. Whereas 
art requires an intellectual shaping according to a creative idea, poetry, 
 under such circumstances, asks to remain passive, to listen, to descend 
to the roots of being, to the unknown which no idea can circumscribe.31
This is the “in- drawing magic” of the poem that Abbe Bremond qualifies as 
the call “to a quietude, where we have nothing more to do than be carried, 
but actively, by one greater and better than we are. Prose, a lively and leap-
ing phosphorescence which pulls us away from ourselves. Poetry, a reminder 
of the inward.”32  There is something strongly “inward” about a poem. A 
poem does not forget its own in de pen dence to come into being: eating the 
poem (experiencing and feeling the poem) but not the concept of poetry. 
If a poem has its conflict with art and again manifests its subservience to 
art, one must know how a poem practices the art of  going beyond art— the 
poem  going beyond a poem.
A brief note on Muhammad Mandur’s shi’rmahmtis (whispered poetry) 
can be in ter est ing  here. Mandur, a foremost thinker in Arabic literary criti-
cism, saw ulfa (intimacy) as the serious demerit of con temporary Egyptian 
lit er a ture. Lit er a ture, primarily poetry, has to be “sincere.” Whispered po-
etry is difficult to describe: a difficulty which is its charm, begetting a mel-
ody that is not ordinary rhythm and also delicate sentiments which sug-
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gestive language evokes. It is a compound experience and not something 
that legitimizes the overloading of ideological content. Semah explains 
that Mandur did not consider poetry “a collection of plain statements 
but a mixture of suggestive images; in it  music is equally, if not more, 
efective in capturing the reader’s mind.” Contributing to the tradition of 
New poetry, Mandur speaks of the importance of delicate emotions and 
vivid perceptions in poetry and how that needs to be reflected with sub-
tlety through poetic expression. New poetry, “by virtue of its genuineness 
achieves the quality of whispered secrets,” a quality that is “distinct from 
rhe toric and jingling verse.”33 Semah points out further that “poetry was 
no longer a kind of oratorical composition to be declaimed at public cere-
monies, for which the old form might still be suitable. It was now intended 
to be read and ‘whispered’; in many cases it became a kind of confidential 
dialogue between  human beings. The new musical scheme was the most 
appropriate for this dialogue which, far from resorting to rhe toric, con-
tented itself with ‘whispering truth’ (sidqhdmis).”34 But poetic experience 
is not wholly conceptualizable: it is not about grasping the foundations of 
experience. A poem is a flow and not pronouncedly a code whose essences 
and experiences are never realized noisily through the “tin- opener” theory 
of interpretation that peers into the poem with investigative triumph.35 
Maritain argues that “poetry dislikes noise” and insightfully warns that “if 
you try to make use of poetic knowledge for knowing, it vanishes in your 
hands.”36
A poem is both a plan and a chance, Frost’s momentary stay against con-
fusion, achieved through clarification and “lucky events.”37 It is directed 
and is directional. Indeed, I share Stevens’s not- too- confident assertion 
that “perhaps  there is no such  thing as  free  will in poetry.”38 Chance and 
choice hang together— fairness of  will and the strangeness of impulse. The 
figure that a poem makes is both about a poet’s being a “poetic mecha-
nism” and the poem’s having an autonomic growth, in the sense that “it 
is what [the poet] wanted it to be without knowing before it was writ-
ten what [he] wanted it to be, even though [he] knew before it was written 
what [he] wanted to do.”39 Writing a poem, Stevens notes, is like reading 
the page of a large book where the poem, with its resonant and rhythmic 
steps, builds like an “an unwritten rhe toric that is always changing and to 
which the poet must always be turning.”40 While writing a poem, the poet 
knows “the plea sure of powers that create a truth that cannot be arrived 
at by the reason alone.”41 The conscious and the unconscious, known and 
the unknown, meet in a chiaroscuro. So a poem is an “integration” of two 
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states of experience, which, however, is mostly fortuitous: “It is not always 
easy to say  whether one is thinking or feeling or  doing both at the same 
time.” A poem has its own “taking place,” a power that the mind lends the 
poem and the power that it draws out of us without our being conscious 
about it. Stevens delicately argues that “it is curious how a subject once 
chosen grows like a beanstalk  until it seems as if  there had never been 
anything  else in the world.”42 But experience, as I have tried to argue, has 
to connect with language; rather, “style” and the subject are peculiarly lig-
atured. Language needs to be ambitious to accommodate and carry over 
experiences, resulting in more dhvani (resonances, obliquity). Ingenuity of 
language makes a better story out of the poem.  Every word has a begin-
ning in the story of a poem and  every word does not end with a beginning. 
Beginning continues  every time a poem  settles in to grow. The vocabulary 
of the poem is seldom preformed.
Miller’s adroit demonstration of the motive of meta phor through an 
engaging discussion of Stevens’s “The Motive for Meta phor” happily mo-
tivates me  here to see what meta phor and its transcontinental cousins 
rupaka (meta phor) and bi (to compare) in Sanskrit and Chinese poetics do 
in the story of a poem. Miller rolls his rhetorical reading into top gear to 
produce several in ter est ing spaces in meaning and poetic experience and 
leaves me to won der  whether meta phor could be considered one of the 
ways of looking at the philosophy and aesthetics of across (exhilarations 
of exchanges), which is my predominant motif in the book. Meta phor in 
poetry carries the vector of transference (in the Aristotelian sense of the 
term) and indirectness that does not meet with much enthusiasm from 
thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Meta phor, indeed, is much 
more than a rhetorical device ( book 3 of Aristotle’s Rhe toric and chap-
ters 21–25 in his Poetics tell us this). Meta phorization is an art—an intuitive 
poetic ingenuity— that generates an efficacious contiguity of apparently 
disconnected  things or thoughts (“unapprehended relations of  things,” as 
Shelley points out in A Defence of Poetry), resulting in plea sure, won der, 
and charm.43 Miller, I would like to believe, must be in agreement with me 
over the “inherent tension” that meta phor holds and in being considered, 
often, as poetry itself. Meta phor changes, through shock and unusual rap-
prochement, the way we look at a poem, its world, and the world we inhabit. 
The poem, then, is like constructing an “interminable building” reared by 
the “observation of affinities / In objects where no brotherhood exists / 
To passive minds.”44 Persian literary criticism sees istiʿāra (meta phor) as 
eloquently pregnant; meta phor states with signification and potency and 
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often exists as a puzzle waiting to be unveiled before the discerning eye. 
Seyed- Gohrab points out that “Persian rhetorical manuals concentrate 
on vari ous categories of meta phors. Meta phors usually underlie other 
rhetorical figures, and the other figures are commonly used to enhance a 
meta phor. One of the most common terms for meta phor is istiʿāra, mean-
ing literally ‘to borrow.’ The term is often regarded in rhetorical manuals as 
a subcategory of majāz and stands in contrast to literal (ḥaqīqī) meaning. 
Meta phor is also discussed in philosophical and religious manuals, with 
somewhat dif er ent definitions in the vari ous disciplines. Authors define 
the term in relation to other adjacent terms such as simile (tashbīh), ex-
emplification (tamthīl) or rhetorical ornament ( badīʿ ).”45 Ideas of affinities 
and resemblance ( borrowing as a critical act) get us closer to yi in Chinese, 
which means “to attach or cling to.” The Confucian scholar Kong Yingda 
(574–648) points out: “To cling means to cling to analogies. If one wants to 
learn poetry, one must first cling to and rely on extensive analogies. If one 
does not study extensive analogies, one cannot master poetry, for poetry 
is analogies.”46 Michelle Yeh shows us how the word bi also functions to 
demonstrate the complexities of comparison and analogy: “Bi as the trope 
of analogy or meta phor in the poetic tradition is derived from a number 
of sources, all of which suggest affinity and complementarity. Compared 
with Western meta phor,  there is an essential diference in their etymo-
logical import. Whereas meta phor literally means ‘to carry (pherein) over 
(meta),’ thus underlining the movement of transference from the vehicle 
to the tenor, from the signifier to the signified, bi emphasizes affinity or 
intimacy ( yi) and even sameness (matching).”47
Understanding bi and the dynamics of meta phor gets us trans(in)fu-
sionally across to rupaka in Sanskrit poetics. Miller’s strong and subtle 
under standing of motive in and for meta phor in Stevens draws me closer 
to Frost’s critical obsession with meta phor, or rupaka. Frost considers 
meta phor not as a  simple and static pairing- of correspondence but as a 
way to establish abheda- pradhana (non diference dominant). Kapil Ka-
poor points out that meta phor established abheda “non diference” be-
tween two dif er ent entities and “teachers of poetics prefer to use the 
concept of abheda, identity, to describe the efect of the meta phor.” And 
so when the bheda, diference, is removed from a simile, we are in the world 
of meta phor that is creative and vital and endowed with critical ampli-
tude.48 Frost’s princi ple of correspondence in meta phor finds a parallel 
in the way Visvanatha in Sahityadarpana perceives the critical unfolding 
of rupaka, as a way of discriminating meaning from the language that 
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contains it.49 Let us try to understand this point by an instance from 
“Birches” again.
He always kept his poise
To the top branches, climbing carefully
With the same pains you use to fill a cup
Up to the brim, and even above the brim. (35–38)
The obviousness of the comparison underlines the pain, restraint, care, 
and poise that combine to lend the proper spirit to art. The meta phor of the 
cup’s filling up to the brim without being threatened by a spillover forms 
the very essence of Frost’s poetic art. This apparently  simple but superbly 
delicate meta phor addresses the notions of Frost’s dual answerabilities 
to society and individual energy, pointing to the urgency of maintaining 
poise. His conscious art lies in understanding the brim and how mea sur-
ing up to it can be disguised as spontaneity. This meta phor, also, has the 
quality of letting us know that  there is an aesthetic buildup, a careful atti-
tude to art (careful being one of Frost’s favorite words) and also a step that 
is careless. Frost’s art strives to perfection through a careful design that 
is not made meretriciously obvious but is adroitly guised in its expres-
sive depth and amplitude, word- idea integration, and the synchronicity of 
meter and feeling. Frost’s meta phorization is akin to Rudrata’s (a ninth- 
century Kashmiri poet and literary theorist) idea of pushtartha, the matu-
rity in meaning and ideation. It is not mere anumana (inference) through 
intellection but an investment in possibilities that probe the inherent re-
lations among images, words, and ideas; this results in new formations, 
figures. Frost’s insistence on the proper poetical education by meta phor 
approximates an aesthetic creativity that hinges on upamaprapancha— the 
construct (with a strong creative bias) of similitude, an impor tant organ-
izing princi ple in Sanskrit poetics. Yet, such aesthetic creativity hinging 
on upamaprapancha is neither a self- determinate pro gress nor a jumping 
grasshopper “whose day’s work gets him nowhere.”50 One can easily note 
that the meta phor has neither a predisposed march in its meaningful ex-
pansion nor a directionless consequence; rather, in its inherent richness 
of networking relations (what we can term sambandha, deep correspon-
dence) we discover an organ izing princi ple whose function depends on 
thought formations and poetic knowledge. Efective figural expression is 
bound to have a wider reach as it contributes through discipline and direc-
tion to the concretization of feeling.51
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So meta phor is meta- phora, literally meaning “between motion,” initi-
ating a kind of change (phora), a translocation of meaning, a momentum 
for the across. The emphasis, through readerly intervention and linguistic 
potency and prowess, on the poem’s ability to see one  thing, something, 
another  thing, and another  thing as coming together in radiant exhila-
rations can bear extraordinary consequences where words can lose their 
“painful definiteness,” words can have their  career “without meaning,” 
and words get “murmured over and over, in continuing suspiration” (in 
the words of Miller). I am tempted to join voices with Miller by arguing 
that meta phor provokes roads not taken, which shrink from “the weight 
of primary noon, / The A B C of being,” for  there is something that stands 
beneath and holds the poem up. Miller perceptively observes that “if the 
poet can bring meta phors to bear can he hope to escape.” This makes the 
category of the “X,” mentioned in the poem’s final line, mysterious—an 
amazing cohabitation of afect through the use of words such as vital and 
fatal. A poem has its own allegiance to truths that it cannot shrink from. 
But a poem is also built through shrinking from the “weight of primary 
noon.”52 The trans character of meta phor is in ter est ing to understand po-
etry: meta phor, rupaka, yi and istiʿāra exist as resemblance. Stevens writes 
in “Three Academic Pieces”: “As the mere satisfying of a desire, it is pleas-
ur able. But poetry if it did nothing but satisfy a desire would not rise above 
the level of many lesser  things. Its singularity is that in the act of satisfy-
ing the desire for resemblance it touches the sense of real ity, it enhances 
the sense of real ity, heightens it, intensifies it. If resemblance is described 
as a partial similarity between two dissimilar  things, it complements and 
reinforces that which the two dissimilar  things have in common.”53 This 
holds an intimate, figurative, rhe toric, productive, and transportative di-
mension. A poem would know how to find the “organism” among  things.
A poem’s truth is a distinct form of knowing, a belief in situatedness, 
a tradition, as Gadamer would argue. Embeddedness in tradition is not 
response to neutrality, but a response to values, “fore- meanings,” or preju-
dices.54 Gadamer’s restitution of prejudice is not relativism but invitations 
to horizon meanings across cultures and historical situations. A poem, for 
me, cannot overcome its prejudices, that is, the prejudgments, the logical- 
linguistic space for understanding both itself and its limitations. It answers 
questions and questions itself within an aesthetic that recognizes both the 
virtues of the poem and what the poem does to us. A good poem always 
outbounds its premises, its formalist aesthetic thresholds, the poem  going 
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beyond the poem. So a poem does not have an “alienated consciousness” 
and is competently enabling in its connection with both itself and its out-
side. It is disclosive and also makes us see again what we always saw and 
have been seeing— a delicate mix of aesthetics and ethics, of art and life, 
the reordering game between the past and pres ent. A poem’s morality is in 
the “other,” in building a community, staying in communities and in gen-
erating a taste. It, to appropriate Gadamer again, is like celebrating a festival 
where intention brings all  under the common sky, although perspectives 
and positions can be dif er ent. A poem is the common ground, the site of 
cele bration, the rendezvous of the ordinary and extraordinary. It has an 
order that is strangely elusive. This results in its becoming dispensable, a 
nonserious art consigned to be read when one has temporal abundance 
and vacuous leisure.
Act III
William Matchett rightly observes that “a poem may include arguments, 
however, or may even end with an overtly didactic summary, as long as 
such arguments or summaries are not destructive of the form of the expe-
rience. Nevertheless, to abstract the idea from the experience—which is the 
poem and to call that abstraction the ‘meaning,’ is to deny the poem’s very 
significance. Not the abstract idea but a complex and vital experience— 
the poem—is the meaning. The poem is its own meaning;  there is no para-
phrase for it.”55 What precision can language produce in communicating 
poetic experience? A poem cannot have the purity of mathe matics, where 
language communicates facts with precision and definitude. The impre-
cision in language, the resonance, the bee in the  bottle, owes to a poem’s 
investments in communicating “ human experience” that cannot always be 
defined with scientific rigor. Matchett observes pertinently that a “ human 
being is the continuing fact of his own consciousness. This is his point of 
contact with the world, a world which can come to him, from moment to 
moment and at any given moment, only through his awareness of it. Even 
his own thoughts, memories, and dreams can impinge only as experiences 
if he is to ‘have’ them. His life consists in his continuing perception, in 
the unremitting flow of complex experiences—inter- related sensations, 
thoughts, and feelings— with his sense of self at the center of this flow. 
Science can explain many aspects of perception, and of  things perceived, 
but it cannot deal with the primary  human fact of experience itself.”56 A 
poem and its relationship with language, then, is invested in nicety, sug-
gestion, and discrimination.
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A poet can work with words as objects but the poem is not something 
that forms out of a par tic u lar arrangement of material objects. A poem 
surpasses the “material” to become not merely inefable but an event that 
cannot be logically burnt out. Words change and just  don’t stay words 
as material objects— undispersed and immovable. Working into a poem 
they frame their own narratives, stories in sounds and images. Poems are 
set in motion, unremitting and per sis tent. Words  will be repeated. Struc-
tures (meter and rhyme, for instance)  will be repeated, too. But repetition 
is a way of undoing the word, the image, the thought, the afect, and the 
materiality of expression. This undoing is the real  doing of a poem.
The  whole question of the poetic is inscribed in “play.” The Wittgensteinian 
silence over poetic language, the creative refigurations of the language- 
games, does not discount a kind of acknowledgement of the rough ground 
of the ordinary and living language (as revealed through a closer reading 
of Philosophical Investigations). Unlike Wittgenstein, who strug gled to 
move out of the rule- boundedness of language, Gadamer is more sensitive 
to the empowerments that the language of poetry may have— the every-
day language and how that forms into the language of poetry. Everyday 
language, as Gadamer notes, “points to something  behind itself and dis-
appears  behind it.”57 But how does the “small change” of everyday lan-
guage change into the “gold coins” of the language of poetry?58 Words have 
intention and are expected to be intentional but intention is never always 
truth serving (in the sense in which the truth of words is trustworthy) or 
meaning efficient. It can also be participation in the creation of a dif er ent 
level of answerabilities ( language standing before us), unintended acts of 
speaking, and problematical investigations of “intentions.” Gadamer sees 
“eminent sense of the word,” the sense that retrieves the word from being 
lost into the materiality of use.59 Words dis appear but gold- like reveal a 
corporeality that is eminent, a coming to life that becomes an event in 
poem- encountering. This makes us consider the “fusion of horizons” at a 
new level of understanding. The language of poetry builds in dialogue; it is 
performative and cannot merely be a propositional submission to truth- 
functionality. It draws on a kind of livingness, forms of life and riddles 
that words create in trying to express life and conditions.  There is no de-
nying Gadamer that a text also has to return to speech, the contexts of 
speaking, the address and establishment of the written word. But how 
do we deny play? A poem plays with rules and the arbitrariness of rules, 
a strange, regulative beauty that is socially derived, drawn up on internal 
kinesis, and built through a logic that is not always restrictive. It is a truth, 
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a story, that tells many tales playfully, through games, often superseding 
the consciousness of the individual. So a poem is not how the individual 
plays with it but a play itself, a playfulness that involves reason and the 
reason to outplay reason.60
This playfulness is the dhvani (suggestion) on which a poem builds it-
self. Suggestiveness brings out the full strength of language. A poem is the 
“connect” with experiences that we sundered ourselves from, the experi-
ences that our daily grind deadened us to. So a poem is like a stained 
glass, arresting “attention in its own intricacies, [confusing] it in its own 
glories, and is even at times allowed to darken and puzzle in the hope of 
casting over us a super natu ral spell.”61 This reminds me of how Octavio Paz 
reconsiders this connection with words and the experiences of the world 
around us. Words need our passions, senses, eagerness, and curiosities to 
be born and stay alive. They examine the world, the poet, and the poem 
itself. Words connect with the circumambient world, with our sensations, 
our thoughts, and desires, and in the pro cess seize the poem, too. Compar-
ing Paz with André Breton, Ricardo Gullón observes that “the language of 
passion and the passion of language are on good terms with one another, 
that they are the recto and verso page of the same attitude. Moreover, 
language is where song happens.  There is no song without words, even 
though a song can be diminished to a susurration or concealed in a num-
ber.”62 This faith in words circumscribes the Spanish poet Jorge Guillén’s 
vision of poetry, where the language of poetry does not discount any word 
in advance  because any expression, as Guillén points out in Lenguaje y 
poesia, “can give shape to the phrase.”63 It has a demo cratic approach to 
words but implicates a closer examination of words than what we usually 
do in prose. The relationship between language and experience is vexed 
and opinions are divided over the ac cep tance of the insufficiency of lan-
guage and unrepresentability of experiences. I would like to see both, the 
insufficiency of language and the reparative and restorative ability of the 
poet’s craft, as constituent paradigms in the making of a poem. What Gé-
rard Genette calls “secondary Cratylism” brings home the dialectic of the 
arbitrariness of linguistic signs and the poet’s commitment to redeem 
them through care, concern, and convergence.64 The language of poetry is 
inscribed in this tension and, through dhvani and vakrokti (oblique expres-
sion), continually prepares to remunerate, rather, refurbish language’s in-
built deficits and constraints.
Dhvani is an impor tant segment in the story of the poem, in the unfold-
ing story of resonant poeming. Dhvani is the unsaid meaning, the sugges-
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tiveness of the poem, its unique strength and charm. Anandavardhana in 
his Dhanyaloka would consider the indirectness of meaning as the poet’s 
greatest art. I would interpret this as the kind of indirect listening that 
a poem generates. Anandavardhana was the “first Indian critic to state 
that a rasa cannot be directly expressed” and rasa and suggestive poetry 
are integrally connected.65 He believed that only  those “figures of speech 
which are in conformity to rasa are capable of imparting suggestivity to the 
sense.”66 Rasa and suggestion can work together to produce three kinds of 
poetry: Dhvanikavya (the highest form of poetry, where dhvani and rasa are 
intertwined to produce the best of poetic efect), Gunibhutavyangyakavya 
(“it is that kind of poetry in which rasa is suggested, but it is made subservi-
ent to the striking features of the primary sense.  Here the suggested sense 
contributes to the primary sense by enhancing its beauty.”), and Citrakavya 
(the lowest class of poetry, where the emphasis is on the “va ri e ties of ex-
pression” and where rasa is thinly felt).67A poem is an emotion of a thought 
(in the words of Frost) and both a rasa of a dhvani and dhvani of a rasa.
Dhvani can be seen to have a corresponding approval in Chinese poetics, 
where Anshi (suggestion) comes with surplus and meaning that invariably 
surpasses words.  There is, indeed, a text beyond the text, brought about 
through yan wai zhi yi (meanings beyond the expressed words), xian wai zhi 
yin (the sound of the string), xiangwai zhi xiang (images beyond the image), 
weiwai zhi zhi (flavors beyond the flavor), and hanxu (subtle reserve).68 
Wang Fuzhi expresses the importance of suggestiveness over descriptive-
ness: “Where the spirit of the ink shoots out, it reaches the extremities of 
the four directions without being exhausted. Where  there are no words, 
the meaning is everywhere.”69 A good poem finds what Liu Xie calls the yin 
(the concealed, the rich implications beyond the text). The yin in the story 
of the poem lends vaicitrya. It is a diversity that draws its life from what 
Kuntaka advocates as vakrokti. Vakratva, or Vakra- bhava, creates a striking 
expression (ukti- vaicitrya) that makes the poetic experience extraordinary 
and exciting. It is  here that the poet exhibits his skill (kavi- kausala) and acts 
of imagination (kavi- vyapara). Kuntaka argues that a special kind of vakya- 
vakrata (obliquity of expression) must combine the svabhava (character) of 
an object,  whether sahaja (natu ral) or aharya (worked up), and this “forms 
the legitimate theme for heightened expression,” allowing it as “one of the 
ele ments of the simpler Sukumara- marga (delicate style).”70 Vakrokti, as po-
etic deviance, is not completely what Dandin calls atisayokti (hyperbole) 
 because that narrows the scope of the concept. It transgresses the ordinary 
and induces strikingness that lends charm to a poem.
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Sethna observes, “Poetry shot through and through with mystery by 
a movement of intense rhythmical feeling which weaves a word- pattern 
whose drift eludes the thinker in us: this is Housman’s conception of ‘pure 
poetry.’ But he does not say that poets should aim at nothing except such 
a word- pattern. What he emphasizes is that any poetic word- pattern is 
poetry by an ele ment that, however, mixed with thought, is  really in de-
pen dent of it and can be best considered a stir of emotion. To touch us 
and move us is the function of poetry.”71 A good poem moves us, makes 
claims on patience, keeps us embraced in a thought, allowing a certain 
experience to build in words and ideas to have a tenure of their own. Reading 
poetry is not rushing the subway of thought to catch the train of mean-
ing. It is education in toleration for thoughts that baffle, is sustainment in 
complicated bends of thinking and meta phorical trajectories— “drunken 
song” (in the words of Frost) with a happy- sad blend. Dylan Thomas notes 
that “a good poem is a contribution to real ity. The world is never the same 
once a poem has been added to it. A good poem helps to change the shape 
and significance of the universe, helps to extend every one’s knowledge of 
himself and the world around him.”72 Caught amid dif er ent takeof points 
in life, experiencing a poem is both an ordinary and extraordinary act, as 
the Indian poet- philosopher- mystic Sri Aurobindo affirms. For him, the 
planes of consciousness and poetic inspiration are connected: his over-
head note in poetry mentions the Higher Mind, the Illumined Mind, the 
Intuitive Mind, and the Overmind, which considers sight as the essential 
poetic gift, the inner seeing and sense, a vein of comfort touching points 
of life- truths, values, fun, and play.73 The story of the poem adds to the 
stories of our lives, our worlds, our own understanding of who and what 
we are. However,
If, in writing poetry, you insist it must be this poem
Then certainly you are not one who understands poetry.74
A poem poems. The story begins.
I begin with some dialogical comments on Ranjan Ghosh’s chapter  3, 
“The Story of a Poem.” I agree with what he says at the beginning about 
the efect of current changes on writing, reading, and teaching poetry. He 
emphasizes, as I do, social, po liti cal, and technological changes, especially 
ubiquitous digitalization.
Ghosh’s chapter, moreover, is, among other  things, a learned and lucid 
introduction to Sanskrit, Chinese, and Arabic theories of poetry. Most 
Westerners know  little about  these. Ghosh’s chapter is especially original 
in the way it mixes his accounts of Eastern theoretical terminology about 
poetry with many citations from diverse Western sources. The implica-
tion, as in Ghosh’s other chapters for this book, is that a comprehensive 
set of transcontinental ideas about poetry exists, though that set is com-
plex and diverse. Ghosh tends to assume that a poem may be reasonable 
but gives the reader access to something beyond reason.
I have learned especially from Ghosh’s chapter about the ancient San-
skrit concept of rasa. Rasa is to a considerable degree the key or sovereign 
term in Ghosh’s account of Eastern theories of poetry. Ghosh’s chapter 
develops a subtle, complex, and capacious theory of poetry. His chapter 
makes use of conceptual and figurative assertions from many traditions, 
including diverse ones in the West, about what poetry is and what it is good 
for. A good example is the passages, often depending on figures of speech, 
about poetry and writing poetry that Ghosh cites from Wallace Stevens’s 
letters and prose works. He does not, however, in his chapter investigate 
 whether or not Stevens’s poetry fits what Stevens says about poetry. That 
strikes me as an impor tant question. Ghosh, happily, leaves it to me to try 
to do that in what follows in this chapter.
I have a quasi scientific commitment to beginning with the evidence. 
The evidence in this case is a short text that most  people would agree is a 
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WESTERN THEORIES OF POETRY
Reading Wallace Stevens’s “The Motive for Meta phor”
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poem. I want to clear my mind as much as pos si ble (it is not  really pos si ble, 
of course) of presuppositions about what poetry is and does. I want to try 
to identify as exactly as I can what actually happens when I read Stevens’s 
short poem “The Motive for Meta phor.”
My primary interest in teaching and writing about lit er a ture has al-
ways been accounting for specific literary texts by reading them for my-
self. I want to identify what they  really say, how they say it, and how that 
 matters to me. Theory, for me, is ancillary to reading poems. Theory is a 
handmaiden, not a queen who is a sovereign end in herself. Theory, for 
me, comes inductively,  after reading, not before. In this I agree with Aris-
totle. Aristotle’s Poetics,  after all, the founding text in Western literary the-
ory, is essentially a reading of Sophocles’s Oedipus the King. Aristotle wants 
to develop an abstract terminology to account for the salient features of 
that play in its context of other Athenian tragedies and their social uses.
I have, in my chapter 10 for this book, identified,  under the aegis of 
questions about “the authority of lit er a ture,” the main theories of poetry 
in the West. What is most striking about  these theories is their diversity 
and their rootedness in changing historical contexts. My goal in this chap-
ter is not to explore  these theories. It would take a book to do this ade-
quately, and then some. I just want to account for what happens to me 
when I read a single poem by Stevens.
I do not know at this point just where my exploration of Stevens’s “The 
Motive for Meta phor”  will lead me. If I knew already where I am  going 
with my reading of this poem, it would not be worth the bother of  going 
 there. In its own modest way, my account of Stevens’s poem  will exem-
plify what Stevens himself says, in a passage Ghosh cites from Stevens’s 
Opus Posthumous, about his own experience of writing a poem: “It is what 
I wanted it to be without knowing before it was written what I wanted it to 
be, even though I knew before it was written what I wanted to do.”1
What I want to do is to account for what happens in my mind, feel-
ings, and body when I try to come to terms with Stevens’s “The Motive for 
Meta phor.” My claim is that this is much stranger than one might assume. 
It is not something that can be summarized as “making logical sense of 
the poem.”  Here is the poem in its entirety. It is the second poem in Ste-
vens’s Transport to Summer (1947).2 How do I know for sure it is a poem? 
For vari ous reasons. It appears in a book by Wallace Stevens entitled The 
Collected Poems. It fits the usual conventions in the West for the way a 
poem, especially a modernist poem, should look on the page. It is printed 
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in lines, the first words of which are capitalized. The lines do not go to 
the right margin. It is printed in five four- line stanzas separated by blank 
lines. The printed lines more or less (not always) alternate five beat lines 
with four beat ones, though rhyme is not used. Most literary scholars in 
the West would agree that it is a poem. One might guess from the absence 
of rhyme that it is a modernist poem. It would seem perverse to say that 
it is not a poem. I emphasize this  because assuming it is a poem brings in 
all sorts of conventional expectations about the text’s form and meaning, 
as well as the question of the relation between hermeneutics and stylistics 
that operates when you try to understand it:
the motive for meta phor
You like it  under the trees in autumn,
 Because every thing is half dead.
The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves
And repeats words without meaning.
In the same way, you  were happy in spring,
With the half colors of quarter- things,
The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds,
The single bird, the obscure moon— 
The obscure moon lighting an obscure world
Of  things that would never be quite expressed,
Where you yourself  were never quite yourself
And did not want nor have to be,
Desiring the exhilarations of changes:
The motive for meta phor, shrinking from
The weight of primary noon,
The A B C of being.
The ruddy temper, the hammer
Of red and blue, the hard sound— 
Steel against intimation— the sharp flash,
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X.3
Why have I chosen this poem? I have done so somewhat arbitrarily, but 
primarily  because it is, like only three other poems by Stevens, not only 
overtly about meta phor but also has the word meta phor in its title. Many or 
even most  people would agree that meta phor and other related figures 
of speech are essential to the way poetry works. Aristotle in the Poetics, 
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 after all, said, in his inaugural wisdom, “By far the greatest  thing is the 
use of meta phor. That alone cannot be learnt; it is the token of genius. 
For the right use of meta phor means an eye for resemblances.”4 Moreover, 
the power of meta phor is one of the big topics in Stevens’s prose works, 
gathered in The Necessary Angel and in Opus Posthumous.5  These works are 
full of provocative formulations about meta phor. An example is one of the 
Adagia (a wonderful collection of adages about poetry) that says, “Meta-
phor creates a new real ity from which the original appears to be unreal.”6 
If I  were to try to account for all Stevens affirms about meta phor in his prose 
works, or even just about what he says about the motive for meta phor, I 
might never be done with  doing that, so subtle, abundant, and contradic-
tory is what Stevens says. I might never be able to turn to “The Motive for 
Meta phor.” So I set all that aside, as I  will do  later with Aristotle, Benjamin, 
de Man, and Derrida.
Well, what actually happens in my mind, feelings, and body when I 
(you) read the poem? Let me confess at once that it is impossible for me 
to read the poem without theoretical presuppositions, however tacit, just 
as it impossible for me to read it without the implicit awareness of all I 
remember (quite a lot) about Stevens’s life and work, about other criti-
cism of his work, and about the many previous essays I have written about 
Stevens’s poetry. I have not just stumbled on a copy of the poem among 
autumn leaves, an ignorance the American New Critics tended to assume 
was the best starting point for reading a poem. An example is Cleanth 
Brooks and Robert Penn Warren in Understanding Poetry.7 Many of the 
students who used Understanding Poetry in courses  were in just that situa-
tion of fairly complete ignorance.
Just to put my terminological cards on the  table at once, let me say that 
I have had much in mind recently the distinction Paul de Man, following 
Walter Benjamin, makes between hermeneutics and poetics or stylistics. 
Rhetorical reading or stylistics or poetics (de Man uses all three terms) is 
attention to the way the tropological dimension of any discourse inter-
feres with its statement of a clear, logical meaning. That is one reason I 
was attracted to Stevens’s “The Motive for Meta phor.” It seems to be about 
that issue. Benjamin, and de Man  after him, claims that poetics (die Art des 
Meinens, the way meanings are expressed) interferes with hermeneutics 
(das Gemeinte, what is meant).
 Here is what de Man says, in a wonderfully ironic passage in “Con-
clusions: Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator,’ ” about this 
interference:
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When you do hermeneutics, you are concerned with the meaning of 
the work; when you do poetics, you are concerned with the stylistics 
or with the description of the way in which a work means. The ques-
tion is  whether  these two are complementary,  whether you can cover 
the full work by  doing hermeneutics and poetics at the same time. The 
experience of trying to do this shows that it is not the case. When one 
tries to achieve this complementarity, the poetics always drops out, and 
what one always does is hermeneutics. One is so attracted by prob lems 
of meaning that it is impossible to do hermeneutics and poetics at the 
same time. From the moment you start to get involved with prob lems 
of meaning, as I unfortunately tend to do, forget about the poetics. 
The two are not complementary, the two may be mutually exclusive in 
a certain way, and that is part of the prob lem which Benjamin states, a 
purely linguistic prob lem.8
The play of pronouns  here (one, you, I) implies that I cannot avoid re-
peating, for example, in this essay, the betrayal de Man names and with 
rueful irony confesses to performing. I do hermeneutics at the expense 
of poetics, as when I try, more or less in spite of myself, to identify what 
Stevens says in this poem, even though I say I just want to report what 
happens in my mind and imagination when I read the poem. The latter is 
something quite dif er ent from hermeneutics. Asking what Stevens  really 
says implies that what he says can be clearly identified and paraphrased, 
that such clarity is not fatally interfered with by the way Stevens says it.
Theory is re sis tance to reading, as de Man argues in his extremely com-
plex essay entitled “The Re sis tance to Theory,” though he does not say so 
in so many words.9 Theory is re sis tance to reading, apparently  because 
theory pretends to foresee clearly the results of reading (demystification 
of aberrational acts of taking meta phors literally), whereas reading itself 
is unpredictable. You never know beforehand just what you are  going to 
find in a given text. Each genuine reading is, consequently, sui generis. It 
is not reducible to the application of a formula that knows what it is  going 
to find. I claim, therefore, that the distinction between hermeneutics and 
stylistics raises questions rather than programming answers.
When you read “The Motive for Meta phor,” you may first note that the 
title tells you that the theme of the poem, its hermeneutical meaning, is 
identification of the motive for meta phor. The poem is about the question of 
what motivates the poet or any other person to use the evasions of meta-
phor to avoid thinking of the “A B C of being,” what ever that is. You may 
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also note that motive and meta phor alliterate. This suggests some obscure 
connection between the words, perhaps by way of the fact that motive can 
also mean “motif,” which a meta phor might be, especially if it or similar 
meta phors recur in a text.
I then note that you is the first word of the poem. Stevens does not say, 
“I like it  under the trees in autumn.” He says, “you like it  under the trees.” 
The you works in two ways at once. The poet is clearly addressing himself, 
self- reflectively, dividing himself into two persons: the one who likes it 
 under the trees in autumn and the one who reflects on what that liking 
means. At the same time the poet is addressing the reader as “you” and 
inviting me, him, or her, to put himself or herself in the place of some you 
who likes it  under the trees in autumn.
I doubt  whether when you read “The Motive for Meta phor” initially you 
are likely to stop with the title or worry about that you. When I first read 
the poem, I went right past all that and began creating in my mind three 
imaginary scenes, one  after the other. The first is an autumn scene. The 
second is a spring scene. The third is a strange scene of pounding with a 
hammer on some object glowing with heat from a forge and making a big 
spark fly. The creation of  these three imaginary scenes on the basis of the 
words on the page is spontaneous and irresistible. I may know that the 
autumn and spring scenes in poem are in aid of conveying a theoretical 
concept, that is, what Stevens claims is the motive for meta phor, but that 
does not stop me. The motive for meta phor Stevens finds is quite dif er-
ent, by the way, from Aristotle’s praise of the gifted poet for having an 
eye for resemblances. For Aristotle, meta phor helps the poet make the 
reader see something more vividly. For Stevens, meta phor helps the poet 
avoid seeing what is  there to see. The scenes that arise spontaneously in 
my mind when I read the poem exceed any conceptual use you can make of 
them.  Those scenes are also, I would claim, dif er ent for  every reader, and 
never quite the same twice for the same reader.
I have said the interior scenes in my mind and feelings are imaginary. 
I mean by that not that it is wrong when you read the poem to think of 
Wallace Stevens himself, walking in the autumn woods near Hartford, 
Connecticut, or out for a nighttime moonlight stroll in the spring. I mean 
rather that nothing is said about that in the words of the poem. The par-
allel is much more with the vivid  mental images I have of the characters 
and their surroundings when I read a novel. The words of a novel create 
a purely imaginary world. Once more  these are dif er ent for  every reader, 
and they are based on relatively limited verbal evidence. I have, for exam-
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ple, vivid  mental images of Lucy Robarts and Lord Lufton in Anthony 
Trollope’s Framley Parsonage (discussed in chapter  10 of this book). I 
would know Lucy if I saw her ( by her match with my imaginary picture 
of her). Trollope’s words, however, are not by any means as specific as my 
 mental image of Lucy or my feelings of admiration and afection for her. 
She exists only in the imaginary world the novel’s words create when I 
read them. In the same way, I create my  mental images, my feelings for 
them, and my subliminal muscular movements of walking in Stevens’s au-
tumn and spring scenes, as well as the feeling in my arm of hammering 
when I read his forge scene, from my knowledge of New  Eng land autumns 
and springs, and from my memories of the sparks flying at my grand father 
Critzer’s farm forge in  Virginia when I visited  there as a child.  There is no 
use telling me  these are irrelevant associations. My mind, feelings, and 
my sympathetic muscular reactions are too strong to be negated by that 
common- sense advice. Spontaneous is the key word  here.  Don’t blame me. 
I cannot help it.
If you look a  little harder at the words on the page, however, some big 
prob lems begin to arise. Just what is the status of  those three scenes? Are 
they ends in themselves? That is, are they what the poem is “ really about?” 
Does the poem intend primarily to call up in the reader (“you”) some ver-
sion of  those scenes? Is every thing  else in the words merely ancillary to 
that? Or are  these scenes in some way figurative expressions of something 
 else, perhaps examples of meta phorical transformations? Perhaps they do 
what they say, as speech acts, as performative utterances that resist the 
weight of primary noon. The poem,  after all, is the second item in a book 
of poems Stevens called Transport to Summer. Transport is a more or less 
literal translation of the Greek word meta phor, which means “carry over.” 
Is the poem an example of the way the poems in Transport to Summer intend 
to carry the reader, performatively, from spring to summer, transport her 
 there?
As any  adept reader of Stevens knows, however, the names of the sea-
sons, for Stevens, each had a complex symbolic or figurative meaning. Au-
tumn and spring  were for him times of transition or change, while winter 
and summer  were times of fixed states. Winter was, for Stevens, the time 
of seemingly endless cold, as in “The Snow Man,” one of his most famous 
and often- anthologized poems.10 Summer was, for him, a poise at warm, 
high noon, as in the wonderful “Credences of Summer.”11 “The Motive for 
Meta phor” exemplifies that coding in the figurative meanings of autumn, 
spring, and summer that the poem asserts. Both autumn and spring, 
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transitional seasons on the way to winter and summer, respectively, ex-
emplify the “exhilarations of changes.” Enjoying  those changes through 
language is the motive for meta phor. My three imaginary scenes, so spon-
taneously vivid in my mind, feelings, and body, turn out by no means to 
be what the poem is literally about. They are figurative examples of what 
meta phors do.
At this point I am (you are) beginning to see that neither Aristotle’s 
definition of meta phor (“an eye for resemblances”), nor Benjamin’s or de 
Man’s clear theoretical distinction between hermeneutics and stylistics 
are of much use. They are theoretical formulations to be tossed out when 
the  actual work of reading “The Motive for Meta phor” begins.
Aristotle apparently means that the meta phorical term or, as I. A. Rich-
ards put it, in a mixed meta phor, the “vehicle,” helps us see what he called 
the “tenor,” or literal meaning, more vividly. The vehicle and the tenor re-
semble one another. Aristotle’s example is “the ship plows the waves.” A 
ship is like a plow. A plow is like a ship. Not insignificantly, this example 
of a meta phor is a means of transport, a ship. The example turns back on 
itself to do what it says. You see the ship more clearly in your mind’s eye 
when you say it plows the waves.
That does not  really work, however, in “The Motive for Meta phor,” for 
example, with Stevens’s ostentatious and grotesque simile: “The wind 
moves like a cripple among the leaves.” I can see in my mind’s eye a cripple 
moving among the autumn leaves all right, but it is a big stretch to say 
that resembles the autumn wind’s way of moving. It is as much a star-
tling dissemblance as a resemblance. I suppose the comparison is based 
on Stevens’s assertion in the line before that he likes it  under the trees in 
autumn “ because every thing is half dead.” You could say a cripple is half 
dead. In any case, “like a cripple” is not much like Aristotle’s more con-
ventional meta phor, based on resemblance: “The ship plows the waves.” 
Stevens’s “like a cripple” also, it happens, is a personification or proso-
popoeia, which Aristotle’s plow is not, except covertly, insofar as a plow 
implies a plowman. Stevens explic itly personifies the autumn wind as “like 
a cripple” struggling through the leaves. Ghosh’s dialogical intervention 
about the tradition of theories about meta phor in vari ous cultures is, by 
the way, much more in tune with Aristotle’s “eye for resemblances” than 
with Stevens’s idea of meta phor as evasion.
Moreover, when I try to apply the distinction drawn by Benjamin and 
de Man to “The Motive for Meta phor” I find it does not  really work as a 
theoretical tool any better than Aristotle’s definition of meta phor. I dis-
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cover I cannot easily distinguish hermeneutics from stylistics in what I 
must say about the poem. Are  those scenes that arise so powerfully in my 
mind’s eye hermeneutical meanings or stylistic devices? I think any deci-
sion about that would be arbitrary and unfounded. Is “like a cripple” a sim-
ile for the literal meaning of the way the wind moves in autumn woods, or 
is that scene not already a figure? Is “like a cripple,” therefore, a meta phor 
(or rather simile) of a meta phor? Stevens says in one of the Adagia, “ There 
is no such  thing as the meta phor of a meta phor. . . .  When I say that man 
is a god it is very easy to see that if I also say that a god is something  else, 
god has become real ity.”12 The first meta phor becomes the literal, of which 
the second locution is a meta phorical resemblance or transport. Stevens’s 
choice of an example, by the way, is surprising and by no means innocent. 
It implies that meta phor is always grounded in some theological scheme.
Moreover, what happens to me is the reverse of what de Man says hap-
pens to him. He tries to do stylistics and ends up deplorably  doing herme-
neutics. I try to do hermeneutics, that is, to account straightforwardly for 
the meaning of “The Motive for Meta phor,” but I almost instantly end up 
getting snarled in stylistics, for example, in trying to establish the linguis-
tic status of “like a cripple,” or the linguistic status of  those three scenes 
that rise up in my imagination when I read the poem.
As you can see, I am just getting more and more entangled when I try to 
use my two theoretical formulations, the one from Aristotle and the one 
from de Man. I had best jettison them both, along with all that Stevens 
says elsewhere about meta phor, and go back to reading “The Motive for 
Meta phor” as best I can on my own, without their help.
Let me then turn back once more to “The Motive for Meta phor” to 
try to see what it  really says. The first  thing I note when I do this is that 
the grammatical armature of the poem is not descriptive or referential 
(e.g., “every thing is half dead. / The wind moves like a cripple among the 
leaves”), but a series of subjective assertions, each followed by one of the 
scenes I have mentioned. Each turns on a word that names your feelings, 
your intimate emotions: “like,” “happy,” “desiring.” “You like it  under the 
trees in autumn.” “In the same way, you  were happy in spring.” “Desiring the 
exhilarations of changes.”  These locutions explain the motive for meta phor. 
The motive is plea sure in feelings of liking, happiness, or desire.
As the poem says, the motive for meta phor is to escape from “the 
weight of primary noon.” Autumn and spring figure such an escape, and 
you therefore like them, or they make you happy, as the poem says. They 
are the location of  things that are neither this nor that, but both at once, 
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in transport or transition. You like the fall  because “every thing is half 
dead,” neither fully alive, nor fully dead. You  were happy in spring  because 
it is the time of “the half colors of quarter- things.” Such  things are not 
quite one color or another color, and not quite one fully developed  thing, 
in diminishing portions: half colors, quarter  things.
This exhilarating escape to  things that are not quite anything definite 
is expressed in the wonderful description of a spring eve ning as the dusky 
place of  things that are not quite one  thing or another  thing, and that are 
in constant, exhilarating change. This constant changing is expressed by 
pres ent participles (“melting,” “lighting”): “The slightly brighter sky, the 
melting clouds, / The single bird, the obscure moon— / The obscure moon 
lighting an obscure world.”
It was a big  mistake on my part to leap to  those vivid, imaginary im-
ages of the three scenes as somehow primary, that is, as what the poem is 
about. That this was a  mistake is indicated in part by the way each of the 
segments naming them ends in a reference to language. The wind that 
moves among the leaves like a cripple “repeats words without meaning.” 
Such locutions are something you like  because though the sounds are 
words, they are words without the painful definiteness of words that have 
a fixed meaning. When are words not words? When they are words with-
out meaning and when they are murmured over and over, in a continuing 
suspiration.
The phrase words without meaning recalls Walter Benjamin’s “pure 
language.” Such expressions exist between, below, above, or outside all 
languages, in the form of sounds or meaningless marks. “In this pure lan-
guage,” writes Benjamin, “which no longer means or expresses anything, 
but is, as expressionless and creative Word, that which is meant in all 
languages— all information, all sense, and all intention fi nally encounter a 
stratum in which they are destined to be extinguished.”13 The scene lighted 
by the obscure moon in an obscure world is a “world / Of  things that would 
never be quite expressed.”  These  things are neither expressed nor not ex-
pressed. This obscure world (in the sense that a text may be obscure, hard 
to read, such as “The Motive for Meta phor”) means that when you enter it 
you can escape being a fixed self. This is a scene “where you yourself  were 
never quite yourself / And did not want nor have to be.”
Please note that  these assertions about the languages of autumn and 
spring are not hermeneutical meanings but figures of speech, manifesta-
tions of stylistics or poetics. Autumn winds, for example, in real ity,  don’t 
repeat any words at all, not even words without meaning. They only do so 
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figuratively, by a poetic meta phor. “The Motive for Meta phor” is a tissue 
of meta phors from one end to the other, with nowhere a literal meaning 
that you can hermeneutically identify, except to say that the  whole poem 
explains what the motive for meta phor is. That explanation can only be 
done, it turns out, in meta phor.
A tissue of meta phors without literal referents is a series of catachre-
ses, that is, displaced locutions for  things that have no literal name, as in 
“leg of a chair,” or “face of a mountain.” A catachresis is neither literal nor 
figurative. It is not literal,  because that stick of wood that holds a chair up 
is not  really a leg. It is not figurative,  because the word leg does not sub-
stitute for some literal word. “Leg of a chair” is what you call it. Aristotle, 
in his wisdom about figurative language, already called attention to such 
strange locutions and to the way they put in question the neat distinc-
tion between literal and figurative words.14 The word catachresis in Greek 
means “forced or abusive transfer,” “against usage.” Many catachreses are 
personifications, as in leg, face, or, indeed, as in “like a cripple among the 
leaves,” among my examples.
Stevens calls the referent of the meta phors that make up his poem, in 
the last word of all, X. X is the sign in mathe matics for an unknown and as 
yet unspecifiable number that can be identified by solving the equation. I 
think Stevens’s equation cannot be solved. The X remains unknown except 
as a “sharp flash,” an evanescent glimpse.
That brings me at last to an attempt to account for the last two stanzas 
of “The Motive for Meta phor.”  These are the most obscure and difficult 
lines by far. I  shall dare to try to read them. The grammar of  these lines in 
their context of the  whole poem is clear enough. The poem says you like 
autumn and spring  because you desire “the exhilarations of changes” that 
occur in  those seasons, both in the outside world and in your subjectiv-
ity, including in your selfhood itself. You desire  these ongoing changes 
 because you are constantly, through time, “shrinking from / The weight of 
primary noon, / The A B C of being.” Meta phors aid in that shrinking. That 
is the motive for inventing them, not, for example, the search for resem-
blances that Aristotle saw as the motive for meta phor.
The difficulties with reading  those last two stanzas begin when you try 
to explain to yourself or to  others two  things: the exact meaning of its 
vari ous phrases and the exact relation among the cascade of phrases and 
words that are given in that grammatical relation called apposition, that 
is, in a list bound together by commas as ligatures: “The weight of primary 
noon, / The A B C of being, / The ruddy temper, the hammer / Of red and 
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blue, the hard sound— / Steel against intimation— the sharp flash, / The 
vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X.” That sequence is  really weird. It is by no 
means to be accounted for by my correct but somewhat desperately reduc-
tive attempt to read it as a scene of hammering on an anvil at a forge. The 
reader  will note that  there are two appositive lists, the primary one and 
then a secondary one within that first one made up of a series of adjectives 
modifying X.
The prob lem with appositive lists is that it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to decide  whether each item is another way to say the same  thing or 
 whether they pro gress or digress in some way or another. Each may say 
something dif er ent from all the  others. Only by looking at the semantic 
meanings of each can we hope to work  toward an answer. It might be saf-
est to assume that Stevens uses so many words in apposition  because no 
single word is adequate.
What the “weight of primary noon” is can be guessed. Stevens often 
makes a parallel, in a kind of code language, between the round of the 
seasons and the times of a twenty- four- hour day. It is not an accident that 
Stevens’s spring scene takes place  under an “obscure moon,” neither the 
pitch dark of midnight, nor the broad daylight of noon, but in between, 
as the clouds melt. Midsummer is primary noon, that is, a moment when 
every thing inside and outside the self freezes for a moment. The solar 
context of the phrase I cite below, from “Credences of Summer” (“without 
evasion by a single meta phor”), confirms that reading. At primary noon, 
every thing is just what it is. Stevens’s you in this poem (though not in 
“Credences of Summer”) finds that fixity an intolerable weight. He  will do 
anything to escape it. He believes meta phors  will provide that escape in 
“the exhilarations of changes.”
What then is “the A B C of being,” the next item in the appositive se-
ries? Is it just another way to say “the weight of primary noon?” Well, 
yes, but not quite. Being is a loaded word in Stevens. This could easily be 
demonstrated by many citations from his work. Roughly speaking, being 
has an Aristotelian or Heideggerian overtone in Stevens’s work.  These au-
thorities affirm two quite dif er ent meanings for being, by the way. Being 
means, for Stevens, I dare to assert, not just what is, “ things as they are,” 
“without evasion by a single meta phor,” but also the invisible ground or 
rock beneath.15 This ground is the substance of  things, not only in the sense 
of their isness, their existence, but also in the etymological sense of what 
stands beneath them and holds them up (their sub- stance).
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That seems to explain being, but why “A B C?” B echoes being all right, 
so the phrase has an internal alliteration, but so what? An A B C is, of 
course, the common name for the basic alphabet of En glish. It is often 
used meta phor ically to name the rudimentary knowledge you have of 
a given topic: “I know my A B C’s about that!” As for Heidegger, so for 
Stevens in a slightly dif er ent way, being is inextricably entangled with 
language. The references to language in this poem attest to that (“words 
without meaning,” “ things that would never be quite expressed”). Primary 
noon is a time when being is reduced to absolutely literal locutions, with-
out pos si ble evasion by a single meta phor. The spaces between the first 
letters of the alphabet, as Stevens gives them, invite the reader to think of 
a finite and exhaustive appositive series  going all the way to Z: “Being is 
A, is B, is C, . . .  is Z.” Only if the poet can bring meta phors to bear can he 
hope to escape “the weight of primary noon” even by way of the evasions 
of meta phor employing “The A B C of being.”
Tom Cohen, in a recent e- mail to me, has brilliantly suggested a pos si ble 
relation between the meta phors for being and that fatal X. Cohen writes: 
“Rumination: Does the ‘abc of being’ forestall the latter [being] by the seri-
ality and inescapability of the former [A B C]— leading to an X that wants 
to get out of the bind (x marks the spot), but is itself a letter, and a Chi at 
that.” Cohen  here suggests that the inescapable seriality of meta phors for 
being forbids ever reaching being itself, only more meta phors for it. The 
letters of the alphabet, intoned in sequence, as we  were taught to do in 
grade school, fi nally reaches the letter X. It is a letter, all right, but difers 
from other letters in being a traditional catachresis, not a meta phor, for 
being itself. As Cohen says, “X marks the spot.” X is chi, both a Greek letter 
(uppercase Χ, lowercase χ ) and Ch’i or qi (氣), “energy force” in Chinese 
culture. Though Stevens may or may not have known about Chinese Ch’i, 
his X certainly names being as a pervasive energy that is pres ent in every-
thing, for example, the autumn wind in the fallen leaves, as well as being 
outside every thing as its dominating master. As Cohen also says in a sub-
sequent e- mail, X is an example of the blank materiality of inscription, in 
the de Manian sense of that phrase. “Inscription,” writes Cohen, “harasses 
tropes, like a fox scattering the hens.”
The final stanza is the hardest of all to explicate hermeneutically. I claim 
it is a series of items that would be pres ent when someone strikes a glow-
ing piece of metal with a hammer in a forge.  These items are in apposition 
not in the sense of being dif er ent words for the same  thing, but in the 
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sense of being a progressive series. You pound with a hammer the glowing 
metal in order to temper it, that is, to make it harder by changing the way 
its molecules are ordered. You turn iron into steel by adding carbon and 
other ingredients. That, to some degree, explains “ruddy” (that is, red hot) 
and “temper.” An obscure play on temper as “feelings” is also pres ent.
The hammer is “of red and blue” not just  because it is glowing hot from 
striking the piece of metal it is tempering, but also  because the words 
“red” and “blue” are part of Stevens’s private color code. “Red” is for real ity, 
 things as they are, and “blue” is Stevens’s name for “imagination.” Imagi-
nation, for him, changes  things as they are into other  things, as opposed 
to the fixity of being’s  X.  These changes happen primarily by means of 
meta phors, in the extended sense of figures generally, seeing what is, the 
weight of primary noon, as a potentially endless series of other  things, 
from A to Z. You see the wind in the autumn leaves as a cripple. In a typical 
evasion, Stevens does not say “steel” against “iron,” but “steel against intima-
tion.” Intimation is, I take it, a name for the glowing metal that is being 
tempered by a steel hammer. The metal being forged (evocative word in 
the light of the language theme in the poem) is full of intimation of the 
other molecular forms it might become when it is tempered. Red and 
blue are the twin poles of Stevens’s constant oscillation in his poetry. 
That  oscillation brings about the exhilaration of changes. The clash of steel 
against intimation brings a “sharp flash” like the spark that flies when the 
forger’s hammer strikes the metal glowing from the forge that is being 
tempered by that blow.
The sharp flash of that spark is then called “the vital, arrogant, fatal, 
dominant  X.” The flash is a momentary glimpse of being, generated by 
the blow of imagination and real ity against intimation. That final series of 
words in apposition (“vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant”) names in person-
ifying catachreses what has no proper name, what is just a nameless un-
known X, that is, being. The sound of X is like the brief explosion of a sharp 
flash when the glowing hammer hits the glowing metal. Steel is Stevens’s 
name  here  either for the metal being forged or for the hammer. The spark 
from the glowing metal being tempered is called intimation  because it inti-
mates the other  things it can become: “steel against intimation.”16
It would seem that the poem ends with an example of the triumph of 
meta phor over the weight of primary noon. The ending is not quite so 
 simple, however. A meta phor substitutes a figurative name for something 
that has a proper name, as when we say the ship plows the waves. A cata-
chresis confesses in its enunciation its powerlessness to give adequate 
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language for what it gestures  toward. Moreover, Stevens conspicuously 
grants sovereign power to the X of being by naming it in a series of per-
sonifications.  These call the X of being some sovereign, no- doubt mascu-
line, vital, arrogant, fatal, and dominant person. A personification is more 
properly called a prosopopoeia. The word means, etymologically, “to give 
a name, a face, or a voice to something that has none of  these.” The poem 
ends with a striking submission of the you to the irresistible power of 
something, an X, that cannot be touched by the evasions of meta phor. It is 
bigger than “you,” much bigger. Nevertheless, the X can be alluded to in 
extravagant meta phors or, rather, personifications.
“The Motive for Meta phor” is therefore, in the end, a poem not about 
the triumphant power of meta phor but about the failure of meta phor to 
evade primary noon. This, however, can only be said in that peculiar figure 
called catachresis.
I have read Stevens’s “The Motive for Meta phor” as best I can, with help 
from Tom Cohen. I have also found, pace de Man, that I cannot do herme-
neutics in writing about this poem without  doing poetics or stylistics in 
extravagant ways at the same time. As I might have known, my reading 
turned out to be more complicated than I expected it would be. I also 
meant it when I said I did not  really know where my reading was  going to 
lead. I especially did not foresee that turn at the end in which the weight of 
primary noon wins out,  after all, over the powers of meta phor. Neverthe-
less that winning out is expressed in that strange species of meta phor that 
is not a meta phor, catachresis. My reading confirms the hypothesis that 
that you never know just where a reading is  going to lead you  until you do 
the reading. It confirms also my further hypothesis that all the theoretical 
knowledge in the world is of  little help in the  actual business of reading 
a given poem in its uniqueness and in its re sis tance to oversimplifying 
theoretical presuppositions.
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•  PART I I I  •
Lit er a ture and the World
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The intellect acquires critical acumen by familiarity with dif er ent traditions. How 
much does one  really understand by merely following one’s own reasoning only?
— Bhartrihari
The wide world, extensive as it is, is only an expanded fatherland, and  will, if 
looked at correctly, be able to give us no more than what our home soil can endow 
us with also. What pleases the crowd spreads itself over a limitless field, and, as 
we already see, meets approval in all countries and regions. The serious and the 
intellectual meet with less success, but  those who are devoted to higher and more 
productive  things  will learn to know each other more quickly and more intimately.
— Goethe
Do not so much as imagine that I  will show you the way to a world lit er a ture. 
Each of us must make his way forward according to his own means and abilities. 
All I have wanted to say is that just as the world is not merely the sum of your 
ploughed field, plus my ploughed field, plus his ploughed field— because to know 
the world that way is only to know it with a yokel- like parochialism— similarly 
world lit er a ture is not merely the sum of your writings, plus my writings, plus 
his writings. We generally see lit er a ture in this limited, provincial manner. To 
 free oneself of that regional narrowness and to resolve to see the universal being 
in world lit er a ture, to apprehend such totality in  every writer’s work, and to see 
its interconnectedness with  every man’s attempt at self- expression— that is the 
objective we need to pledge ourselves to.
— Rabindranath Tagore
If lit er a ture is truly sacred in the sense that I have tried to explain in 
chapter 1, then it is crucial to read each literary work more or less in de-
tachment from its local roots in a specific author and locale, as well as in 
detachment from its place in so- called world lit er a ture. The work’s sacred-
ness, that is, its complex relation to an imaginary realm, is what is most 
impor tant about it, more impor tant than its local and global affiliations. 
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MORE THAN GLOBAL
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Lit er a ture is nowadays often said to be at once global and local. This, by 
extension, also means that,  after all,  there is nothing  either local or global 
about lit er a ture. Djelal Kadir’s sensible proposal to associate the lexis 
“world” with “no par tic u lar or necessarily predictable referent” means 
that the development of world- lit er a ture programs is neither logical nor 
inevitable:
This discovery makes it unavoidable for us to have to explain the phe-
nomenon we are referring to as the predicate object or as the predicative 
pro cess of our worlding actions— which world, at what time, in what 
location, through which language, and with what intentions. World, in 
other words, can never be taken as a given since it is invariably the con-
structed outcome of our par tic u lar performative interventions. And, by 
extension, the lit er a ture it conditions becomes a par tic u lar lit er a ture 
whose specificity is a derivative of the instance of the phenomenon 
“world” we define as predicative referent of our action in the verb to 
world.1
The acts of “worlding” are deeply performative and transfigurative. Such 
acts (in)fusionize; that is, they fold the “inside” of our experiences ( by 
which I mean one’s own local contexts, the specificity of native tradition, 
the train of inheritance of a thought in a par tic u lar culture and knowledge 
system) into the “outside” (the epistemic and cultural contexts of dif er ent 
traditions and knowledge worlds). The revelations of the inside and the 
outside do not come together in a two- way course in which  either the local 
reaches for the global or the global tries to find connection with the local. 
Although we cannot ignore the strict divisions between the inside (we 
may for clearer understanding call it local) and the outside ( global), the 
acts of worlding demonstrate that connections, the scale enlargements, 
are not built in a unitotal pattern. Worlding promotes “planetary time,” 
which Wai Chee Dimock argues is “supranational time” that “goes backward 
(a recursive loop in the past), and it goes forward (a projective arc into the 
 future).” Dimock points to a
jurisdictional order whose bound aries, while not always supranational, 
are nonetheless not dictated in advance by the chronology and territory 
of the nation- state. As a set of temporal and spatial coordinates, the 
nation is not only too brief, too narrow, but also too predictable in its 
be hav ior, its sovereignty uppermost, its borders defended with force 
if necessary. It is a prefabricated box. Any lit er a ture crammed into 
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it is bound to appear more standardized than it is: smaller, tamer, 
duller, conforming rather than surprising. The randomness of literary 
action— its unexpected readership, unexpected web of allegiance— can 
be traced only when that box is momentarily suspended, only when 
the nation- state is recognized as a necessary but insufficient analytic 
domain, ceding its primacy upon scale enlargement.2
This promises a “more,” the unexpected web of meaning, which I have 
termed the “more than global.” On the surface, the local and the global 
have their usual separateness and rupture; but, in what I argue is more 
than global, such ruptures often become a kind of provocation to ques-
tion the promise and latency of a dialogue between the two. Difractive 
refigurings produce the more than global phenomenon that acknowledges 
how globality becomes the “enclosure in the undiferentiated sphere of a 
unitotality” and is suppressive, as Jean- Luc Nancy points out, of “all world- 
forming of the world.”3 Lit er a ture cuts “together- apart” leaving the local- 
global in new temporalities— “spacetimematterings.”4  Doing lit er a ture is 
“entangled intra- relating,” which is, as Karen Barad explains, “not to say 
that emergence happens once and for all, as an event or as a pro cess that 
takes place according to some external mea sure of space and of time, but 
rather that time and space, like  matter and meaning, come into existence, 
are iteratively reconfigured through each intra- action, thereby making it 
impossible to diferentiate in any absolute sense between creation and re-
newal, beginning and returning, continuity and discontinuity,  here and 
 there, past and  future.”5
So the more than global is inscribed in what I call “intra- active transcul-
turality,” which is not about  going beyond the global or reducing the local 
to a form of repre sen ta tion or meaning- formation. It is the destruction of 
an expressive and organic “totality” but is also a way of providing a sense 
of a totality, a world- wide- forming totality, whose access is not always in 
accessibility.6 The more than global is radical immanence, not a choice but 
an event.
Worlding formed through intra- active transculturality inheres in a com-
plicated reading of monde (world). Jean- Paul Martinon observes:
 There is indeed a strange parallel between globalization and what Nancy 
calls “world- forming” (mondialisation). This parallel shows that neither 
comes full circle, both exceed each other, thus never allowing for sense 
(world- forming) to make absolute sense or for non- sense ( globalization) 
to end in  either a parousia of (scientific) meaning, or total annihilation. 
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In this way,  there is no escaping this impossibility to recycle properly 
 because creation is what goes radically beyond the logic of production 
(and therefore recycling), and, yet, the possibility of this production 
never leaves the horizon of creation. The two always go together while 
always exceeding themselves. This is not a circular thought; it is the 
facticity of thought itself, that is to say, it is the facticity of the world 
itself. In this way,  there is no pure creation or world- formation as such. 
 There is an exposure or opening that both creates and for good or bad 
also produces.7
The more than global, much in the spirit of monde, the problematic in-
volving the contrastive acts of production and creation and making sense 
of horizein or horos as bound or landmark, staves of the ascendancy of 
“homo- hegemonization” to reveal sense and contradiction among multi-
ple points of articulation. In world- wide- ization, in pro cesses of worlding, 
connections through intra- action and autoimmunization are built mostly 
through reflective, interpretive judgments. Commenting on Derrida’s “Glo-
balization, Peace, and Cosmopolitanism,” Victor Li rightly observes:
The importance of establishing mondialisation’s Euro- Christian prov-
enance is that it enables a deconstructive genealogical examination 
of globalization together with its ethico- politico- juridical concepts of 
national sovereignty and territory, cosmopolitanism,  human rights, 
and international law. . . .  Such a genealogical deconstruction would 
establish globalization not as a neutral, objective pro cess, but as mon-
dialisation, or, even better, as mondialatinization, a worldwide- ization 
emanating from a Christian Eu rope. Thus, since globalization is  really 
mondialisation or mondialatinization, we have to concede that it is, as 
Derrida bluntly notes, “Eu ro pe anization.” But just as mondialisation’s 
Eu ro pean genealogy elliptically interrupts globalization’s universal en-
compassment or encirclement of the earth, so too mondialisation as the 
Eu ro pe anization of the world sufers its own elliptical interruption in 
the form of an autoimmunitary pro cess. In other words, we are wit-
nessing, Derrida tells us, a “double movement”: “globalization [mondial-
isation] of Eu ro pe aness and contestation of Eurocentrism.8
Intra- active transculturality, revealed through the more than global, 
eventalizes sense more than the mere reclaiming of Eu ro pe anness, which 
is symbolic of creating and producing horizons. The critical habitation of 
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Words worth’s “Dafodils” within some par ameters of Sanskrit poetics, as 
exemplified in the next section of this chapter, is not a contestation of 
Eurocentrism, an act that becomes another polarized, Eurocentric way 
of seeing procedures of knowledge formation, but a form of world- wide- 
ization. The more than global is not a proj ect to dehistoricize and deterri-
torialize Eurocentric filiations,  because in its intra- active embeddings the 
approach worlds and unworlds its always already inscribed rootings and 
routings. We  don’t globalize (horizoned, hence, landmarked in globularity 
and sphericality) but stay globalized and presentified with the apprehen-
sion of totality in its world- wide- ness.
The more than global, then, is not “ after global” and, thus, does not 
necessarily demand an exegesis of what happened to lit er a ture in its post-
national constellations. So to consider the more than global as merely 
resulting in world lit er a ture is to undercut my arguments. It is a taking 
place that forms and norms its own ways of address. This address, as Nancy 
notes, is a kind of thinking that “addresses itself to ‘me’ and to ‘us’ at the 
same time; that is, thinking addresses itself to the world, to history, to 
 people, to  things: to ‘us.’ ”9 The more than global is our “curious ‘being- 
with one- an other’ [être- les- uns- avec- les- autres],  toward our addressing 
one- another.”10 How can meaning be generated beyond the “me” and in-
vested in the “us”? How can the me ( local) find its meaning not in the other 
( global) but in us? This implies that meaning is not just in the local or the 
global or  after global or before local but exists in an immanent and contin-
ued circulation that is more than global. Nancy observes: “If one can put 
it like this,  there is no other meaning than the meaning of circulation. But 
this circulation goes in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the 
space- times [les espace- temps] opened by presence to presence: all  things, 
all beings, all entities, every thing past and  future, alive, dead, inanimate, 
stones, plants, nails, gods— and ‘ humans,’ that is,  those who expose shar-
ing and circulation as such by saying ‘we,’ by saying we to themselves in all 
pos si ble senses of that expression, and by saying we for the totality of all 
being.”11 The more than global is obligated to make sense of this circulation 
as a singular, plural entanglement. The singularity of the more than global 
makes us realize that “ every one is just as singular as  every other one, and 
consequently substitutable. Communication both singularizes them and di-
vides them out; what is commensurable is their incommensurability.”12 The 
more than global worlds through what Nancy argues is the coextensivity of 
understanding, where the acts of grasping and escaping are coenactments.
116 •  CHaPter 5
More Now
Zhang Longxi points out that “once we recognize the diversity and het-
erogeneity of the Other, as we do of the self, cross- cultural understanding 
can be seen as part of our efort at understanding in general, of our end-
less dialogue with  others, with ourselves, and with the world at large.”13 
However, cross- cultural understanding is not merely about reaching out 
for the other through dialogic interplay among cultures, civilizations, and 
concepts. It is also about judging and orienting one’s peculiar nativism, 
cultural exclusiveness, constellative patterns of beliefs, manners, and 
languages in an intra- active negotiation involving “unpeace,” the excès 
sensible (the profusion and fusion of sense or sense making) that inscribes 
the contesting territories of power, domination, obscurity, obfuscation, 
and elision across time and historical periods. Unpeace is the other name 
for seduction, assemblage, and curiosity, the immanent power to world 
the already existing, yet imperceptible, establishment, the being- with that 
“manifests in concrete, contract, commerce and most profoundly in confi-
ance.”14 Miller implicates this unpeace when he raises the question: How 
can world lit er a ture avoid being dominated by some single national aca-
demic culture? And again: How can a discipline of world lit er a ture res pect 
the many dif er ent conceptions of lit er a ture in dif er ent times and places 
throughout the world? Appropriating the brilliant and resonant vocabu-
lary of Michel Serres, I would like to see the more than global in “displace-
ments, confusing allegiances” that do not ignore “wide pages and tenuous 
diferentials” and,15
as if chance fluctuation, unexpected storms or atmospheric distur-
bances, spread stochastically through the space of the high seas, sud-
denly led to (the formation of) a temporarily stable locality, an island 
where another time would come into being, a local time forgetting the 
past, the ordinary and the time of the journey. Remote in relation to the 
methodical path,  these islands create order through fluctuation, a dif-
fer ent order that could well be called exodic. You  will never find  these is-
lands with a methodical approach. Exodic, exotic, ergodic, they lie outside 
the global equilibria of the episteme. Method minimizes constraints and 
cancels them out; exodus throws itself into their disorder.16
The inherent antagonism (unpeace) in world or comparative lit er a ture 
is not in view of a meeting of opposites but a sort of refusal to accept the 
existence of opposites. Worlding sees incommensurability with approval, 
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a provocation to avoid the encyclopedia and endorse what Serres calls a 
“scalenopcedia”— not an isosceles, right- angled or equilateral triangle, but 
“unbalanced in parts, scalene signifies lameness, like Hephaistos, an inven-
tor and the husband of Aphrodite, lame like several relatives of Oedipus, 
with sore feet, like him; scalene describes an oblique, twisting, complicated 
path.”17 Construction, conjoining, and conflict become a single act. Com-
parative lit er a ture must deeply invest in the unpeace, in the intra- action, 
and indulge in “leaping sideways,” wandering “as  free as a cloud,” gazing 
in  every direction and improvising. Serres observes that “improvisation 
is a source of won der for the eye. Think of anxiety as good fortune, self- 
assurance as poverty. Lose your balance, leave the beaten track, chase 
birds out of the hedges.”18 However, wandering and improvisation are 
not absolutely without and outside sense. In fact, cultural specificity is 
a part of a pro cess where circulation and comparison consort antagonis-
tically without ignoring certain irreducible diferences that are inherent 
in transcultural negotiations. My more than global program of thinking 
indisputably acknowledges cultural specificities and exemplarities, certain 
unchangeable dimensions in a par tic u lar thought- tradition and system of 
knowledge  because without such ac cep tance and understanding of certain 
specificities the  whole idea of  doing lit er a ture transculturally is destined 
to get chaotic and inconsequential. So both the specificity and the irre-
ducible diferences among cultures and traditions synergistically intensify 
and complicate the exchange value of a given work. This contributes to 
the circulation, the sense- making, of the more than global where spec-
ificities and paradigm- transcendence are intra- related, augmenting the 
of balance  factor in literary understanding. But any critical inclusiveness 
is deeply opposed to hegemonies inflicted upon us by certain languages 
in their global circulation. Several languages spoken by large numbers of 
 people, and, thus, blessed with a significant corpus of lit er a ture, can gen-
erate a conceptual pool to globalize an idea or a paradigm. This implies, 
for instance, that the hermeneutic nexus among Hindi, Chinese, Spanish, 
German, and En glish can clearly ignore Sanskrit. Being global can then 
become a kind of self- imprisonment within an insular local. This generates 
the stultifying provinciality of being global from which literary studies 
must seek its own modes of in de pen dence.
Comparative lit er a ture, working out of its traditional penchant for 
sources and inevitable comparison of cultures and times and thought, came 
to identify, with the publication of the American Comparative Lit er a ture As-
sociation report of 1993, a course removed from traditional Eurocentrism 
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that was vectored to be global (Miller provides an account of the growth 
of comparative lit er a ture in North Amer i ca in the next chapter).19 But the 
question that has been debated  here is  whether comparative lit er a ture 
exists only to become comparatist in our  doing and understanding of lit-
er a ture or any close reading of lit er a ture is removed from the domain of 
such practices. But has lit er a ture ever been without its peers— distant or 
teleomorphic? Being conscious of initiating a comparative framework is 
one aspect; the other aspect is the belief in lit er a ture’s embedded com-
parative status— the entangled status, the molecularity, and what I call its 
intra-active transculturality. Jonathan Culler argues that “comparative 
lit er a ture should accept the diferential possibility that the evolution of 
literary and cultural studies has created, as the site for the study of lit er-
a ture as a transnational phenomenon, did not gain many adherents, and 
the question of what comparative lit er a ture should be has remained as 
much in dispute as ever, except insofar as we agree that it is the nature 
of comparative lit er a ture to be the site at which the most diverse options 
of the humanities contend— not just a discipline in crisis but by its very 
nature a site of crisis.”20
Indeed, lit er a ture, or sahitya, is a site of crisis  whether one disciplinizes 
it as comparative or leaves it alone to manifest its own nodes and modes 
of comparison— a pa norama and not a landscape, to follow Serres. Com-
parative lit er a ture is less a discipline in need of promotion and establish-
ment than a norm and an inevitable urge (the more) to understand what 
lit er a ture can do and is capable of  doing. Fernando Cabo Aseguinolaza 
rightly notes that “lit er a ture is a Eu ro pean concept— even Eurocentric in 
the most radical sense of the word— both in terms of its genealogy and 
in its fundamental link to the alphabetically written word and to the idea 
of the book. So, too, are the corpora with which it was originally associ-
ated and the basic fields  towards which the first historiographic attempts, 
from Bacon on,  were oriented.”21 Through intra- active transculturality, 
I intend to dilate the radius of lit er a ture’s meaning- making ability, ren-
dering an aesthetic whose generous tenancy  shall include non- European 
writing with cognition and recognition. It is also a strategy to re- premise 
“Angloglobalism” arguing for an inclusion of the complexity of the Eu ro-
pean space (comparison can also be intra- European or intra- Asiatic).22 
This works against the imperialism of canonicity or ideological group be-
hav ior in literary studies that are adamantly unidirectional in trying to 
see the evolution and formation of lit er a ture as literary models, graphs, 
and maps.23 It is about changing the mea sure of critique— the geo- politics 
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and spatiality of knowledge—of lit er a ture irrespective of  whether we label 
it as world lit er a ture or comparative lit er a ture.  There is much more than 
is usually understood both in Gottfried Herder’s concept of the globe as 
inscribed in incommensurable cultures and in the interdenominational 
capaciousness of Goethe. Goethe’s Weltliteratur involves a critical ecu-
menism whose dynamics has always been far more complicated than what 
the matrices of the global- local divide and of the theory of epochs have al-
lowed us to conceive. Being global is not simply a reaching out constricted 
by the strengths of the reigning critical methodologies; it is also a reaching 
in, voyaging centripetally to form more global configurations of under-
standing, a reconceived Weltliteratur.24
My arguments built on intra- active transculturality are out of rhythm 
with what Zhang Longxi, endorsing the popu lar cooptative momentum in 
comparative lit er a ture, affirms in Unexpected Affinities. Longxi does this, 
for instance, by way of a comparative exegesis of John Bunyan’s The Pil-
grim’s Pro gress and the sixteenth- century Chinese Journey to the West (Xi 
you ji ). Longxi clusters Liu Xie, John Keats, Gustave Flaubert, Heinrich 
Heine,  A.  E. Housman, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Alfred de Musset, Franz 
Grillparzer, and  others to elucidate the Confucian notion that poetry 
provides an outlet for the sufering soul.25  Here the predominant spirit 
tries to avoid the shock, the adventure, and risk of bringing unfamiliar 
patterns and paradigms of reading into serious play. Intelligent and in-
vestigative, with citation of pertinent passages, Longxi’s text rides the 
“ going global” mode. He leaves out the dystopian unease, or the unpeace 
that intra- active transculturality brings. He minimizes the vagaries of in-
commensurability, does not let critical world formations inhere in what 
Rosi Braidotti’s calls “transposition” and, hence, reduces the potentialities 
of “taking place.”26 Comparative dystopic unease then invites the anxiety 
of conflictive exchanges, the “gradient” of comparison and diference, dis-
mantling, most often, the enclaves of literary systems that preserve can-
onicity or horizones of world lit er a ture.27 The more than global, through 
sense- able (the ability to generate sense and also about making sense able) 
and sense- less (the act of not finding conventional sense all the time) un-
ease, introduces the impurity in our reading of lit er a ture across time and 
cultures—an eroticism that refuses to stay exclusively immured in spec-
ificity, culture- boundedness, and conceptual autonomy.  Going global has 
a direction, but the more than global is a possibility. This might head and 
veer other wise, where diference is sens- ing. Veering (connected to the 
French verb virer, to turn or turn around, and the Latin verb vertere, to 
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turn), as Nicholas Royle argues, “involves contemplating all sorts of turns, 
funny and other wise.”28 He points out that veering “entails an experience 
or event of diference, of untapped and unpredictable energy.”29 It might 
go “ toward something open,” as Paul Celan writes, “inhabitable, an ap-
proachable you, perhaps, an approachable real ity.”30 So the dystopian un-
ease in comparative thinking can surely come from a transpoetical veering 
in which the subject is irrevocably split horizontally to announce itself 
with différence.
When we formally identify the world and the globe in the global, we 
miss what it means to experience the more than global. I am arguing for a 
recircumscription— both in the deeper inflection implied by Herodotus’s 
oikoumene and home as the world. I am certainly not gesturing  toward a 
boundless chaos. “It rather suggests,” as Didier Coste observes, “that we 
should move away from the priority of any single origin and consider the 
one- and- whole both as origin and goal, and thus itself bi- centered. Com-
parative thinking, as it moves away from that one- and- wholeness in order 
to make sense, creates its own bipolarities, around which it is up to our 
anthropological self- consciousness to move— elliptically also in the sense 
of an omission, an abbreviation, an encryption and a forgetting.”31  These 
moves, Coste suggests, import a radical openness and a newfound famil-
iarity among correspondences of ideas and paradigms widely separated 
in time, context, and culture. With this come cognitive shifts, chrono-
morphic transits, the unease that interpretative profits in cultural trans-
lation bring, and the conceptual inflections that result from epistemic 
interplays. So the worlding through intra- active transculturality is clearly 
not produced additively but generates itself coadunatively replete with 
the peculiar modes of (in)fusion, subtraction (the shrinking of meaning- 
premises to generate reterritorialization), and inwardness, which for me is 
a movement in perception and insight that reinterrogates the capacious-
ness, viability, and horizoning power of concepts.
The more has an undertow of joy. This is a joy that does not make us, as 
Rabindranath Tagore argues, “limited by the power of the intellect or the 
power of work,” but makes us experience ourselves without any “cover or 
calculation in between.”32 Tagore continues:
The son is dear not  because we long for the son, but  because we long 
for the atma, our true self. Property is dear not  because we desire the 
property but  because we desire the atma, or the self. This means that in 
what ever we experience ourselves more fully, we desire that. The son 
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eliminates my shortcomings; I find myself all the more in my son. In 
him, I become more of myself. This is why he is my dearest kin; he is a 
manifestation of my self outside of me. It is the truth I experience so 
certainly within myself that makes me experience love; that very same 
truth I know in my son and therefore my love for him expands. That is 
why to be close to someone is to know what they love. It is thus that 
we understand where, in this wide world, they have located themselves 
and how far they have spread their souls. Where my affection does not 
lie, my soul only skirts the rim of its own boundary.33
The more than global is an afection that leads one to experience the 
other outside oneself and eventually to know oneself better. The local is 
known better outside itself as much as the global is understood better in 
the more than global, which is, however, not beyond global. It is a pro-
found desire that dwells in the joy emerging out of being local and global 
at the same time— the  father (the global, as it  were) finding himself in 
the son (our assumed local). This enables the son to become dear to the 
 father. In turn, the  father comes to know himself more in the afective mo-
mentum leading him to reach out to the son. This is his desire to locate 
himself in his son. That desire, again, is developed paradoxically, through 
a reaching-in, in modes of inner immigration, leading the  father to find 
himself. So finding oneself more in  others is to become more of oneself. 
The dharma of the more than global then is the sambandha, the astute 
listening where the  father ( global) and son ( local) address each other in a 
resonant relationality. In sambandha, the global finds itself in the local, en-
abling a knowledge that helps the global to discover its globality, as when 
the  father finds more of himself in his son.  Here lies the more that pro-
duces joy when one’s own truths become the truths of the world. In the 
words of Tagore: “The  house it [I refer  here to the more] inhabits is not 
merely a structure of bricks and mortar—it attempts to make it a home 
and colours it in its own hues.”34 Compared to a  house, a home in its afec-
tive and aesthetic configurations is more fluid, less constricted, and knows 
the art of accommodativeness where the  father and the son can live and 
learn and make more senses out of their living (sambandha) at dif er ent 
points of time. I would like to argue that the  house of the local and the 
global built out of the bricks and mortar of ideology, princi ples, traditions, 
and cultural individualities becomes the home of the more of the global, 
where the local and the global, like the son and the  father, exceed them-
selves in the joy of discovering and reaching out for each other. The flow 
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of knowledge in such continued disequilibria is not between the local’s 
reaching for the global and the global’s reaching down to meet the local. It 
rather becomes a moment, a now, that is both achronic and cross- chronic. 
In this constructed now, the  father finds himself to be more than what 
he is. The son realizes the amount and kind of “ father” that was already 
 there in him. So  going global that is not understood within the premises of 
what I call the comparative dystopian unease is not global enough.
The impregnated more in the intra- active transcultural now disturbs us 
with a presence. Bill Ashcroft rightly argues that the presence in transcul-
tural encounters is a
moment of sudden awareness in which the reader engages an excess, 
the “beyond” of interpretation in what may be understood as a sense 
of cultural “otherness.” When this works most successfully, the other-
ness is one’s own. This moment may overlap and merge with the aes-
thetic and indeed cannot be fully separated from it, but it encompasses 
a radical unfamiliarity that is perhaps better understood as an encounter 
with the uncanny, the umheimlich. The strangest feature of this encoun-
ter in the transcultural text is that this uncanny space becomes, poten-
tially, a space of negotiation.35
Presence is absence in pro cess. Presence is in “to be” and what was 
“not to be.” It undoes the presentness of meaning. It, as Nancy argues, is 
“not form and fundament, but the pace, the passage, the coming in which 
nothing is distinguished, and every thing is unbound. What is born has no 
form, nor is it the fundament that is born. ‘To be born’ rather is to trans-
form, transport, and entrance all determinations.”36 Intra- active transcul-
turality presences, is itself a presence, which is always already  there but 
“neither in the mode of being (substance) nor in that of  there (as a pres-
ence).” It is mostly in the mode of being born where meaning is not a rep-
resentative fixity ( global or local)  because birth “efaces itself and brings 
itself in defi nitely back.” So the birth of a literary text “is this slipping away 
of presence through which every thing comes to presence.”37
In intra- active transculturality, a text’s taking place— presence to 
presence— does not necessarily need a precondition to come to power. In 
agential intrarelating a text builds resonance and “travelling frequencies.” 
 These frequencies, Dimock argues, are “received and amplified across time, 
moving farther and farther from their points of origin, causing unexpected 
vibrations in unexpected places. . . .  Texts are emerging phenomena, acti-
vated and to some extent constituted by the passage of time, by their con-
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tinual transit through new semantic networks, modifying their tonality 
as they proceed.”38 The resonance and presencing demonstrate how much 
noise a text carries inside it. A literary text, for me, is always a noise, an 
intricate and challenging mix of sound and frequencies. It is when we as-
certain a meaning of a text that we adjust its frequencies to generate sense 
(consonance and clarity). But all  music is fundamentally noise  because the 
slightest of maladjustment of registers can turn  music to noise. So it is 
noise that is an ontological real ity and the  music that comes out of it is only 
a real ity manifested through fine- tuning and studious adjustment. If we 
consider Words worth’s “Dafodils” as a romantic poem, we are merely ad-
justing the noise of the poem to a certain frequency; it is  music to many 
and  will continue to stay as a par tic u lar genre of  music (romantic nature 
poem) to many for many years. But the event of the more than global is 
mostly about engaging with the noise and, hence, the poem, as we  shall 
see in the following pages, strug gles to speak in unitotality: it thickens 
its tonality, develops inflections, and reverberates with new pitches and 
rhythms.  These noises are what I argue to be contradictions, the ferment-
ing sources that a text generates intra- actively.
The more than global produces a now with multifold pres ents making 
the poem available through spacetimematterings. The now is an exposure 
in and to the new, where no memory of a contradiction or incommen-
surability comes to infringe on the domain of the not- yet formed. The 
freedom emerging out of the exposure has a life of its own outside the 
memories that all pres ents (with their competences and contradictions) 
usually bring into the crucible of the now. What I mean by this is that my 
reading of “Dafodils” within the now  will not have any memory of how the 
poem was read at dif er ent points of time and space. This is achieved in 
a detemporalized flicker of interfusing concepts— the nowing of diverse 
cultural and epistemic hemi spheres hitherto thought of as foreign to the 
poem. The more- now exists in  every location of space and time. It func-
tions in a swirling inclusiveness that is formless and characterless and yet 
prodigiously productive. T. R. S. Sharma claims that “ there is nothing like 
an ageless concept, for concepts age like men, sometimes even faster. The 
more ancient they are, the more recent they sound, and often the most an-
cient concept turns out to be the most modern or post- modern or easily 
lends itself to a post- modern appropriation.”39 The traveling diferential that 
such fluidity generates makes Raimundo Panikkar’s “diatopical hermeneu-
tics” an impor tant dimension to world- ization.40 Understanding “Dafo-
dils” is not about putting two periods, two times, and two texts together 
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in contrast, comparison, and correspondence. This understanding is not 
the result of a  simple strategy of interwelding the desivad (nativism) with 
videshibad (Euro- Americanism). G. N. Devy has seen this strategy as the 
dialectical tension between mārga (the mainstream) and deśî (the local or 
regional).41 The creative antagonism, revealed through the taking place 
of “Dafodils,” to be presented in the pages that follow, is not informed 
by Devy’s entrenched attitude about adducing nativist empowerment 
through the appropriation of deśî traditions and thoughts; rather, it has 
the presence- power of intra-active transculturality that allows the mārga 
and the deśî to intersect and flow into each other, creating a difractive 
sudesivad (neonativism) in entangled topoi and mythos.42
Comparatists might leap into an attack, claiming, perhaps rightfully, 
the legitimacy of the coming into contact of diverse cultural paradigms in 
intra- active, transcultural world- formations. I  don’t deny their anx i eties. I 
believe that lit er a ture’s worlding is not achieved by cheering a chaos born 
out of the incoherent interplay of ideas. We need to accept that  there 
are certain irreducibles in linguistic, cultural, and epistemic formations, 
without which lit er a ture cannot proceed in its meaning- making. This, in-
deed, makes for a yes-no space. But intra-active transculturality contin-
ually re orients questions that are phrased not as “why this?” but as “why 
not this?”
Taking Place
“Dafodils” is a  simple, seemingly innocent, poem. Dorothy Words worth 
notes: “When we  were in the woods beyond Gowbarrow Park we saw a few 
dafodils close to the  water- side. We fancied that the lake had floated the 
seeds ashore, and that the  little colony had so sprung up. But as we went 
along  there  were more and yet more; and at last,  under the boughs of the 
trees, we saw that  there was a long  belt of them along the shore, about 
the breadth of a country turnpike road. I never saw dafodils so beauti-
ful.”43 William Words worth, placing the poem in “Poems of the Imagina-
tion” (1815), observes: “The subject of  these Stanzas is rather an elemen-
tary feeling and  simple impression (approaching to the nature of an ocular 
spectrum) upon the imaginative faculty, than an exertion of it. The one 
which follows . . .  is strictly a Reverie; and neither that, nor the text  after 
it in succession, ‘The Power of  Music,’ would have been placed  here . . . 
except for the reason given in the foregoing note.”44 Despite its notional 
anchorage in elemental feeling, imagination, beauty, reverie, and seeing— 
the approved and au then tic princi ples of understanding Words worth’s 
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poetic art— intra- active transculturality worlds the poem’s taking place in 
a difractive space where the poem builds an entangled habitation in certain 
domains of Sanskrit poetics. Spacetimematterings produce contact points 
that generate sense but do not reduce meaning to itself. The more than 
global happens through  these contact points which are substantial and 
have their own singularities. The meaningful happening of “Dafodils” 
through “contacts” with some par tic u lar paradigms of Sanskrit poetics 
and Hindu philosophy is the co- incidence, a kind of trans-immanent event. 
The event of the poem and its Sanskrit territorialization are being- with— 
superpositions that generate correspondence through already existing 
disruptions and dispositions. So the  simple taxonomies of a supposedly 
romantic poem and certain elective dimensions of Sanskrit poetics are not 
held in a dialectical play but stay world- wide- ized in an entangled relation-
ality. Comparative dystopian unease spooks the poem with certain aspects 
of Sanskrit poetics, and is, hence, haunted and re- turning unannounced. 
The taking place is both an exposure (a world of nows to its already exist-
ing pres ents) and a deposition (the sedimentation of pres ents worlding a 
repository of meaning, the plurality of nows) where the text in question 
subtracts itself to add to its life. Subtraction is the poem’s ability to with-
draw from itself, its nature, its already existing  music developing a noth-
ingness that presences, from the already- always to not- yet. Comparative 
dystopian unease decimates the binary and makes sense of the restless-
ness of intrarelated correspondences beyond the brute givens. The world 
cannot be worlded and worlding cannot stay worlded to enable more than 
global formations. Urs Stäheli appropriately notes that “using discourses 
on the local and global, then, is a par tic u lar way of making invisible the 
constitutive paradox of the world— the impossibility of its unity.”45 So the 
world of the poem stays withdrawn enabling Sanskrit (in)fusionist modes 
to enliven a radical articulation of its blind spots.
The intra- active transcultural development of the poem happens 
through the singularity of dance and joy. The poet is united in a dance 
(all four stanzas of the poem mention the word dance). In this dance, the 
existential unites with the cosmogonic:
The waves beside them danced; but  they
Out- did the sparkling waves in glee:
A poet could not but be gay,
In such a jocund com pany:
I gazed— and gazed— but  little thought
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What wealth the show to me had brought:
For oft, when on my couch I lie
In vacant or in pensive mood,
They flash upon that inward eye
Which is the bliss of solitude;
And then my heart with plea sure fills,
And dances with the dafodils. ( lines 13–24, italics mine)
The dance is the synthesizing princi ple and a cele bration of aesthetic 
delight. It is a consciousness of joy that finds a difractive entanglement 
with the spirit of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, where individual cre-
ative delight is seen as part of a universal continuum of immanent and 
immutable joy.46 The poet commits to a power to encompass the life, the 
spirit, and the truth that is undergirded by joy. The Upanishad tells us— 
ananda rupam amritamyad vibhuti, from the speck of dust at our feet to 
the stars in heaven— that all is a manifestation of truth and beauty, of 
joy and immortality. Joy manifests itself through the poet’s submission 
to the dafodils and the objects orbiting around them, as it  were. The poet 
who “could not but be gay” relishes the experience with a stable delight, a 
radiant joyousness of spirit (prasada). It is significant to observe that he 
moves among the objects of sense with a mind brought  under his control. 
This control of the mind is not for a joyless ascesis but for a tranquility 
that generates happiness. The “bliss of solitude” accompanies a “pensive 
mood” and the ananda (joy) becomes the state of self- sufficiency. It is a 
repose within itself where the dafodils, as objects of poetic desire, are 
assimilated into the poetic being, resulting in blissful exaltation. Within 
the inherent anandavada (princi ple of joy) of the poem we find clear con-
centric lines of the expansion of the ego. From beholding the flower, the 
ego moves to embrace the clouds, the trees, the bay, the sparkling waves, 
and then transits to the inner thoughts. This inward movement efectuates 
a confluence of the blissful heart (inner being) with the dafodils and, fi-
nally, dilates into an all- pervasive manifestation that Rabindranath Tag-
ore would point out as ananda dhara bohiche bhuvane (currents of joy are 
flowing across the universe). The poet and this immanent bliss are part-
ners in being and becoming where “ every event is virtually pres ent or im-
manent in  every other event.”47 This proj ects the periodic transition of 
the poetic ego, the ahamkara. Each stage of transition is subversion and 
submission proceeding from that stage and into the next one. The anterior 
real ity of the ego (the consciousness that bursts into the relish of nature) 
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is sutured to the madhyamavastha (the  middle phase) where the poetic ego 
proliferates into bhavas (myriad sentiments) as it comes into contact with 
other ele ments of nature. The disruption in madhyamavastha sublates into 
the uttarakoti or paramakashtha (the final phase or period) that is the pres-
ent now of a higher unity where the “flash upon that inward eye” is made 
pos si ble. Indeed, the poem itself has a flash (the won der and the joy) in 
its eruption and, also, in its experience of the harmonic, pensive point of 
creativity. Such flashes of experience, realization, and achievement point 
to what in Zen Buddhism is called the Buddha- nature, whose unity is not 
determinate but dynamically sunya (empty), not in the sense of a vacuum 
but in a form that is procreative. This is what I would like to interpret  here 
as the brimming vacant mood.
The “wealth” revealed externally and eventually relished within pre-
pares the ground for a “flash upon that inward eye.” This is not a tran-
sition to the state of absolute transcendence but is the attainment of a 
kinship with the dafodils. It is an interface of the self with becoming. 
The poetic being meditatively feels the rhythm of the creation, the life 
pulsating around the poet, resulting in the bliss of solitude. The flash of an 
experience in the inner being of the poet is a dip in solitude that gets him 
closer to the deepest layers of the spirit in nature. The flash, “all at once,” 
of “a host of golden dafodils” is a sudden illumination that brings Words-
worth in accord with an inward vision. This enables him to connect with a 
consciousness that is both aesthetic and metaphysical.
 There is a projective desire in the poem that through its self- subversiveness 
collapses the interior and the exterior of aesthetic relish. This relish intra- 
actively finds its entanglement in the tathata, the “thus- being of  things.” 
This tathata, through a suspension of discrimination and choice, encourages 
a nonduality and nonconditionality of  things. The poet and the circum-
ambient objects are held harmonically together by the flash; they are dis-
criminated from one another. So any choice to privilege one ele ment over 
the other is suspended. The poetic self moves in points of multiple con-
vergences  toward an aesthetic evolution. In such a consummate experience 
with the dafodils the rasavada (aesthetic consciousness) and brahmasvada 
(mystical consciousness) integrate into each other, ānandaikaghana ( bliss 
of unity).
Calling into question the global exemplarity of reading a poem that 
belongs to early nineteenth- century British lit er a ture, the discussion so 
far produces an access to a new operative now where relevant dimensions 
of Sanskrit poetics and a poem by Words worth are caught in manifest, 
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more- than- global sense- formations (I- other- I). Each exceeds its own for-
mations and provenance to find itself in the other and in more than the 
other, in the more. This is a greeting of the other by encountering the 
relevance of the other in the “I.” It serves the double purpose of saving 
the “I” from being overwhelmed by the other. “I” means the other not 
merely as the “promised” (the pres ent or pres ents) but also as the prom-
ising (surplus or presence). The “I” is saved by greeting the other  because 
saving need not be considered as the rigid preservation of hermeneutic 
sanctity. Through submission to the other, the “I” is sal vaged and its reten-
tion is made pos si ble.48  Under the I- other- I bind, generated through intra- 
active transculturality, the poem has a problematic homecoming where 
the homecoming is in a sahit with the otherness of one’s being. The poem 
is not in the alterity of the other. The agential intra-actions trigger both 
this expansion of interlocking epistemes and a folding back onto itself. “I 
is someone  else,” as Arthur Rimbaud has reiterated.49 So the dance being 
the I is also the other. The taking place, thus, neutralizes the hierarchy and 
power that self and the other construct within a local- global bind. This 
leaves us in the midst of the more- efect.
The more- efect can be substantially argued through an intra- active 
understanding of the dance. The dance of the dafodils stimulates nature 
and cosmically sets of the lila, or play of creation. The Vedantic text Brah-
masutra affirms that Brahman’s creative activity is not undertaken by any 
need on his part but by way of sport.50 This krida (sport) is aesthetic cre-
ativity. The dance of the dafodils stimulates the lila, the krida, in the poet. 
The dance of the poet and the dance in the poet are aesthetic realizations 
in space and time, resulting in a joyous overflow of energy. This surge, a 
plenitude of energy, is not anarchic but kridaniyakam (play) that promotes 
a life of sensitivity, aesthetic consciousness, and commitment to a har-
monic consummation.  Here the lila, or sport, finds an aesthetic poise in 
the poet who surrenders to its intrinsic delight.
The delight and the bliss of solitude are manifestations of santarasa. 
This is an impor tant emotion within the rasa theory signifying tranquility 
and also sthayi or the stable. The poet is close to achieving santapraya, 
the blissful serenity of liberation. However, the santarasa paradoxically 
emerges out of the participatory world (the poet’s highly intense inter-
action with the objects around him) as uddipanavibhava, the enhancing 
stimulus. It uncannily owes its joy to the lila and the alaukika- ahlada, the 
transmundane plea sure. The complex dynamics of santa (tranquil) cor-
responds to the krida. Santa thereby becomes an event of sportive quiet. 
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The lila, the ananda, and the santarasa come together in samapatti (syn-
ergy), which is the poet’s sthitaprajna (poise). This is the yukta- viyuktadasa, 
the bond- liberated state. The poet is yukta ( bound) to the dafodils and 
to their circumambient milieu through his immediate experiences of de-
light and won der. He is also viyukta ( liberated) beyond the immediacy 
of experiences into a moment that becomes his very own. This produces 
the pensive mood and opens the inward eye. In  these moments of aes-
thetic and sensual relish, the poet has the privilege of being himself and 
another. In this yukta- viyuktadasa, the dance with the dafodils becomes 
cittavistara (the expansion of consciousness). The poetic soul with its in-
gathered joy becomes rasenatripta— satiety in emotions. With this citta-
vistara, the waves, the breeze, the trees, the lake, and the “never- ending 
line” of dafodils become interwoven beings. They inter- are with all the 
 others. The aesthetic relish— “my heart with plea sure fills”— receives the 
impulsion of the inner “bliss of solitude” and the poet reaches the uttara-
koti, the final phase. In this climax, the poetic ego is liberated to the point 
where it enjoys at once santarasa and krida. He makes meaning out of his 
yukta- viyuktadasa. It is a kind of rahasya mudra (a mysterious posture). 
This posture is something that Tagore meta phor ically finds in a bee who 
“must sit, steady and unwavering, on the pollen if it is to taste the honey 
hidden in the heart of the flower.”51 The rahasya mudra, the mysterious 
poise, whose center is afflicted with a serious disquiet, shows that the po-
et’s succumbing to a joy is not a revel or a riot as it might seem. His joy is 
the result of a dialectic between santarasa and kridaniyakam that makes 
it indeterminate and diaphanous. It is a lila, an ananda, that de- centers 
itself continually to find a center (sthitaprajna) in flashes of experiences 
caught in diachronic moments of creative relish. So the pres ent of the 
dance meets the pres ent of the lila. The “I” and the other are caught in 
a pleasant perplexity— the lila taking place both inside and outside the 
poet is Words worth’s rasenatripta (rasa consummation). This makes him 
find his pensive poise through a deep interiority of aesthetic experiences. 
The lila in nature builds its presence in Words worth, resulting in vivarta, 
or transformation of the poetic being, in which the lila within and without 
converge and resonate. The plea sure springs from the lila mystique and 
the poet strikes the rahasya mudra, balancing all the forces within him, the 
jocund clutch of forces in clouds, vales, hills, lake, trees, breeze, stars, bay. 
He experiences the paradox of poise in lila, the leisure in sport, a pause in 
the flow, a dynamism in the quiet integration of forces. It is the rahasya 
(mystery) of creation.
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Within this more than global phenomenon, the poem has come through 
as a kind of Nancyean fragment that has “accidental and involuntary as-
pects of fragmentations.” Benjamin Hutchens argues that such fragmenta-
tion in its singularity becomes “ecstatic and exploratory in nature.” Nancy 
points out,“If the fragment is indeed a fraction, it emphasizes neither first 
nor foremost the fracture that produces it. At the very least, it designates 
the borders of the fracture as an autonomous form as much as the form-
lessness or deformity of the tearing.”52 The more than global enables the 
poem to realize the value of textual tearing, the searing of systematicity, 
frissiveness of fraction, and the entropic energy of world- formations. The 
poem, in its negotiation with a few accredited par ameters of Sanskrit po-
etics, forms itself as a fragment- event, not a romantic poem understood 
in a kind of traditional interpretive fatigue and its concomitant satiety 
but through inscription and exscription with an undecidable energy and a 
collapse of sense. Within the more than global intra- active band, the poem 
begins always as an interruption through an immanent worldview that 
betrays the always already fragmentary state. Sanskrit poetics does not 
come as anachronic to its exposition; its incidence is invested in the areal-
ity of its power and praxis as a work of art. “Dafodils” is both a sharing of 
sense and a circulation of sense. Hutchens shows us that sense, for Nancy, 
“is its own constitutive loss. It pres ents itself in ‘the very opening of the 
abandonment of sense, as the opening of the world.’ The fact that  there is 
a ‘ there is,’ a world of existing singularities, testifies that thinking itself 
is the pos si ble opening of sense. Within the exigencies of sense, nothing 
truly ‘has’ sense, but every thing in the nonsense of its being reveals sense 
to the opening of thought.”53 A Sanskrit reading is not outside the poem 
 because by being entre- nous it is cum, staying and making “sens- able” sin-
gularizing “while at the same time connecting  these singularities.”54 In the 
sense- ridden, comparative, dystopian grid exposure is  exposition.
Post- Posts
In his reading of Nietz sche, Miller initiates a complex negotiation between 
what Nietz sche calls the burden of the past and a liberating reading in the 
pres ent. Nomadism can develop as productive experiences, and it happens 
when the  silent pressures on the local to overcome its immediateness re-
sult in a reading of the local with a consciousness of the global currents 
of experience that are considered not just as dissonance. It is antagonism 
or transfigurative distress, resulting in both knowing and ignorance. This 
means that lit er a ture can be experienced, as Miller argues elsewhere, as 
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catachresis and as black holes. Miller’s discussion becomes an in ter est ing 
invitation to dialogue on this subject of critiquing the now and the princi ple 
of the more. Sudesivadism is my rejoinder to the specter of barbarism that 
Miller critiques in Nietz sche. Nietz sche’s opposition to Weltliteratur stems 
from the fear that it would lead to an overabundance of unmanageable 
knowledge. Miller implicates this “more than enough” in world lit er a ture 
and rightly considers how Nietz sche’s distress over universalizing lit er-
a ture is paradoxically a way of exploring more meaningful experiences. 
Distress turns into a lively unease that leaves us in a circulation where 
one’s own local conditions and milieu of understanding are infected by 
certain centrifugality. This is a healthy nomadism that does not aspire for 
Hegelian totality or for the impossible sovereignty in knowledge sought 
by George Eliot’s Casaubon in Middlemarch. I concur with Miller on how 
world lit er a ture escapes what Nietz sche considers Alexandrianism by gen-
erating the more and exploring the now. It does not give us comfort but 
inflects the distress as a way to understand and live productively.
A few lines from Lao Zi can help us to understand the more at a dif er-
ent level:
Thirty spokes share a hub: where absence is,
 there the use of the carriage lies.
Mix clay to make a vessel: where absence is,
 there the use of the vessel lies.
Drill holes as doors and win dows to make a room: where
absence is,  there the use of the room lies.55
The more in the global is the absence— the sense withdrawn, nothing 
as sense— that is where the use of lit er a ture lies. The absence that lies in 
the vessel or in the room is the vacuum that provides form and accommo-
dates content. Similarly, the category of the more in globalizing lit er a ture 
creates absences that are not vacant but are points where thinking begins 
to open sense. Lit er a ture’s absences thus exist ahead of our occupancy and 
invite us to connect with the joy that Tagore has brilliantly analyzed. We 
may see this somewhat in the light of Buddhist emptiness. It is a pregnant 
sunyata in which the tireless plurality of nows becomes events that are 
intra- relating and forever coming to be. Lit er a ture’s local specificities are 
embedded in history, context, and time. Nevertheless, they are perennially 
exposed to an openness of thought that is not simply about taking a text out 
of its home base and throwing it into the domains of dif er ent cultures in 
time and place. The restive openness can be qualified as a disclosive afect 
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of totality both in the sense of its accommodativeness and immanence. 
Zen master Dogen’s seeing of the absoluteness of the bird and the fish 
as being continuous with the sky and the  water is analogous to our intra- 
active habitation in “Dafodils”: “When a fish swims in  water,  there is no 
end of the  water no  matter how far it swims. When a bird flies in the sky, 
fly though it may,  there is no end to the sky. However, no fish or bird has 
ever left  water or sky since the beginning. . . .  But if a bird leaves the sky, 
it  will immediately die, and if a fish leaves the  water, it  will immediately 
die. You must understand that the  water is life, and the air is life. The bird 
is life and the fish is life. Life is the fish and life is the bird.”56
The poem becomes self- forgetful in a life of its own. The intra- active flu-
idity that conceptual figurations of deśî and videsi bring creates a sustain-
ing life for the more than global. Lit er a ture cannot survive without the 
entangled more, just as the bird or the fish  will die without air or  water. 
If air and  water are life, the bird and the fish are life, too. If the local and 
the global are life, the more than global is life, too. This attests to the to-
tality that the life of lit er a ture cannot do without. Lit er a ture has a life of 
its own. It has a life in being made global, has a life in not being rendered 
global, never becoming global, preglobal, and in being more than global, 
too. The more is the life and the life is the more. Perhaps, the more makes 
lit er a ture dis appear better, as Emerson foresaw.57
The intra- active enactment in negativity and presence is Nancy’s “trem-
bling,” the act of being afected, staying in vibration both in visibility and 
in the nihil.58 Comparatism unleashes a desire to connect, while the more 
than global is predominantly about a nothingness, the nothing being the 
“diferential spacing for an encounter with the other— a just- between- 
us— from which worlds are created by sharing in the same performative 
modality as sovereignty and the self.”59 The more than global makes 
sense of the performative we. It is informed in the we where Nancy locates 
the access to sense. The poem’s access to sense is the entangled event of 
being coimplicated within Sanskrit poetics. Hutchens explains:
The origin of the world emanates from any contact composing a “we.” 
Each singular self has access to the presence of the world, but it is only 
contiguity with other singular selves that enables it to have “access to 
an access.” That is to say,  there is a multiplicity of presences of the world 
within the “we,” and each proximity provides a multiplicity of accesses 
to the presences. If each singularity is co- implicated within the world, 
then the originary existential state of all singularities is a sharing in 
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the world, not any ontological divorce from it into a state of transcen-
dence. The “world” is not merely some extrinsic horizon of singular ex-
istence, but the coexistence that enables existences to be exposed to 
the circulation of sense and the presences of a world.60
The potency or wealth of the we decimates the sovereignty of the local 
and global as the two limiting points of understanding lit er a ture. The more 
than global ( both mundas and immundas) is about making sense of the 
end, the end as the inauguration of creativity. Intra- active transculturality 
finds the “wandering  labour of sense” in the poem— a sense that is not 
predominantly produced but out  there,  there itself, letting- it-be, inter-
leaved, insinuated and interlarded. It urges us to read lit er a ture with trans -
immanence freeing us from our conservatism into a conceptual warfare 
where a meaningful harvest is presenced out of the ruins of finitude. It is 
in the radical nonequivalence of worlding that lit er a ture can find its expe-
riences of freedom.
And fast by hanging in a golden Chain
This pendant world, in bigness as a Starr
Of smallest magnitude close by the Moon.
Thither full fraught with mischievous revenge,
Accurst, and in a cursed hour he hies
Milton, Paradise Lost, bk. 2, lines 1051–55
Ranjan Ghosh’s orientation and argument in his chapter  5, “More than 
Global,” are considerably dif er ent from what I say in this chapter. I have 
learned much from his chapter, both about his own way of thinking and 
about the Sanskrit and Hindi theory of lit er a ture in the context of his 
transcontinental, (in)fusion theory of lit er a ture. The dialogical diferences, 
however, emerge from diferences between our two ways of reading texts, 
Ghosh’s reading of a Western poem, Words worth’s “Dafodils,” my reading 
of a passage by Nietz sche. A juxtaposition of the two readings is perhaps 
the clearest way of seeing what is at stake in the dialogue between us.
Dialogue, by the way, can have two somewhat contradictory meanings. 
It can mean a Habermasian give and take of conversation that has consensus 
as its goal, or it can mean a two- centered (dia- logue) conversation  between 
persons who  will remain in dissensus. My interchanges with Ghosh mix 
 these two forms of dialogue. Sometimes we come to agree. At other times 
we remain in disagreement.
On the one hand, Ghosh reads “Dafodils” as triumphant confirma-
tion of Rabindranath Tagore’s exhortation (in Ghosh’s epigraph) that one 
should strive “to  free oneself of that regional narrowness and resolve to see 
the universal being in world lit er a ture, to apprehend such totality in  every 
writer’s work, and to see its interconnectedness with  every man’s attempt 
at self- expression— that is the objective we need to pledge ourselves to.”
I, on the other hand, am enough dubious about what it would mean to 
read a poem as an example of “world lit er a ture” that I have not even tried 
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to do so. Instead, I have tried to read as best I can a passage from Nietz-
sche’s Th e Birth of Tragedy in the context of Nietz sche’s own life situation 
as a nineteenth- century professor of classical philology at the University 
of Basel, Switzerland. I am also much more concerned than Ghosh usually 
is with the specifi cities of technological change that have brought about 
what we call globalization, and its concomitant, a new form of the disci-
pline called world lit er a ture. I am also fearful that this new discipline  will 
simply universalize Western theories of lit er a ture, whereas Ghosh does 
not hesitate, though with many nuances, qualifi cations, and caveats, and 
with recognition of the local in  every literary text, to universalize a “more 
than global,” that is, to advocate a transcontinental theory and prac-
tice of poetry that is exemplifi ed as much by Sanskrit sahitya as by all the 
Figure 6.1  Satellite photo of earth as “Blue Marble.” Credit: NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center. Image by Reto Stöckli (land surface, shallow  water, clouds). Enhancements by 
Robert Simmon (ocean color, compositing, 3D globes, animation).
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Western sources Ghosh cites. Hindi or Sanskrit theory is, for Ghosh, when 
combined with Western theories, as useful for reading Words worth’s “Daf-
fodils” as it is for reading a literary work in Sanskrit or Hindi.
My instinct, on the contrary, is to hold that a special theory should 
be derived in each case as much as pos si ble from the terminology of the 
text at hand in the light of its specific surrounding historical, biographical, 
and linguistic context.  Doing that, of course, is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, since any readings, even the ones most submissive to the lan-
guage of the text, manifest in one way or another individual commitments 
on the reader’s part, for example, my commitment to a rhetorical reading 
of the tropes in a text, as opposed to Ghosh’s (in)fusion theory, which 
tends to relate details in a poem to larger conceptual issues, such as, in his 
chapter 5, “worlding” or “the more than global.” He discusses for twenty 
manuscript pages citations from a large number of Eastern and Western 
authors, both theorists and writers of poems and novels, before he turns 
to a reading of Words worth’s “Dafodils” that develops a more than global 
way of reading Words worth’s poem.
World lit er a ture, in its recently resurrected form, is indubitably a con-
comitant of economic and financial globalization, as well as of new, world-
wide telecommunications. Marx and Engels long ago, in a famous passage 
in the Communist Manifesto (1848), prophetically said just that:
And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual 
creations of individual nations become common property. National 
one- sidedness and narrow- mindedness become more and more impos-
sible, and from the numerous national and local lit er a tures  there arises 
a world lit er a ture.”1
We are on all sides asked by the media to think globally and are given 
daily new information about globalization in its current form. We have 
also been granted, for the first time in  human history, an ability to look 
at the earth from outer space, that is, from outside what is happening 
 here. Millions of  people all over the world have seen one or another of the 
unsettling space- ship or satellite photo graphs. They provide a distant and 
detached perspective on the earth, with a vengeance. To be, or to pretend 
to be, wholly detached and objective is, nevertheless, perhaps diabolical. 
Milton  imagined Satan as one of the first space travelers in lit er a ture, as in 
the passage from early in Paradise Lost I have begun by citing.2 Satan was 
not exactly detached, since his goal was to bring about the fall of man, but 
he certainly could see the  whole earth from a distance, hanging in space, 
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as all the sons and  daughters of Eve can do nowadays. We are not exactly 
detached and indiferent,  either.
World lit er a ture’s time has come (again). The current return to world 
lit er a ture is perhaps an inevitable concomitant of globalization, but I see 
some prob lems with it. The prob lems I see are quite dif er ent from Ghosh’s 
rejection of world lit er a ture in the name of what he calls the more than 
global. He means by that the participation of  every literary work in what-
ever language and from what ever local culture in what he calls the “sacred-
ness of lit er a ture.”
The pres ent context for developing a rigorous discipline of world lit-
er a ture is not the same as the context in which Goethe, two centuries 
ago, proposed the reading of Weltliteratur. For one  thing, the current 
flowering of a new academic discipline called world lit er a ture is, in the 
West at least, a permutation of the still relatively new discipline of com-
parative lit er a ture, something that did not yet exist in Goethe’s day or 
in Marx’s. Western comparative lit er a ture was determinately Eurocen-
tric in its creation and consolidation. Some of its early champions, such 
as René Wellek,  were from the Prague semiotic school, or from Slavic 
linguistics generally, or  were exiles from Germany. In the United States 
and Eu rope, literary study was still firmly divided into departments of 
this or that language or  family of languages, En glish, German, romance 
languages, classics, near Eastern languages, East Asian languages, Scan-
dinavian languages,  etc. Having a separate department for something 
called comparative lit er a ture met with a lot of re sis tance from  those en-
trenched centers of power. I well remember that from my experience 
teaching in the En glish Department at The Johns Hopkins University 
from 1953 to 1972.
The new discipline of comparative lit er a ture varied a lot from univer-
sity to university, but it was given credence by being established at elite 
universities like Harvard and Yale. Harry Levin did this at Harvard, and 
the émigré scholars Eric Auerbach and René Wellek  were largely responsi-
ble for  doing this at Yale, with some help eventually from younger émigré 
scholars like Peter Demetz, Geofrey Hartman, and Paul de Man. In spite 
of the fact that such scholars all had En glish as a second language, com-
parative lit er a ture tended to have an implicit nationalism by giving one 
language predominance, En glish in Yale’s case and in the United States 
generally. Wellek’s monumental A History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950 
(1955–1992), in eight volumes, translates all its citations into En glish, even 
though his native language was Czech. He appends his citations in the 
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original languages in small print at the end of each volume. For René 
Étiemble, on the contrary, the leading comparatist in France, French was 
the dominant language. Many departments of comparative lit er a ture, 
most notably the one at Yale, became centers of literary theory. Compar-
ative lit er a ture at Yale was the center of the writing and teaching of the 
so- called Yale Critics.3 World lit er a ture has developed in opposition to the 
Eurocentrism of most Western comparative lit er a ture departments.
The pres ent context for the development of world lit er a ture as an aca-
demic discipline also responds to the many facets of globalization  today 
that make Eurocentrism obsolete. I say more about  these conditioning 
contexts in other chapters in this book.
The recent, impressive development of a new discipline called world lit-
er a ture seems pretty far from climate change, the World Wide Web, and 
the recent financial meltdown, but I think it can be shown to be a some-
what dif er ent version of a pattern of inadvertent reversal evident in  those 
forms of globalization. The renewed emphasis on the teaching and study 
of world lit er a ture has, without doubt, been a response to manifold forms 
of technological and economic globalization. Another quite dif er ent re-
sponse is the widespread takeover of lit er a ture departments by  those 
kinds of social studies called cultural studies, postcolonial studies, ethnic 
studies,  women’s studies, film studies, and so on.  These developments are 
to a considerable degree a good  thing. It is harder and harder to justify the 
separate study of supposedly homogeneous national lit er a tures, or to jus-
tify the isolated study of lit er a ture separately from other cultural forms. 
Widespread migration from all over the world to all over the world has 
meant that more and more  people worldwide live in ethnically diverse 
communities where many languages are spoken, if you can any longer call 
them communities. In one section of Montreal, so I am told, an astonishing 
fifty- six dif er ent languages are spoken. It seems natu ral and inevitable 
 these days to look at lit er a ture globally.
 Doing that, however, difers radically from the shift to cultural stud-
ies and their ilk.  These fields of study tend to take for granted that print 
lit er a ture is playing a smaller and smaller role in most  people’s lives, as 
new media like film, tele vi sion, Facebook, and video games replace printed 
novels, plays, and poems.
The ethos of fewer and fewer  people worldwide is determined to any 
large extent by reading lit er a ture in the traditional Western sense of 
printed novels, poems, and plays. This transformation is no doubt occurring 
unevenly around the globe, but it is happening to some degree everywhere. 
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I wish this  were not so, but the evidence shows that it is the case. As I said 
in my part of the introduction to this book, statistical evidence shows the 
astounding number of hours a day many  people spend surfing the web or 
using a smartphone or playing video games. Such  people do every thing 
but read Shakespeare or Jane Austen, even in e- text versions. Lit er a ture, 
in the old- fashioned sense of printed books, moreover, is migrating to 
e- readers like Amazon’s Kindle or Apple’s iPad.
Lit er a ture, in the traditional sense, tends to be marginalized in cultural 
studies, as it is in the lives of the mostly younger scholar- teachers who “do 
cultural studies.” The new discipline of world lit er a ture, on the contrary, 
might be seen as a last- ditch efort to rescue the study of lit er a ture. It does 
this by implicitly claiming that studying lit er a ture from around the world 
is a way to understand globalization. This understanding allows one to be-
come a citizen of the world. If I study world lit er a ture in a course or in a 
textbook, I  will become a cosmopolitan, not just a citizen of this or that local 
monolingual community. In the course of developing the new world lit er a-
ture, however— through the planning of courses, the publication of text-
books, and the training of competent teachers— some prob lems arise.  Here 
are three impor tant challenges to the new discipline of world lit er a ture.
One: the challenge of translation. No single student, teacher, or ordi-
nary reader can master all the hundreds of languages in which world lit er a-
ture is written. Any literary work in a given language can be translated into 
any other language, but difficulties of translation always exist.  Will world 
lit er a ture have a single master language, such as Chinese or En glish, into 
which a given textbook  will translate all the se lections? That would appear 
to be a form of cultural imperialism. How can world lit er a ture avoid being 
dominated by some single, national academic culture? This issue arises in 
Ranjan Ghosh’s use in his chapter 5 of a complex integument of Sanskrit 
words to express his reading of Words worth’s “Dafodils.”  Those Sanskrit 
words sound, in transcriptions of the originals into En glish letters, quite 
strange to a Westerner like me. Sahitya? Ghosh gives En glish meanings 
of  those words.  These are of  great help. But just having a rudimentary 
vocabulary of Sanskrit poetics with translations of  those words is not at 
all the same  thing as reading key texts in Sanskrit poetics in the original 
language and then internalizing  those texts in the form of an embodied 
attitude  toward reading lit er a ture. Ghosh has apparently done that, as his 
chapters in this book indicate, though it is only part of his larger proj ect of 
developing a transcontinental (in)fusion approach to lit er a ture that draws 
together sources from all over the world.
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Two: the challenge of repre sen ta tion. A scholar can spend his or her 
 whole life studying a single national lit er a ture and still not master it. World 
lit er a ture  will, of necessity, for example, in textbooks or courses, work by 
way of relatively brief se lections from the lit er a ture of many countries or 
regions. Such se lections  will always be to some degree biased or controver-
sial. How can this bias be avoided as much as pos si ble? Who  will have the 
authority to decide which works in a given language or in a given national 
lit er a ture belong to world lit er a ture? What  will be the criteria for the de-
cisions to include or exclude? Does Franz Kafka, for example, belong to 
world lit er a ture? The book on Kafka by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari is 
subtitled  Toward a Minor Lit er a ture.4 Is that a true description? Does being 
minor mean Kafka’s works do not belong to world lit er a ture? How would 
you know for sure one way or the other?
David Damrosch, in the brilliant introductory essay to his What Is World 
Lit er a ture? touches with wisdom and impressive learning on all the issues 
I am raising. He sidesteps the prob lem of setting a canon of world lit er a-
ture by saying that “world lit er a ture is not an infinite, ungraspable canon 
of works but rather a mode of circulation and of reading.”5 Does that mean 
that any literary work that is circulated and read globally automatically 
becomes part of world lit er a ture?
Teachers of world lit er a ture and editors of textbooks on world lit er a ture 
still need to decide, however, which works to help circulate and get read. 
Such experts also need to decide what to tell students about a work from 
a culture that is dif er ent from their own. Damrosch identifies succinctly 
the challenges to  doing this. “A specialist in classical Chinese poetry,” he 
says, “can gradually, over years of  labor, develop a close familiarity with 
the vast substratum beneath each brief T’ang Dynasty poem, but most of 
this context is lost to foreign readers when the poem travels abroad. Lack-
ing specialized knowledge, the foreign reader is likely to impose domestic 
literary values on the foreign work, and even careful scholarly attempts to 
read a foreign work in light of a Western critical theory are deeply prob-
lematic.”6 Would that mean that reading a Western poem in the light of 
Sanskrit theory is also problematic? That is a dialogical question I hereby 
pose to Ghosh.
Three: the challenge of defining what is meant by lit er a ture. Goethe, in 
one of  those famous conversations with J. P. Eckermann about world lit-
er a ture, serenely affirms his belief that lit er a ture is a universal. It is some-
thing possessed by  every  human culture, everywhere at all times. When 
Eckermann, Goethe’s fall guy or straight man, resisted reading Chinese 
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novels by asking  whether the one they have been discussing is “perhaps 
one of their most superior ones,” Goethe responded firmly:
“By no means,” said Goethe; “the Chinese have thousands of them, and 
had when our forefathers  were still living in the woods.”
“I am more and more convinced,” he continued, “that poetry is the 
universal possession of mankind. . . .  the epoch of world lit er a ture is at 
hand, and every one must strive to hasten its approach.”7
What Goethe says  here is echoed by Ghosh’s epigraph from Tagore in 
chapter 5. This indicates that the notion that poetry is the universal pos-
session of mankind is by no means limited to one culture or another. 
But even within a relatively homogeneous, though multilingual, culture, 
such as that of Western Eu rope and Amer i ca, lit er a ture is not quite so easy 
to define or to take for granted as Goethe makes it sound. Nonetheless, 
one might say of lit er a ture what a United States Supreme Court Justice 
famously said about pornography: “I  can’t define it, but I know it when I 
see it.” Lit er a ture, in its modern Western form, is not even three centu-
ries old. Is it legitimate to globalize that parochial notion of what is meant 
by  lit er a ture, to make it valid for all times and places, for all cultures? The 
modern Western idea of lit er a ture is parochial in the sense of being limited 
to Western culture during one historical time— the time of the rise of the 
 middle class, of increasing literacy, and of the printed book. It seems un-
likely that what we Westerners have meant by lit er a ture for the last  couple 
of centuries would hold true worldwide. How can a discipline of world lit-
er a ture res pect the many dif er ent conceptions of lit er a ture in dif er ent 
times and places throughout the world? Damrosch recognizes that lit er a-
ture means something dif er ent in each culture, but he says, in a circular 
formulation, that we can define lit er a ture as what ever  people in diverse 
times and places take as lit er a ture. All of us, in all our diversity of cultures 
and conceptions of lit er a ture, know a piece of lit er a ture when we see one.
The efort to globalize literary study, admirable though it is, encoun-
ters through its deployment intrinsic features in so- called lit er a ture that 
unglobalize the proj ect.  These features of diversity tend, or  ought to tend, 
to return literary study not so much to the dispersed and self- enclosed 
investigations of national lit er a tures in a given language in a given time 
and place as to the one- by- one reading of individual works that we have 
deci ded are examples of lit er a ture. The narrowness of segregated national 
lit er a ture study is just what the redevelopment of world lit er a ture was try-
ing to escape. Comprehensive study of even a single national lit er a ture, 
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however, is a Herculean, perhaps impossible, task. In the end, no literary 
work, it may be, fits the periodizing or generic generalizations that can be 
made about it. To speak of “the Victorian novel” is a mystified projection 
of unity where im mense variation actually exists.
The new discipline of world lit er a ture, I conclude, problematizes itself, 
or  ought to problematize itself, through rigorous investigation of the 
presuppositions that made the development of world lit er a ture as an aca-
demic discipline pos si ble and desirable in the first place. Does that mean it 
is not worthwhile to read a few pages of Chinese, Hindu, Arabic,  Kenyan, 
or Czech lit er a ture in En glish translation, with succinct expert commen-
tary? Would it be better not to read bits of  those lit er a tures at all? By no 
means. The challenges to world lit er a ture I have identified do mean, how-
ever, that one should not exaggerate the degree to which courses in world 
lit er a ture are any more than a valuable first step  toward giving students 
knowledge of lit er a tures and cultures from all corners of the earth.
I have stressed the challenges and difficulties faced by world lit er a ture 
as a discipline concomitant with the new forms of globalization. That does 
not mean world lit er a ture should not flourish. Shakespeare, in the vari ous 
plots of As You Like It (1600), shows pretty conclusively that love in the 
sense of sexual desire and love in the sense of spiritual afection may not 
by any means be reconciled. They form an aporia, an impasse. No bringing 
together of lust and love. The play ends triumphantly, however, with four 
marriages.  These break through the impasse. Let world lit er a ture thrive, 
say I, just as Shakespeare’s mad King Lear says, “Let copulation thrive.”8
This chapter, up to this point, was presented in an earlier form as part 
of my pre sen ta tion at a conference in Shanghai, “Comparative Lit er a-
ture in the Phase of World Lit er a ture: The Fifth Sino- American Sympo-
sium on Comparative Lit er a ture” (August 11–15, 2010). As I expected, I 
learned much from all the papers. By meeting and hearing so many of the 
leaders worldwide in the new discipline of world lit er a ture, I learned that 
this discipline is thriving globally and that a consensus is beginning to 
emerge about what world lit er a ture is and what it does, what its conven-
tions and protocols are.
I found, however, especially relevant to my own reflections about world 
lit er a ture Thomas Beebee’s paper asking “What in the World does Frie-
drich Nietz sche have against Weltliteratur?” I found Beebee’s paper ex-
tremely provocative, not least by way of the citations from Nietz sche’s The 
Birth of Tragedy and Beyond Good and Evil, the exegesis of which generated 
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his essay. I had so much to say about both Beebee’s paper and the citations 
on his handout that I refrained from commenting at the time he presented 
his paper for fear of impolitely taking up too much time in the discussion. 
The following remarks, as a conclusion to this chapter, are my belated re-
sponse to hearing Beebee’s admirable paper.
Just what does Nietz sche have against Weltliteratur? In order to be brief 
and to avoid an interminable exegesis, I limit myself almost completely to 
the citations from Nietz sche in Beebee’s handout. Readers of the major 
essays on Nietz sche’s The Birth of Tragedy by Paul de Man, Andrzej Warm-
inski, Carol Jacobs, and Thomas Albrecht  will know how complex, contra-
dictory, and controversial The Birth of Tragedy is.9 Warminski, in “Reading 
for Example,” gives an example of the prob lems of translation I have men-
tioned. He shows that Walter Kaufmann, in the standard translation of 
The Birth of Tragedy, misleadingly translates the German word Gleichnis 
as “symbol.” Kaufmann thereby imports the  whole Romantic ideology of 
symbol into Nietz sche’s text, whereas Gleichnis actually means “parable,” 
or “figure,” or just plain “image,” in the sense of “likeness,” which is,  after 
all, what Gleichnis literally means (Warminski, Readings, xliv– xlv).
What Nietz sche says in the striking passage from The Birth of Tragedy 
Beebee began by citing adds one more challenge to the enterprise of world 
lit er a ture to the three I identify and discuss above. Readers of Nietz sche’s 
“Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben”  will remem-
ber that Nietz sche argues, paradoxically and even scandalously, that it 
is healthy to forget history so we can get on with living productively in 
the pres ent.10 We need to start afresh without the  great weight of history 
on our shoulders. Nietz sche’s title has been translated in many dif er ent 
ways, in exemplification of what I say above about translation and world 
lit er a ture, but my German dictionary gives “advantage” and “disadvantage” 
as the primary meanings of Nutz and Nachtheil, not “utility” and “liability,” 
as the Richard Gray translation I cite has it.
This essay is Nietz sche’s version of James Joyce’s definition of his-
tory as “the nightmare from which I am trying to awake.” Nietz sche’s and 
Joyce’s views of history seem paradoxical and scandalous to us humanities 
professors who have given our lives to studying the history of lit er a ture, 
including, for many now, the history of world lit er a ture. Nietz sche him-
self was charged with an obligation to study and teach literary history as 
an Ordinarius Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basle. 
Appointed at twenty- four, he was one of the youn gest ever called to such 
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a post. The Nietz schean view is the opposite of the by no means implausi-
ble and now proverbial counterassertion that  those who forget history are 
condemned to repeat it.
Nietz sche’s basic assumption, in the extracts from The Birth of Tragedy 
and Beyond Good and Evil Beebee discusses, is that we now live trapped in 
the meshes of what he calls an “Alexandrian” culture: ”Our  whole modern 
world is entangled in the net of Alexandrian culture. It proposes as its 
ideal the theoretical man equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge, 
and laboring in the ser vice of science, whose archetype and progenitor is 
Socrates.”11 Just what do  these two sentences mean? They mean that, like 
the citizens of Alexandria in the twilight of the ancient Greek world, we 
in the modern world know every thing and have accumulated all knowl-
edge, such as was gathered in the famous library of Alexandria, or as was 
collected in the  great Eu ro pean university libraries of Nietz sche’s time, or 
as does the Internet encompass  today. In  these days of global telecommu-
nications, anyone can get information about almost anything by Googling 
it from almost anywhere in the world, that is, wherever one has an Inter-
net connection that allows one to open Google. Use of Google is by no 
means globally allowed. Moreover, even our art, in Nietz sche’s view, has 
been enfeebled by becoming imitative. It is cut of from fresh sources of 
inspiration. Our poets and artists know too much about the histories of 
poetry and art. This is Nietz sche’s version of what Harold Bloom, in the late 
twentieth  century, was to call “the anxiety of influence.”12
Nietz sche takes a dim view of this situation. Why? Why does Nietz sche 
define the power of knowing every thing as like being entangled in a net? It 
might seem a wonderful asset to have knowledge of every thing  under the 
sun at one’s fingertips. On the contrary, Nietz sche holds that just as a wild 
animal, a fish, or a bird caught in a net is deprived of the ability to live its 
life freely, so Alexandrian  people are para lyzed. They are prevented from 
living a normal  human life by knowing too much, just as we  today, it may 
be, are made Alexandrian by being entangled in the im mense knowledge 
provided by the Internet. Nietz sche’s concept of a proper  human life is 
to live and act in the pres ent, in a par tic u lar situation with pres ent prob-
lems. We must live oriented  toward the  future, forgetting the past. One of 
Beebee’s citations quotes Nietz sche’s citing of Goethe’s praise of Napoleon 
to Eckermann as the type of the non- theoretical man who embodies “a 
productiveness of deeds.”13 Normal  human beings dwell within a local cul-
ture. This culture includes indigenous lit er a ture and other art forms. Such 
a culture is sequestered from other cultures and takes its assumptions, as 
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well as its native language, as universals. The Greeks saw every one who 
did not speak Greek as barbarians. It sounded as if they  were stammering 
“bar . . .  bar . . .  bar,” not speaking anything intelligible. Learning another 
language seemed pointless or dangerous to the Greeks. It would lead to 
dissonance, to the multiplication and dissolution of the self.
The word dissonance appears in the second of Beebee’s citations. It is 
taken from the last section of The Birth of Tragedy, section 25. The word 
dissonance appears with increasing frequency  toward the end of The Birth 
of Tragedy. “If we could imagine dissonance become man— and what  else 
is man?— this dissonance, to be able to live, would need a splendid illu-
sion that would cover dissonance with a veil of beauty [einen Schönheits-
schleier über ihr eignes Wesen].”14 A more literal translation would say 
“spread a veil of beauty over its own being.” “Ihr,” “its,” could refer  either 
to dissonance or to man, but Nietz sche’s argument,  after all, is that man 
is essentially dissonance. They are the same. Man is dissonance in living 
 human form. (Pres ent- day readers are likely to note, by the way, the im-
perturbable sexism of Nietz sche’s formulations. He speaks of dissonance 
become man, not man and  woman. Mensch apparently includes every one, 
both men and  women. Sexual diference does not  matter to Nietz sche, 
at least not in  these citations. Birth is used in the title without apparent 
reference to the fact that only  women can give birth.)
Just what is Nietz sche’s dissonance? Thomas Beebee was perhaps too 
reticent or too intellectually chaste to say anything, so far as I can remem-
ber his oral pre sen ta tion, about that dissonant can of worms, the vexed 
opposition between the Dionysian and the Apollonian that ambiguously 
organizes the  whole of The Birth of Tragedy. That opposition is especially 
salient as the leitmotif of section 25. In incautiously opening that can of 
worms, I say the opposition ambiguously organizes The Birth of Tragedy. 
The opposition is ambiguous  because, though at first it seems that the Di-
onysian and the Apollonian are clear opposites, it turns out that  matters 
are not quite so  simple. The Dionysian, it appears, refers to the under-
lying cacophony of the universal  Will (an echo of Schopenhauer), “the Di-
onysian basic ground of the world.”15  Music and Greek tragedy (Sophocles 
and Aeschylus, but not Euripides) are direct expressions of this Dionysian 
“basic ground of the world.”16 “ Music and tragic myth are equally expres-
sions of the Dionysian capacity of a  people, and they are inseparable.”17
The full title of Nietz sche’s book,  after all, is The Birth of Tragedy out of 
the Spirit of  Music. Just why Nietz sche says “spirit of  music” rather than 
just “ music” is a difficult question to answer. Apparently the spirit of  music 
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precedes  actual musical compositions, such as  those operas by Wagner 
that are Nietz sche’s prime example of the modern Dionysian. The spirit of 
 music and  music, Nietz sche’s phrasing implies, are two dif er ent  things. In 
any case, the Apollonian seems clearly opposed to the Dionysian. “Man” 
cannot face the Dionysian directly and go on living. It has to be covered 
over with a veil of beautiful illusion: “This dissonance [that is, dissonance 
become man in a Menschwerdung], in order to be able to live, would need 
a splendid illusion that would spread a veil of beauty over its own being.” 
As T. S. Eliot puts this, “ Human kind / Cannot bear very much real ity.”18
This opposition seems clear enough. It has an Apollonian, reasonable 
clarity. The more one reads carefully, however, every thing Nietz sche wrote 
about the Dionysian and the Apollonian, including the abundant notes 
written prior to The Birth of Tragedy, Nietz sche’s letters of the time, the 
recanting “Attempt at a Self- Criticism,” written for the third edition of 
the book (1886), and the comments on The Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo 
(written 1888, published 1908), the more complicated  matters become. 
The edition of 1886 even had a dif er ent title: Die Geburt der Tragödie, oder: 
Griechenthum und Pessimismus (The Birth of Tragedy, or: Hellenism and 
Pessimism). More and more, the careful reader comes to recognize that 
the Dionysian and the Apollonian, even at the time of the first edition of 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872), are not opposites. They are, to borrow Jacobs’s 
word, “stammering” permutations of one another as slightly dif er ent 
“transfigurations” or figurative displacements of an original dissonance 
that, pace Schopenhauer, can never be expressed directly.
That dissonance can only be figured by one or another catachresis, that 
is, by a borrowed word or phrase used to name something that has no 
proper name. Dissonance,  after all, is not  music but the absence of  music 
in clashing sound, just as stammering is language that is not language but 
the product of a speech impediment that produces repetitive dissonant 
sounds, like “bar, bar, bar.” Already in section 25 of The Birth of Tragedy the 
same word, transfiguration, is used to define what Dionysiac  music, tragic 
myth, and Apollonian illusion all do in dif er ent ways: “ Music and tragic 
myth are equally expression of the Dionysian capacity of a  people, and 
they are inseparable. Both derive from a sphere of art that lies beyond the 
Apollonian; both transfigure a region in whose joyous chords dissonance 
as well as the terrible image of the world fade away charmingly.”19 Only 
Apollonian form, apparently, can save us from the formlessness of the Dio-
nysian: “Of this foundation of all existence— the Dionysian basic ground 
of the world— not one whit more may enter the consciousness of the 
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 human individual than can be overcome again by this Apollonian power 
of transfiguration.”20
The reader is left, in the end, with an opposition not between the Di-
onysian and the Apollonian, but between the primordial, under lying dis-
sonance, on the one hand, and, on the other, both the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian in all their vari ous permutations as forms of the transfigura-
tion (in the sense of turning into figures) of what mankind cannot face 
directly and go on living.  These apparently clear figures, however, betray 
their origin in their own stammering dissonance. Carol Jacobs has in her 
brilliant essay “The Stammering Text: The Fragmentary Studies Prelimi-
nary to The Birth of Tragedy” conclusively demonstrated this in her admi-
rable reading of the notebooks (especially notebook 9) preliminary to The 
Birth of Tragedy.21 Her essay culminates in an exegesis of Nietz sche’s use 
of the word stammeln (stammer) both in the notebooks and once in The 
Birth of Tragedy itself.22 Jacobs’s difficult insight might be summarized by 
a slight extension of her epigraph from The Birth of Tragedy itself: “Thus the 
intricate relation of the Apollonian and the Dionysian in tragedy may  really 
be symbolized by a fraternal  union of the two deities: Dionysus speaks the 
language of Apollo; and Apollo, fi nally the language of Dionysus.”23
In truth, Nietz sche, as Albrecht and  others of the scholars listed in my 
endnotes argue, saw both the Dionysian and the Apollonian as generating 
out of their own stammering dissonance the illusion of primordial disso-
nance, rather than just being figurative transfigurations of it. My word 
catachresis, as I said in chapter 4, the tropological name for a “forced or 
abusive transfer,” hints at this possibility.24 I refrain from pursuing this 
rabbit any further down its rabbit hole. It is a good example of the way 
an innocent- looking word, dissonance, can lead to a virtually interminable 
reading that ultimately includes every thing the author wrote and its dis-
sonant (and therefore resistant to totalization) intellectual, cultural, and 
linguistic context.
Nietz sche’s harsh judgment of Goethe’s Weltliteratur is a concomitant 
of this larger set of contextual assumptions. Specialists in world lit er a ture 
know many languages, many cultures, many lit er a tures. They set  these all 
next to one another in simultaneity, as exemplary of a universal or global 
lit er a ture that began thousands of years ago and that still flourishes every-
where in the inhabited world. The efflorescence of world lit er a ture as an 
academic discipline  today is clearly a concomitant of globalization, as I 
began this chapter by asserting. Nietz sche in Beyond Good and Evil (1886) 
saw this, ironically, as civilization, humanizing, pro gress, or “the demo cratic 
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movement in Eu rope,” that is, as “an im mense physiological pro cess . . . 
the slow emergence of an essentially super- national and nomadic species 
of man, who possesses, physiologically speaking, a maximum of the art 
and power of adaptation as his typical distinction.”25 This pro cess has now 
reached a hyperbolic level. The new, nomadic species of man takes many 
forms  today, but it might be personified in the scholar who travels much 
of the time all over the world by jet plane, as I used to do, to attend confer-
ences and to give papers that are heard by participants who come from all 
over the world, the globe compacted to the size of a lecture hall.
In the light of this brief establishment of a wider context for world lit-
er a ture, as Nietz sche saw its “disadvantage” for life, I now turn back to the 
first citation Thomas Beebee made from The Birth of Tragedy. The narrower 
context of Nietz sche’s putdown of world lit er a ture is Goethe’s cele bration 
of it in that famous interchange with Eckermann, already cited, about Chi-
nese novels as a manifestation of world lit er a ture. The Chinese, Goethe told 
Eckermann, had novels when we Eu ro pe ans  were still living in the woods. 
“The epoch of world lit er a ture is at hand, and every one must strive to has-
ten its approach,” said Goethe with his usual somewhat  ironic cheerful-
ness. It is coming anyway, so why not hasten its coming, or, rather, we 
should therefore hasten its coming. Goethe, as opposed to Nietz sche, saw 
no danger in world lit er a ture. In his serene and sovereign imperturbabil-
ity, he welcomed its coming, perhaps  because he was sure he would be part 
of it, as has certainly turned out to be the case.
Nevertheless, the efects on Goethe’s Faust of total knowledge should 
give the reader pause. Beebee’s citations include a reference in The Birth of 
Tragedy to Goethe’s Faust as the type of modern man’s omniscience turn-
ing against itself in a perpetual dissatisfaction: “How unintelligible must 
Faust [He means Goethe’s Faust], the modern cultured man, who is in him-
self intelligible, have appeared to a true Greek. . . .  Faust, whom we have but 
to place beside Socrates for the purpose of comparison, in order to see that 
modern man is beginning to divine the limits of this Socratic love of knowl-
edge and yearns for a coast in the wide waste of the ocean of knowledge.”26
Well, just what does Nietz sche have against Weltliteratur?  Here is the 
crucial passage Beebee cites. It must be scrutinized closely: “Our art re-
veals this universal distress: in vain does one depend imitatively on all 
the  great productive periods and natures; in vain does one accumulate the 
entire ‘world- lit er a ture’ around modern man for his comfort; in vain does 
one place oneself in the midst of the art styles and artists of all ages, so 
that one may give names to them as Adam did to the beasts: one still re-
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mains eternally hungry, the ‘critic’ without joy or energy, the Alexandrian 
man, who is at bottom a librarian and corrector of proofs, and wretchedly 
goes blind from the dust of books and from printers’ errors.”27
Just what is the “universal distress,” the unassuaged need for “comfort,” 
the eternal hunger that modern man sufers? The passage just cited from 
The Birth of Tragedy, as well as other passages from Nietz sche’s writings, 
indicate that it is the distress of a successful Socratic, Faustian, or even a 
Kantian or Hegelian, search for total knowledge, empirically verified and 
epistemologically sound. This search has turned against itself through its 
very success. This reversal has left modern man in a state of universal 
distress, typified by the eternal dissatisfaction of Goethe’s Faust. The dis-
satisfying superabundance of knowledge that  causes Faust grief is ex-
emplified  today by the more or less limitless knowledge about every thing 
 under the sun, and beyond the sun, available on the Internet.
The immediate context of the passage just cited from section 18 of The 
Birth of Tragedy affirms clearly that this superabundance of knowledge is 
the cause of universal distress. The  whole section, however, is complex 
and would demand a lengthy exposition. To put what Nietz sche says in an 
oversimplifying nutshell, the search by theoretical, scientific, or scholarly 
man for the power and equanimity granted by a comprehensive knowl-
edge has reversed itself by reaching the irrational and illogical, from which 
theoretical man recoils in fear:
It is certainly a sign of the “breach” of which every one speaks as the 
fundamental malady of modern culture, that the theoretical man, 
alarmed and dissatisfied at his own consequences, no longer dares en-
trust himself to the terrible icy current of existence: he runs timidly up 
and down the bank.28 So thoroughly has he been pampered by his op-
timistic views that he no longer wants to have anything  whole, with all 
of nature’s cruelty attaching to it. Besides, he feels that a culture based 
on the princi ples of science must be destroyed when it begins to grow 
illogical, that is, to retreat before its own consequences.29
In this extraordinary passage, rational knowledge is said to overreach 
itself and become dangerously illogical, irrational. This is the “distress” of 
which Nietz sche speaks in the opening sentence of the first citation Bee-
bee discussed: “Our art reveals this universal distress.”
Just how, for Nietz sche, does this revelation through the art of the 
pres ent moment, that is, the moment of the late nineteenth  century in 
Eu rope, occur? It happens, says Nietz sche, through the Alexandrian 
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 derivative and imitative quality of  today’s art. Pres ent- day artists and 
poets know too much literary history and too much art history to pro-
duce other than feeble imitations of the  great productive artists and poets 
of the past. Nietz sche’s formulations take place, you  will have noticed, 
through a cascade of phrases beginning with “in vain.” It is as a member 
of this sequence that the failure of world lit er a ture to give modern man 
comfort in his distress is asserted. Categorizing art styles and periods in 
the lit er a ture of all ages and countries (for example, speaking of Baroque, 
Romantic, or Victorian styles), work all we literary historians perform, is 
as arbitrary and ungrounded as are, to a skeptical eye,  those names Adam 
gave to all the beasts.
The bottom line is that for Nietz sche world lit er a ture, far from giving 
modern man comfort in his distress, fails completely to do that. In fact, 
turning to world lit er a ture is one of the signal ways that distress mani-
fests itself and is exacerbated. As far as Nietz sche is concerned, it would be 
better not to know, better to forget all  those alien lit er a tures that swarm 
around the globe. It would be better to live as Nietz sche implies Athenian 
Greeks did, that is, in joyful possession of a narrow local culture that ig-
nored all other cultures and lit er a tures and saw them as barbarous.
Nietz sche’s view of Greek culture is not quite so  simple, however. The 
Birth of Tragedy ends with paragraphs asserting that Athenian Apollonian 
beauty was a compensation for Dionysian madness: “In view of this con-
tinual influx of beauty, would he [someone  today imagining himself a cu-
rious stranger in ancient Athens] not have to exclaim, raising his hand to 
Apollo: ‘Blessed  people of Hellas! How  great must Dionysus be among you 
if the god of Delos [Apollo] considers such magic necessary to heal your 
dithyrambic madness.’ ”30 Nietz sche imagines an old Athenian’s respond-
ing, “But say this, too, curious stranger: how much did this  people have to 
sufer to be able to become so beautiful!”31 The Dionysian  causes sufering. 
The Apollonian is beautiful.
Nietz sche’s forceful rejection of world lit er a ture already manifests in 
hyperbolic form the reversal that was the climax of the paper I gave at 
the Shanghai Symposium (that is, the original version of the first part of 
this chapter). The new discipline of world lit er a ture, I said, “problematizes 
itself, or  ought to problematize itself, through rigorous investigation of 
the presuppositions that made the development of world lit er a ture as an 
academic discipline pos si ble and desirable in the first place.” One of the 
bad efects of the discipline of world lit er a ture, Nietz sche implies, is that it 
transforms scholars into something like what Nietz sche became or feared 
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becoming as a professor of classical philology. Nietz sche’s description is 
memorably sardonic. It recalls George Eliot’s description in Middlemarch 
of Edward Casaubon and his futile pursuit of the Key to All Mythologies. 
 Here again is Nietz sche’s description: “The ‘critic’ without joy or energy, the 
Alexandrian man, who is at bottom a librarian and corrector of proofs, 
and wretchedly goes blind from the dust of books and from printers’ er-
rors.” It may have been in part fear of becoming like this critic that led 
Nietz sche to resign his professorship. His main, overt reason was trou ble 
with his eyesight.  Here is Eliot’s description of Casaubon: “Poor Mr. Casa-
ubon himself was lost among small closets and winding stairs, and in an 
agitated dimness about the Cabeiri, or in an exposure of other mytholo-
gists’ ill- considered parallels, easily lost sight of any purpose which had 
prompted him to  these  labors.”32 What circulates in Casaubon’s veins is 
neither blood nor passion but marks of punctuation, just as Nietz sche’s 
dry- as- dust scholar spends his time with misprints. As Mrs. Cadwallader, 
one of Casaubon’s sharp- tongued neighbors, says, “Somebody put a drop 
[of his blood]  under a magnifying- glass, and it was all semicolons and pa-
rentheses.”33 For both Nietz sche and Eliot, culture as enshrined in texts 
is reduced to concern with the materiality of the letter or of punctuation 
marks, such as have preoccupied me in revising and footnoting this essay. 
Friedrich Nietz sche, the precociously brilliant young professor of classi-
cal philology, may have written an outrageously unorthodox first book 
(The Birth of Tragedy) as a way to avoid becoming just another classical 
philologist.
I make one final observation. I intended to make a few brief comments 
about Thomas Beebee’s admirable paper and about the citations from 
Nietz sche on which he focused. As I might have foreseen, my comments have 
got longer and longer and might be yet longer. They extend themselves 
in defi nitely. What Thomas Beebee, and then I, following in his footsteps, 
have said about Friedrich Nietz sche’s theory of Weltliteratur indicates that 
theoretical statements about world lit er a ture require as much contextu-
alizing exposition as do works of world lit er a ture themselves. Such state-
ments must be read, and they must be contextualized.
I do not think we can ever go back to a world of isolated socie ties, each 
with its own indigenous culture. To wish we could all be like the putatively 
happy ancient Athenians, as Nietz sche sometimes seems to do, is, in my 
view, a form of unproductive nostalgia. We must make do with what we 
have, which is a worldwide Alexandrian culture. The new efflorescence of 
world lit er a ture as an academic discipline is a natu ral concomitant of this. 
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Its  great value is that even if it does not give “comfort,” it does help us to 
understand and to live productively in the new, uncomfortable world of 
global telecommunication and global wandering that Nietz sche calls no-
madism. The encounters between me and Ranjan Ghosh in the alternating 
chapters of this book are attempts to exemplify in another way such an 
“understanding and living productively.”
Though Ghosh and I agree in putting the new discipline of world lit er-
a ture in question, our questioning comes from opposite directions. Our 
chapters 1 and 2 somewhat unexpectedly ended in my recognition of a 
consonance, or at least resonance, between Ghosh’s concept of Sahitya, 
which is one version of his sacredness of lit er a ture, and my only slightly 
ironic allegiance to “the imaginary” as expounded by Wolfgang Iser and 
Maurice Blanchot. Our chapters 5 and 6 are not so happily in tune, even 
though in both cases the exposition is structured as a juxtaposition of 
a theory section and a section “close reading” a text, a poem by Words-
worth in Ghosh’s chapter, a passage from Nietz sche’s The Birth of Tragedy 
in my chapter. Ghosh challenges the new discipline of world lit er a ture in 
the name of the more than global, that is, in the name of a complex theory 
of lit er a ture based on both Eastern and Western sources that works as 
well for Words worth’s “Dafodils” as it would for any poem in Chinese, 
Sanskrit, Hindi, or Bengali. I challenge world lit er a ture in the name of the 
irreducible idiosyncrasy and specificity of each literary work, for example, 
Words worth’s “Dafodils.” That individuality can, I claim, be assimilated 
neither to a more than global theory nor to what ever may be said about 
the characteristics of En glish Romantic lit er a ture or even of Words worth’s 
poetry. The most impor tant features of “Dafodils” are sui generis. More-
over, my “theory section” in this chapter by no means takes Nietz sche, 
much less Goethe, as solid foundations for a theory of world lit er a ture. 
Both Goethe and Nietz sche, I hold, must be read with a critical eye and 
with close attention to problematic linguistic details in what they wrote, 
not as solid foundations on the basis of which a correct more than global 
theory of lit er a ture might possibly be constructed.
•  PART IV •
Teaching Lit er a ture
This page intentionally left blank
Every thing in the seminar must, in princi ple, begin at fictive zero point of my rela-
tion to the audience: as though we  were all “complete beginners” the  whole time.
— Jacques Derrida
One cannot without intellectual dishonesty assimilate the “production” of 
texts . . .  to the production of goods by factory workers: writing and thinking are 
not alienated  labor in that sense, and it is surely fatuous for intellectuals to seek to 
glamorize their tasks . . .  by assimilating them to real work on the assembly line.
— Fredric Jameson
Entering my postgraduate Indian classroom of seventy- odd students 
to teach Samuel Beckett’s Endgame is taking a plunge into a cocktail of 
challenge and fun. The classroom becomes atmospheric in billowing ex-
pectations constructed on the pillars of existential philosophy, modernist 
aesthetics, Eu ro pean dramatic tradition, and certainly Beckettian philos-
ophy and ethics of writing. So theoretically Endgame has already had its 
rules of interpretive gaming ready and formed and my presence in the 
classroom stays entrenched in a prefigured circulation where the students 
and the teacher function as satellites around a heliocentric textual gravity. 
However, once I decide to activate the  battle lines across disciplines, the 
“throb” in the classroom changes and teaching, a beginning conducted at 
fictive zero point, generates “desire lines” that demand able and prescient 
protection from official and sanctioned pathways of communication and 
travel.1 My teaching tries to snif out how diferences across cultures of 
understanding and traditions of thought can be the strength of communi-
cation, the nutrition of good learning and understanding. What Marjorie 
Garber calls “discipline envy” becomes for me the “disciplinary eros” in the 
classroom. Garber observes: “But I use envy  here to designate a mechanism, 
a kind of energy, an exhilarating intellectual curiosity as well as what Ve-
blen called emulation. Envy in this sense is not the same as jealousy (‘fear 
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of losing some good through the rivalry of another; resentment or ill  will 
 toward another on account of advantage or superiority’). Rather it corre-
sponds to older notions of the word that are generally positive rather than 
negative: a ‘desire to equal another in achievement or excellence; emula-
tion’ and (a sense derived from the French envie) a ‘wish, desire, longing; 
enthusiasm.’ ”2
What if I import transcultural envy into the classroom? How does that 
change the desire lines, introduce a sense of loss and limit, create prob-
lems in the identification of paradigms of understanding, schadenfreude, 
the plea sure at the expense of someone’s discomfort and unease? But 
what gain does this unease bring? Pursuing and practicing humanities in 
the classroom is setting out on a search for the “blue bird.” Garber refers to 
the symbolist play by the Belgian writer Maurice Maeterlinck called The Blue 
Bird, where two  children embark on a quest for a special blue bird. Garber 
writes: “The  children set out on their journey. In the space of what they 
think is a year but what turns out to be a long Christmas night’s dream, 
they travel to the Land of Memory, the Palace of Night, the Graveyard, 
and the Kingdom of the  Future, but although they often glimpse a blue-
bird, they can never quite capture it.”3 They return home only to discover 
that their pet turtle dove, a caged bird they paid scant attention to, is in-
deed blue in color. Garber rightly notes “that the  children of this story 
needed to travel around the world, and to the worlds of the past and the 
 future, in order to recognize that what they had been seeking was at home 
with them all along. They had neglected or failed to value it,  because it 
seemed so ordinary. Their bluebird, when they fi nally put it to work in the 
world, giving it to the neighbor’s child and curing the child’s illness, ulti-
mately escapes.”4 I would like to argue that any literary text in a classroom 
has a blue bird that actually is the link, the continuum, the vestibule, the 
unease, between what the text possesses and the critical peregrinations 
that occur around it. The blue bird occasions exciting  angles and turns 
in a text that, again, are not what strictly define a text. It enhances the 
choices that a text delivers, the points around which the text vanishes and 
reappears; the text somehow eludes captivity.
It has to be agreed that “any pedagogy that eliminates the classroom 
text from its questioning repeats the colonizing gesture. Critical prob-
lematizing should therefore interrogate the authority relations that seem 
at once so ste reo typical and so natu ral.”5 So a text dynamically inscribed 
into the notion of the uncanny (the transcultural uncanny as elaborated in 
chapter 5) cannot be immured within the dialectic of the center and the 
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periphery, which has influenced facetiously our universals of critical un-
derstanding. Rather, a “new universalism” is  under critique and awaits ap-
propriation where the West and the East have ceased to sit on  either side of 
the fence in a triumphalist and imperialist way; interestingly, de- centered 
thinking has come to change our discourses in an equation where Pozzo 
and Lucky (characters from Beckett’s Waiting for Godot), as representa-
tives of crosscultural epistemic and conceptual par ameters, as it  were, are 
not master- slaves changing batons, but become proficient and productive 
in their exchanges for each other’s configurative identities. The “contact 
zone” speaks of in equality in power, values, and ideologies; but such in-
equalities result in freedom, echoing Alexis de Tocqueville, to create spaces 
to test the limits and frontiers of negotiation.6 Equality constrains and, 
hence, the transcultural planetization of reading and reception is about 
breaking norms, courting the “unpeace”: the meaning it makes is both 
within and beyond us. This is not without rules, rules that lend rationality 
to understanding and interpretive claims, but must take into account the 
ability of the interpreter to reframe few rules, reinvest his or her critical 
understanding to bend the game to his or her advantage, to rally home a 
point, or winsomely score from a deft, perceptive nexus of ideas, leaving 
 behind a trail of surprise and serendipity.
Within such a restless aesthetic, a kind of “revenge of the aesthetic,” 
Beckett’s Endgame has a disquiet that beckons transcultural momentum 
and movement, provocatively dislocating the play from its Eurocentric 
anchorage by relating it uncannily to a world with which its apparent rela-
tion looks contradictious and ambiguous. How pertinent is the paradigm 
of archetypal existentialism in our understanding of Endgame even  after 
the play has crossed the borders of the Indian subcontinent and invited 
a renewed epistemic achievement? So let me begin by arguing that Beck-
ett’s works are about the  human condition and, hence, cannot avoid being 
dialogic with dif er ent worldviews. They bring in their wake ambivalence 
and the splitting of concepts that only transculturalism, with its odd mix 
of congruence and contradiction, can generate. Thus, within the dynam-
ics of “border- art,” the play, when read and performed in India, can pre-
dominantly, albeit arguably, remap itself within a Hindu worldview.7 This 
attitude is contrary to what Rukmini Bhaya Nair calls the “lotus eater syn-
drome,” one that “the typical En glish lit er a ture teacher is guilty of perpet-
uating.” She writes (indeed, an appropriate observation whose real ity has 
not changed much between the time her piece was published and a gen-
eral Indian lit er a ture classroom  today): “The En glish lit er a ture classroom 
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in Indian universities is one such well- defined cultural context in which 
pre- selected texts are placed before us, sign- posted as it  were, explained 
with the help of earlier deified generations of critics, positively evaluated 
in terms of other non- canonical texts, and thus raised to full glory before 
the bemused eyes of students. . . .  [Students] have so internalized the re-
ceived explanations, comparisons, definitions and deifications that their 
own linguistic awareness is silenced or suppressed.”8 My reading of Beck-
ett’s Endgame  here is a demonstration of how such intellectual faineance 
in the classroom can be overcome with all its attendant complications and 
spin- ofs.
Producing a New Object
The blue bird is the provocation to think outside disciplines, the mean-
ingful inspiration for transdisciplinary mobility and momentum. It does 
not belong to anyone, is not to be understood as “purely on its own terms,” 
exists to multiply the color of a text and enthuse a maieutic reception.9
Louis Menand notes:
What humanities departments should want is not interdisciplinarity 
or postdisciplinarity, and they should definitely not want consilience, 
which is a bargain with the devil. What they need to do is hunt down the 
disciplines whose subject  matter they covet and bring them into their 
own realm. To the extent that programs and particularly gradu ate pro-
grams consist of a guided tour of the Norton Anthology, lit er a ture pro-
grams are perpetuating their isolation. Why  aren’t all lit er a ture majors 
required to take a course on the sociology of lit er a ture? Or a course on 
lit er a ture and philosophy, or lit er a ture and science? Why do students 
of lit er a ture have to take their history courses in history departments 
when lit er a ture departments could ofer them history for lit er a ture 
students? This seems a minor curricular point, but it goes to the fear 
academics have that their fields  will be dumbed down if they stray from 
their traditional bound aries. It’s the bound aries themselves that are 
dumbing us down. Interdisciplinarity begins at home.10
Academic freedom,  whether in a classroom or outside it, does not 
necessarily invest in disciplinary disciplehood— a typical Indian provin-
cial university syndrome— daunted by disciplinary dictates and commu-
nal fealty. Working  under the arch of a discipline is espousing sheltered 
freedom, structured and well premised. The autonomy that such spaces 
constitute primarily sponsors a negotiation between a critical purveyor 
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and the integrity of disciplines. A literary critic, for instance, need not be 
swamped by a continental phi los o pher, for each of them is committed 
to safeguard disciplinary integrity and in de pen dence. However, academic 
freedom inspires opening onto each other, with a Derridean impiety, with 
a mind that has caution, critical care, innovation, invention, experiment, 
audacity, a kind of “step careful and step careless” attitude (to appropriate 
Robert Frost). Douglas Steward notes that we might pastiche Derrida: 
“ there is no outside- the- humanities.” He observes:
The pastiche may seem flippant, but in the age of genocide and terror-
ism the notion that nothing  human could be alien to us as humanists in the 
world’s sole superpower could not be more relevant. This relevance is 
exactly what many in the humanities have wanted to engage when they 
have been accused of impertinent politicking in the classroom: to ask if 
language can be more adequate to the truth; to ask if history has been 
recounted truthfully; to discern the alien as  human; to learn the lan-
guage and culture of the other; to explore the history of the inhuman/e 
in the  human/e; to demand an expansion of  human rights; to interro-
gate the border rather than the  human being at the border; to discover 
what rhe torics of language and image mobilize a border around who 
counts as  human; to question who is patrolling the border and with 
what ends.  These questions can only be impious.11
Herein lies the need to create a new ethics of an Indian undergradu-
ate and postgraduate classroom for teaching lit er a ture, the need to in-
terlocute impious questions that would form a genuine part of academic 
freedom and would not perniciously threaten interdisciplinarity. I agree 
with Miller on the strategic strangulation that a common core curriculum 
can produce, which is why college and university teachers in India are sub-
jected to a “syllabus” approved by a central committee trusted to unleash 
a near common program of reading for students across the country,  under 
the aegis of the University Grants Commission. The question is heavi ly 
centered on what we should read to get a degree that would enable and 
endow a professional  career. The agony is prob ably less in being strapped 
 under a generally agreed syllabic sky than when a teacher encounters a 
text in a classroom. The common Indian gradu ate and postgraduate class-
room-teaching has a direct connection with the kinds of questions that 
end- of- semester examinations would demand of the students. Students 
should read a par tic u lar text, and teachers should teach the text in a par tic-
u lar way  because questions should be set in a par tic u lar way. It is difficult, 
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if not impossible, for Beckett’s Endgame to manifest on the students in the 
way it exists in this chapter  because the autonomy and design of teaching 
lit er a ture in a general Indian classroom is much prescribed, unfortunately 
mapped and formalized through generational transmission, collective 
parity, and subservience to a consensually settled standard.
But should teaching and the experience of lit er a ture be what most 
teachers in India are familiar with and immune to? Literary texts should 
be reinvented in the classroom through the conjoined commitment de-
rived out of the patience and curiosity of the students and the desire and 
indulgence of the teachers. Disciplinizing interdisciplinarity, then, is mak-
ing allowance for an entangled discursivity where the “already spoken” 
builds on and polemicizes the “not yet spoken”— a “smooth” classroom 
milieu caught in dialogized consciousness. As I have argued elsewhere in 
this book, the entangled generation of meaning is not always something 
that we figurize or extrapolate; it already exists in a life of its own, within 
a self-sustaining chamber (Beckett’s thoughts about life and humanity at 
large peremptorily coexisted with or superposed Hindu ethics and certain 
paradigms of Hindu philosophy, existing before what I thought I had un-
raveled for my students in the classroom).
Rey Chow observes that ultimately “aesthetic judgment involves a re-
flection of the terms of the reflecting activity (or subjectivity) from within 
rather than only a reflection of the external object it judges, bringing with 
it a potential for dismantling  those terms precisely as the reflecting activ-
ity (or subjectivity) tries to reach for the universal. Defined along  these 
lines, aesthetic or reflective judgment seems poignantly germane to  those 
areas of knowledge production in which prob lems of radical otherness 
are the most acute.”12 A classroom must encourage aesthetic and reflective 
judgments that stay circumscribed by cultural diference and the dena-
tionalization of lit er a ture.  There is, thus, an “instant” in such an attitude, 
the pursuit of an instant in its radical presentness. It works on the gains 
of a fraught now, the hope that its perpetual pregnancy generates, “in-
termittently eclipsed by an awareness of the pres ent as deferment, as an 
empty excited openness to a  future which is in one sense already  here, in 
another sense yet to come.”13 Being unavailable to itself, the instant is con-
tinually  under pressure to lose its instantness. By wrestling with the now, 
transcultural poetics keeps diverse subjects in com pany, enfolds one pres-
ent into the other and stays ironically “pres ent imperfect.” This is about 
routing the uncanny in the classroom, which turns into a literary zone, a 
zone that Vilashini Cooppan describes as the “disjunctive merging of the 
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familiar and the strange, the pres ent and the past, the repressed and the 
returned,” where no text is pure and original and no work can avoid being 
“inserted into the globalized pro cesses of migration, borrowing, adapta-
tion, and retelling.” Cooppan adds, “Temporally, it haunts, ghosting new 
texts with the residual presence of older ones, or indeed, old texts with the 
anticipatory presence of new ones.  Because the time line of the uncanny 
is not chronological, it invites us to resist the impulse to read only some 
texts— usually modern, postcolonial, emergent, or other wise belated 
texts—in the shadow of their greater  others, and to recognize instead a 
ghostly alienness animating  every text.”14
Let me unveil, at this point, the teaching of Endgame within an un-
canny transcultural eros. Working within the ambit of Hindu ethics and 
philosophy, one may begin the class by arguing that it is the problematiza-
tion of the dharma of existence that deeply informs many of Samuel Beck-
ett’s plays, particularly Waiting for Godot and Endgame. And so it might be 
worthwhile to ask: what is dharma? The word comes from dhr, which means 
to form, sustain, and support, and “in its widest sense,” as John Koller ob-
serves, “it refers to that which sustains and holds together the universe 
itself.”15 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan interprets dharma as the right action. 
He points out that “in the Rg Veda rta is the right order of the universe. 
It stands for both the satya or the truth of  things as well as the dharma 
or the law of evolution.”16 In fact, to hold and sustain order, the obser-
vance of the necessary acts becomes essential; it helps to keep the order 
of the world.17 Hence, it is karma, action, that eventually becomes the de-
terminant for the sustenance of order.  Every form of life cannot deny its 
dharma of existence, the law of its being, and this concern with order— the 
order of being, the being- in- the- world, the ever- impinging world of alien 
entanglements, the order of values— brings us to interrogate the text in 
the classroom with a host of questions: to what extent have Hamm and 
Clov honored the dharma of their being as evolutionary and generative? 
Do Hamm and Clov suggest every thing that life represents or does not 
represent? Within the limitations of their mutilated selves, how far can 
we consider them to be the representatives of all humanity? Are we to as-
sume that  there is no other side to this benumbing world of the play? Can 
we not look into the substratum of this enervating predicament and fin ger 
the nerves that evoke this hellish milieu? How can we perspectivize the 
prevalence of “evil” spacing itself out in such an existential configuration? 
Despite Hamm’s self- reflexive moves to change the horizon of existence, 
the inherent immovability of sufering remains the “unyielding sureness 
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of real ity,” which does not fail to cross our  will. Why this per sis tent suf-
fering and what is the sufering for? Does Endgame provide us with the 
means by which we can judge the real ity and vitality of sufering? How do 
we account for such a dismembered and disjointed world? Is it the collapse 
of dharma, the loss of order, in  every conceivable sphere of existence? It 
is worthwhile to see how ideas emerging from Indian knowledge systems 
argue a case for the play, putting forth a critique pronouncedly removed 
from what we have come to accept as inherited modes of reception.
The samkhya- karika sees three kinds of sufering, bodily or physical, en-
vironmental, and  mental. It is virtually impossible to remove sufering: 
“From the torment by three fold misery arises the enquiry into the means 
of terminating it; if it be said that it is fruitless, the means being obvious 
to us, we reply no, since in such means  there is no certainty or finality.”18 
Sufering, in Endgame, cannot end “the abject and indigestible husks of 
direct contact with the material and the concrete.”19 Spinoza, who had a 
 great influence on Beckett, has this to say in his “On the Improvement of 
the Understanding”:
 After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of so-
cial life are vain and futile, seeing that none of the objects of my fear 
contained in themselves anything  either good or bad, except in so far as 
the mind is afected by them, I fi nally resolved to inquire  whether  there 
might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which 
would afect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all  else:  whether, in fact, 
 there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would 
enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.20
Beckett’s Endgame seems to be shorn of any “good”; sarvam duhkham 
(universal sufering), the classically elemental, unimpassioned ritual of 
agony, permeates  every crevice of the play. This sarvam duhkham charts out 
value- bereft lives for both Hamm and Clov as it does to all of us on earth. 
If we take Patanjali’s thesis in Yoga- Sutra (2.15) and Visuddhimagga we find 
that duhkha is born out of the agony of the search, the dissatisfaction and 
the rebutted craving. But duhkha, as embedded in the searching conditions 
in Endgame, is not plain corporeal sufering or  mental affliction. It is not a 
state of paranoia about a loss of plea sure and also not a hedonistic concept 
that could be critiqued in conflation with sukha (plea sure or happiness). 
Duhkha in Endgame is, rather, a realization that we are essentially in a 
conditioned state where  there is a complete lack of freedom (compare the 
samskara- duhkha of the Visuddhimagga). In our conditioned state,  there is 
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a marked awareness of this utter absence of freedom and it is what makes 
duhkha a profound realization. Buddhist philosophy would have us believe 
that every thing is sufering  because every thing is conditioned and is in 
a state of impermanence and flux. The Nyaya school would instruct us to 
judge every thing as pain, for we do not have any experience of unmixed 
plea sure, or sukha. The Hindu concept of sufering argues this phenomenon 
as an “eternal return of events.”  There is no harm  either in being tempted to 
perceive a kind of eternal recurrence of the same monotonic life- activities 
in Endgame, which si mul ta neously engender ennui and enigma. Arthur 
Danto elaborates: “Imagine having endless times to go through what we 
all have gone through once, the mastering of our bodies: learning to walk 
erect, learning to control our bowels and  going through all the same stages 
of emotional awakening again and again with all its embarrassments, all 
the torments. . . .  I think the knowledge would be shattering. The mere 
tedium of it all could not be borne.”21 This is the Hindu view of a despairing 
life that rec ords the very depths of Beckett’s world.
 There is no escape for Hamm and Clov from this loop of duhkha. The ab-
surdity of the situation is heightened by the fact that while they can take 
this view and realize what they do in life is arbitrary and meaningless, they 
cannot disengage themselves from life by this awareness. It may be said 
that we realize the truth while we remain, as we must, immersed in the 
ocean of untruth. This immersion in the sea of untruth is very difficult to 
rationalize: an inertial force power ful enough to defy systematic rational-
ization takes over. Even if they choose to undertake a self- transcendental 
step backward, they are regressed by the question about the available free-
dom to do so. Are they  really  free to make a move? But is the truth of suf-
fering the only real ity that Hamm and Clov are faced with? Can we argue 
that the submergence in a sea of untruths is what makes the experience 
of sufering for both a ceaseless and encompassing phenomenon? We can 
within the classroom concur to argue that the situation in the play is not 
as depressing and calamitous as it seems on the surface. The prospects of 
karma lie implicit within; it, thus, triggers karmic possibilities, unrealized 
on most occasions, of freedom and positive authenticity against the grain 
of a soul- deadening sufering that stays conspicuously written into the 
very heart of the play. Could they then invent a transcendental meaning, a 
value within their arbitrary, hollow, and purposeless life? One must admit 
 here that when duhkha exists as a per sis tent and insuperable real ity the 
responsibility rests with man’s weakness, what Hindu ethics would term 
as the “untruth,” and not with God. Is sarvam duhkham a child of man’s 
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 incompetence to realize his predicament? Are the weaknesses and un-
truths enough of a hindrance to preclude the rationalization of absurdity?
Pain, argues Rabindranath Tagore in Sadhana, is the feeling born out of 
our finiteness, our incompetences: “It is what error is in our intellectual 
life.” The embedded evil in the circumambient situation precludes Hamm 
and Clov from consorting with the “ whole” or the dharma of existence. 
“Evil is ever moving,” writes Tagore. It becomes characteristic of man “to 
represent statically what is in motion” and “in the pro cess  things assume 
a weight in our mind which they have not in real ity.”22 Evil and sufering 
are the manifestations of the imperfections in our knowledge, our available 
power, and in the application of our  will. Beckett’s protagonists have re-
vealed their weaknesses to themselves, resulting in choking depression. 
 Human life is drawn up within a narrow frame in which miseries and 
failures are made to loom large and limitations are allowed a dominant 
voice. Failing to hold the core of  things (“Am I right in the centre?”23 ques-
tions Hamm), they hit the self hard in a confounded state of understanding 
that brings them before an unavoidable “hollowness.” Hamm: “Do you 
hear? . . .  Do you hear? Hollow bricks! . . .  All that’s hollow!”24 They fail to 
realize that the ideal of truth is not in the narrow pres ent, not also in our 
immediate sensations, but in the consciousness of the  whole that gives us 
a taste of what we should have in what we do have.
hamm: . . .  Put me right in the centre!
clov: I’ll go and get the tape.
hamm: Roughly! Roughly! . . .  Bang in the centre!
clov:  There!
hamm: I feel a  little too far to the left. . . .  Now I feel a  little too far to 
the right. . . .  I feel a  little too far forward. . . .  Now I feel a  little too 
far back.25
This wobbly, indecisive state, informed by a strug gle to remain at the 
center, comes from an incomplete sense of the self. Beckett’s world, with 
its elusive focal point, cuts at the root of a deep inner growth that we may 
describe as the liberating enterprise to “work at ourselves.”26 Dharma, in 
Hindu ethics, demands a self that has a proper sense of the center, be-
comes the totality of our functional resources, and is not built on reason 
or feeling alone. It encourages the development of a knowledgeable self 
that can tell the right from the wrong, the beautiful from the ugly.27 The 
“ ought” of dharma gets appropriately responded to by an “I  ought.” The 
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answer emerges from one’s awareness and conscience to explore the poise 
at the center, a belief that leads us back to the deep- welling foundations of 
life that I would like to qualify as “being- needs.”28 It is the demand on the 
self to remain in accord with a wider system of values, a demand to look 
beyond survival needs.
One pole of Hamm and Clov’s being, in the words of Tagore, is hitched 
to “stocks and stones.” They are faced with a real ity that has an inexpugn-
ably dictating and compulsive presence. However, when the searchlight is 
on the other pole of their being, the identity of their existence takes on 
a kind of alethic truth. This pole is “separate from all.” “ There,” as Tagore 
explains, “I have broken through the cordon of equality and stand alone as 
an individual. I am absolutely unique, I am I, I am incomparable.”29  There 
is a discernible lack of individuality in the atmosphere that hangs grimly 
over the play. We notice that the characters, within the ethics of their ex-
istence, strug gle to maintain themselves against the “tremendous gravi-
tation of all  things”— the centripetality of an abyss of dead  matter. The 
individual is sorely out of place. But can we perceive Hamm as being pos-
sessed with a discernible mission to trace his individuality? Is the strug gle 
worth the isolation that provides the meditative space to rethink Beck-
ett’s man- world nexus? Hamm tries; at least, he dares to. He fails; he tries 
again. Beckett, it must be admitted,  wills his failure to an appreciable ex-
tent. By willing it, however, Beckett, it may be argued, unearths the need 
for a superstructure of the self that would revel in a karmic thrust. The 
drugged dimension of existence is willed to unconceal some vital promises 
that can thus encounter the regnant disabilities of a normalized inert exis-
tence. This elemental, existential bankruptcy stems from a desiccation of 
individuality, something that we can call our very own. What Hamm and 
Clov do not— rather cannot— imbibe is a relation between the “I” and the 
“they” that intersubjectively enriches our existence. A communion with 
the other and the world at large is sustained through continual reformula-
tion of the internal laws of the self, the smithy of the “I.” The predicament 
of  every  human is a misplaced understanding of gaming without ends, 
when one gets busy with the nets and neglects fishing. As part of this phil-
osophical rejoinder to the Endgame crisis, one can argue that the prob lem 
is not in being able to unlearn the knowledge of “imperfection”;  there is 
no efort to burn up the error that could set  free the light of unshackled 
existence. Hamm and Clov are all too self; they fail miserably to encourage 
and establish such an understanding and knowledge with their “own” and 
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what exists outside of their own. The confusion springing from the strug-
gle to come to grips with the state of  things, thus, persists unabated.
hamm: Do you know what’s happened?
clov: When? Where?
hamm: (violently) When! What’s happened! Use your head,  can’t you! 
What has happened?30
They fail to widen the limit of the self. It is the misconstrual and lack 
of understanding of the “life of the self” that  causes all such complications 
and contradictions, upstaging the dharma of their pres ent. Beckett’s play 
hinges on a dialectical tension between the self trying to think positive 
thoughts and the per sis tent opposition that it  faces to snuf out any sem-
blance of hope. For me the text builds itself on this “growing out while 
collapsing in” princi ple that nourishes a tension and makes an oppressive 
life less tortuous in nature and potency. The sense of self grows out of 
the consciousness of sin, of the benignity of grace, and of the self’s very 
atmospheric existence. Hamm’s radius of the self is not defined on such 
lines of consciousness. To what extent does Hamm realize that he has been 
degrading himself, that his sense of the self has been inadequate and non-
discriminatory (viveka- yuktena- manasa)? The evil and ennui confronting 
Hamm emerge from his inability to redefine his self- identity. The contin-
gent, atmospheric stress dominates him in that the limit of contraction 
becomes the limit of blindness. In a dehumanized set up, tethered to the 
dead weight of the finite, Hamm fails both to evoke and participate in 
the “peak experiences.”  These peak experiences (one needs to note what 
Hamm means by trying to have an “idea,” a “bright idea!”)31 shape the self 
into being decently volitional, strengthening it in the pro cess. However, 
it is what could have turned the situation of Hamm and Clov into both 
axioge ne tic and axiosoteric.32
Does Hamm demonstrate certain signs of a prospective generation 
of “values” indicative of a positive re sis tance to the  great neutralizing 
enterprise of absurd existence? Hamm, for me, has made some meaning-
ful eforts, the consequences of which may belie the initial thrust of  will. 
Yet Hamm shoots through with a positive desire— hoping for a “gull,” the 
“sea,” the “sky”— amid the crippling limitations of the pres ent.
hamm: No gulls?
clov: ( looking) Gulls!
hamm: And the horizon? Nothing on the horizon?33
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In Hamm we rec ord a certain fluctuation in  mental attitudes— a wax-
ing and waning of hope, desire and efort. This desire is for a vital or 
higher existence that may ofer a contrast to the profaneness of a soul- 
numbing finitude. Hamm says: “If I could sleep I might make love. I’d go 
into the woods. My eyes would see . . .  the sky, the earth. I’d run, run, they 
 wouldn’t catch me.”34 Such an urge to romanticize, to sail beyond the re-
pressive encapsulation of real ity, must be read as a positive commentary 
on the need to reinterrogate the dharma of existence. Hamm’s perennial 
“act of sitting” is the reflective part of our existence, the reflectiveness 
that chooses to impose questions on our predicament. Hamm evinces the 
 human capacity of self- consciousness (karmic possibilities) as he takes a 
step backward to reflect on life and the futility, the absurdity of our striv-
ings, hopes, aspirations and evaluations. But Hamm’s psychic state, in its 
reflective awareness, radiates a reflexive dynamicity to find a place for 
imagination, a possibility of hope and a curiosity for a horizon. The karmic 
propensities to rationalize a way out of the depressive undertow of events 
cannot be ruled out. Attempts made by Hamm, albeit abortive, are none-
theless attempts to determine a choice;  these are eforts to look at the 
other side of hell to see  whether the possibility of happiness can be raised. 
Hamm’s efort to unleash himself becomes a truncated, though promis-
ing, projection of an image of man repeatedly thwarted and disclaimed. So 
being decisively dwarfed cannot avoid manifesting the culpability of silence 
and inaction. Hamm proposes to write out a meaning and in the pro cess 
opens up the possibility of reframing the real ity of absurdism and the pol-
itics of normalized given.
But such karmic affirmations are sparse as they die out  under the heft of 
a relentless surge of dead energy (the tamasic state in Hindu philosophy). 
Herman Keyserling, applying the Hindu doctrine of karma, perceives the 
activism of the self, which in “what is  free in it” becomes a significant com-
ponent of the agent. Eforts made to overcome the given is a way to self- 
transcendence. 35 The Gita ascribes it as dhriti, the conative per sis tence, the 
rigor to signal a growth of being. But the karmic propensities in the play could 
not be realized in concrete acts; the world of the play lacks proper “naviga-
tors” whose growth, at best, is stunted and whose discourse of growth does 
not have the gestaltic relationship between the self and the world.
hamm: I am asking you is it very calm?
clov: Yes.
hamm: It’s  because  there are no more navigators.36
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The anxiety of living in Endgame is traumatic. The  will to navigate and 
the freedom to step into the shoes of a navigator are decimated. Perhaps the 
specter of deindividualization in the soul- killing sufering sparks a pro-
pensity to dream of the gulls, the sail, the seas and the urge to look down, 
over the win dow. When Hamm says— “Let’s go from  here, the two of us! 
South! You can make a raft and the currents  will carry us away, far away,”37 
we realize their urge to experience “what is  free” in the self, the desire 
to realize “being- needs” over “survival needs.” It is the urgency to “build 
the raft” that  matters (Hamm: “Get working on that raft immediately”38). 
Hamm and Clov need to build the raft and learn to navigate. 39
Thomas Nagel writes: “We cannot live  human lives without energy and 
attention, nor without making choices which show that we take some 
 things more seriously than  others. Yet we have always available a point of 
view outside the par tic u lar form of our lives, from which the seriousness 
appears gratuitous.  These two inescapable viewpoints collide in us, and 
that is what makes life absurd. It is absurd  because we ignore the doubts 
that we know cannot be settled, continuing to live with nearly undimin-
ished seriousness in spite of them.”40 Clov does tend to live this absurdity 
with seriousness. But Hamm, entrapped by an overpowering disability, 
generates some energy to make a choice that points to another version of 
seriousness. This seriousness interrogates the other side of the prevailing 
predicament but is countermanded by the “seriousness of absurdity” that 
Clov cannot avoid representing. This is what makes for the duhkha in life, 
resulting in dissatisfaction embedded in valuelessness. The value judg-
ments that would other wise have come from questioning life or existence 
“seriously” are annulled deterministically. Karma is a spiritual necessity 
which makes one judgmental and adjudicatory, forging a way through the 
maya (illusion) and avidya (ignorance) of life. Niskarmakrita (remaining 
inactive) means contravening dharma. Gita describes karma as something 
that springs from guna (dispositions). It is, however, difficult to find gunas 
in Hamm and Clov that are strong enough to challenge niskarmakrita. 
Gunas have manifested in brief bursts; desire for karma raises, at best, a 
transient promise. But circumstantial immovability has not allowed the 
self to grow. The world of Hamm and Clov cannot produce the mecha-
nism to raise the self by the self, the existent self raised by the karmic 
self. The Hamm- Clov ensemble puts forth a self that requires a construc-
tion through the establishment of another self; it is reinvesting one’s 
prevalent self, says the Gita, through the karmic potency of another self, 
adding to a genuine sense of it and vidya (knowledge). Hamm needs to 
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keep Clov afected by the choice (as pointed out earlier) to extend the 
dimensions of his choices within the ambit of the existentialist enigma 
of duhkha.
 Human existence that fails to combine the reflective karma with the dy-
namic karma is fated to get weighed down in schism and sickness. The kar-
mic reflexivities that we notice in Hamm do not lead him to an orderly and 
poised dharma of existence and certainly not to any deeper realization of 
values and order. Addled eforts of Clov, significantly  under Hamm’s direc-
tion, to reach up to the sight beyond the win dow (the symbol of the ladder 
is significant) can be ascribed as the bid to appropriate truth—an entity 
that lies beyond the world of appearances as incomprehensible and inde-
scribable. In fact, what can be seen through Murphy, Moran, and Molloy 
is a perception of the core that, however, is a fugitive entity delimited by a 
mere glimpse of the idea and the inability to realize it. Hamm’s efort then 
becomes an emaciated plowing of the surface without digging enough 
into any formative stage of understanding.41 Hamm’s spasmodic eforts (a 
fleeting intimation of self- transcendence: “What? A sail? A fin? Smoke?”)42 
are hopelessly caught midway between an alleged determinism of circum-
stances (nothing can happen) and an ever- mounting self- thwarting con-
servatism of the individuals (since nothing can happen inaction remains 
the only pos si ble action). Such consciousness of an overpowering eventu-
ality makes the absence of freedom the defining signature of their lives. 
Hamm and Clov also dread “waking” (an alive, alert consciousness of 
circumambient real ity) and, therefore, cannot evade espousing the avidya 
or avidyas; this allows the deception to continue unabated. What lies 
amiss in the Endgame world is jnana (the emancipatory wisdom) that is a 
“realized” and realizable experience. If the arrival of Godot is an eagerly 
awaited event, looking beyond the win dow for sights that would rejuve-
nate the prevalent levels of existence is also an intense requirement.43 
Hamm and Clov fail to reach the desired dharma  because their  will is not 
informed by the knowledge of the potential of the self. The self must act 
centripetally, pedaling within, to wade across the muck that engulfs them 
both from without; it is also about enjoining the sundered notes within, 
piecing the shards together, to trigger an initiation  toward some vital 
and redemptive moments. Both Hamm and Clov, in their adharmic pat-
terns of existence, have chosen to flinch from the boy’s presence, failing 
to explore a possibility of redemption and deliverance. Steeped in avidya 
(the ignorance springing from the lack of sense of self) they are not ready 
to accept the generative impact of a new procreative force. The boy ofers a 
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possibility to mend walls and is the beckoning to vidya that promises to 
replace the self- debilitating life of the mind and soul with a true emanci-
patory one, an inner emigration. Tagore, in Gitanjali, characterizes this 
situation poetically: “I am ever busy building this wall all around; and as 
this wall goes up into the sky day by day, I lose sight of my true being in 
its dark shadow.”44 Blinded to the real ity and potential of true being, the 
Endgame world awaits redemption. So the prevalent strains of adharma 
in Hamm and Clov’s lives do not allow a  wholesome perspective on exis-
tence, disrupting in the pro cess the integrality that lies enshrined in the 
conceptualization of dharma. Within this aspect of Hindu thought we 
find a refusal to appeal to a  whole  human being, a denial to speak to an 
integrative worldview. The entropic disability in Hamm and Clov’s predic-
ament points to an abuse of life, a life that leaves no door open for modes 
of liberation and enlightenment. Perhaps Beckett’s world in Endgame has 
denounced the rebel in the  human; it loses sight of or, rather, is denied the 
sight of, the internal revolution in  every  human; the betrayal of self, thus, 
is the violation of the dharma of existence.
Fi nally, I am tempted to refer to Gita (section 18) again to my students 
to analyze the five  factors— adhishthanam (the matrix of action), karta 
(agent), karanam (the diverse instruments of action), chesta (coordinated, 
well- meaning efort), and daivam (the wider expanse of action beyond 
the immediate). The disabled karta (Hamm and Clov) and their enfee-
bled chesta contribute to the tamasic state (the dark state of sufering). 
Inhibited thus, it fails to achieve the daivam, which I interpret  here as the 
world beyond the immediate consequence of objective karma— the zone 
of being- needs. It is the karta or doer’s intensive karanam (modes of action) 
that discloses a world beyond the causal existential web. Dharma through 
good action and voluntary action becomes the inner law of being. Hamm 
and Clov prove a failure and the failure signals the collapse of dharma and 
the consequent relapse into tamas (darkness). So the evil remains and the 
tamasic state continues. This evil, unfortunately, does not allow sufering 
to be seen as positive— the positive sufering, or duhkha, that encourages 
molting, the act of sloughing of the self that meekly surrenders to ab-
surdity. Diferently argued, it may be pointed out that the mere fact of 
our continuing in existence proves that existence is worthy of contin-
uance. Within the world of the play, a Hindu view of life would seek to 
question and problematize this worthiness to continue living. The class-
room can converge on the fact that Hindu philosophy of dharma can make 
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a  “diference”— somewhat radical, though—to our transcultural under-
standing of the play, educating ourselves diferently on Beckett to produce 
a “new object.”
Resetting the Teaching Machine
Endgame in the classroom then splits into two texts: a pedagogic one that is 
more oriented to the conventional teaching machine devised and encoded 
for the writing examination and consequent grading; perhaps our repres-
sive ways of grading and examination system maim our teaching ways in 
the classroom. Our illocutionary and pedagogical persuasions drive us 
to experience a literary text within certain conditions that a classroom 
straps on us, conditions that are at once constitutional and institutional. 
Texts are usually tried in their syllabic and received constitutional coun-
tenances, within laws that have made them look similar  every semester, 
 every year, in  every encounter. Most Indian lit er a ture classrooms avoid 
working as pedagogical outlaw; they are heavi ly daunted by disciplinary 
envy that might thicken the air of teaching with less vis i ble or discernible 
light houses. Classrooms promote a parody of reading and replication of 
reading strategies that dodge individualism for a collective critical con-
sciousness. A student rarely reads but duplicates the rituals of learning 
inscribed within institutional modes of instruction and per for mance ap-
praisal. The second part of the split is the “performative,” which challenges 
the cultural and afective bounds of learning lit er a ture, becoming a happy 
victim of the teacher- critic’s desire- lines. Are we then conflating and con-
trasting two dif er ent kinds of textual disciplines in the classroom?
On what pos si ble lines can a modernist text speak to students in the 
classroom? Or should I rephrase the question: In what “erotic” ways can 
a modernist text articulate itself to students attending a lit er a ture class? 
The performative classroom, then, is always interdisciplinary, a source and 
space for “intersubjective vitality,” where teaching comes as a “task verb.”45 
Although we cannot ignore disciplined interdisciplinarity, we must prefer 
delicate randomness of connection— the “transgression of law,” the mon-
ster that Alain Badiou instructs us to seek— that might just choose to trip 
over the strictness of righ teous disciplinary claims.46 Outlawing lit er a ture 
has its value and the fun owes a lot to some law deficit. This is a kind of 
“guerrilla pedagogy” that Jody Norton argues is “dislocative, decentering, 
confounding and clarifying. . . .  mobile, improvisational, contingent, and 
unpredictable.”47 She writes:
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 There are two crucial ways in which guerrilla pedagogy is unlike guer-
rilla theater. First, whereas guerrilla theater presented explic itly radical 
messages, guerrilla pedagogy does not have an agenda, other than tex-
tual analy sis, ideological critique, and self- examination. Conservatives 
can interrogate and affirm (or modify) their own ideas and values as 
easily as liberals or radicals. The guerrilla teachers are open about their 
politics, but work hard to keep authority separate from belief systems, 
so that the latter must convince or not on their own merits. . . .  Secondly, 
whereas guerrilla theater, operating rapidly in noisy public areas, had a 
practical need for “simplicity of tactics” and was self- consciously “not 
subtle” . . .  , guerrilla pedagogy, carried on over eighty minutes in the 
quiet, private space of the classroom, can aford as much complexity 
and difficulty as the discussants can generate and absorb.48
Outlawing the teaching machine is inscribed in the abilities and va-
lence of translation, the repeated demands on one’s background, cultural 
consciousness, and the complex negotiations with textual alienation that 
such consciousness infuses.  There is a vibrant tangle between the vernac-
ular that my students speak— the multilingual Indian classroom— and 
the medium of classroom instruction, which is En glish. So when Endgame 
comes to enliven the classroom in its polydiscursivity, we cannot ignore 
how dif er ent linguistic backgrounds deliver dif er ent levels of afect and 
connotative understanding. The textual afect  here deepens and widens 
in its singularity. The  whole game I am implicating  here is worked out on 
a unique axis that has to appreciate that I am not teaching Endgame in 
translation (say, in Hindi or Bengali) but in En glish interpreted through 
concepts and paradigms that are imported from the non- Anglophone tra-
dition. How does the text adjust to sitting on  these transcultural cross-
points of meaning generation? But this teaching across traditions and 
cultural consciousness produces its own afect that transcends the lan-
guage in which the reading was executed. The textual afect might become, 
for instance, Buddhist or Hindu or Zen without being required to have it 
“translated” into Tibetan, Japa nese, or Hindi. This becomes a kind of de-
nial of language, rather, an overcoming of the language to generate a radi-
antly dif er ent experience of textual impact and textual density. Tejeswani 
Niranjana notes appropriately:
If En glish lit er a ture is indeed being transformed—at home and abroad— 
into En glish studies, it seems pertinent to consider the gap between the 
roles we as teachers are prepared to play and that we may choose and 
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then prepare to play. The first is a result of conditioning and envisages 
our own role as that of a catalyst— unchanging but capable of trans-
forming  others. The second involves using our alien selves as prisms 
and filters to explore and understand our historical situation. It is one 
of the few privileges that our discipline afords us— a painful but prom-
ising way out of the canonized readings of our texts and ourselves.49
So the teacher’s self in this new classroom is seriously complexified, in 
that a nonnative En glish speaker reads a text written in En glish or trans-
lated from French into En glish with a big group of students whose native 
language is not En glish, with diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. 
The text in the classroom is read in En glish but thought both in En glish 
and in non- English ways, a continual pro cess of remapping conducted 
both consciously and unconsciously, a unique vein of sensitiveness to the 
text that refuses to “use a torque wrench at 65 pounds of pressure to bolt 
Idea A into Student’s B brain.”50
The  things that Miller wants a Chinese reader or a video- games- playing 
Western young man or a student in an Indian classroom to know to appre-
ciate W. B. Yeats’s “Cold Heaven” (see chapter 8) are precise and perceptive. I 
agree with Miller that reading a poem, as much as reading a play, requires a 
roadmap, a cartographic familiarity with context, stylistics, sociocultural 
peculiarities, and certain other sets of information that are instrumental 
in building the pathway to the province of the poem. But is our knowing 
the kind of bird the rook is or the kind of flower dafodils are always in-
surmountably essential to the understanding of a poem? My students 
would have  little idea about the Irish landscape (the materiality or embod-
ied understanding of the poem) and, in this case, the sights and sounds 
of the train- journey that Yeats undertook from Manchester to Norwich 
on February 21, 1911, when he drafted the poem. In many ways, a poem 
or a play or a novel set in a Eu ro pean context is in all likelihood a step 
away— a bit withdrawn and reclusive— from my students in the Indian 
classroom. The sociocultural displacement of a text in a classroom is 
a real ity that the reading and experience of lit er a ture have to encounter. 
I agree mostly with the fifteen points that Miller makes about knowing 
the poem, but what I still stay interested in is the worlding that a poem 
provides in the classroom, both in its aesthetic and postaesthetic ways. 
Yeats, with his proven familiarity with Indian and Chinese philosophy, 
Japa nese drama, and Zen Buddhism, occult practices, Goethe, Winckel-
mann (he did not know German), Tagore (he did not know Bengali), and 
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Upanishadic thought, magic, theosophy, and other fields of interest endow 
his poetry with the profound potentialities for worlding. The across  factor 
is high and decisive when we find Arabia, as part of Yeats’s engagement 
with Asia, making a presence in his poetic sensibility.51 His acquaintance 
with Alfārābi and Avicenna, of whom he wrote in Rosa Alchemica, teach-
ings of Arab en Shemesh, Arabic folklore, Charles Doughty’s book Arabia 
Deserta, T.  E. Lawrence’s book Seven Pillars of Wisdom, and enthusiastic 
explorations into The Arabian Nights develop several ave nues of commu-
nication that brought his Irish consciousness to flank notes and queries 
into Arabia, explorations into Chinese thought, Japa nese ways of life and 
action, incursions into Upanishad and Vedic thought: a febrile and fecund 
association in trans- now. The more than global impetus must try to make 
a variety of (in)fusionist inroads into Yeats and Arabia beyond poems like 
“The Gift of Harun Al- Rashid,” “Solomon to Sheba,” “Solomon and the 
Witch,” “The Second Coming,” and “Michael Robartes and the Dancer,” 
which have Arabia or Arabic influences as con spic u ous categories of refer-
ence. Yeats notes, “Certain typical books— Ulysses, Mrs.  Virginia Woolf’s 
Waves, Mr. Ezra Pound’s Draft of XXX Cantos— suggest a philosophy like 
that of the Samkara school of ancient India,  mental and physical objects 
alike material, a deluge of experience breaking over us and within us, melt-
ing limits  whether of line or tint; man no hard bright mirror dawdling by 
the dry sticks of a hedge, but a swimmer, or rather the waves themselves.”52 
 Under (in)fusion- trans- now can the classroom read “The Cold Heaven” 
within the philosophy of Daimon or the artifice and apocalypse of Mirror? 
Why cannot our ways— one of them Miller’s predominantly rhetorical 
method and the other being my emphatically philosophical, transcultural 
ways of reading—be brought into a dialogic plexus to re- premise the ex-
perience of a literary text in a classroom? Our “whys” are not divergences 
but synergic peaks of contrastive studies.
A demo cratic community in the classroom, then, acknowledges that 
cultures are unequal as much as forms of class- life, text- life, and student- 
teacher life are continuously  under mediation and resuscitation. The class-
room of lit er a ture is parrhesic and stays alive through a lively dialogue 
both with the past that a student brings and the critical consciousness 
that a teacher imports. Such forces synergize to argue how a text can come 
alive in the pres ent— a performative narrative caught between the pulls 
of tradition and the creative accents of individuality. The subjectivities of 
students then become both multiple and demo cratic, composite and anti-
essential. Students dwell genitively in such spaces with both oppositional 
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and transformative consciousness. So the experience of reading lit er a ture 
is both humanist and skeptical, never beyond criticism and dialogue; it is 
aware of the limits of reason and committed to the defense of reason, en-
couraging subject positions implicated in intersections of power, knowl-
edge, politics, desire, and afect. However, the dynamics between the 
teacher and the student are subjected to “pedagogy efect,” which Gregory 
Ulmer qualifies as “a kind of symbolic vio lence.”53 It becomes a submis-
sion to “magisterial efect,” which, without the depropriation of authority 
the teacher privileges over the students, quite disingenuously cuts of the 
participation of the students in the discursive domain of the classroom. 
Endgame’s interpretive articulation predominantly emerges from the 
teacher’s end. But teachers cannot be completely neutral  either. Perhaps 
knowledge- generation in the classroom has an imbalance to it, calling for 
participation but not without its own scale- tilting, where the slant is more 
on the freshness that the teacher can bring.
Teaching lit er a ture is perhaps always a failure— the inadequacies in 
making lit er a ture get taught. We pedagogize, paradoxically, in efective 
failure. Shosana Felman, in discussing Lacan and Freud on pedagogy, 
speaks of a “pedagogical imperative” that is inimical to “desire,” the desire 
to speak other wise, removed from established protocols of teaching.54 The 
classroom is held in the cusp of repression and license, the seriously vexed 
borderline between conventional pedagogy and the desire to undo it. This 
sets us up with the “impossibility” of teaching, the “ doing away with peda-
gogy,” and the concomitant challenge that refuses to die out. Ignorance in 
the classroom is a real ity that refuses to get dislodged  under the mounting 
attainment of knowledge  because the untotalizable quotient of learning 
and teaching cannot be ignored. Teaching Beckett expressly addresses the 
consciousness of the text, its uncanny ways and haunted terrains, but can-
not forget its  career stewed in ignorance, in regimes of thought that stay 
at the realm of the unconscious, the unarticulated voices, the domain of 
teaching or thought that the teacher would not be able to reach or access. 
Felman explains:
Ignorance is thus no longer simply opposed to knowledge: it is itself a 
radical condition, an integral part of the very structure of knowledge. 
But what does ignorance consist of, in this new epistemological and 
pedagogical conception? If ignorance is to be equated with the a- totality 
of the unconscious, it can be said to be a kind of forgetting-of forget-
fulness: while learning is obviously, among other  things, remembering 
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and memorizing (“all learning is recollection,” says Socrates), ignorance 
is linked to what is not remembered, what  will not be memorized. 
But what  will not be memorized is tied up with repression, with the 
imperative to forget— the imperative to exclude from consciousness, 
to not admit to knowledge. Ignorance, in other words, is not a passive 
state of absence— a  simple lack of information: it is an active dynamic 
of negation, an active refusal of information.55
Re sis tance to the learning and teaching of a text comes with its profits. 
It combines ignorance at both levels of the interlocutor and the recipi-
ent. Roger Simon argues: “What is to be recognized in a dialogic pedagogy 
is that both student and teacher are doubly ignorant, not only of their 
structured re sis tances but as well of the knowledge of what it is that re-
sists in the other. Given this doubled structure of ignorance in a pedagog-
ical encounter, each then must listen for the silence in the other, helping 
each other to knowledge that is inaccessible. This knowledge is not in the 
teacher; it cannot be given. It is only to be acquired in the conversation 
between the teacher and students as coinvestigators of each other’s re sis-
tances.”56 The passion of the classroom is both knowledge and ignorance. 
I teach Endgame reveling both in ignorance and knowledge as a pedagogue 
and antipedagogue  because teaching is also about the impossibility to 
teach and think all that teaching can do. Deficit is ignorance, which in-
versely is the excess that keeps the passion in the classroom  going.
An entire epoch of so- called lit er a ture, if not all of it, cannot survive a certain 
technological regime of telecommunications (in this res pect the po liti cal regime is 
secondary). Neither can philosophy, or psychoanalysis. Or love letters.
— Jacques Derrida, “Envois,” in The Post Card
This chapter is more or less an extended endnote to what Derrida says in 
the epigraph above, about what happens to lit er a ture in our age of ubiq-
uitous digitalization. Let me begin with a dialogic response to Ranjan 
Ghosh’s chapter 7. Having now read it carefully, I understand much better 
than even with the help of his chapters 1, 3, and 5 the most salient features 
of his commitment to teaching En glish lit er a ture in India. Ghosh centers 
his account of teaching En glish lit er a ture in India on an example, Samuel 
Beckett’s Endgame. The reader of Ghosh’s chapter gets a good idea of just 
what Ghosh would have to say about Beckett’s play in a class at the Uni-
versity of North Bengal of seventy- odd “post- gradu ates,” that is, of what 
we would call “gradu ate students.”
Ghosh, in his chapter 7, emphasizes the way he teaches against the In-
dian equivalent of the common core curriculum in the United States. He 
observes at one point that some of his students are not native En glish 
speakers. He has informed me by e- mail, however, to my surprise, that 
many of them have learned excellent En glish in convent schools. I had not 
known convent schools  were so impor tant in India or at least in Bengal. 
My surprise shows how  little I know about con temporary India. Ghosh’s 
solution to the  actual situation in his classroom when he walks in to teach 
Beckett’s Endgame is innovative. It successfully resists, moreover, the 
expectations of general institutional teaching methodologies in Indian 
universities and colleges, just as I believe much good teaching of lit er a-
ture in the United States  these days resists the procedures of the common 
core curriculum. Ghosh pres ents a reading of Beckett’s play by way of the 
Hindu or Sanskrit tradition in the Gita and elsewhere of dharma and other 
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related Hindu or Sanskrit concepts. His Hindu reading is augmented or 
“(in)fused,” as is characteristic of his writing, with a wide array of citations 
from a variety of Western sources.: Wai Chee Dimock, Shoshana Felman, 
Rey Chow, Terry Ea gleton, and  others. I should stress that Ghosh sees 
Hindu dharma not as fundamental or “best,” but as just one ele ment in 
the complex transcultural combination he calls the (in)fusion approach. To 
use dharma in that par tic u lar classroom situation, however, is a good way 
to teach Beckett’s Endgame to  those par tic u lar students (and to interpret 
it for me, too, I should add).
Ghosh’s chapter has as one of its goals an energetic challenge to tradi-
tional ways of teaching En glish lit er a ture in India. This customary way, so 
he tells his readers, is according to a standardized method of reading and 
teaching a given work. In place of that, and with augmentation from nu-
merous citations of recent Western essays and books that are in one way 
or another consonant with his own position, Ghosh argues persuasively 
for reading Beckett’s play in an Indian classroom in the context of an elab-
orate “transcultural” theory of lit er a ture that sees each literary work as 
giving hints of a transcendent spiritual power that can only be glimpsed 
indirectly. That theory of lit er a ture, as his earlier chapters already have 
shown, is an impor tant part of the perennial Hindu religious tradition, 
with its roots in Sanskrit writings. As Ghosh shows, that tradition depends 
on a lot of key words in Sanskrit that are exceedingly hard to translate into 
En glish, as I discover when I look them up in Wikipedia.
I tend, in opposition to Ghosh’s procedure, to take for granted that I 
should read Yeats’s “The Cold Heaven” in the context of Yeats’s own tra-
dition, what ever may be my own opinions about that tradition. I give a 
good bit of factual “background” information about my example, “The Cold 
Heaven,” including its relation to Chinese thought. I cite the entire poem, 
which is one reason I chose a short text for discussion in a lecture orig-
inally given before a Chinese audience. (I by no means assume, by the 
way, that an Indian academic audience is all that much like a Chinese one.) 
Whereas Ghosh makes some short citations from  here and  there in Beck-
ett’s Endgame, I wanted my Chinese audience to hear the  whole poem read 
aloud, from that marvelous first line to the disquieting end: “Suddenly I 
saw the cold and rook- delighting heaven. . . .  and stricken / By the injus-
tice of the skies for punishment.“ My outline of a reading of “The Cold 
Heaven” remains in the tradition of the “close reading” or “rhetorical read-
ing” done in the United States, with a close focus on linguistic detail, for-
mal features, and figurative language as generators of meaning. I stress 
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Yeats’s own tradition more than Ghosh does Beckett’s personal tradition. 
Yeats, as Ghosh observes, belonged not only to a native Irish tradition 
that was Protestant Christian, but also to a perennial tradition he learned 
from his reading in esoteric sources like Madame Blavatsky. As Ghosh cor-
rectly observes, Yeats did much reading in Arabic, Indian, and Chinese tra-
ditions. This mixture was Yeats’s own tradition, just as Irish Anglicanism 
was Beckett’s native tradition. Hindu religious theories of lit er a ture can 
hardly be said to have been decisively formative for Beckett, at least so far 
as I know. Ghosh’s reading is therefore an example of what the  great Amer-
ican critical theorist Kenneth Burke called “perspective by incongruity.” 
Ghosh’s use of Hindu theories of lit er a ture to read Endgame in an Indian 
classroom tacitly presumes that such transcultural readings, readings by 
way of what he calls “across,” is sometimes the best way to go.
Tradition: the word means in our readings what was passed on by par-
ents and early schooling, and then augmented by further education, read-
ing, and friendships. In Beckett’s case, one impor tant adult influence was 
his long acquaintance and collaboration with James Joyce in Paris. Joyce, 
both in Ulysses and, especially, in Finnegans Wake, infuses with a vengeance 
terms and traditions from all over the world, often by way of what are 
called portmanteau words, words, that is, that superimpose words from 
dif er ent languages and traditions in a single complex word that you  will 
find in no dictionary. A portmanteau word is like a lot of incongruous 
 things packed in a single suitcase. Such words are Ghosh’s (in)fusion 
approach in a nutshell, so to speak.  Here is just one example out of an im-
mense number, since portmanteau words are the vocabulary of the  whole 
of Finnegans Wake, from the title on. I give a bit of the context for the 
one word I have most in mind: “This is brave Danny weeping his spache 
for the popers. This is cool Connolly wiping his hearth with brave Danny. 
And this, regard! How Chawleses Shewered parparaparnelligoes between 
brave Danny boy and the Connolly. Upanishadem! Top. Spoken hath L’arty 
Magory. Eregobragh. Prouf!”1
It would take pages and pages to unsnarl this palimpsest, even if I had 
learning enough to do so. It mixes figures of Irish politics: James Con-
nolly, a leader of the Easter uprising (1868–1916); Charles Stewart Parnell, 
Irish nationalist po liti cal leader, whose scandalous private life ruined his 
po liti cal  career (1846–1891); Daniel O’Connell (1775–1847), Irish po liti cal 
leader and the “ Great Emancipator,” who fought for Catholic Emancipation 
and Irish in de pen dence. The passage alludes to Irish popu lar  music such 
as “Danny Boy,” and to Irish esoteric spiritualism, folklore, and aesthetics. 
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“L’arty Magory” may be a reference to Yeats’s friend Lady Gregory. All 
 these are superimposed in “Upanishadem.” Upanishads is the name of one 
of the greatest of Hindu spiritual texts, written in Sanskrit, of course. 
 Here, if I read it right, the word becomes not only a reference to Irish es-
oteric spiritualism, but an exclamation directed at brave Danny Boy, Con-
nolly, Parnell, and the rest. “Upanishad” means “sitting at the foot or feet of.” 
Sit at the feet of the  whole lot of them! “Upanishad” is a reference to the 
way the Upanishads are made of questions and answers between master 
and disciple.
I add one final impor tant dialogic response to Ghosh’s chapter 7. Read-
ing Ghosh’s chapter makes me, “suddenly,” aware of a big diference in our 
“subject positions,” as I have been taught to call them, especially in rela-
tion to lit er a ture in En glish, which we both teach. It is perhaps not without 
significance that both of us have chosen as our examples of literary texts 
in chapters 7 and 8 of this book Irish authors originally from a Protestant 
background: Samuel Beckett and W. B. Yeats. Ghosh is an Indian citizen. 
I am a United States citizen. We have both inherited the efects of British 
colonialism in the countries we live in, but in far dif er ent ways. My an-
cestors came in the late eigh teenth  century from a German- speaking part 
of Eu rope (Hesse) to the new United States, just as the latter was being 
established in a successful war of revolution against the British colonizing 
occupation of one part of North Amer i ca. My paternal ancestor was a 
Hessian soldier recruited (or perhaps “impressed” is a better word) by the 
British army to fight in North Amer i ca against the rebelling colonists. He 
surrendered to the American army, prob ably at the  Battle of Saratoga, 
1777, where 5,895 British and Hessian troops laid down their arms. He 
then settled in the new United States,  after being freed from a prisoner 
of war camp in the new state of  Virginia. En glish is my native language, 
though my ancestors on both sides  were German- speaking immigrants. 
En glish lit er a ture feels as though it belongs to me, in spite of the ab-
surdity, about which I say something  later in this chapter, of building 
our lit er a ture teaching in the United States on works written by a  people 
we defeated in a War of In de pen dence. We descendants of transplanted 
Eu ro pe ans, moreover, though we remember the shame of slavery, tend 
to forget or minimize the way the creation of the United States was ac-
companied by the equally shameful, genocidal elimination of almost all 
American Indians.  These  were the ironically so- called Indians ( because 
Columbus mistakenly thought he had reached the East Indies).  Those 
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 peoples  were in Amer i ca as diverse tribes for thousands of years before 
the Eu ro pe ans arrived.
India, too, was invaded, occupied, and colonized by the British, but its 
native inhabitants  were by no means almost completely exterminated, 
though many  were killed over the years. Huge diferences exist, of course, 
between Indian cultural, intellectual, and religious traditions, on the one 
hand, and American Indian ones, on the other. When India was fi nally 
liberated, in 1947, about one hundred and fifty years  after the liberation 
of the United States from British colonialism, the abundantly surviving 
native Indian  peoples took control. Though Indian history and culture is 
im mensely complex, down to the pres ent day, Ranjan Ghosh is one example 
in language and culture of a large group living in India  today.
The comparison seems somehow grotesquely inappropriate, but it is a 
 little as if in the United States British and Eu ro pean power  were to have 
been eliminated, leaving the Iroquois, the Seneca, the Sioux, and all the 
other American Indian tribes in possession of their ancestral homeland. 
 Those American Indians would then have been able to bring back, though 
in dif er ent circumstances, their own cultural assumptions as exemplified 
in their beliefs, practices, oral traditions, and writings. That this did not 
happen in North Amer i ca makes it quite dif er ent from India, to say the 
least.
Gauri Viswanathan, in a remarkable book, Masks of Conquest: Literary 
Study and British Rule in India (1989), has demonstrated that the discipline 
of En glish lit er a ture study, more or less as we knew it  until recently in 
the United States and around the world, was in ven ted as a way to teach 
Indian natives in British occupied India about En glish culture. This was 
perhaps on the assumption that the imperialistic occupation would last 
in defi nitely. It is no won der that Ranjan Ghosh opposes the traditional 
way of teaching En glish lit er a ture in India as it still exists. His opposition 
goes by way of innovative reading strategies that straddle multiple conti-
nents— a kind of no- centric approach. Ghosh wants forcefully to reassert 
the importance of the  great Hindu and Bengali intellectual traditions in 
all his chapters in this pres ent coauthored book. I have nothing at all com-
parable that “belongs to me” in the way Ghosh’s Hindu texts on lit er a ture 
belong to him. I have nothing parallel to which I can appeal as an alter-
native to Anglo- American intellectual traditions. Ghosh wants to show, 
 under the aegis of sahitya, the power of Sanskrit traditions to provide a 
strong and valid way to read even texts in En glish and American lit er a ture, 
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for example, Beckett’s Endgame. One must always keep in mind, however, 
that sahitya is only one aspect of that much more comprehensive, trans-
continental, “more than global” complex, the materials from all over the 
world that Ghosh’s approach infuses and fuses.
Ghosh’s chapter  7 has given me an opportunity to see, and I hope at 
least partially to understand, the diferences and similarities between what 
it means to read and teach British lit er a ture in India as opposed to reading 
and teaching it in the United States, as I have done for so many years.
The first draft of this chapter, written in 2010, included the paragraphs 
that follow this one. Now, in the last days of June 2015, I  will go on to up-
date  these opening remarks as they  were changed again in late 2014, and 
augment them still further. The context within which lit er a ture is taught 
in United States colleges and universities has changed markedly since 2010.
By “we” in my title (“Should We Read or Teach Lit er a ture Now?”) I mean 
we students, teachers, and the ordinary citizens of our “global village,” if 
such a term still means anything. By read I mean careful attention to the 
text at hand, that is, “close reading.” By lit er a ture I mean printed novels, 
poems, and plays. By now I meant initially the hot September of 2010, 
the culmination of the hottest six months on rec ord, clear evidence for 
 those who have bodies to feel that global warming is not a fiction. Much of 
what I say  here, however, still applies in early 2016. I mean the time  after 
a global financial crisis and worldwide deep recession whose efects have 
not yet wholly dis appeared in 2016. I mean the time of desktop comput-
ers, the Internet, iPhones, iPads, dvds, mp3s, Facebook, Twitter, Google, 
video games by the thousand, tele vi sion, and a global film industry. I mean 
the time when colleges and universities are, in the United States at least, 
losing funding and are shifting more and more to a corporate model. As 
one result of  these changes, over 70  percent of university teaching in all 
fields is now done by ill- paid adjuncts, that is, by  people who not only do 
not have tenure but who also have no possibility of getting it. They are 
not “tenure track.” I mean a time when calls on all sides, both by President 
Obama and his colleagues in the government and by the media left and 
right, are being made for more and better teaching of science, technol-
ogy, engineering, and math (Stem), while hardly anyone calls for more and 
better teaching in the humanities. The humanities, as a high administrator 
at Harvard, perhaps its then president, Lawrence Summers, is reported to 
have said some years ago now, “are a lost cause.”
Often ill- paid adjuncts are deliberately kept at appointments just below 
half- time, so they do not have medical insurance, pension contributions, 
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or other benefits. All three of my  children have doctorates, as does one 
grand child, but none of the four has ever held a normal tenure- track 
teaching position, much less achieved tenure. Tenure-track positions in 
the humanities are few and far between, with hundreds of applicants for 
each one, and an ever- accumulating reservoir of unemployed humanities 
PhDs. Books by Marc Bousquet, Christopher Newfield, Frank Donoghue, 
and Jefrey J. Williams, among  others, have told in detail the story of the 
way U.S. universities have come to be run more and more like business cor-
porations governed by the financial bottom line, or, as Peggy Kamuf puts 
it, the “bang for the buck.”2 The humanities cannot be shown to produce 
much bang of that sort at all.
The weakening of American public universities has been accompanied 
by a spectacular rise in for- profit and partly online universities like the 
University of Phoenix.  These are openly committed to training that  will 
get you a job. John Sperling, the head of the Apollo Group, which devel-
oped the University of Phoenix, said some time ago, “[the University of 
Phoenix] is a corporation. . . .  Coming  here is not a rite of passage. We are 
not trying to develop [students’] value systems or go in for that ‘expand their 
minds’ bullshit.”3
Richard Levin, an economist and still president back in 2010 of Yale 
University, in a lecture given before the Royal Society in London, enthu-
siastically praised China for more than doubling its institutions of higher 
education (from 1,022 to 2,263), for increasing the number of higher edu-
cation students from one million in 1997 to more than 5.5 million in 2007, 
and for setting out deliberately to create a number of world- class research 
universities that  will rank with Harvard, mit, Oxford, and Cambridge.4 
The numbers Levin cites are no doubt far higher now. Levin’s emphasis, 
however, is all on the way China’s increased teaching of science, technology, 
engineering, and math  will make it more highly competitive in the global 
economy than it already is. Levin, in spite of Yale’s notorious strengths in 
the humanities, says nothing whatsoever about humanities teaching or its 
utility  either in China or in the United States. Clearly the humanities are 
of no account in the story he is telling.
It is extremely difficult to demonstrate that humanities departments 
bring any financial return at all (“bang for the buck”) or that majoring in 
En glish is preparation for anything but a low- level ser vice job or a low- 
paying job teaching En glish. (I won der, by the way, what Ghosh’s En glish 
major students at the University of North Bengal characteristically go 
on to do when they gradu ate.) Many students at elite places like Yale can 
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safely major in the humanities  because they  will take over their  father’s 
business when they gradu ate, or  will go on to law school or business school 
and get their vocational training  there. Lifelong friendships with  others 
who would come to be impor tant in business, government, or the military 
are often for Yale students more impor tant than any vocational training. 
The presidential race between George  W. Bush and John Kerry in 2004 
was, somewhat absurdly, between two men who did not do all that well 
academically at Yale but who  were members of Yale’s most elite secret so-
ciety, Skull and Bones. Whoever won, Yale and the po liti cal power of the 
Skull and Bones network would win.
Enrollments in humanities courses and numbers of majors have in the 
United States, not surprisingly, especially at less elite places than Yale, 
shrunk to a tiny percentage of the undergraduate and gradu ate population. 
Only composition and beginning language courses plus some required 
distribution survey courses are  doing well in the humanities. Legislators, 
boards of trustees, and university administrators took advantage of the 
 Great Recession to exercise more control over universities, to downsize, 
and to manage what is taught. The state of California, for example, essen-
tially went broke during the recession that began in 2008. That meant for 
a while frozen positions, reduced adjunct funding, and salary reductions 
for faculty and staf in the University of California system of between 
5   percent and  10   percent, depending on rank. Teaching loads  were in-
creased for above- scale professors, that is, for the ones who have done the 
most distinguished research and who have been rewarded by being given 
more time to do that. The humanities especially sufered  because so many 
 people believed they  were less impor tant than Stem courses and research.
That was what I said in 2010, slightly revised now in 2016. What can I 
say  about the “now” of April 2016, as a context within which lit er a ture 
must  today be read and taught? The situation has changed quite a bit in 
the intervening four years, and by no means always for the better. The 
United States is still hell- bent on autoimmune self- destruction. Auto-
immunity is Jacques Derrida’s term for the way a community or a nation 
destroys itself through its own self- protection mechanisms. Derrida’s fig-
ure is drawn from autoimmune diseases in the  human body that turn the 
body’s immune system against itself, for example, in the pancreatic cancer 
that killed Derrida himself.
I put the self- destructive autoimmune forces at work in the United 
States  today  under six interrelated rubrics. They constitute the context 
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now for reading or teaching lit er a ture in my country: (1) education; (2) the 
media; (3) economics; (4) politics; (5) foreign wars; and (6) climate change. 
Except for putting education first, since it is the main topic in this book, 
my list is not in any hierarchical or causal order. Each demands and has 
elsewhere received, from me and from many  others, lengthy treatment, 
with abundant facts and statistics. I have written something about them 
in early chapters of this book.  Here I  shall merely sketch the context for 
any discussion of lit er a ture teaching in the United States now in 2016. 
I have said my six rubrics are interrelated. What binds them together, I 
claim, is the dif er ent ways each of them is fundamentally inflected  these 
days by the digital revolution, a transformation that is, with astonishing 
rapidity, changing  every corner of our lives.
One, education: What I said back in 2010 about the diminished role of 
the humanities in higher education is still true, as is the shift to teaching 
by adjuncts in all fields. Though the funding for higher education has im-
proved somewhat as the  Great Recession has gradually receded, though 
tuition and other costs have continued to increase rapidly, the emphasis 
on more spending for stem courses, as opposed to humanities and social 
sciences, has increased. Our colleges and universities are more and more 
becoming trade schools, preparing students directly for technological 
jobs, as opposed to what they used to be: liberal arts institutions prepar-
ing young  people to live better lives  because they know something about 
all fields, science and mathe matics as well as philosophy, history, lit er a ture, 
and economics. Higher education used also to teach students the critical 
thinking that might help them to resist being taken in by the lies with 
which they are bombarded from all sides  these days by the media.
Though lit er a ture is still widely taught by a  great many gifted and de-
voted teachers, and though an im mense number of books and essays on 
lit er a ture, such as this one, are still published, nevertheless, the  actual role 
of lit er a ture  either in the sense of printed books or in the sense of online 
e- texts has become more and more peripheral. All of Anthony Trollope’s 
novels are available as e- texts, to give one example of lit er a ture’s avail-
ability  these days in nonprint forms.  People can read Trollope novels on 
their smartphones or iPads if they wish, but almost all, and not just in the 
United States, use them for other purposes instead. They use Facebook 
(an amazing average of seventeen hours, fifty minutes daily, per online vis-
itor in September 2014), Twitter, Google, BuzzFeed,  etc.5 That irresistible, 
magical  little, gadget you can hold in your hand has, even more than in 
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2010, to a large extent replaced printed books. It is an amazing cultural 
and psychological transformation. By five years from now an estimated 
5.9 billion  people worldwide  will own smartphones.6
The final change since 2010  in our colleges and universities is the 
incredibly rapid development of vari ous digital substitutes for  actual 
face- to- face teaching in a classroom: online courses; universities without 
buildings; moocs, or “massive, on- line, open courses,” and the like. Why 
should I, or my  family, pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to send me 
to Oberlin or Harvard, if I can get the “same education” almost for  free, 
sitting at my computer at home? The old- fashioned university, with class-
room buildings and residential dormitories, is rapidly being outmoded 
by the digital revolution, and with it the traditional ways of teaching lit-
er a ture (face- to- face lecture courses, seminars, tutorials, and the like).
The controversial common core curriculum, now being widely  adopted 
in the United States, with its standardized lists in the lit er a ture section 
of books to read and with its prescriptions of what constitutes correct 
American En glish, along with standardized exams, is a creature of the dig-
ital revolution through and through. In spite of its attempts to be flexible 
and to encourage give and take in the classroom, it pays  little attention to 
diferences among teachers or students in a given classroom. Applying the 
common core throughout the country gives  great opportunity for adver-
tent or inadvertent ideological indoctrination, just as did the traditional 
teaching of En glish lit er a ture in British India. In my judgment, on the 
contrary, the in de pen dent lit er a ture classroom is a  great place to teach 
students to think for themselves as well as a place for the teacher to find 
out what works best for a par tic u lar set of students, including which liter-
ary texts work best.7
Two, the media: I have mentioned the new digital media that are so 
rapidly replacing the printed- book medium and even old- fashioned radio, 
tele vi sion, and films shown in theaters: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
a host of other digital media.  People watch Fox News on their handhelds. 
Judgments about courtship, marriage, how to vote, and the like are influ-
enced or even determined  these days by  these new digital media, no longer 
by novels. Novels, poems, even, for the highly educated, Greek and Latin 
classics, played to a considerable degree that role in Victorian  Eng land, at 
least for  middle- class citizens.
What can one say about the content of  these new media, streamed 
into the smartphones of so many millions of  people? To put it briefly: 
that content is for the most part pretty awful. It facilitates a major 
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dumbing- down of the American  people. The “news,” say in tv format 
on Fox News, but also on nbc, and even on pbs, is full of lies and distor-
tions. It is also constantly interrupted by commercials, the same ones 
shown over and over again, day  after day.  Those ads are even more dis-
torted, for example, the claim in ads by the American Petroleum Insti-
tute, that  until recently  were shown over and over, night  after night, on 
nbc News, that “fracking” (recovery of oil and gas from shale deposits) 
is safe, clean, and  will gain us “energy in de pen dence.” Nothing is said in 
such ads about how fracking and the burning of its products  will mark-
edly increase disastrous global warming, nor about the fact that fracking 
is not at all safe. The news stresses vio lence, sex, the imminent threat of 
contagious disease, and the latest happenings among media celebrities, 
as do our films and news applications for smartphones, like BuzzFeed. 
I watch nbc Eve ning News on tele vi sion from 6:30 to 7:00 pm. Twenty 
minutes of it is made up primarily of brief stories about the latest disas-
ters from around the world, often with dead bodies and vis i ble blood. 
The other ten minutes are made up of ads, often of  great sophistication. 
Much of our poetic and cinematic talent goes into inventing  these ads. 
Since nbc tv news is intended primarily for old folk like me (younger 
 people get their news from smartphone sites), many such ads are for 
medicines that promise to alleviate such diseases as diabetic nerve pain, 
shingles, dry eye, pneumonia, loss of bladder control, erectile disfunc-
tion, or atrial fibrillation. The video parts show happy  people whose lives 
have been changed by Cialis or Restasis or what ever. Meanwhile, the voice-
over, accompanied by subtitles, intones, as required by law, the horrible 
side efects of each medicine.  These lead me to resolve never to take any 
one of them if I can help it. Such news and the accompanying ads appear 
calculated to keep the American  people in a perpetual state of abject ter-
ror, anxiety (“Am I coming down with shingles?”), and distraction. This 
is perhaps so we  won’t notice that our civil liberties are disappearing 
into a constant state of surveillance both by the government and by the 
media themselves (the latter for marketing purposes). “Big  Brother is 
watching you!” as George Orwell has his fascist authorities’ posters say 
in his prescient novel, 1984.
In spite of all  these negative features of the new dominant media, In-
ternet sites like Google, Wikipedia, and Proj ect Gutenburg give  people 
studying lit er a ture, teaching it, or writing about it enormous resources 
available at a few clicks of a mouse. The Internet has quietly revolutionized 
literary study, as my use of it for this book indicates.
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Three, economics: Since 2010 the  Great Recession has receded some-
what, with a lower unemployment rate, though  little increase in wages 
for ordinary workers. The stock market is at historic highs, with the Dow 
over eigh teen thousand again, though it has fluctuated a lot recently. The 
disparity between rich and poor has never been higher, however, with 
40   percent of national wealth in the hands of the top one  percent. The 
“recovery” has not greatly helped the ordinary ill- paid worker at, say, 
Walmart. The recession was brought on and prolonged to some degree by 
a false belief in the beneficial efects of government austerity (reduction 
in expenditures for  things like school lunches, medical care, education, 
and road building) and by un regu la ted use by banks and other financial 
institutions of digital programs to speculate with depositors’ money, for 
example in subprime mortgages. No efective regulation of banks has yet 
been imposed. Banks, hedge funds, and the like are now at it again. Sooner 
or  later, another disastrous crash  will likely come. The economy is at this 
point completely dependent on digitization, for example, on the possibil-
ity of making thousands of computer- programmed stock market trades 
in a fraction of a second, buying, selling, and then buying again to make 
almost innumerable tiny profits that add up to billions.
Four, politics: the United States  these days, I am sorry to say, is more 
and more becoming a postdemocracy, a plutocracy. To a large degree, this 
depends once more on computer programs. In this case, it is programs that 
allow the hiding or obfuscation of a po liti cal contribution’s  actual source. 
Such programs keep the money circulating so fast that no one can iden-
tify where it originally came from. The very rich have bought our federal 
politicians, especially the Republicans in Congress. They have bought also 
many state and local elected officials from state governors on down. The 
very rich, through their often somewhat covert owner ship of the media, 
for example Fox News, have succeeded in getting voters to believe in a lot 
of lies, for example, that the Afordable Health Care Act (“Obamacare”) is 
a terrible piece of legislation, whereas it has given health care already to 
over sixteen million citizens who did not have it. Obamacare is working 
very well, in spite of Republican attempts to sabotage it at  every step of 
the way. Another set of lies is what the media, bought and paid for, have 
kept on saying against Obama, that he is in efec tive and vacillating, that 
every thing he has done is bad or unconstitutional, that he  ought to be 
impeached, that he is not  really an American citizen in any case, and so 
ineligible to be president,  etc., a constant litany of abuse. Against  these 
lies, Paul Krugman, in a recent New York Times op-ed piece, has presented 
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a substantial list of impor tant good  things Obama and our federal govern-
ment did just in 2014:  handling the Ebola threat; bringing about further 
economic recovery in jobs and growth; bringing Obamacare successfully 
into operation; confronting Vladimir Putin’s threats without rushing into 
war.8 When I revised this once more, in mid- September 2015, the dozen 
or so Republican candidates for president  were holding periodic debates, 
with the dangerous bufoon Donald Trump the center of attention and the 
leader of the polls. Each and  every one of them tells such a collection of 
lies and makes such disastrous proposals as would make any of them a cat-
astrophic president both in domestic policy and in their support for per-
petual foreign wars. Now, in April 2016, it looks as if Donald Trump, the 
worst of the lot,  will actually be the Republican candidate for president.
Five, foreign wars: the United States is committed to a perpetual “War 
on Terror” that was first enunciated by President George W. Bush  after 
the bombing of the Twin Towers on 9/11/2001. That is part of the context 
in which any teaching of lit er a ture must take place in the United States 
 today. We spend a huge percentage of our annual gross domestic product 
on military costs, 40  percent of the entire world’s military expenditures, a 
patent absurdity. We are armed to the teeth. Our disastrous invasions of 
Iraq and Af ghan i stan have cost at least two trillion dollars all told. Think 
how many schools could have been built with that money or how many 
new bridges and new roads to repair our decaying infrastructure! The ten 
miles of paved and numbered state road (Route 15) between my winter 
home in Sedgwick, Maine, and the nearest town of any size (Blue Hill) has 
been,  until recently, more or less unusable in the winter  because of frost 
heaves and potholes. Now a new surface has been applied that makes it a 
rollercoaster rather than a series of big bumps. President Obama has with-
drawn our troops from Iraq and Af ghan i stan. The formal end of the War in 
Af ghan i stan was declared December 28, 2014, thirteen years  after our ini-
tial invasion, but of course we still kept “advisory” troops  there, as we do 
in Syria. American soldiers are still  dying in  these countries. Obama acqui-
esces too easily to our generals, for example, in authorizing the bombing 
of isis in Syria and Af ghan i stan. This is a futile enterprise that has hardly 
given isis pause, but has already produced many civilian casualties and 
has made us hated even more than we  were before by many in the  Middle 
East. Af ghan i stan, Iraq, and Syria are all, in April 2016, in one way or an-
other in po liti cal and social chaos. The forms  these disastrous conditions 
have taken are to a considerable degree the result of our invasions of the 
first two and every thing short of invasion of the third.
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Our bombing of isis “targets” is an example of a new kind of digital 
war, terrifying in its impersonality. This is not only  because all our military 
might, warplanes for example, depends on digital programming, as does 
communication among soldiers, but also  because much of our warfare is 
carried on now by unmanned, digitally operated drones that are controlled 
from command centers in the United States. Some military officer watch-
ing a screen in the military base in  Grand Forks, North Dakota, presses a 
button on his computer mouse, and a large number of  people thousands 
of miles away in Syria are killed with “pinpoint precision.” He then pre-
sumably goes home in the eve ning with a clear conscience and in more 
or less complete safety to join his wife and  children at his home on the 
military base. Similar equipment is used to monitor our borders against 
“illegal aliens.” Such border guards, like our soldiers, are often trained 
through video games like World of Warcraft or Call of Duty. About  these 
much could be said. The players of such games (millions of them) partici-
pate by digital manipulation in an imaginary world of the utmost vio lence. 
They thereby become inured to deaths that they have themselves caused in 
that cyberspace world. What would Words worth, Dickens, Trollope, or 
Elizabeth Gaskell have thought of such replacements for reading poems 
and novels? I have not forgotten that  there is a lot of killing in Homer and 
Shakespeare, too! Think of Macbeth, Hamlet, or Achilles.
Six, climate change:  human- caused global warming is in many ways the 
paradigmatic example of “auto- co- immunity,” as Derrida calls it. In all of 
my examples what is intended to save or help the community works to 
destroy it. To recall one example, banks, which are supposed to keep our 
money safe and pay us fair interest for it, lose our money in wildly specu-
lative investments. All of my examples are ways the digital revolution fa-
cilitates collective self- destruction. Global warming, however, is the most 
extreme example. Carbon technology (coal, oil, and gas) brought many 
good  things to our culture: automobiles, central heating, electricity for 
all,  etc. Unbeknown to us, however,  until recently, burning  these fuels was 
emitting sufficient carbon dioxide into the atmosphere to warm the planet 
enough to melt Arctic and Antarctic ice as well as glaciers everywhere they 
still exist, to flood our coastlines and coastal cities, and ultimately, in not 
all that many de cades, to bring extinction to many species of life on earth, 
including perhaps homo sapiens. We in the United States are already expe-
riencing floods, violent storms, forest fires, prolonged droughts, rising sea 
levels, and the warmest years on rec ord. We have known for several de cades 
now the facts about global warming and that it is anthropogenic. Neverthe-
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less, the use of digital technology in media propaganda by oil companies 
and  others to spread the lie, known by them to be a lie, that global warming 
is a hoax has meant that so far nothing sufficient has been done by gov-
ernments around the world to mitigate climate change. We are now on the 
cusp of irreversible climate change. It is most likely already too late.
Should or  ought we to read or teach lit er a ture in a “now” that is in so 
many ways an extreme crisis situation? Is it a civic obligation to do so? If 
so, which works? How should  these be read and taught? One tempting an-
swer would be to say that “the humanities are a lost cause.” We do not have 
time, in our dire straits, to spend on something so trivial and so peripheral as 
reading George Eliot’s Middlemarch or any other “ great work of lit er a ture.” 
I  shall  later on in this chapter give, however, a dif er ent and somewhat 
more hopeful answer.
During the nineteen years I taught at The Johns Hopkins University, 
from 1953 to 1972, I would have had ready answers to the questions about 
 whether or not we should read or teach lit er a ture, and how.  These an-
swers would have represented our unquestioned consensus at Hopkins 
about the nature and mission of the humanities. A (somewhat absurd) 
ideological defense of literary study, especially study of British lit er a ture, 
was pretty firmly in place at Hopkins during  those years. We in the En-
glish Department at Hopkins had easy consciences  because we thought 
we  were  doing two  things that  were good for the country: teaching young 
citizens the basic American ethos and  doing research that was like that of 
our scientific colleagues in that it was finding out the “truth” about the 
fields covered by our disciplines: languages, lit er a tures, art, history, phi-
losophy. Veritas vos liberabit, the truth  shall make you  free, is the motto of 
Hopkins. It is a quotation from the Bible, by the way, something said by 
Jesus (John 8: 32). By truth Jesus hardly meant scientific truth, as it for 
the most part did at Hopkins in my time  there. Lux et veritas, light and 
truth, is the motto of Yale. Just plain veritas is Harvard’s slogan. Truth, we 
at Hopkins believed, having forgotten the source of our motto, included 
objective truth of  every sort, for example, the truth about the early poetry 
of Alfred Tennyson or about the poetry of Barnaby Googe. Such truth was 
a good in itself, like knowledge of black holes or of ge ne tics. Our research 
and teaching was focused primarily on the lit er a ture of a foreign country, 
 Eng land, which we defeated in a revolutionary War of In de pen dence. The 
absurdity of some of the presuppositions  behind that proj ect only recently 
got through to me. We in “the land of the  free” had gone on acting like a 
colony in our teaching of lit er a ture. More and more, in the years since the 
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1950s, a shift has occurred  toward teaching predominantly American lit er-
a ture rather than British lit er a ture.
Hopkins, as is well- known, was the first exclusively “research university” 
in the United States. It was founded on the model of the  great German re-
search universities of the nineteenth  century. In literary study that meant 
inheritance of the German tradition of Romance philology, Germanic philol-
ogy (which included En glish lit er a ture), and classical philology, all of which 
flourished at Hopkins. No comparative lit er a ture at Hopkins in  those days. 
Such research needed no further justification beyond the intrinsic value ac-
corded to the search for truth and the not entirely persuasive assumption 
that humanities scholars who  were  doing that kind of research would be 
better teachers of lit er a ture as the precious repository of our national val-
ues. The word research was our collective leitmotif.  Every professor at Hop-
kins was supposed to spend 50  percent of his (we  were almost all men) time 
 doing research in his field of specialty. That included humanities professors.
Hopkins was to an amazing degree run by the professors, or at least it 
seemed so to us. Professors made decisions about hiring, promotion, and 
the establishment of new programs through a group of professors called 
the “Academic Council.” They  were elected by the faculty. Though  there 
was no established quota, the council always included humanists and so-
cial scientists as well as scientists. That means the scientists, who could 
have outvoted the humanists,  were cheerfully electing humanists. Out-
side support for research at Hopkins came not from industry, but primar-
ily from government agencies like the National Science Foundation, the 
National Institutes of Health, the National Defense Education Act, and 
the National Endowment for the Humanities. We benefitted greatly from 
the Cold War mentality that thought the United States should be best in 
every thing, including even the humanities. None of the teaching was done 
by adjuncts, though gradu ate students taught composition and discussion 
sections of large lecture courses. Most students who received the PhD ob-
tained good, tenure- track appointments. Misleading statistics even indi-
cated that a shortage of PhDs in the humanities was about to happen, so 
the En glish department at Hopkins briefly instituted a three- year PhD in 
that field. Two of my own students finished such a PhD and went on to 
hold professorships at impor tant universities. That shows a PhD in En glish 
need not take twelve years or more, the average time  today.
Hopkins was, in my time  there, a kind of paradise for professors who 
happened to be interested in research as well as in teaching. Hopkins then 
was the closest  thing I know to Jacques Derrida’s nobly idealistic vision in 
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2001 of a “university without condition,” a university centered to a con-
siderable degree on the humanities and devoted to a disinterested search 
for truth in all areas.9 It is a  great irony that Derrida’s  little book was de-
livered as a president’s lecture at Stanford University, since Stanford is 
one of the  great elite, private universities in the United States that is and 
always has been deeply intertwined with corporate Amer i ca and, by way 
of the Hoover Institution, located at Stanford, with the most conservative 
side of American politics.
Well, what was wrong with Hopkins in  those halcyon days? Quite a 
lot. Practically no  women  were on the faculty, not even in nontenured 
positions— not a single one in the En glish department during all my nine-
teen years at Hopkins. Our protocols at Hopkins for teaching lit er a ture in 
En glish seem from my perspective now to have been narrowly ideologi-
cal and sexist. We downplayed American lit er a ture and taught lit er a ture 
mostly by British men. The education of gradu ate students in En glish was 
brutally competitive, with a high rate of attrition, often by way of with-
drawal by the En glish department faculty of fellowship funds, initially 
granted to students who  were  later judged not to be performing well. 
Some students whom we “encouraged to leave” took PhDs elsewhere and 
had brilliant  careers as professors of En glish. Hopkins, fi nally, was up to 
its ears in military research at the Applied Physics Laboratory. The Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies was not then, and still 
is not  today, to put it mildly, what one would call a model of demo cratic 
thinking. Even so, Hopkins seemed to me in the fifties and sixties a won-
derful place to be a professor of the humanities.
Now, over fifty years  later, every thing is dif er ent in U.S. universities 
and colleges from what it was at Hopkins when I taught  there. Even in 
the fifties and sixties, Hopkins was the exception, not the rule. I have de-
scribed the not entirely cheerful situation in which my questions, “Should 
we read or teach lit er a ture now? Do we have an obligation to do so?” must 
be asked and an attempt to answer them made. How did this disappear-
ance of the justification for literary study happen? I suggest three reasons:
The conviction that every body  ought to read lit er a ture  because it em-
bodies the ethos of our citizens has almost completely vanished. Few 
 people any longer  really believe, in their heart of hearts, that it is neces-
sary to read Beowulf, Shakespeare, Milton, Samuel Johnson, Words worth, 
Emerson, Dickinson, Whitman, Dickens, Woolf, Stevens, and Conrad in 
order to become a good citizen of the United States.
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A massive shift in dominant media away from printed books to all 
forms of digital media, what I call “prestidigitalization,” has meant that 
lit er a ture, in the old- fashioned sense of printed novels, poems, and 
dramas, plays a smaller and smaller role in determining the ethos of 
our citizens.  Middle- class readers in Victorian  Eng land, as I have said 
earlier, learned how to behave in courtship and marriage by entering 
into the fictive worlds of novels by Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Anthony 
Trollope, Elizabeth Gaskell, and many  others. Now  people satisfy their 
needs for imaginary or virtual realities by watching films, tele vi sion, 
dvds, playing video games, and listening to popu lar  music. It was an-
nounced as long ago as July 19, 2010, by Amazon that for the first time 
they are selling more e- books to be read on iPads or Kindles than hard-
cover printed books. A high point of the summer of 2010 for a colleague 
and friend of mine in Norway, a distinguished humanities professor, 
was his trip to Rotterdam to hear a Stevie Won der concert at the North 
Sea Jazz Festival, followed by a repeat per for mance of the same concert 
in his home town of Bergen. He e- mailed me with  great excitement and 
enthusiasm about  these concerts. Stevie Won der has obviously  great 
importance in shaping this humanist’s ethos. Whenever I gave a lecture 
on some literary work in any place in the world, members of my audi-
ence, especially the younger ones, always wanted to ask me questions 
about the film of that work, if a film had been made. They knew the film, 
not the book.
The rise of new media has meant more and more the substitution of 
cultural studies for old- fashioned literary studies. It is natu ral for young 
 people to want to teach and write about  things that interest them, for 
example, film, popu lar culture,  women’s studies, African American stud-
ies, and so on. Many, if not most, departments of  En glish in the United 
States  these days are actually departments of cultural studies, what ever 
they may call themselves. Less and less lit er a ture is taught  these days in 
American departments of En glish. Soon, Chinese or Indian students 
of En glish lit er a ture, American lit er a ture, and worldwide lit er a ture 
in En glish  will know more about  these than American students do. A 
list not long ago of new books published at the University of Minnesota 
Press in “Lit er a ture and Cultural Studies” did not have one single book 
on printed lit er a ture proper.
Just to give three examples out of hundreds of  career- orientation 
shifts: Edward Said began as a specialist on the novels and short stories 
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of Joseph Conrad. He went on to write a book that is theory- oriented, 
Beginnings, but his  great fame and influence rests on po liti cal books like 
Orientalism, The Question of Palestine, and Culture and Imperialism. Second, 
a quite dif er ent example: Joan DeJean is a distinguished professor of 
romance languages at the University of Pennsylvania, but she does not 
write about French lit er a ture in the old- fashioned sense of plays by Ra-
cine, novels by Pierre de Marivaux or Flaubert, poems by Baudelaire, or 
novels by Duras (all men but Duras, please note). Her influential books 
include, among  others, The Essence of Style: How the French In ven ted High 
Fashion, Fine Food, Chic Cafes, Style, Sophistication, and The Age of Comfort: 
When Paris Discovered Casual— and the Modern Home Began. In short, Pro-
fessor DeJean does cultural studies, with a feminist slant, not literary 
studies. Third example: Frank Donoghue began his  career as a specialist in 
eighteenth- century En glish lit er a ture. He published in 1996 a fine book on 
The Fame Machine: Book Reviewing and Eighteenth- Century Literary  Careers. 
Around 2000, Donoghue shifted to an interest in the current state of the 
humanities in American universities. In 2008, he published The Last Pro-
fessors: The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities. He then 
began lecturing frequently as an expert on the corporatizing of the Amer-
ican university.
I have briefly sketched the pres ent- day situation in the United States 
within which the question “Should We Read or Teach Lit er a ture Now?” 
must be asked: smaller and smaller  actual influence of lit er a ture on common 
culture; fewer professors who teach lit er a ture as opposed to cultural stud-
ies; fewer tenured professors of lit er a ture in any case; fewer books of literary 
criticism proper published, and tiny sales for  those that are published; 
reduced enrollment in lit er a ture courses in our colleges and universities; 
the reduction of lit er a ture departments  toward being ser vice departments 
teaching composition and, in even fewer universities, the rudiments of 
foreign languages and foreign cultures. The attitude  toward languages 
other than En glish seems to be, “What, me worry? Every body everywhere 
speaks and reads En glish anyhow, or  ought to do so. Why worry about 
teaching French, German, Italian, or Rus sian?”10
The usual response by embattled humanists is to wring their hands, be-
come defensive, and say lit er a ture  ought to be taught  because we need to 
know our cultural past, or need to “expand our minds,” or need the ethical 
teaching we can get from literary works. Presidents of the Modern Lan-
guage Association of Amer i ca (mla) have in their presidential addresses 
over the de cades echoed what Matthew Arnold said about the need to 
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know, as he puts it in Culture and Anarchy (1869), “the best that has been 
thought and said in the world.” Robert Scholes, for example, in his mla 
Presidential address delivered in 2004, asserted: “We need to show that 
our learning is worth something by . . .  broadening the minds of our stu-
dents and helping our fellow citizens to more thoughtful interpretations 
of the crucial texts that shape our culture. . . .  We have nothing to ofer 
but the sweetness of reason and the light of learning.”11 “Sweetness and 
light” is of course Arnold’s repeated phrase, in Culture and Anarchy, for 
what culture gives. That book was required reading in the freshman En-
glish course all students took at Oberlin College when I became a student 
 there in 1944.
I think the noble, Arnoldian view of the benefits of literary study is 
pretty well dead and gone  these days, in spite of Ranjan Ghosh’s spirited 
defense of Arnold in his dialogic response to my chapter 10. For one  thing, 
we now recognize more clearly how problematic and heterogeneous the 
literary tradition of the West actually is. It by no means teaches some uni-
fied ethos. Many of its greatest works are hardly uplifting in the usual 
sense of the term. That includes, for example, Shakespeare’s King Lear, 
Melville’s Moby Dick, and many  others. About reading King Lear, Keats said 
in a sonnet, “On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again”: “For once 
again the fierce dispute, / Betwixt damnation and impassion’d clay / Must 
I burn through.”12 Nor is American lit er a ture much better. Of one of our 
 great classics, Moby- Dick, its author, Herman Melville, said, “I have writ-
ten a wicked book.” As for Keats’s own writings, Matthew Arnold found 
Keats’s letters deeply troubling. Arnold wrote to his friend Clough, “What 
a brute you  were to tell me to read Keats’ letters. However, it is over now: and 
reflexion resumes her power over agitation.”13 Furthermore, it is not at all 
clear to me how reading Shakespeare, Keats, Dickens, Whitman, Yeats, 
or Wallace Stevens is any use in helping our students to deal with the ur-
gent prob lems that confront us all  these days in the United States: I have 
discussed six of  these earlier in this chapter. Young  people in the United 
States now need, or think they need, to get training that  will help them 
get a job and be able to pay for housing and food. As I  shall argue in a 
 little more detail at the end of this chapter, students might benefit from 
courses that would teach them how to tell truth from falsehood on Inter-
net postings.14
Well, why in the world should we read and teach lit er a ture now, in  these 
dire circumstances? In order to make this question less abstract, I  shall 
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confront my question by way of a short poem by Yeats. I greatly admire 
this poem. It moves me greatly. It moves me so much that I want not only 
to read it but also to teach it and talk about it to anyone who  will listen. The 
poem is called “The Cold Heaven.” It is from Yeats’s volume of poems of 
1916, Responsibilities. It is available in a number of sites online.  Here is 
the poem:
the cold heaven
Suddenly I saw the cold and rook- delighting heaven
That seemed as though ice burned and was but the more ice,
And thereupon imagination and heart  were driven
So wild that  every casual thought of that and this
Vanished, and left but memories, that should be out of season
With the hot blood of youth, of love crossed long ago;
And I took all the blame out of all sense and reason,
 Until I cried and trembled and rocked to and fro,
Riddled with light. Ah! when the ghost begins to quicken,
Confusion of the death- bed over, is it sent
Out naked on the roads, as the books say, and stricken
By the injustice of the skies for punishment? 15
I long ago wrote a full essay on this poem.16 I discussed it briefly again 
once more in 2010 at a conference on world lit er a ture at Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University. At Jiao Tong I used Yeats’s poem as an example of how 
difficult it is to transfer a poem from one culture to a dif er ent one. Now I 
want to consider the poem as a paradigmatic exemplification of the diffi-
culties of deciding  whether we should read or teach lit er a ture now. Should 
I read or teach this poem now?
My first answer is that  there is no should about it, no compelling ob-
ligation or responsibility. I can read or teach it if I like, but that decision 
cannot be justified by anything beyond the call the poem itself makes on 
me to read it and teach it. Least of all do I think I can tell students or 
administrators with a straight face that reading the poem or hearing me 
teach it is  going to help them find a job, or help them mitigate climate 
change, or help them resist the lies told by the media, though I suppose being 
a good reader might conceivably aid re sis tance to lies, as I  shall  later in 
this chapter argue. Reading the poem or teaching it is, however, a good in 
itself, an end in itself, as Kant said all art is.
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The mystical poet Angelus Silesius (1624–77) affirmed, in The  Cherubic 
Wanderer, that “the  rose is without why.”17 Like that  rose, “The Cold Heaven” 
is without why. The poem, like a  rose, has no reason for being beyond it-
self. You can read it or not read it, as you like. It is its own end. Young 
 people  these days who watch films or play video games or listen to popu lar 
 music do not, for the most part, attempt to justify what they do. They do it 
 because they like to do it and  because it gives them plea sure. My academic 
friend from Bergen did not try to justify his  great plea sure and excite-
ment in hearing at  great expense the same Stevie Won der concert twice. He 
just e- mailed me his  great enthusiasm about the experience. It was a big 
deal for him, just as reading, talking, or writing about Yeats’s “The Cold 
Heaven” is a big deal for me. That importance, however, is something I 
should not even try to justify by its practical utility. If I do make that 
attempt I am bound to fail.
A natu ral response when I see a film I like or hear a concert that moves 
me is to want to tell other  people about it, as my correspondent in Ber-
gen wanted to tell every body about  those Stevie Won der concerts.  These 
tellings most often take the form, “Wow! I saw a wonderful movie last 
night. Let me tell you about it.” I suggest that my desire to teach Yeats’s 
“The Cold Heaven” takes much the same form: “Wow! I have just read a 
wonderful poem by Yeats. Let me read it to you and tell you about it.” 
That telling, naturally enough, is to pass on what I think other readers 
might find helpful to lead them to respond to the poem as enthusiasti-
cally as I do.
I list, in an order following that of the poem, some of the  things that 
might need to be explained not only, for example, to a Chinese reader, but 
also, no doubt, mutatis mutandis, to a video- games- playing Western young 
person ignorant of Eu ro pean poetry, or to a student in an Indian classroom. 
David Damrosch recognizes with equanimity, as do I, that when a given 
piece of lit er a ture circulates into a dif er ent culture from that of its origin, 
for example by translation, it  will be read diferently.
I am not talking  here, however, about a full, culturally embedded reading, 
or the sort of (in)fusionist, transcultural reading Ranjan Ghosh sketches out 
in his dialogic response to this section of my chapter, or about a reading that 
might arise from a classroom discussion, but just about making sense of 
Yeats’s poem. This need to make sense might arise, for example, in teaching 
this poem to an undergraduate or gradu ate class in a U.S. university.  Here 
are some  things it might be good to know when trying to understand “The 
Cold Heaven”:
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Something about Yeats’s life and works.
An explanation of the verse form used: three iambic hexameter qua-
trains rhyming ABAB. Is it an odd sort of sonnet in hexameters rather 
than pentameters, and missing the last couplet?
Knowledge of the recurrent use of sudden or suddenly in Yeats’s lyr ics, 
as in the first lines of his poem, “Leda and the Swan”: “A sudden blow: 
the  great wings beating still / Above the staggering girl.”
What sort of bird a rook is and why they are delighted by cold weather.
The double meaning of heaven, as “skies” and as the super natu ral realm 
beyond the skies, as in the opening of the Lord’s Prayer, said daily by 
millions of Christians: “Our  Father who art in heaven”; compare “skies” 
at the end: “the injustice of the skies for punishment.”
An explanation of oxymorons ( burning ice) and of the history in West-
ern poetry of this par tic u lar one.
Attempt to explain the semantic diference between “imagination” and 
“heart,” as well as the nuances of each word.
Explanation of “crossed” in “memories . . .  of love crossed long ago,” both 
the allusion to Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet as “star- crossed lov-
ers,” that is, as fated by the stars to disaster in love, and the reference 
to the biographical fact of Yeats’s disastrous love for Maud Gonne. She 
turned him down repeatedly, so it is to some degree absurd for him to 
take responsibility for the failure of their love. He did his best to woo 
her.
Account of the diference between “sense” and “reason” in “I took the 
blame out of all sense and reason,” or is this just tautological? A. Nor-
man Jefares cites T. R. Henn’s explanation that “ ‘out of all sense’ is 
an Irish (and ambiguous) expression meaning both ‘to an extent far 
beyond what common sense could justify’ and ‘beyond the reach of 
sensation.’ ”18
Explanation of the double meaning of the verb “riddle” in the marvel-
ous phrase, “riddled with light”: riddle as punctured with holes, like a 
sieve, and riddle as having a perhaps unanswered riddle or conundrum 
posed to one. Being riddled with light is paradoxical  because light is 
supposed to be illuminating, not obscuring.
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Unsnarling of the lines centering on “quicken” in “when the ghost [mean-
ing disembodied soul] begins to quicken, / Confusion of the death bed 
over.” Quicken usually refers, in one of its meanings, to the coming to 
life of the fertilized egg in the womb, so an erotic love- bed scene is super-
imposed on the death- bed one.
“As the books say”: which books? The esoteric and Irish folklore ones 
Yeats delighted to read.
One would need to relate “injustice of the skies for punishment” to the 
usual assumption that heaven only punishes justly, gives us our just 
deserts  after death. Why and how can the skies be unjust? By blam-
ing him for something that was not his fault? This would need to be 
related to Greek and  later tragedy. It is not Oedipus’s fault that he has 
killed his  father and fathered  children on his  mother, or is it? Are we 
all guilty in Freud’s sense of having an Oedipus complex or an Electra 
complex?
Why is the last sentence a question? Is it a real question or a merely 
rhetorical one? Would the answer find its place if the blank that follows 
the twelve lines of this defective sonnet  were filled? The poem seems 
both too much in line lengths and too  little in number of lines.
Fi nally, readers might like to know, or might even observe on their 
own, that Yeats, like other Eu ro pean poets of his generation, was 
influenced in this poem and elsewhere by what he knew, through 
translations, of Chinese poetry and Chinese ways of thinking. The 
volume Responsibilities, which contains “The Cold Heaven,” has an epi-
graph from someone Yeats calls, somewhat pretentiously, “Khoung- 
Fou- Tseu,” presumably Confucius: “How am I fallen from myself, for 
a long time now / I have not seen the Prince of Chang in my dreams”19 
Readers might have a lot to say about this Chinese connection and 
about  whether or not it makes “The Cold Heaven” a work of world 
lit er a ture.
All this information would be given to my hearers or readers, however, 
not to expand their minds, but in the hope that it might help them admire 
the poem as much as I do and be moved by it as much as I am. Yeats’s poem 
can hardly be described as uplifting, since its thematic climax is a claim 
that the skies are unjust and punish  people for  things of which they are 
not guilty. That is a terrifying wisdom. Telling  others about this poem is 
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not something I should do but something I cannot help  doing, something 
the poem urgently calls on me to do.
In an  actual U.S. classroom, depending a bit on  whether it was an under-
graduate or a gradu ate course and on how many students  there  were in 
the class, my contextual information and rudimentary reading would be 
followed or accompanied by questions and discussion from the students, 
and perhaps lead to papers, long or short, in which students would pres-
ent their own readings. Large lecture courses on lit er a ture in the United 
States, such as the introductory lit er a ture major courses at Yale, which 
I taught in for many years, are often augmented by small “discussion 
sections” taught both by the se nior faculty and by gradu ate students. In 
 those, students engage in the give and take of reflection on the material 
presented in the lectures. Some form of student participation is a funda-
mental part of teaching lit er a ture in the United States, though I believe, 
as against the conviction of some teachers  these days, that faculty mem-
bers have an obligation not to hide their knowledge and their own ways 
of reading par tic u lar works. The fine line between handing down the law 
and failing to help students learn to read for themselves must be walked 
by each teacher as best she or he can.
Do I think much  future exists in United States colleges and universities 
or in our journals and university presses for such readings and modes of 
teaching? Not as much as I would wish. Even many of  those who could teach 
lit er a ture, who  were hired to do so, choose, rather, to teach cultural studies 
instead: fashion design, or the history of Western imperialism, or film, or 
some one or another among  those myriad other interests that have replaced 
lit er a ture.
I add in conclusion, however, somewhat timidly and tentatively, one 
pos si ble use studying lit er a ture and literary theory might have, or  ought 
to have, “in  these bad days” (an echo of Matthew Arnold’s early sonnet “To 
a Friend.”). Citizens, in the United States at least, are  these days inundated 
with a torrent of distortions and outright lies from politicians, the news 
media, and advertising on tele vi sion and radio, for example, commercials for 
oil companies, or assertions in Donald Trump’s campaign speeches, which 
have been rated as only 9 percent accurate.
Learning how to read lit er a ture rhetorically is primary training in how 
to spot such lies and distortions. Students might benefit from lit er a ture 
courses that would teach them how to tell truth from falsehood in Inter-
net postings. This is partly  because so much lit er a ture deals thematically 
with imaginary characters who are wrong in their readings of  others, for 
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example, Elizabeth Bennett in her misreading of Darcy in Jane Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice or Dorothea Brooke’s misreading of Edward Casaubon 
in George Eliot’s Middlemarch, or Isabel Archer’s misreading of Gilbert Os-
mond in Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady. (My choice of  these heroines 
does not mean that it is only  women who make such  mistakes in Victorian 
novels. Think of Pip in  Great Expectations or of Lydgate in Middlemarch or 
of Conrad’s Lord Jim!)
Lit er a ture is also training in resisting lies and distortions in the skill it 
gives in understanding the way the rhe toric of tropes and the rhe toric of 
persuasion works. Such expertise as literary study gives might be trans-
lated into a savvy re sis tance to the lies and ideological distortions politi-
cians and talk- show hosts promulgate, for example the lies of  those who 
deny climate change, or the lying claims, believed by high percentages of 
Americans, that Barack Obama is a Muslim, a socialist, and not a legiti-
mate president  because he was not born in the United States. The motto 
for this defense of literary study might be the challenging and provocative 
claim made by Paul de Man in “The Re sis tance to Theory.” “What we call 
ideology,” says de Man, “is precisely the confusion of linguistic with natu ral 
real ity, of reference with phenomenalism. It follows that, more than any 
other mode of inquiry, including economics, the linguistics of literariness is 
a power ful and indispensable tool in the unmasking of ideological aberra-
tions, as well as a determining  factor in accounting for their occurrence.”20
The chances that literary study would have this benign efect on many 
 people are slim. One can only have the audacity of hope and believe that 
some students and teachers who read and study lit er a ture and literary the-
ory might be led to the habit of unmasking ideological aberrations such as 
 those that surround us on all sides in the United States  today. The chances 
are slim  because of the difficulty of transferring what you might learn by 
a careful reading, say, of The Portrait of a Lady to unmasking the dominant 
ideologies that mean a thoughtful person should only vote Republican if 
her or his income happens to be in the top two  percent of all Americans 
and if maximizing your wealth in the short term is your only goal. Another 
 great difficulty is the  actual situation in American universities  today, as I 
have described it. Derrida’s The University without Condition was not ex-
actly greeted with shouts of joyful assent when he presented it as a lecture 
at Stanford. In spite of their lip- service to teaching so- called critical think-
ing, the politicians and corporate executives who preside  today over both 
public and private American colleges and universities are unlikely to sup-
port something that would put in question the assumptions on the basis 
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of which they try to make decisions about who teaches what. As I have ar-
gued earlier in this chapter, they think they need colleges and universities 
 these days, if at all, primarily to teach math and science, technology, en-
gineering, computer science, basic En glish composition, and other skills 
necessary for working in a technologized cap i tal ist economy. The ability to 
do a rhetorical reading of Pride and Prejudice and transfer that skill to pol-
iticians’ and advertisers’ lies is not one of  those necessities. I have never 
yet heard President Barack Obama so much as mention literary study in 
his eloquent speeches about the urgent need to improve education in the 
United States.
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•  PART V •
Ethics and Lit er a ture
This page intentionally left blank
But true art is never fixed, but always flowing.
— Ralph Waldo Emerson
Dissonances are only the remote consonances.
— Arnold Schoenberg
 Human life . . .  is composed of two heterogeneous parts which never blend. One 
part is purposeful, given significance by utilitarian and therefore secondary ends; 
this part is the one we are aware of. The other is primary and sovereign . . .  it 
evades the grasp of our aware intelligence.
— Georges Bataille
The ethics of sahitya ( lit er a ture) are inscribed in a variety of hunger. Sa-
hitya creates its own hunger, the desire to feed on the “other” and be fed 
upon. It is formed out of a hunger to explicate ways of  human experience 
and engagements with emotions. It is anchored in a hunger that is its eros, 
its creative aesthesis, its power of sustenance and motivation. The inherent 
hunger of sahitya calls for at once imaginative ventures of crossdiscipli-
narity and the understanding of  human values born out of philosophic 
designs, both conceptual and experiential. Sahitya has the ability to oper-
ate beyond the point of a direct act of perception. This is what lends free-
dom to individual interpretive journeys, furthering intelligible aesthetic 
experiences. We encounter new interpretive be hav iors with potentially 
realizable values springing out of a certain premise of inheritance, a liter-
ary heritage, ideas nourished by a certain intellectual climate, cultural and 
symbolic accumulation, and also some unfulfillments that keep sahitya 
alive against the reificatory modes of subjugation. Hunger satiated is hun-
ger generated. Hunger attended is hunger made pos si ble. Hunger is expe-
rience realized; hunger is responsibility awaiting fulfillment. The ethics of 
sahitya argue for vari ous incarnations of hunger, both at the level of the 
aesthetic and the postaesthetic.
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THE ETHICS OF READING SAHITYA
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Emotion, Hunger, and (In)fusion
The success of interpretation is most often a lie. The text, in its reticulated 
existence, brings the disenfranchised  others to bear on its signification. 
For me this “aesthetic of hunger” in sahitya is about forming, foreground-
ing, and fictionalizing the “other.” This other is born out of an urge and 
need to feel for a variety of discourses and thoughts across cultures and 
traditions. Hunger is a “mark,” the “referentiality,” and the otherity that 
sahitya is possessed by and embedded in. The literary critic as a disci-
plinary scofflaw, a Barthean “joiner,” appreciates the ineliminable hun-
ger in sahitya to evolve greater modes of meaning and deeper enclaves of 
sense, and this hunger is integral to sahitya’s survival.
The (in)fusion approach re spects both the nontranscendent and the 
transcendent aspects of what we understand as sahitya, and literarity 
builds on the intentional acts that, without being merely projective and 
subjective, can also be figured out within certain networks of meaning and 
an abiding consciousness of limits and restrictions. In fact, the invention 
that Derrida looks into in relation to his understanding of lit er a ture is 
somewhere close to what the (in)fusion approach commits to perform— a 
certain restiveness with essence, a certain restless agony with dogmatism. 
But in its transdiscursivity and transcultural propensities the (in)fusion 
approach raises the notion of accountability and responsibility to create 
and invent hunger in lit er a ture. This is a responsibility  toward the other 
that is, as Derek Attridge argues, “also a responsibility  towards the  future 
since it involves the strug gle to create within which the other can appear 
beyond any of our programs and predictions, can come to transform what 
we know or think we know.”1 Looking at a text (in)fusionally does not 
mean that meaning can multiply endlessly with the promotion of radi-
cal linguistic skepticism and textual permissiveness. (In)fusion approach 
looks at the “real ity” of the text and “thinks out” the ways of thought, the 
intricacies of the concepts, the possibilities of theory to explore this 
“real ity” or the “tissues of textualities.” It is the real ity of the theory- 
paradigm interface, the viability of conceptual trafficking and the inter-
connectivity among traditions of interpretation or critical thought that 
concern an (in)fusionist. This spells out a “discretion” which springs from 
our deep and meticulous understanding of critical paradigms, concepts, 
or theoretical orientation; the understanding teaches us or validates our 
interpretative orientation to stretch and extend the “infusionist space” 
and sanction an awareness of the limit. (In)fusion approach in its acts of 
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“homecoming festival”2 cannot oversight a certain submission to tell a 
truth, an obedience before a law and an ac cep tance without flagrant con-
tempt of a court of certain receptive modes of acknowledged competences 
and comprehension. Sahitya then is a “strange coupling, the coming to-
gether of two  orders, one chaotic, the other ordered, one folding and the 
other unfolding, one contradiction and the other dilation.”3 It is a way of 
forming a “composed chaos.”4
The complex dynamics between hunger and the other throw us into 
the fury and force of literary cannibalism. The Brazilian modernist poet 
Oswald de Andrade’s “Manifesto da poesia pau- brasil” (1924) (Manifesto 
of Brazilwood poetry) and Manifesto Anthropofago (1928) talk about a deep 
tension that “challenges the dualities civilization/barbarism, modern/
primitive, and original/derivative, which had informed the construction 
of Brazilian culture since the days of the colony.” The import of modernist 
aesthetic proj ects and national and nativist identities are held in a “playful, 
polemical theory of cultural cannibalism,” where the cannibal meta phor 
develops the idea of devouring— the consuming of the other—in that 
one’s lit er a ture adapts the strength of the other and incorporates them 
into the native self.5 The ethics of anthropophagy bring into play partici-
patory consciousness: “I am only concerned with what is not mine. Law 
of Man. Law of the cannibal.”6 An implicit refigurative spirit constructed 
as a challenge to authority and authenticity is revealed in expressions like 
“the world’s single law. Disguised expression of all individualism, of all 
collectivisms. Of all religions. Of all peace treaties.”7 Kenneth Jackson ob-
serves that “from Freud, Oswald absorbed the transformation of tabu into 
totem and blended the concept with Nietz sche’s meta phor (in A Genealogy 
of Morals) of man as an animal that assimilates interior and exterior con-
flicts. From Keyserling the idea of technological savagery would be mixed 
with Spengler’s conclusion about the victory of the machine and lead Os-
wald to the theory of a ‘revolucao caraiba’ [super natu ral and indigenous 
revolution]. This Brazilian revolutionary synthesis would replace indige-
nous originality and pau- brasil [Brazilwood] simplicity with the cannibal-
istic instinct of rebellion.”8 So anthropophagus reason makes allowance 
for the continual mastication of the other to produce what I may argue is 
the regurgitated aesthetics of reading, which is about setting new trans-
poetical  orders, politics of relationality, and planetization. Pointing to the 
new literary combinatorics, Rachel Galvin notes that “the poetics of canni-
balism have pointed politico- aesthetic implications: ingesting and devour-
ing describe the ludic recombination of preexisting cultural ele ments—or 
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what might be called, more neutrally, innovation through engagement 
with tradition.”9 Anthropophagia disembeds what stays latent in the phi-
losophy of revisionism and the across. The literary capital built out of such 
transcreative hunger has its own power and politics of insertion, inter-
ference, and assimilation. Hunger inspires recycling, reimagining, and re-
combinatory energy.
It is worthwhile to see how this cannibalistic hunger, in its ways of 
coupling— folding and unfolding, hiding and revealing— speaks through a 
poem as well known as Matthew Arnold’s “The Scholar- Gipsy” (1853). 
V.  S. Seturaman points out that Arnold’s mind was preoccupied with 
thoughts from the Bhagavad Gita (the princi ples of dwandwas [dialectic, 
contrariety] and also a state of consciousness which transcends all dual-
ism).10 Commenting on Arnold’s interests in oriental wisdom, Seturaman 
observes that for Arnold
the secret of life was not joy but peace. Peace, however, is not sad pa-
tience but something that passes beyond the Dwandwas. . . .  As for 
his attitude to Oriental wisdom it must be clear to  every reader of his 
Note- Books that it was one of res pect and devotion. The entries in the 
Note- Books mark, in the words of the editors, “Arnold’s consecration to 
a life larger than that of the poet and essayist. What ever one thinks of 
his studies in religious subjects, few men have tried harder to attend to 
the  great language of faith and to make it the word of their daily lives.”11
And  there are as many as half a dozen entries from Oriental scriptures 
like Manava dharma shastra, the Bhagavad Gita, and Buddhist works. The 
orientalist “tremors” and tendrils are the poem’s inherent hunger. Hunger 
hides its own hunger. It is a locked away hunger that has always fascinated 
and fostered crisis. It has made the other feel the necessity of its emer-
gence, the necessity that encourages the strength to break through the 
lock, the secret of inheritance. The “hiding” is, thus, its own incitement 
and enticement, too. Working beyond ascriptive modes of interpretative 
be hav ior, this poem throws itself in imaginative sympathy into the lives 
and desires of other disciplinary and discursive formations. Hunger thus 
invokes traveling theory— its travails and truths—as it moves across cul-
tures and experiential domains inviting channelization and reproduction 
(all my chapters are a potential mix of hunger and the traveling difer-
ential). This is theory as it might exist or configure itself to exist within 
spatialities determined by the par tic u lar efectivities and intensities of 
dif er ent traditions and cultures.  There is a mourning over the “loss” of 
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traditional ideas into a “hunger of a new becoming,” and it is what makes 
the experience of reading sahitya provocative. The hunger of lit er a ture is 
born, thus, amid the duality of a loss and an excess. This can be what Derrida 
would call “demi- deuil,” half- mourning, which installs a kind of interrup-
tion within the motivation that literary analy sis has  toward a teleologi-
cal fulfillment. Half- mourning is about the incompleteness and insatiety 
of hunger that calls for strife between the imperiousness of ontological 
questions, established protocols of signification, and what Derrida would 
ascribe as “commentary.” Alors, qui êtes- vous?
What does the hunger do to the poem? Whom does the poem become? 
Seturaman points out that Arnold “deliberately calls his poem The Scholar 
Gipsy— a scholar who has chosen to become a gipsy. He stands surely for 
a new kind of awareness, a new poise, for such values as concentration, 
detachment, a unified functioning of the faculties.”12 Arnold’s belief in 
the “integrated vision” incarnates the gipsy- scholar with a sattvic nature 
which, thus, empowers him to understand the unity of the world better. 
He has attached a new meaning to his “wandering.”  There is no happi-
ness for the man who does not travel, says the Aitareya brahmana. This is 
in meaningful contrast to the mad rush of the common Victorians. The 
Scholar- Gipsy, in a Kierkegaardian undertone, discovers the meaning of 
walk and with it the possibility of the “spark” falling from heaven. He en-
sures walking himself into a state of well- being and walking away from 
 every illness. This walk and a certain elusiveness attached to it prepare him 
for the moment when the spark (“And waiting for the spark from heaven 
to fall”) from heaven would fall. In a trans- now dynamic, the spark can 
come to mean the infinite consciousness that is omnipresent, pure and 
tranquil, an experience  after which one stops feeling the “lapse of hours” 
(“The Scholar- Gipsy”). It is a light without fire, a spirit without body that 
illuminates our inner being. It is the moment of joy that one experiences 
by abandoning the transient (the concealed ananda, joy, in the Vedic sense 
of the term). It is a vision that comes through “inner Emigration” and 
from this inwardness one gets the glimpse of some abiding real ity. So the 
spark can fall as revelation of truth that might teach the Victorians the pre-
cepts of dharma, help them to reach the heart of the  matter, establish the 
supreme necessity of invocation, grow an awareness of the inner being, 
and emphasize the means of purification of the soul. It can also mean the 
flame of a single lamp about which the Buddha pontificates in Sutra of Forty 
Two Sections. I am also tempted to look at this moment as the hour of the 
“spiritual revolution” that Sri Aurobindo emphasizes. The trou ble with the 
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Victorians has been the defective or ga ni za tion of the inner being. With 
the descent of the spark, the Victorians would stop being rebellious to the 
higher law and consent to be spiritualized. Arnold realizes, “More strictly, 
then, the inward judge obey!” (“The Better Part”). He admits, “The aids to 
noble life are all within” (“Worldly Place”). So the spark is the “mark of 
everlasting light” above the ebb and flow of howling senses (“East Lon-
don”), something that renders worth to one’s  labor through the night. It 
turns man “composed, refresh’d, ennobled, clear” (“A Wish”). He writes: 
“Leave then the Cross as ye have left carved gods, / But guard the fire 
within!” (“Pro gress”). This fire fights against all eforts to obliterate the 
“unregarded river of our life.” The unspeakable desire resides in the wait-
ing for the moment:
 After the knowledge of our buried life;
A thirst to spend our fire and restless force
In tracking out our true, original course (“The Buried Life”)
The spark is a way of tracking the “original course” within. It can de-
scend as perfect tranquility when one transcends both life and extinction 
and overcomes the contrary pull of the desirable and the undesirable— the 
dwandwas of the Gita that Arnold was so interested in. In Hindu religious 
philosophy, it is the moment when the mind becomes a blank sheet, when 
one gives himself and demands nothing. It is the inspiration that seeks to 
assimilate the many. The spark is a pos si ble resolution to the dwandwas, an 
exit from “anarchy.” I see it as a hope for a new birth among antinomies and 
existential striations— a lesson that He is in the spark and all sparks are 
in Him. It is a promise for liberation, a culture of existence when ironically 
one has been made captive by the “mighty moment.” The spark can also be 
a divine mandate, a promise to preserve his devotees, an hour to manifest 
His majesty and a vocation to establish  every assembly which stood for 
Him with “one aim, one business, one desire” (“The Scholar- Gipsy”). It is 
the hour when our faculties work together in harmony, choosing culture 
over anarchy. The spark can also mean the moment of peace (seen in keep-
ing with Arnold’s philosophy of integralism) that comes from spiritual 
rehabilitation and a feeling of oneness with nature, leaving aside a self- 
gratifying, mechanized existence. Distanced from the spark, the Victori-
ans, as “ignorant armies” clashing by night (the tamasic state, according to 
the Hindu view of life), keep playing in the three cities of waking, dream-
ing, and deep sleep. They are far away from the state of “unclouded joy” 
and betray a misconception about the true nature of a spiritual culture.
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Miller’s observations on Arnold’s views on idea and fact in the next 
chapter goad me to see the politics and aesthetics of hunger even further. 
Not that I have any disagreement with the kind of ethical position that 
Miller demonstrates; this chapter, as a contrast to his position, is inten-
tioned to explore the other dimensions in which I think sahitya can exist 
to ethicalize. Miller’s response to my discussion on “The Scholar- Gipsy” 
invites a dialogic intervention that intends to work out Arnold’s ideas 
on tradition and comparison. For a man to whom impersonality, disin-
terestedness, seriousness, and renouncement  were significant ideas that 
went into formulating his ethics of reading and living, the impertinence 
of individuality and the “saturnalia of personal passions” could never be 
provinces of art and poetry.13 “ Doing as one likes” (the liberty of “ordinary 
selves”) cannot be the ground and cause for ethical action and thinking. 
Discipline of conduct is close to Arnoldian ethos. I agree with Miller, as 
with Arnold, that disinterested endeavor to know the best that has been 
thought and known in the world cannot be left in the abstract (confined to 
the “athletes of logic,” systematic philosophy, and dogmatic theologists) 
but must find a way to connect with life, become a criticism of life, gen-
erating a sense of creativity.14 But Arnold was not committed to uphold 
British civility; instead, he invested his life and thought into creating a 
culture. Unlike his German counterpart Johann Gottfried Herder (Kultur-
geschichte), for whom the self- sufficiency of a nationalist  whole dominated 
the cultural, literary discourse, Arnold thought of a perfection where 
walking alone was courting anarchy and being with  others organically and 
symbiotically spelled culture. Deep interest in comparative education— 
Arnold’s reports on the education system in France, Italy, Germany, Hol-
land, and Switzerland are works of an educational prophet— demonstrates 
his eagerness to know “how  others stand” and “to know how we ourselves 
stand.”15 Arnold writes:
In short, it is expedient for the satisfactory resolution of  these educa-
tional questions, which are at length beginning seriously to occupy us, 
both that we should attend to the experience of the Continent, and 
that we should know precisely what it is which this experience says. 
Having long held that nothing was to be learned by us from the foreign-
ers, we are at last beginning to see, that on a  matter like the institution 
of schools, for instance, much light is thrown by a comparative study of 
their institution among other civilised states and nations. To treat this 
comparative study with proper res pect, not to wrest it to the requirements 
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of our inclinations or prejudices, but to try simply and seriously to find 
what it teaches us, is perhaps the lesson which we have most need to 
inculcate upon ourselves at pres ent.16
A critical comparative negotiation between the self and the other, the 
native and the foreign, the insider and the outsider, is what forms culture. 
Rhe toric and emotional exuberance over triumphalist, racist, ethnic, and 
nationalist braggadocio clogs the mind into an unvital space, disabling all 
spiritual progression. Arnold points out that “everywhere  there is connex-
ion, everywhere  there is illustration: no single event, no single lit er a ture, is 
adequately comprehended except in its relation to other events, to other 
lit er a tures.”17 The ethics of thinking and  doing are recognizing the “con-
nection,” the sahit (the other name for hunger), that contributes to the 
idea of perfection and “modernity,” the intellectual maturity and orien-
tation to observe facts with a critical spirit, not prejudice or caprice. Tra-
dition is the word that holds the desired tenancy. Shirley Letwin explains 
that Arnold’s thinking in terms of tradition can be illustrated through the 
example of Palladian architecture. Palladian buildings bear traces of clas-
sical tradition but Palladio maintained a certain sense of order, a sense 
of the parts connecting to the formation of the  whole. Palladio learned a 
“classical theory of proportion through his studies in the circle around the 
humanist, Trissino.” But he made sure to add his own contribution, sup-
plemented through his reading of Alviso Cornaro, the Bolognese theorist, 
Sebastiano Serlio, Italian designers like Brunelleschi and Michelangelo, 
and  others. Letwin argues that “all this Palladio absorbed and reformulated 
so that out of a repertoire drawn from many diverse sources, he produced 
buildings that look as if they have grown out of the ground on which they 
stand. Though  there is good reason for describing Palladio as classical, 
he was not classical in the same way as Bramante, Sangallo, Sansovino, 
or Raphael. He has created a style of his own, the Palladian building.”18 
This accent on comparison and synthesis leaves us to confront hunger in 
the understanding of art: the hunger that does not stay immured in the 
nationalist bunkum but develops its traveling potential across systems, 
cultures, and continents. Hunger is not in being “ ought” but is in the 
“is”; being British is becoming British with the German, Italians, and the 
French.  There is a hunger for the idea of  wholeness but formed not with 
parts that are monochromatic and dogmatically affiliated to an inflex-
ible core. Parts are distinct; they have their own hunger that combines 
cosmopo liti cally and transpoetically to produce an idea. This idea is the 
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“being with”— discovering oneself, not just “how to live” but also what 
makes living. Tradition is a failure if deemed rigid and transcendental; tra-
dition is life and “sweetness” when it outlives any imposed dogmatism to 
start believing in incorporation, a connective momentum across borders. 
Hunger is the propriety of literary conduct that becomes both the author-
ity and the order, transgression and culture.
Lit er a ture’s indigence is in ignoring the other. Hunger is lit er a ture’s 
insecurity. It encounters the distress and anxiety of being trapped in the 
holy (the interpretation of the word spark moves beyond the economy of 
the sacrosanct meanability of the poem per se), the constrictions of un-
derstanding life and its relation to art within certain restrictive paradigms 
that prevent sublimation and outreaching. Lit er a ture “pres ents” and, 
at the same time, embellishes the “not- yet- pres ent.” Funded meanings 
drawn from established codes and motivations are not discounted; rather, 
the “secondary imaginary” is created with a renewed purposiveness. Hun-
ger, then, is aesthetic reordering, a rapport with disciplines and indispens-
abilities of the medium without being oblivious to the continual striving 
to aesthetic re- creation. It is scarcely absolutist (as the interpretation of 
the poem shows) and makes for a critical intelligence that enhances its so-
ciocultural participation and outdoes the intellectual egoism and immure-
ment. Imaginative and intentional sympathies with the author and his 
art cannot nudge out values that provide the aesthetic distance required 
for the interventionist other to function. The exegesis on the spark is a 
demonstration in that direction. This is the catholicity that hunger in lit er-
a ture is capable of foregrounding, combining fresh patterns of belief, per-
vasive  human attitudes, and also appraisals of a heritage that  every work 
 under investigation cannot avoid betraying.
Franz Kafka’s “A Hunger Artist” is an example of lit er a ture’s abilities 
for aesthetic refigurations. Brenda Machosky notes: “Ontologically, lit er-
a ture is pres ent in the very moment of its experience, in reading it. The 
hunger artist is a figure for the writer, for lit er a ture itself, and for the reader, 
 because hungering, even more than fasting, manifests presence. Hungering 
depends on each moment. It does not  matter if you hungered yesterday, or 
if you  will hunger tomorrow. Hungering, unlike fasting, is not a  matter of 
 will or desire. In German,  there are two verbs for fasting: fasten and hun-
gern. Kafka consistently chooses hungern.”19 Machosky adds that lit er a-
ture “remains in crisis  because it continually poses itself as a question” 
and to “respond to the question of lit er a ture can be terrifying enough to 
keep us from ever proceeding beyond the practicalities of the institution 
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of lit er a ture. When we sustain ourselves with the question, we hunger. 
Lit er a ture demands hunger, and we cannot fast in the presence of lit er a-
ture any more than we can feast on it.”20 Miller, in chapter 2, through his 
reading of Blanchot and Iser, reaches at a hunger, too. This is the hunger 
that produces the critical perspectives on the real, the hunger that makes 
lit er a ture transpose the real into the fictive, and the hunger that makes 
lit er a ture generate the plea sure of  going beyond itself. The imaginary that 
Miller talks about is the hunger both for the materialization of the imag-
inary and the approach to the unapproachable imaginary which inheres 
in ambiguity and undecidability. The Iserian imaginary is also a kind of 
hunger, with its embeddings in  human self- cultivation and plasticity. 
Hunger is also implicated in Blanchot’s “unknown, obscure, foreign, dan-
gerous point from which the récit begins.” Sahitya’s hungry sacredness is 
the empty space waiting to be rented and stays perennially advertised for 
repeated occupancy.
Sahitya, in its openness to critical understanding, releases a certain 
amount of energy, an excess that comes from a loss of meaning. This un-
utilized energy (as evidenced through the potency that the spark sparked 
of) is what makes sahitya’s hunger continue, defying interpretive, pro-
ductionist strategies of understanding. The hunger of sahitya, then, is 
about a complementarity struck between strategies to normalize meaning 
and becoming- meaning. However, hermeneutic caution calls for a careful 
understanding of the general economy of hunger. The understanding of 
the spark shows that hunger reads into the causality of events and emotions, 
works out a coordination between thoughts and pro cesses, seeks out an 
understanding of a  wholeness, coherence, logic, and yet looks for a sus-
pension of meaning, destabilization, and redefinition. Sahitya, in its gen-
eral economy, provokes the aesthetics of  labor, combining investment 
with energy, capital with product, force with value, and invention with 
revelation.
What crisis can this hunger create? Is it about the aesthetic, cognitive, 
ethical, and the intentional? Is this at once about being- lit er a ture and 
becoming- lit er a ture? The hunger is both science and art having an ethics 
peculiar to its situatedness within certain cultural, po liti cal, and histor-
ical persuasions and premises. The strict domains of the inside and the 
outside of textual desire are difficult to pin down. The space of hunger is 
scarcely neutral. In fact, our inabilities and, hence, frustrations to under-
stand the hunger on several occasions result in fostering a greater set of 
competences. Is this journey  toward unraveling the known and unknown 
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a kind of religious pursuit akin to man’s fervency to decipher the myster-
ies in the face of the unknowable and the uncontrollable? Certain hungers 
mollify further curiosities by getting identified and satiated. But a few of 
them are tantamount to a tryst with wilderness, and it is in such acts of 
inconclusive and indeterminable eventualities that surprise and rapture 
reside.
Hunger not generated is sufering; hunger not met is sufering, too. 
Does sahitya’s hunger then grow out of a law of love, a love of diference, 
love of being refuted and polemicized, love of the unreadable, love of 
being one among many, love of resisting fake, love of inheritance and tra-
dition? Sahitya is a personal act, an answerable act, and yet inscribed in 
certain notions of irresponsibility. Hunger is desire and love— a catholic 
agape and eros— which turns into a kind of attention and acknowledges 
the “composite manifoldness” of an event or a  thing. This hunger does not 
stir all in equal mea sure for love, like suspicion, varies. (In)fusion- trans- 
now makes suspicion across borders act as love for neighbors. This is a 
risky task to perform where hunger cannot be omnivorous in nature but 
has to be discriminatory, in that the neighbor can shun the love, refuse 
it, and leave the hunger thwarted. The hermeneutics of hunger cannot be 
righ teousness without trial; it is seldom a ceaseless empowerment to pro-
ceed and proj ect— something I would term as “bigotry of écriture.” The 
negotiation born out of hunger cannot singularly be an endowment in 
self- knowledge but it has a  future in a charitable mutuality that becomes 
life- giving to both the self and the other. The hunger proceeding from a 
point for the other mutates into a hunger of the other for the point from 
which it all began. The happiness in meaning- expansion is salvific. The 
hunger in Arnold’s poem is an unselfing attention to the kenosis of liter-
ary merit: the phenomenon where the sacralization of divine attributes 
are relinquished by Christ to embrace the experience of  human sufering 
forms a close analogy to the desacralization of literary meaning in “The 
Scholar- Gipsy,” which makes the poem espouse a sufering in hermeneu-
tic, crosscultural hunger.
Hunger is neither banality nor  free love. This is the excitement of 
sinning on an eroticism where emotions are most often afection, virtuos-
ity, exultation, exchange, and protests. And in a Nietz schean erotic trans-
figuration, this interpretive eros erupts less out of the attractive and the 
desirable and more from the unlovable and the unreadable (a deeper under-
standing of the case study on the spark demonstrates this phenomenon). 
This hunger is both conditional and unconditional and subjected at times 
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to an accountability that requires high proficiency of paradigm and epis-
temic competence. Paradigms cause each other to appraise sahitya’s hun-
ger, but that does not always typically follow a forwardish accretional or 
incremental movement in meaning, which we understand as an extension 
of what existed for us to proceed from. This “causing” upon each other 
is both backward and forward, where the circumambient and the flitting 
lock horns amid the interstices of heritage and invention. I would like to 
see this import of the other through the emotion of sacrifice (from the 
Latin sacrificium, root of facere, “to do, perform,” primarily used in the 
sense of “something given up for the sake of another”). Sacrifice would 
mean giving up on something for the benefit of the other. But  here the 
otherness invested in the trans- now hunger is meant to be a sacrifice 
whose benefit extends to both the parties in play. It is a hunger ( like the 
meaning of spark that feeds on Hindu, Buddhist philosophy and Arnold’s 
consciousness of the Victorian spiritual crisis) that is constructed around a 
sacrifice ranging across ideas, ideology, experiment, perceptions to produce 
a cosmopolitan experience of intermeshing discourses. This can be argued 
as being ambitious for each other, being organismic when required, and be-
coming the health that grows, as Nietz sche would like to see: continually 
growing  because acquirement comes from giving up again and again and 
the intent to give up to survive and thrive.21 The health and volume (in the 
Gadamerian sense of the word) of the poem have grown in a pro cess of 
giving up or sacrificing reified meaning for the hospitable accommodation 
of the other, consequently sponsoring role- perplexities between guests 
(the Hindu and Buddhist intonations) and the hosts (Arnold’s spiritual 
and cultural figurations). Phenomenologically, this hunger is intersubjec-
tive in the sense that the parent and target lit er a ture and theory come into 
a communion where the hunger of one is increased by being hungry for the 
other, in recognizing and sensing the hunger in the other for oneself. This 
is collaborative, dialectical hunger, more aggressive and combative than 
Socrates would have liked. Indeed, my (in)fusion- trans- now is epitomized 
and conceptualized in a hospitality, which, far from being a snug shelter of 
established protocols of meaning, provides hospitality to the unsheltered, 
the “stalking- talking- stranger,” that keeps literary studies alive. This is 
both conditioned and unconditioned hospitality whose specificities are 
difficult to determine and that often refuse to work  under fettered condi-
tions of signification. It lends dignity to the rights of the stranger, the 
foreigner: the host text’s hunger is also a responsibility that needs critical 
attendance and commentary.
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Taking a cue from Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other (1992), I would 
like to argue that the foreigner, which (in)fusionism brings into the court 
of interpretation of a text, is vulnerable to both exclusion and rejection. 
The trans- now inputs that invest the reading of the poem are apparently 
the “absolute other,” which is always  under the risk of disenfranchisement 
 under the literary, cultural, and contextual rights that the text  under 
discussion promotes and tries to establish. The hospitality of the hunger 
legitimizes the right to speak and also a freedom to receive, accept, and 
sufer. The interpretation that builds on the spark is a kind of pervertibil-
ity, a dignity of meaning whose legitimacy rests more on unconditional 
laws of hospitality. This dignity is not sovereignty, not a Kantian universal, 
but what (in)fusionism, in a Derridean way, can often do is demi- dignité 
(the possibility of validating a hunger). Hunger in such cases of unprogram-
mability becomes an event. In its iterability the thoughts on the spark 
become an event.
Hunger is the potency that sahitya possesses where affirmation is both 
conservation and the expenditure of energy. But the (in)fusion approach, 
despite the kind of reflexivity that it whips up, admits the pos si ble con-
frontation with a “sacredness” of meaning (it is not necessary that all 
acts of interpretation become sacrifice or subversive). So the (in)fusion 
approach, despite being aware of its limits (head- brushing with sanctioned 
significance of the sacred), justifies a “ will”— a  will to empower, otherize— 
and an erotic dynamics (corresponding with Derrida’s “re- mark”) for 
a general economy of discharge and energetic dissipation. The critical 
exposition centering on the spark lives on a hunger that functions trans- 
poetically but cannot sever its inherent connection with the context that 
gave birth to it (the Victorian malaise that Arnold was deeply troubled by). 
It is an example of interpretive hunger that expends and yet saves what it 
emerges from. The conditional commitment to Arnold’s originary inten-
tions are not discounted; rather, the (in)fusionized progression calls for 
an articulated desire to move beyond Arnold’s predictable and established 
conventions of thinking and belief into the moment of a pregnant neigh-
borhood of the other. This is the name- calling of the other, the other’s 
ability to write the event.
Hunger, Ethics, and  Things
Sahitya, in its creation and in the construction of the life- worlds, is never 
closed of from the “ things” that constitute it. On one hand, we have  things 
represented as literary, in the form of a plant, a  table, a piece of wood, a 
220 •  CHaPter 9
hammer, a stone, and many other  things; on the other,  there is the un-
represented  matter in the form of  things that preexist sahitya but exist, 
as I  shall argue, in the making of sahitya. For instance, while writing this 
chapter I encountered  things like the  table and the chair that I sat and 
wrote on, the win dow, the curtains, the floor, the décor, the lights, the 
wood, the dust, the breeze that blew across my study and so on. The ethics of 
creativity address both states of  things, the classical and the quantum, one 
that is vis i ble in its repre sen ta tion (the intended, conscious encounters), 
and the other that is invisible and imperceptible (unintended)  because 
they go unrepresented in the final form of a text. Sahitya would know its 
 matter (substance), the  things ( here meant as objects, dravya) that help 
make it  matter (the subject, visaya), but most often fails to be distinctly 
conscious about the materiality (how  matter  matters both in the sense of 
how it is made to  matter— the “pressure of prejudice,” as Edmund Hus-
serl points out, and how  matter  matters on its own) that contributes to 
its “coming into being.”22 I am not arguing for a state of postrepre sen ta-
tionalism, rather, a state of invisible repre sen ta tion, a material ontology 
of creation whose uncanny worth lies in a disturbing dialectic where not 
being represented is not about undermining its significant contribution 
to the pro cesses of literary production or repre sen ta tion. Sahitya is not 
just a construction of the mind created out of the writer’s imagination, 
emotions of won der, curiosity, and private considerations and perspectives. 
 There are ways sahitya is “thingized” in its formation and finality. Sahitya 
is obtained out of a complexity that is built on how a writer reacts to the 
 things around him (the mentalization of  matter as revealed through the 
writer’s use of the narrative, images, meta phor, and rest) and how  things 
in their in de pen dence and necessity serve to form the writing. This, I 
argue, is an entanglement where the mind and the body come into a com-
plex play: the writer thinks through the faculties of his mind and is also 
afected by the  things he uses or accesses to make his thinking find shape 
and consequence, an ethics of copresence meshed in invisibility.
Sahitya thus begins in a chaos of  things, chaotic in its undetermined 
and underdetermined patterns of interaction in which the computer, its 
battery, its memory, the power connection, the strokes on the keyboard, 
the mouse, the light on the screen, the display of the text on it, do not 
additively contribute to the writing material but combine and recombine 
 every moment in the growth of the  matter as a manuscript. The materi-
ality of the  matter is not intrinsically chaotic and the apparent order, as 
represented in the coherence of sahitya itself, does not arise magically. 
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Rather,  there is a pattern in the intra- actions that is not “relata” but an 
intricate combination that we strug gle to make much sense of, where our 
accountability fails and intuitive knowledge takes over. It is  here that the 
“bottom of  things” surface: when  things are seen beyond their anthro-
pocentric utility and understanding.23  There is a butterfly efect (in the 
words of chaotologists) in sahitya— order, but not preordained, at the edge 
of chaos, not what Ian Stewart has described as “cake- mix periodicity/ape-
riodicity.”24 The chaos that sahitya has to negotiate is not about knowing 
a preconceived order, but knowing a law that apparent lawlessness con-
ceals. Something happens on a minor scale (the flapping of the wings of 
the butterfly) to efect a dramatic change or event  later (for instance, a 
storm of the coast of India). In the course of the construction of a text, 
 there are chances that one of my paragraphs can hurry into emergence 
 under the pressure of a failing battery found reeling  under a sudden power 
cut. It is highly likely that this paragraph that I hastily script  will have 
forgotten its point of origin when the text becomes fi nally ready.  There 
are no disputes as to the contribution of the mind  toward the construc-
tion of this paragraph, which we might eventually judge as extraordinary. 
But this extraordinariness, I would like to argue, results from an entan-
gled efect of a dwindling battery and the sudden shift, prob ably intensi-
fication, in the levels of my concentration  because I did not want to lose 
out on my thoughts  under the specter of the computer’s  dying on me any 
moment.  These  things undoubtedly contribute to the making of sahitya 
(dravya- visaya, coconstitutive enactments). The chair I sit on to write is 
the welcome support I need to make my writing pro gress comfortably; it, 
like the  table or the other objects associated with my writing, adds to the 
security and con ve nience of my literary business, which is tagged irrevo-
cably to constructions within finitude. That the object we designate as a 
chair afects my thoughts through its principled contribution in the form 
of comfort and con ve nience cannot be denied  because writing without a 
chair like object or an object like a chair is not an easy deal— sitting on 
the floor or on the bare earth may not always be gleeful alternatives. The 
object as chair is coextensive with the pro cesses of my writing: dravya 
in imperceptible ligatures with visaya, a kind of pro cessual relating, an 
unavoidable mangle.
Although I call  these  thing- forces and  thing- efects the order on the 
edge of chaos, they cannot become fixed determinants in the corpuscular 
growth of the text.  Things working in de pen dently and in their par tic u lar 
order can influence their  human other in a variety of ways. Sahitya, as 
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a kind of order, is constructed through a force field of  things that does 
not have any vis i ble and formal contribution to make (within the ambit 
of  human comprehension, the sinking battery or the power cut or the 
display on the screen  will sufer from an indiference, not considered as 
ever having a role to essay in the formation and existence of sahitya). The 
subjectivity of objects is lost out to the autonomy of  things resulting in, to 
appropriate John Casti, nothing less than a “surprise.”25 Sahitya is not mag-
icalized into being but it has its own encounters of surprise. As a product 
of entangled fields— within princi ples of quantum understanding  there is 
a demon in the atom— sahitya is thingized. Meta phor ically, the bibliogra-
phy does not produce a book; it is just a part of the creation (the mind that 
reads and pro cesses) and the other part owes to the book’s being produced 
by a variety of  things. So the book is both a literary  thing and a  thing.
I would like to identify in sahitya a dif er ent consciousness that tries 
to find the link between form (configurations that develop through in-
teractions with  matter) and empiricism (direct contact with  things). The 
consciousness that develops the form or the content or the aesthetic of 
sahitya changes our awareness of the physicality of sahitya’s formation. 
This calls for a unique participation in the nature and configuration of 
real ity and  matter. To think of sahitya as emerging separately from mind 
and  matter is to miss the character of entanglement I am arguing about. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson is right to note that “ every property of  matter is 
a school for the understanding— its solidity or re sis tance, its inertia, its 
extension, its figure, its divisibility. The understanding adds, divides, com-
bines, mea sures, and finds nutrient and room for activity in this worthy 
scene. Meantime, Reason transfers all  these lessons into its own world of 
thought, by perceiving the analogy that marries  Matter to Mind.”26 The 
ethics of sahitya develop in the convergences that diferential forces of the 
mind and  matter efectuate, a kind of “holography” or “sympoesie.”
Ethics of sahitya are not always manifest in the represented,  because 
sahitya has always had her trou ble with the external world, the trou-
ble being in its agential dynamicity to annihilate or consume the world 
through repre sen ta tion and normativism and, again, its subsequent, nig-
gling failure to remain content with the represented congeries of knowl-
edge. With the slant on Descartes, we can argue that although our claim to 
a privileged access to ideas is confident, our communication with material 
objects is constricted and inscribed in a “deficit making” (we understand 
 things in a real ity we are generally confident about), resulting in asymmet-
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ric understanding that is quin tes sen tial to sahitya. The ethics of sahitya 
inhere in a materiality whose possibilities or conditions of emergence are 
not necessarily prefigured in the politics and poetics of linguistic repre-
sen ta tions. The problematic of critical understanding, then, is hubbed in 
an entangled creativity whose points of origin are difficult to locate and 
whose represented product— genetic and constellative through  factors that 
are  human, nonhuman, materialist and nonmaterialist—is challenging 
and intriguing in its pretence to an integrated  wholesomeness of meaning.
 There is a fullness of materiality whose presence and imperceptible 
presence (not a real absence) contribute to the performativity of sahitya. 
Barad observes:
It is difficult to imagine how psychic and sociohistorical forces alone 
could account for the production of  matter. Surely it is the case— even 
when the focus is restricted to the materiality of “ human” bodies— that 
 there are “natu ral,” not merely “social,” forces that  matter. Indeed,  there 
is a host of material- discursive forces— including ones that get labeled 
“social,” “cultural,” “psychic,” “economic,” “natu ral,” “physical,” “biolog-
ical,” “geopo liti cal,” and “geological”— that may be impor tant to par tic-
u lar (entangled) pro cesses of materialization.
If we follow disciplinary habits of tracing disciplinary- defined  causes 
through to the corresponding disciplinary- defined efects, we  will miss 
all the crucial intra- actions among  these forces that fly in the face of 
any specific set of disciplinary concerns.27
Sahitya is a phenomenon that is ethicized through “agentially intra- 
acting components.”28 Its bound aries of ethics are not created through the 
influence of preexisting relations; rather, they are created through agential 
intra- actions, “relata- within- phenomena,” which result in an “interdeter-
minacy” that is not fully linguistic.29 The  table is not simply the cause that 
supports the writing pad or the computer of the author; its exteriority to 
the subject does not limit its function and agency. The  table undergoes 
agential cuts in presencing entanglements that are local in nature, which 
is about taking its causality beyond what we think a  table and the author 
are connected and mediated by. This increases the possibility of the  table 
as an object and aggravates its contribution  toward the ethics of writ-
ing and experiencing lit er a ture. An ethics of lit er a ture is produced, then, 
through the nonhuman, without the relata and with the materiality of the 
 matter. They are not, as Barad argues, “set in place” before the constitutive 
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mechanisms of sahitya begin, the  matter as phenomena. “Bound aries do 
not sit still.”30 And the intra- actions result in the cultivation of the imma-
nence through a separate understanding of time and space:
The world is a dynamic pro cess of intra- activity in the ongoing reconfig-
uring of locally determinate causal structures with determinate bound-
aries, properties, meanings, and patterns of marks on bodies. This 
ongoing flow of agency through which “part” of the world makes itself 
diferentially intelligible to another “part” of the world and through 
which local causal structures, bound aries, and properties are stabilized 
and destabilized does not take place in space and time but in the mak-
ing of spacetime itself. The world is an ongoing open pro cess of matter-
ing through which “mattering” itself acquires meaning and form in the 
realization of dif er ent agential possibilities.31
The ethics, then, are in feeling the materiality of experiencing sahitya: 
reading lit er a ture through the materiality of  matter and the workings of 
the body. Reading lit er a ture  matters in how the body of the reader reads 
it— a book in hard and paperback, the cover design and its afects, the font 
size, read in iPad or pdf (the electronic aesthetics of reading), the position 
and state in which the reading was conducted (reclining on an armchair or 
standing with the book kept on a high  table or sitting on a chair with the 
book on the  table or sitting on a quiet park bench). It is significant for us 
to realize how a pathographical treatise or pathography read by a patient 
recuperating through her illness in the hospital bed and read again when 
she is home in her armchair, cheerful in body in its post-illness state, de-
liver difering levels of afect. Such soma- humanist ways of reading are 
loyal to intra-active formations, reject relata but are sensitive to sahitya’s 
reception and experience dwelling both in the materiality and biologics 
of the body and what supports the body through a chair, a bed, a writing 
 table, the lamp, the décor and state of the room, the win dows and carpet 
and other equipmental impingement.
So sahitya is produced through entanglements in the nonhuman: 
Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” owes its creation as much to his creative 
imagination as to the Hellenic frieze that he saw. Tagore’s poems are pro-
duced through a contribution of the  table he worked on, the win dows that 
allowed gusts of summer breeze to blow across the room, the other equip-
ments that his room had, the door that he ensured was locked to seal him 
of from  human contact when he was writing, and the arrangement or 
décor of the room that Tagore is known to have changed very often to 
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stave of boredom. A poem on a tropical, subcontinental summer, written 
in the intense heat and dust of Santiniketan during his time, with no fa-
cil i ty for electricity, cannot be similar semantically, imagistically, and af-
fectively to another poem on summer unleashed, for instance, within the 
confines of a snug room powered by an air conditioner or soothed by the 
blessing of ceiling fans. This is what I argue is the intrusion of the non-
human on the  human body to produce art (the nonhumanization of the 
 human)— a fact that, most often, theories of aesthetic production ignore. 
Tourists visit Tagore’s  house at Santiniketan to see where the poet might 
have written his poems and stories but invariably miss how the materiality 
of his writing- space contributed to the production of art.  There is a dis-
juncture in the history of the setting and the aesthetics of production (the 
 things around and with which the book got written and the book as a 
work of art): the ethics of sahitya are about making a critical call on this 
disjuncture, trying to see how the material history of writing contributes 
to the aesthetic history of literary production.
The famous Indian scientist Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937) is 
quoted to have said that when we eat vegetables we also eat the sun. This 
comment is relevant to what I am trying to argue. We cannot eat the sun 
and can enjoy eating the vegetables only; but in a deep entanglement the 
sun as the nondiscursive and the nonrepre sen ta tional other is inscribed 
in the discursive and the real (vegetables). This is a complicated version 
of the material that is not merely the vegetable but the sun- installed and 
sun- inscribed materiality of eating. Much in the same way, lit er a ture can-
not be a mere vegetable but has a sun to it, in the form of the nonhuman 
and the material that contributes to its making. When we eat, rather anni-
hilate, consume, and experience lit er a ture, we just  don’t stay confined to 
the aesthetic, the social, the cultural, and the imaginary; we also consume 
the nonhuman that went into its making. Intra- action in sahitya is not 
just in seeing the background or the historical, aesthetic conditions of pro-
ductions but in trying to experience the difractive materiality, a vibrant 
presence in absence beyond the humanist center of literary production. 
Unfortunately, sahitya veils a continent while ofering it to be experienced, 
 because sahitya does not know how its ac know ledg ment of  things in their 
nonanthropomorphized real ity can be manifested or represented. This is 
the disjuncture (sahitya’s mattering as against  matter needs rethinking) 
that our ethics of reading sahitya has to identify. The ethics of sahitya are 
about this awareness, this continent of  things that does not illuminate any 
area of our consciousness beyond disciplinary and normative categories of 
226 •  CHaPter 9
understanding. To miss understanding this disjuncture is to miss reading 
the surplus that  things imperceptively generate in their production of sa-
hitya. The art historian and artist James Elkins, in his book What Painting 
Is, writes:
But I know how strong the attraction of paint can be, and how wrong 
 people are who assume paint ers merely put up with paint as a way to 
make pictures. I was a painter before I trained to be an art historian, and 
I know from experience how utterly hypnotic the act of painting can be, 
and how completely it can overwhelm the mind with its smells and col-
ors and by the rhythmic motions of the brush. Having felt that, I knew 
something was wrong with the delicate dry erudition of art history, but 
for several years I  wasn’t sure how to fit words to  those memories.32
In the entangled relationship of paint and painting the paint loses its 
thingness to structures of understanding, the planes of transcendence, 
the foundations of thought that exist external to paint as a  thing and 
consider it as the means to painting. Elkins pans across 8,900 books cata-
logued in the Library of Congress on the history of art, art criticism, and 
techniques of painting to discover that less than six “address paint itself, 
and try to explain why it has such a power ful attraction before it is trained 
to mimic some object, before the painting is framed, hung, sold, exhibited 
and interpreted.”33 Losing sight of this disjuncture means we are handed a 
lost game, a missed encounter, between  matter and materialization,  thing 
and thingification.
Hunger and the Postaesthetic
The ethics of sahitya has a postaesthetic hunger: a hunger for and in the 
postaesthetic. It is like looking into the picture and getting arrested by an 
uncertainty; it is about a failure to methodize the experience of seeing; it 
is a wrestle with an indefinable, secret understanding, the nature of which 
is rarely in the loop of interpretive modes. My understanding of this se-
cret is at the level of the inefable and the asymmetrical understanding of 
literary experience: a negotiation between the emotive, reflective, and the 
intangible. This speaks of the inability to hermeneuticize hunger defini-
tively, becoming “for once, and then something.”
Once, when trying with chin against a well- curb,
I discerned, as I thought, beyond the picture,
Through the picture, a something white, uncertain,
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Something more of the depths— and then I lost it.
 Water came to rebuke the too clear  water.
One drop fell from a fern, and lo, a  ripple
Shook what ever it was lay  there at bottom,
Blurred it, blotted it out. What was that whiteness?
Truth? A pebble of quartz? For once, then, something.34
I am tempted to see such experience and discernment as something 
close to Husserl’s epochē, the suspension of existence, which leaves the ob-
ject as existing in de pen dent of the perceiver and external to the domain of 
universally presupposed interpretive  factor. This experience is about the 
transport and the delight that certain conditions of understanding lend to 
the constitution of the self. It has a strange quality beyond the presuppos-
itiveness of methodicity. An investiture that cannot decide between the 
pebble and the quartz and yet tenaciously delights in the  ripple that blurs 
and blots is once something and then becomes something  else: “I lost it.” 
This experience inaugurates without a method, a flighty, spontaneous em-
anation, expiring in a hint of a structure that is dourly loose at its ends 
and impermanent in nature. The postaesthetic of sahitya, for me, is deeply 
invested in emotion, its speaking, and its ability to draw narration out of 
the self.
What happens, for instance, when one reads the first two stanzas of 
Words worth’s “By the Sea” with no knowledge of the poet and his aesthet-
ics, staying oblivious of all the conceptual par ameters informing a tradition 
that can help one to prise the poem open methodologically? Expressions 
like “the holy time is quiet as a nun” and “the gentleness of heaven is on 
the sea: / Listen! the mighty Being is awake” can put the  whole economy 
of sahitya to test, igniting an experience that moves and defies all expla-
nation frameworked through the meta phorics of interpretive bound aries 
and conceptual structures. What ethics of sahitya am I talking about if I 
say, “I  don’t know why it feels this way?” What happens when a universe 
of discourses fail to “horizon” my literary experience?  Here the herme-
neutical and heuristically unutilized, rather, never- to- be- utilized energies 
are losses that write of a gain whose emergence is clearly out of step with 
conventional means of understanding and intellectual consumption. Lit-
erary worlds are also produced beyond what I have come to see as the (in)
fusionized domain of literary hunger: experiences relished in the  tremble, 
the unperceived undulation of the text, and the resonant volume that it 
silently mounts on us.
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If Graham Harman’s “object oriented ontology” is brought to bear on 
our understanding of the ethics of sahitya, we are faced with seeing a text 
as neither getting dissolved “upward into its readings or downward into 
its cultural ele ments.”  There is no access to a method,  whether New Criti-
cal, feminist, or poststructuralist. If all reading is a method, then such an 
approach is always a countermethod, in the sense that the experience of 
a text becomes a re sis tance to any such dissolution or annihilation within 
the bounded frames of analy sis. Harman writes:
All eforts to embed works exhaustively in their context are doomed to 
failure for some fairly obvious reasons, though one usually avoids stat-
ing them  because they are often associated with  people whose  motives 
are viewed with suspicion. One of  those obvious reasons is that to some 
extent, the social conditions  under which authors produced The Epic 
of Gilgamesh or Frankenstein are not entirely relevant to  these works 
themselves. For one  thing,  these works travel well across space and 
time— and generally the better the work, the better it travels. If liter-
ary canons have been dominated by white Eu ro pean males, then this 
may be cause for shaking up the canons and reassessing our standards 
of quality, not for dissolving all works equally into social products of 
their inherently equal eras. We are all at our best not when conditioned 
by what happens around us, but when an inner voice summons us to 
take a courageous stand, walk in a dif er ent direction, or do the most 
outstanding work of our lifetimes.35
Any courageous stand resulting in an unconditioned reading of a text 
is hunger of a dif er ent level, generated both by the text on the reader 
and the reader’s “innocent” desires on the text. Hunger is not merely 
the generative and productive index of certain social, historical, mate-
rialist, cultural, and traditional forces subservient to a certain period 
in time and space; it is also the product of forces that are never regis-
tered or recorded in our formal understanding of a text’s travel down 
the ages and times. Harman is right to note that more than connection 
it is the “nonconnections” that can be considered as influences on lit er a-
ture. Instead of proposing that since a text is demonstrative of a certain 
aspect in cultural history or po liti cal thought or social discourse, let us 
examine where and why is the connection. We must ask why  there is no 
connection between a text and another segment of history or culture.36 
Precisely what we consider as nonconnection is what Harman considers 
the premise to begin with.
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What interests me about nonconnections is the way a text withdraws 
from itself. Deconstructionists would see a text as withdrawing from the 
reader  every time he wants to conquer it with an irrefutable sovereignty 
of meaning. This results in the text’s slipping away from the reader and 
emerging in a variety of meaning- experiences. But  here the argument is 
about making the text withdraw from being a text, disclosing an experi-
ence that does not stay limited to what the text has to ofer. “Beauty is truth, 
truth beauty” is a text that withdraws from Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn” per se: a withdrawal that indicates that the ontology of the line has a 
unique indiference to the poem as a  whole, neither making the line emerge 
as a kind of mounting conceptual climax nor making the line take the poem 
climactically to a dif er ent altitude. The line’s ontological value is in re-
dundancy, a recurrence in meaning even outside the poem’s intended or 
established meaning, a retrojection whose void is in fullness.
So why are we prodded to explain  things always or provide heuristic 
frameworks for all experiences?  Can’t experiences cease, impermanently 
though, to be agential, intentional, and moralistic? What is the goodness 
of being “good for nothing?” Jerry Foder writes:
It’s very hard to get this right  because of our penchant for teleology, 
for explaining  things on the model of agents with beliefs, goals, and de-
sires is inveterate and prob ably itself innate. We are forever wanting to 
know what  things are for, and we  don’t like having to take Nothing for 
an answer. That gives us a wonderful head start on understanding the 
practical psy chol ogy of ourselves and our conspecifics; but it is not of 
the (no doubt many) re spects in which we  aren’t kinds of creatures ide-
ally equipped for  doing natu ral science. Still I think that sometimes out 
of the corner of an eye, “at a moment which is not action or inaction,” we 
can glimpse the true scientific fission: austere, tragic, alienated and very 
beautiful. A world that  isn’t for anything; a world that is just  there.37
The ethics of sahitya are in realizing that literary experiences are some-
times austere, bare, and alienated. It redefines the understanding of the 
beautiful by ofering “nothing” in response to any interrogation as to what 
makes something beautiful.  There is an indiference to the princi ples of 
aesthetic formations and understanding, dropping the coins of “how” and 
“why” deep down into the well of non- reckoning. This surely is also a way 
to rethink nonconnections.
If one, instead of describing space as “the boundless, three- dimensional 
extent in which objects and events occur and have relative position and 
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direction,” writes, “space is a doubt,” what kind of an experience does that 
proj ect?38 The words space and doubt ooze a thought, leaving  behind room 
for reflection that is unstructured, most often method- defying, and more 
in the nature of a provocation. This provocation does not prod one to  labor 
on theories of space; rather, it becomes an experience that  settles on our 
self and grows on us with a sense of confusion and ignorance that we may 
take delight in and very rarely feel embarrassed about. This is about “feel-
ing” the thought out, implicating a diference that we make between the 
delight of the odor of a  rose and a high fashion perfume with an inscription 
of its chemical composition. Sahitya  frees itself up in the postaesthetic 
when the trenchant rigor and regimes of aestheticization are discounted 
in  favor of a pretheoretical state. The experience of the postaesthetic sig-
nifies a mobility beyond a given horizon of expectations, vectoring into 
an excess, discoursing about which is, most often, difficult. I would like to 
term this phenomenon as “becoming aesthetic.” This tendency to conjoin 
with the habits of the postaesthetic is what sahitya provokes us to salvage, 
a bargain power that supposedly was lost on lit er a ture in the compulsive 
duress of interpretation. If écriture has made deeper inroads into sahitya’s 
manifestation of its hunger, the postaesthetic has its phantom presence, 
feeding on its own uncanny ability to salvage experiences beyond what 
methodological stridency and (in)fusionist astuteness allow. It is about 
feeling the hunger and not rationalizing, logicalizing, and historicizing it. 
Becoming aesthetic is when sahitya speaks, speaking from an indwell-
ing power (its sacredness) whose nature is unstructured, unpredictable, 
asymmetrical, and yet uninterruptedly provocative. Sahitya, on such 
occasions, moves rather than constructs and signifies. Becoming aesthetic 
owes to sahitya’s ability for deviancy, detouring competences in the form 
of an “imposed aesthetic” or trained habits of aesthetic response. Sahitya 
makes itself vulnerable in the premises of the literary, and vulnerability is 
its fate in the postliterary, also.
The postaesthetic of hunger is the excess of energy that leaps beyond 
the interpreter’s mortal, limiting abilities to submit to a signification; it 
is a separate sort of uselessness that sahitya exudes without the slightest 
aim to become ascribed and inscribed. Uselessness is a hunger whose man-
ifest gain is in a senseless loss, in being unremarkable to a sensus communis 
(common sense). It emerges in a moment of readerly transaction without 
being obligated to reemerge in a similar way to the following reader or any 
succeeding readerly intervention. Sahitya has its own unreserved expen-
ditures in the sense of the prelogical and pretheoretical as distinguished 
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from the preontological. The postaesthetic is built around a “coyness” with 
no apotheosis of meaning or determined identity. This is the zone of the 
“radical aesthetic,” which is an experience where torture is mixed with the 
delight of having felt something and yet not being able to unveil what it 
felt like. It is an experience that sahitya grows on us where even a mild, 
probing spirit can expire into a helpless smile of inexplicability. This is 
“becoming aesthetic,” whose constituents and experiential relish are ever 
so elusive and, at best, translucent.
Is the secret of the aesthetic and the postaesthetic of sahitya integral 
to its own survival? Does it make sahitya unique in its demo cratic forbear-
ance and endurance, letting upon itself multiple discourses in a carnival 
of power and knowledge? What is it that makes sahitya readable, yet intan-
gible, sometimes unreadable and, hence, provocative and rapportable and 
yet not wholly presentable? In sahitya’s strangeness lies its hunger. The 
mystery is its hunger. In a way, its hunger mystifies it. Miller and I have 
been left troubled in this book by sahitya’s hunger— one in a dominantly 
rhetorical way and the other (in)fusionally caught within the trans- now 
phenomenon of literary experiences. Committed to our contrastive habits 
of  doing lit er a ture, we found our own aesthetic and politics of reflection 
within a canvas that did not allow antagonism but sponsored a rhythm, a 
rhythm both in contrariety, rupture, and sambandha in much desired and 
inevitable estrangement. We walked across each other in nodding ac know-
ledg ment of our distinctness of thought and literary habits and settled on 
the across to rediscover together the changing climate of values, afect, 
hunger, and ethics around us— a sahit across continents that I hope the 
reader  will discover and appreciate.
Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.
— Percy Bysshe Shelley
Ranjan Ghosh and I have agreed to center our last pair of essays on ethics in 
relation to his sahitya and to my lit er a ture. The reader should remember that 
 these two key words are synonyms. Sahitya, Ghosh tells me in an  e- mail, 
is “a Sanskrit, Bengali, Hindi word and simply means what we in the West 
call lit er a ture.” Lit er a ture, for me, means primarily printed poems, plays, 
novels, and short stories, as in the term Victorian lit er a ture, so I assume 
sahitya means the same. Using the word lit er a ture, as we in the West do, is 
a relatively recent event. The word gets its modern sense only with the full 
shift to a print culture in the eighteenth- century. Neither Sophocles nor 
Shakespeare would have said they  were writing lit er a ture, in the modern 
sense of the word. The term originally meant anything written in letters. 
Our pres ent- day meaning is more restricted.
What the two of us mean by ethics in relation to sahitya or to lit er a ture 
difers to some degree from one to the other of us. Ghosh means by the 
ethics of sahitya, to oversimplify quite a bit, sahitya’s insatiable “hunger” 
(his word) for a relation to the other as manifested in sahitya. Hunger is a 
key word in Ghosh’s chapter 9. As he tells me in that same e- mail, “I meant 
the hunger that is inherent in Sahitya. Hunger is desire, motivation, inten-
tion, and dynamicity. Sahitya is impregnated with hunger and functions, 
sometimes, in de pen dent of the readerly hermeneutics.” Sahitya is  here 
said to have in de pen dent hunger. It is hungry on its own, without any in-
tervention by the reader, for example, any attempt to understand a given 
example of sahitya. Ghosh calls that attempt to understand “hermeneu-
tics.” The word hunger is surely, at least obscurely, a personification, as is 
“impregnated.” A given poem or novel has a life of its own. The reader must 
carefully follow Ghosh’s argument in his chapter 9 to get an answer to the 
obvious question, “What is sahitya hungry for?” Its hunger is clearly, in 
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any case, an outward orientation that Ghosh names “desire, motivation, 
intention, and dynamicity.”
I mean by “the ethics of lit er a ture” a version of what the word ethics 
has meant in the West since Aristotle, that is, the issue of how to act 
or choose rightly. For me, the ethical dimensions of a given literary work 
involve a work’s ethical authority over me, that is, its ability to influence 
my ethical acts and judgments. The ethics of a work include the author’s 
ethical responsibility to his readers. Writing a novel or poem is, among 
other  things, an ethical act. Moreover, the ethics of a work involve the 
narrator’s or the poem’s speaker’s ethical obligations to her or his or “its” 
 imagined characters and to the projected readers the narrator or speaker 
of the poem addresses. In a novel, this is the narrator’s obligation to tell 
the truth about the imaginary characters in the story. My reading  later in 
this chapter of Anthony Trollope’s Framley Parsonage  will elaborate this 
issue further. Fi nally the repre sen ta tion, within the work, of the characters’ 
ethical choices or acts constitutes a work’s internal ethical dimension. Is, 
for example, Lucy Robarts’s lie to Lord Lufton, in Framley Parsonage (“I 
cannot love you.”) ethically defensible? My concept of the ethical dimen-
sion of lit er a ture is, you can see, somewhat dif er ent from Ghosh’s “ethics 
of reading sahitya,” as I  shall now go on to specify.
I can only indicate a few features of Ghosh’s chapter 9  here. I  shall es-
pecially stress the way Ghosh’s procedures difer considerably from mine, 
in an attempt to fulfill our contract to be “dialogical.” Though Ghosh is not 
against close reading or the establishment of context, historical, biograph-
ical, or other wise, for him sahitya carries its own authority and is to a 
considerable degree in de pen dent of any originating contexts.
Ghosh’s references and citations are wide- ranging, including as they do 
many Western essays and books, among them a relevant section on books 
by Georges Bataille, but also including references to Hindu and Sanskrit 
sources that may especially interest Western readers of this book. He 
gathers  these sources together, into a complex “transcultural poetics of 
meaning and understanding.”
I would stress, in a way somewhat dif er ent from Ghosh’s synthesizing 
propensities, the profusion of dif er ent ideas about the ethics of lit er a-
ture in the West. Each work, for me, is unique. Each has a dif er ent idea of 
the ethics of lit er a ture from the ones that preside over each of the other 
works. No single concept of the ethics of lit er a ture dominates, for exam-
ple, even in something so relatively circumscribed and homogeneous as 
Victorian En glish lit er a ture. Works in that group may nevertheless have 
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what Ludwig Wittgenstein called a “ family resemblance.” Still, you must 
learn to read each work carefully for itself and expect it to be sui generis. 
You must derive its ideas about ethics, that is, correct and incorrect con-
duct, from the work itself. I  shall try to do that  later on in this chapter for 
Trollope’s Framley Parsonage.
It follows naturally from our somewhat dif er ent premises that our in-
terpretative procedures difer greatly. My conclusions aim to be based on 
a careful and more or less comprehensive close reading of what ever work 
I am discussing. This reading includes formal or rhetorical features as well 
as thematic statements, as you  will see in my reading of Framley Parsonage. 
Ghosh, on the contrary, abstracts details from the literary works he cites 
to support the transcultural poetics of meaning and understanding that 
he has been developing for years and that he calls the (in)fusion approach. 
I feel my way inductively  toward any generalizations I make, whereas 
Ghosh’s style is full of formulations like the following: “So the ‘spark’ can 
fall as revelation of truth that might teach the Victorians the precepts of 
dharma, help them to reach the heart of the  matter, establish the supreme 
necessity of invocation, grow an awareness of the ‘inner being,’ and em-
phasize the means of purification of the soul.”
Ghosh  here appropriates Arnold’s line about “waiting for the spark 
from heaven to fall,” from his long poem “The Scholar- Gypsy,” as an ex-
ample of the poetics of sahitya. He makes this appropriation on the basis 
of an article he cites by V. S. Seturaman that focuses on something most 
Arnold scholars  will have noticed, namely that Arnold knew and was in-
fluenced by oriental scriptures like the Bhagavad Gita. He was especially 
taken by the Gita’s development of “the princi ples of ‘dwandwas’ ” [a mu-
sical debate] and the Gita’s advocacy of “a state of consciousness which 
transcends all dualism,” for example, the oppositions of dwandwas. In my 
view, by the way, Arnold did to some degree wish he could believe in the 
Gita, but was unable quite to do so. More central to Arnold’s thinking, in 
my judgment, are the famous assertions at the beginning of “The Study of 
Poetry” (1880):
 There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma 
which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which 
does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialized itself in the 
fact, in the supposed fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry 
the idea is every thing: the rest is a world of illusion, of divine illusion. 
Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact. The stron-
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gest part of our religion to- day is its unconscious poetry. . . .  More and 
more mankind  will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret 
life for us, to console us, to sustain us.1
If we had world enough and time, I’d dearly like to engage in a serious 
dialogue with Ranjan Ghosh about how he reads this passage, especially 
the opposition between “fact” and “idea,” in the context of the rest of Ar-
nold’s essay, not to speak of the rest of Arnold’s voluminous work. For me, 
Arnold meant by idea something akin to “imaginary fiction” or “literary 
fiction.” Ghosh has responded in a dialogic entry in his chapter 9 to what I 
say  here about Arnold, with an assertion of his more positive way of read-
ing Arnold’s writing as an example of sahitya.
What does it mean to believe, choose, or act “on the ethical authority of 
lit er a ture?” Where does a text said to be lit er a ture get its ethical author-
ity? What is that authority’s source, ground, or guarantee? Who or what 
validates it or authenticates it, signs of on it, takes responsibility for it? 
The author? The reader? Some divine or super natu ral power? The circum-
ambient society? The work’s sources or influences? Some preexisting real-
ity the work accurately copies, imitates, or represents? Can a work perhaps 
be self- authorizing? Just what would that mean, “self- authorizing?” All 
 these ways of ascribing authority to literary works have had valence in the 
Western tradition, often at the same time, in incoherent profusion, down 
to the pres ent day. An essay I have already published, “On the Authority 
of Lit er a ture,” discusses, with some help from Henry James, Proust, and 
many  others, the permutations in the West of answers to the questions I 
have just posed.2 My exploration in that essay of the vari ous ways author-
ity has been claimed for lit er a ture culminates in a recognition that this 
authority derives from a performative use of language artfully begetting 
in the reader, as James puts it, a disposition to take on trust the virtual 
real ity the reader enters when he or she reads a given work. That certainly 
happens. It happened to me, for example, when I read The Swiss  Family 
Robinson as a child. Since my “On the Authority of Lit er a ture” is easily 
available, I  shall not repeat its arguments  here, but turn straight to Anthony 
Trollope’s Framley Parsonage in order to investigate the way it exemplifies 
my vari ous categories of the ethics of lit er a ture.
Anthony Trollope’s Framley Parsonage (1861) is the fourth of the six so- 
called Barsetshire novels.  These novels are about an extended community 
of clergymen and their families in an imaginary En glish shire. The same 
characters return from novel to novel in this sequence, but the focus in 
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each is on one or two  family stories among the members of that imaginary 
community. Framley Parsonage was first published serially in the Cornhill 
Magazine (a coup for Trollope and a turning point in his writing  career) 
from January 1860 through April 1861, and in book form (three volumes) 
by the publisher Smith, Elder, in 1861. It was his first con spic u ous success 
as a novelist. Both the serial edition and the three- decker book edition had 
six admirable illustrations by a distinguished artist of the pre- Raphaelite 
school, John Everett Millais. I have cited the standard, modern Oxford 
World’s Classics edition,3 since it has pagination, but it does not include the 
illustrations. The original edition with the illustrations included is avail-
able as a Gutenberg e- text, to be read for  free on your computer. I mention 
 these details to put the novel in its historical context of Trollope’s writing 
and in the context of the history of the book. All forty- seven of Trollope’s 
novels, plus his nonfiction books, seventy- seven books all told, are avail-
able as Gutenberg e- texts for  free.
Earlier in this chapter, I identified four ethical dimensions of a given 
literary work. The first dimension is the work’s ethical authority over the 
reader, its power to determine the reader’s ethical acts and judgments. 
That is certainly the case for me with Framley Parsonage. When I read it, 
a vivid imaginary world opens up for me. Just what is that imaginary 
world like? It is dif er ent for each work and no doubt for each reader or 
for each reading by the same reader. What my inner imaginary world is 
like when I read Framley Parsonage is a complex question. It is also one 
not much talked about, even in recent research in cognitive science about 
what happens in reading. Cognitive science tends to mea sure what parts 
of my brain light up when I read such and such a work, rather than trying 
to study subjective sensory images as the reader reports them: “Now I am 
seeing my idea of a long drawing room with many fashionably dressed 
 people standing or sitting in it.” Pedagogical theories about how best to 
teach  people to be good readers tend to assume that reading is primarily 
a  matter of making sense of the words, a  matter of vocabulary, grammar, 
and syntax.
My imaginary space for Framley Parsonage, it happens, is relatively rich 
in visual images. I make up in my mind the topography of Barsetshire and 
the décor of rooms in the  houses on the basis of the sparse details Trollope 
gives. He claims to have had the topography of the  whole imaginary shire 
vividly in his mind and to have made a map of it. My  mental images are 
also influenced by the map of Barsetshire devised by Mgr. Ronald Knox 
and available at the beginning of the relatively new illustrated paperback 
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edition of The Warden (1952) and in the reissued Oxford World’s Classics 
edition (1991). The Warden was originally published in 1855. In spite of that 
help, my subjective image of the space between Framley Parsonage and 
Lady Lufton’s mansion is quite dif er ent from Knox’s schematic map, with 
dots for villages and lines for roads. I imagine trees, fields, fences, hedges, 
and roadbeds, to a considerable degree on the basis of my experience of 
rural  Eng land. My subjective images are also to some degree influenced 
by the admirable Millais illustrations.  Here is the one showing a meeting 
between Lord Lufton and Lucy Robarts early in the novel, followed by the 
one showing the memorable meeting at Miss Dunstable’s reception be-
tween Lady Lufton and her  great  enemy, the Duke of Omnium, with the 
hostess Miss Dunstable between them:
Much as I admire the Millais illustrations and believe they accurately 
show period costume and Victorian hairstyles and fashion, they do not 
agree with my  mental images of  those characters, perhaps  because I read 
the novel long before I saw the original illustrations. Trollope, in An Au-
tobiography, praises them for their accurate rendition of what he had in 
mind. Millais and Trollope had their  mental images. I have mine. The difer-
ence is that Millais was a genius at turning his interior visions into graphic 
repre sen ta tions, whereas my visions mostly remain secret, private, un-
communicated. This is  because of my inability to do what Millais did in 
drawing, or what Trollope did with words. My interior visual images, in 
any case, exceed the data. I have my own  mental images of what the char-
acters look like, for example, images of Lucy Robarts, or of her  brother 
Mark, or of Lady Lufton.  These images are aided by clues in the narrator’s 
discourse, for example, the narrator’s report that Lucy was “brown,” 
“short,” and had wonderfully flashing eyes. I am also constantly aware, at 
least subliminally, that I am  free at any time to reenter that  mental space, 
 either in memory or by rereading the novel. It remains available at any 
time, in an odd sort of perdurability.
To an unusual degree, however, my subjective experience when reading 
Framley Parsonage is auditory rather than visual. I hear the almost contin-
uous voice of the narrator, who is very much pres ent as a speaker through-
out and who speaks, strangely enough, in my own voice, as though I  were 
reading the novel out loud to myself. Moreover, I enter into the characters’ 
interiorities by way of the narrator’s masterful use of indirect discourse. 
I hear what they are thinking, feel what they are feeling, as though their 
consciousnesses had a miraculous ability to turn themselves into eloquent 
language. That language seems to have been spoken within their minds 
Figure 10.1  Millais’s illustration of 
meeting between Lord Lufton and 
Lucy Robarts in Framley Parsonage 
(1861).
Figure 10.2  Millais’s illustration of 
meeting between Lady Lufton and 
her  enemy, the Duke of Omnium, 
in Framley Parsonage (1861).
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in the first- person pres ent tense and then reported by the clairvoyant or 
telepathic narrator in the third-person past tense by way of that remark-
able kind of language that linguists and narratologists call  free indirect 
discourse.  These interiorities are then reduplicated in my own mind and 
feelings. As a result, in reading Framley Parsonage I come to feel that I know 
the characters even better than I do my own  family and friends, since I have 
no direct access to the interiorities of the real  people around me such as the 
narrator of Framley Parsonage provides me for the characters in the novel. 
By way of this wholly imaginary intimacy with characters who exist only as 
words on the page, I come to care a lot about what happens to them.
The novel, moreover, by way of the stories Trollope’s narrator tells 
about  these entirely imaginary Victorian personages, Mark Robarts, Lucy 
Robarts, Lady Lufton, Mr.  Sowerby, and so on, certainly influences my 
ideas about correct or incorrect ethical be hav ior. That happens even if I 
try to place  these characters back in another country and an earlier time 
that, some would claim, since it is historically conditioned, has relatively 
 little relevance to my own ethical actions and decisions.
The second dimension I listed is the author’s ethical responsibility to 
his readers. Trollope himself writes eloquently about this in An Autobiog-
raphy, as I have demonstrated in more detail in previous essays, though 
never in relation to Framley Parsonage. I have never written anything about 
that novel before now. In An Autobiography, written in 1875–76, though 
published posthumously, Trollope tells how, as a poor day student, he was 
treated as a pariah at  those fash ion able public schools, Harrow and Win-
chester. In compensation, and in striking confirmation of Freud’s theory 
of art as expressed in a wonderful passage at the end of the twenty- second 
of his Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Trollope developed a habit that lasted 
many years of daydreaming long continuous narratives.  These  were car-
ried on from day to day, from month to month, and from year to year. He 
bound himself down, as he says, “to certain proportions and proprieties 
and unities.”4 He was, he says, “his own hero”: “I was a very clever person, 
and beautiful young  women used to be fond of me. I strove to be kind of 
heart and open of hand and noble in thought, despising mean  things and 
altogether a much better fellow than I have ever succeeded in being since.”5 
Trollope’s imaginary self- image was, in short, a highly ethical person.
Trollope, in accordance with what many parents would still tell their 
 children, goes on to say, “ There can, I imagine, hardly be a more danger-
ous  mental practice.”6 Daydreaming is dangerous, I suppose,  because, like 
novel- reading, daydreams are a means of escaping from the real world 
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and its duties. Nevertheless, continues Trollope, “I have often doubted 
 whether, had it not been my practice, I should ever have written a novel. I 
learned in this way to maintain an interest in a fictitious story, to dwell on 
a work created by my own imagination, and to live in a world altogether 
outside the world of my own material life. In  after years I have done the 
same,— with this diference, that I have discarded the hero of my early 
dreams, and have been able to lay my own identity aside.”7 One might 
argue, contra Trollope, that something very like his own identity is pres-
ent in his narrators, conspicuously, for example, in the narrator of Framley 
Parsonage.
The passage I have cited is, in any case, striking evidence that in 
Trollope’s case, his novel- writing was a displacement of his penchant for 
guilty daydreams. His novels, moreover, had their origin in a wish to be 
ethically good. A  later passage in An Autobiography gives an amazing de-
scription of the way Trollope dwelt within the fictitious worlds created by 
his own imagination. The novels proper  were the writing down as words 
on paper of a rendition of what was initially solitary, secret, and subjec-
tive. His best work has been done, he says, “at some quiet spot among 
the mountains,— where  there has been no society, no hunting, no whist, 
no ordinary  house hold duties.” He concludes, “And I am sure that the 
work so done has had in it the best truth and the highest spirit that I 
have been able to produce. At such times I have been able to imbue myself 
thoroughly with the characters I have had in hand. I have wandered alone 
among the rocks and woods crying at their grief, laughing at their absur-
dities, and thoroughly enjoying their joy. I have been impregnated with 
my own creations till it has been my only excitement to sit with the pen 
in my hand and drive my team before me at as quick a pace as I could 
make them travel.”8
I have elsewhere discussed the purport of the not- all- that- obscure sex-
ual imagery in this passage. The reader  will note, for my purposes  here, 
however, Trollope’s insistence on his responsibility for “the best truth” 
in his novel- writing. This ethical obligation to make his novels improve 
his readers’ morals is made explicit in the last citation I  shall make from 
An Autobiography. In this case, Trollope is writing explic itly about Framley 
Parsonage.  Here the image of self- impregnation is turned into an image 
of impregnating his readers with ethical goodness. Speaking of Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s praise of Trollope’s novels as hewing a lump out of the real 
earth and following the  people on that lump of earth as they go about 
their daily lives, Trollope says:
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I have always desired to “hew out some lump of earth,” and to make 
men and  women walk upon it just as they do walk  here among us,— 
with not more of excellence, nor with exaggerated baseness,—so that 
my readers might recognize  human beings like to themselves, and not 
feel themselves carried away by gods or demons. If I could do this, 
then, I thought, I might succeed in impregnating the mind of the novel 
reader with a feeling that honesty is the best policy, that truth prevails 
while falsehood fails; that a girl  will be loved as she is pure and sweet 
and unselfish;— that a man  will be honored as he is true and honest 
and brave of heart; that  things meaning done are ugly and odious, and 
 things nobly done beautiful and gracious. . . .  
 There are many who would laugh at the idea of a novelist teaching 
 either virtue or nobility,— those, for instance, who regard the reading 
of novels as a sin, and  those who think it to be simply an idle pastime. 
They look upon the tellers of stories as among the tribe of  those who 
pander to the wicked pleasures of a wicked world. I have regarded my 
art from so dif er ent a point of view that I have ever thought of myself 
as a preacher of sermons, and my pulpit as one which I could make 
both salutary and agreeable to my audience. I do believe that no girl has 
risen from the reading of my pages less modest than she was before, 
and that some may have learned from them that modesty is a charm 
well worth preserving. I think that no youth has been taught that in 
falseness and flashiness is to be found the road to manliness; but some 
may perhaps have learned from me that it is to be found in truth and a 
high but gentle spirit. Such are the lessons I have striven to teach, and I 
have thought that it might best be done by representing to my readers 
characters like themselves,—or to which they might liken themselves.9
Well,  there you have it! I know no other passage that expresses so 
well the Victorian ideology of realistic fiction and so eloquently praises 
its power to teach ethical princi ples and conduct to its readers. Trollope 
also pays his re spects to  those Victorians who thought reading novels was 
sinful or a waste of time. My readers  will notice the unabashed sexism 
of what Trollope says. Girls should be modest and do their best to wait 
passively for some eligible man to fall in love with them. An example is 
(apparently) Lucy Robarts in Framley Parsonage. Trollope says of her in An 
Autobiography: “I think myself that Lucy Robarts is perhaps the most natu-
ral En glish girl that I ever drew,— the most natu ral at any rate of  those 
who have been good girls.”10
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Youths, as opposed to girls, should be true and have a high but gentle 
spirit. Lord Lufton is the example of that in Framley Parsonage. I might 
also mention at this point Trollope’s unashamed and deplorable anti- 
Semitism, as in the dishonest and lying moneylenders, the Tozers, in 
Framley Parsonage. It is all very well to say that such anti- Semitism was an 
essential part of Victorian ideology, as in Dickens’s Fagin in Oliver Twist. 
That it was more or less universal in that time, place, and culture does not 
make it any the less reprehensible and dangerous. Hitler capitalized on the 
habitual anti- Semitism of some German  people to lead them to condone 
the Holocaust.
That Trollope wanted his novels to inculcate ethics is clear enough. The 
question now is  whether he succeeded and, if so, by way of what thematic 
and narratological devices. That takes me to the final two dimensions of 
lit er a ture and ethics as they are exemplified in Framley Parsonage.  These 
are, you  will remember, the narrator’s ethical obligations to her, or his, or its 
characters and to the projected readers the speaker addresses. In a novel, 
this is the narrator’s obligation to tell the truth about the characters. The 
final ethical dimension is the repre sen ta tion, within the work, of ethical 
choices or acts by the characters.
First, the narrator of Framley Parsonage: it is all too easy to assume 
that the narrator is Anthony Trollope himself. The narrator speaks of 
himself as an “I.” He uses the same “voice” and style as does, for example, 
the writer of An Autobiography when Trollope is narrating the misery of 
his childhood experiences. To put this the other way, reading An Auto-
biography sometimes seems like reading yet another novel by Trollope. 
Many of the same narrative devices are used and the same self- irony is 
pres ent. Autobiographies, we know, are always to some degree fictional 
reconstructions.
A  little reflection, however,  will lead one to recognize that Anthony 
Trollope and the narrator of Framley Parsonage are quite dif er ent. Trol-
lope’s life experiences  really happened in the real world and are therefore 
capable of being judged as true or false by a pro cess of comparison with 
external evidence. Nothing of the sort is pos si ble for Framley Parsonage 
 because the  whole  thing is a made-up fiction. No Barsetshire ever existed, 
no Lord Lufton, no Lucy Robarts, none of the events and choices the novel 
rec ords. The narrator of the novel, however, speaks in the first person as 
if they all existed and happened. Trollope, the author, could have made it 
up in any way he liked. The narrator, on the contrary, speaks as if bound 
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to tell the truth about real historical events and personages, as when he 
says about one event, “I  here declare, on the faith of an historian, that 
the rumor spread abroad . . .  was not founded on fact.”11 That seems  really 
weird, when you think of it, as when the narrator says of some dingy law 
chambers, “I once heard this room spoken of by an old friend of mine, one 
Mr. Gresham of Greshambury.”12  Here the narrator speaks as if he  were 
a real person in the fictional world of the novel, as real as Lucy Robarts 
or Lord Lufton. I conclude that the narrator of Framley Parsonage is best 
thought of as one of the fictitious characters in this work of fiction. He is 
perhaps even the most impor tant one, since the reader is entirely depen-
dent on the narrator’s telepathic powers for her or his knowledge of the 
(fictitious) events and persons of the novel.
The narrator’s ethical responsibilities go in two directions,  toward the 
reader and  toward the characters. In both orientations the primary obli-
gation is truth- telling. Magna est veritas, “ great is truth,” is the title of 
chapter twenty- four. The phrase is echoed several times in the text. In 
one place, the narrator says: “Being desirous, too, of telling the truth 
in this  matter, I must confess that Lucy did speculate with some regret 
on what it would have been to be Lady Lufton.”13 The narrator has an eth-
ical obligation to tell the  whole truth about the characters to the reader. 
He also has an obligation to the characters to be scrupulously accurate in 
reporting their speech, thoughts, feelings, and actions. This truth- telling, 
please remember, all takes place within the imaginary world in which the 
characters are taken as real  people. In one sense, every thing the narrator 
says is a lie, since it asserts as historical fact what was no such  thing.
Just what storytelling devices or forms of discourse does the narra-
tor employ to fulfill that double ethical responsibility? I identify four. Of 
course, they overlap. More than one is often used in the same paragraph. 
Other modes are also used, for example, the verbatim printing of private 
letters. Letters sent by post  were the Victorian version of our e- mail, tele-
phone, and other means of private communication at a distance. As every-
one knows who has read An Autobiography, Trollope worked for the British 
Post Office for many years.  These four salient methods of storytelling are 
by no means unique to Trollope among Victorian novelists or among nov-
elists in general, but Trollope has brilliant mastery of them. He uses them 
in ways and with a power that are unique to him. Given a citation in any 
of his modes, an  adept reader would likely be able to tell  whether or not it 
was by Trollope.
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 Here are the four most common narrative modes Trollope uses. Each 
is pervaded in one way or another by an ironic tinge that is a par tic u lar 
feature of Trollope’s style.
Much of the Framley Parsonage is made up of dialogue. This give and 
take usually has  little commentary beyond some variant of “he said” or “she 
said.” Most often, but not always, the dialogue is between just two of the 
characters. Such dialogue is a chief means of getting the story told.
The narrator of Framley Parsonage pres ents a good bit of descriptive 
or ruminating discourse  here and  there along the way. You could call it 
“sermonizing.”  These narrative interventions are about many topics, for ex-
ample, parliamentary politics in the  Eng land of Trollope’s time. Trollope’s 
narrator is by no means impersonal or detached.
Much of the stylistic texture of Framley Parsonage is made up of that pe-
culiar form of language called by linguists  free indirect discourse. Trollope 
is a  great master of this common Victorian narrative form. In  free indirect 
discourse the narrator enters into the mind, feelings, interior monologue, 
and bodily sensations of one or another of the characters. The narrator 
speaks in the third- person past tense of what was for the characters  either 
altogether unworded or a secret interior speech in the first- person pres ent 
tense. It is a basic and entirely “unrealistic” assumption in Framley Parson-
age that the narrator has full “telepathic” knowledge of what is  going on 
in the interiorities of almost all the characters. It is “unrealistic”  because 
such direct insight into the minds and feelings of  others in my judgment 
happens only in fictions, not in real life. I borrow Nicholas Royle’s wise 
suggestion that “telepathic narrator” is a better term than “omniscient 
narrator.” “Omniscient” has irrelevant and misleading theological impli-
cations. The characters, on the contrary, have only a partial and imperfect 
insight into what the other characters are thinking and feeling. No total 
clairvoyance of  others for them.
Trollope, fi nally, often pres ents explicit ethical analy sis by the narrator 
of a character’s nature, be hav ior, and choices. Did he or she choose and act 
rightly? What was the pro cess whereby choice and act came to happen in 
a given case? Trollope’s narrator in Framley Parsonage does not hesitate to 
pass ethical judgment on what the characters think and do.
In order to keep this chapter to reasonable length, I  shall concentrate 
on the love story between Lucy Robarts and Lord Lufton for my examples. 
That story is, moreover, the most in ter est ing from my chosen perspec-
tive of ethics and lit er a ture. Trollope initially intended the story of the 
reverend Mark Robarts’ disastrous entanglement in moneylenders to be 
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the central story. He planned the novel to be “a morsel of the biography 
of an En glish clergyman who should not be a bad man but one led into 
temptation by his own youth and by the unclerical accidents of the life 
around him.”14 Trollope asserts in An Autobiography that Lucy’s story grad-
ually became the main plot: “Out of  these slight ele ments I fabricated a 
hodge- podge in which the real plot consisted at last simply of a girl refus-
ing to marry the man she loved till the man’s friends agreed to accept her 
lovingly.”15
Nevertheless, the reader should remember that Framley Parsonage, like 
almost all of Trollope’s novels and like most Victorian novels, is a multi-
plotted concoction or hodge- podge of somewhat analogous stories. It was 
also originally published, as I have said, in parts in the Cornhill Magazine, 
so it is an example of that common Victorian genre, the serial novel. The 
first readers encountered the novel in installments, with time breaks 
between each segment. The story of Lucy’s love is interwoven with a  whole 
set of other stories that in one way or another are entangled with it. This 
set includes not only the Mark Robarts story, but the story of Mr. Nathan-
iel Sowerby’s loss of his ancestral estate, Chaldicotes, and the large fortune 
that goes with it, as well as his seat in parliament, through his spendthrift 
ways. This plot has attendant po liti cal stories of other mps, prime minis-
ters, and  Eng land’s imperial possessions. The reader learns much about 
the power of Tom Towers and the  great newspaper, The Jupiter (read the 
London Times), for which Tom writes “leaders.” A moving subplot is the 
story of Miss Dunstable. She has inherited an enormous fortune from her 
 father’s (and then her own) sales of a quack medicine, the “Oil of Leba-
non.” In the end she comes to marry a poor country doctor, Dr. Thorne. 
Intertwined with the courtship of Lord Lufton and Lucy Robarts is the 
story of Lady Lufton’s unsuccessful attempt to get her son, Lord Lufton, 
to marry the statuesque but empty- headed Griselda Grantly, the  daughter 
of Archdeacon and Mrs. Grantly. Griselda’s  actual marriage to Lord Dum-
bello, whose name fits his nature (what a pair!), is a separate story. Lord 
Dumbello is the next in line in the Hartletop  family and  will be a Marquis. 
Griselda  will become a Marchioness, much higher in the social scale than 
Lucy as the wife of Lord Lufton, a mere Baron. Trollope, fi nally, includes in 
Framley Parsonage episodes about the life of the miserably impoverished 
Mr. Crawley and his wretchedly underfed and barely clothed  family. Craw-
ley is the perpetual curate of the small parish church at Hogglestock. He is 
the central figure in a  later Barsetshire novel by Trollope, The Last Chroni-
cle of Barset (1867).
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All  those plots make a hodge- podge all right, but thematic and figura-
tive resonances or analogies bind all  these stories together. This is gener-
ally the function of multiple plots in a work of fiction, especially Victorian 
fiction, but it is also the case with the multiple marriage plots of Shake-
speare’s plays, such as As You Like It.
In the course of reading Framley Parsonage, the reader learns by way of 
Trollope’s often ironic transposition of the real Victorian social context 
into an imaginary fiction all sorts of  things about the Church of  Eng land 
in the mid- nineteenth  century. The reader also learns about the im mense 
complexities of the British class structure, especially in its relation to 
money. Miss Dunstable, for example, is enormously wealthy, but she is 
below the extremely poor Reverend Crawley in the social scale, as well 
as below the man she marries, Dr. Thorne. Crawley has gone to Harrow 
and Cambridge. He knows Greek and Latin, while Miss Dunstable is the 
 daughter of a seller of quack medicine. The reader also learns about Brit-
ish imperialism at that stage of it (1860). He or she also learns about the 
bewildering complications of  Eng land’s mode of parliamentary and mo-
narchal governance. Framley Parsonage, fi nally, shows in action the crucial 
Victorian assumption that falling in love was an absolute and permanent 
change in a person.
One might sum up much of this context by saying that Victorian fiction 
most commonly centered on love stories  because what interested Victori-
ans most was the question of who would marry this or that marriageable 
maiden and so rearrange, at least to some degree, the pres ent distribution 
of rank and money. Lucy Robarts, the  daughter of a country physician and 
the sister of a mere parish clergyman, becomes Lady Lufton, a Baroness. 
Her first son  will inherit Lord Lufton’s barony. The large Lufton fortune 
 will pass on to the next generation, Lucy’s  children,  either in part as 
dowries, if they are girls, or through outright inheritance by the first son. 
This  will happen by the strange En glish law of primogeniture. At least it 
seems strange to an American reader like me. Primogeniture leaves sec-
ond or third sons penniless, forced to enter the army or to become cler-
gymen. If money and rank mattered most to the Victorians, primarily of 
the  middle class and the upper class, who read novels, it is easy to see why 
the marriage plot so fascinated Victorian readers, and why the ethical is-
sues involved in courtship and marriage  were so impor tant to them. Lucy 
has to prove herself worthy to become the next Lady Lufton. She must do 
that in the context of all  those assumptions about class and money I have 
specified.
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Lucy’s marriage, as is often the case with courtship and marriage in 
Victorian novels, takes place against the vigorous opposition of parents, of 
guardians, of all  those responsible for Lucy’s care as a maiden of marriage-
able age. Her marriage is a species of exogamy, almost like the marriage 
to an Israelite of the Moabite Ruth, in the Book of Ruth, in the Old Tes-
tament. Lucy’s socially forbidden  union, however, is necessary to the con-
stant renewal of the community that marriage brings about. The marriage 
of the insipid Griselda Grantly to the vapid Lord Dumbello simply perpet-
uates a feeble aristocracy.
All of this concern for class and rank is exceedingly difficult for an 
American reader to understand, since our class structure is so dif er ent. 
For example, we have no aristocracy. A lack of money is not a big obsta-
cle to marriage. Divorce is easy. Parental approval for a marriage is by no 
means so universally required. An American student reading Framley Par-
sonage is likely to say, “What’s the prob lem? If they are in love with one 
another, why  don’t they get on with it?”
The story of Lucy’s and Lord Lufton’s love for one another is told in a 
series of discrete episodes presented at intervals interleaved with episodes 
from the other plots. To single  these out and make a direct sequence of 
them is greatly to falsify the way Victorian (and modern day) readers en-
countered and now encounter that story. Magna est veritas, but I can only 
hope that my readers  will forgive my unforgivably untrue truncation. It 
allows me to focus on the major example of truth- telling and lying as ethi-
cal events in Framley Parsonage. A full and detailed account of the way the 
novel works might take hundreds of pages.
I identify eleven stages or episodes in the Lucy Robarts story as Trollope 
tells it. The first comes when Lucy goes with her  brother and  sister- in- law, 
Mark and Fanny Robarts, to a dinner party at Lady Lufton’s  grand  house, 
Framley Court. Lady Lufton is Mark’s rich patroness, who has given him 
his living as the vicar of the church at Framley. Lucy feels completely out 
of place. She wishes she had never come. I cite part of a sequence that 
occurs in the drawing room  after dinner as the guests talk and listen to 
Fanny Robarts play and sing, Griselda Grantly play, and Lord Lufton sing. 
The episode goes on for a  couple of pages. I cite it in part  because it is an ad-
mirable example of Trollope’s remarkable ability to interweave with ease 
all the modes of narration I identified above. Just try to do it yourself, 
dear reader, and you’ll see what amazing skill it hides in its apparent in-
formality. Its subtlety is beguilingly  simple in appearance, but difficult to 
analyze. It is also difficult to describe in words the scene of two characters 
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in dialogue that forms itself in my mind as I read. That imaginary scene is 
no doubt dif er ent for each reader.
 There she sat, still and motionless, afraid to take up a book, and think-
ing in her heart how much happier she would have been at home in 
the parsonage. She was not made for society; she felt sure of that; and 
another time she would let Mark and Fanny come to Framley Court by 
themselves. . . .  Lucy sat alone, turning over the leaves of a book of pic-
tures. She made up her mind fully, then and  there, that she was quite 
unfitted by disposition for such work as this. She cared for no one, and 
no one cared for her. Well, she must go through with it now; but an-
other time she would know better. With her own book and a fireside 
she never felt herself to be miserable as she was now. She had turned 
her back to the  music for she was sick of seeing Lord Lufton watch the 
artistic motion of Miss Grantly’s fin gers, and was sitting at a small 
 table as far away from the piano as a long room would permit, when 
she was suddenly roused from a reverie of self- reproach by a voice close 
 behind her: “Miss Robarts,” said the voice, “why have you cut us all?” 
and Lucy felt that, though she heard the words plainly, nobody  else 
did. Lord Lufton was now speaking to her as he had before spoken to 
Miss Grantly.
“I  don’t play, my lord,” said Lucy, “nor yet sing.”
“That would have made your com pany so much more valuable to 
us, for we are terribly badly of for listeners. Perhaps you  don’t like 
 music?”
“I do like it,— sometimes very much.”
“And when are the sometimes? But we  shall find it all out in time. We 
 shall have unraveled all your mysteries, and read all your riddles by— 
when  shall I say?—by the end of the winter.  Shall we not?”
“I do not know that I have got any mysteries.”
“ ”Oh, but you have! It is very mysterious in you to come and sit 
 here— with your back to us all—”
“Oh, Lord Lufton; if I have done wrong— !” and poor Lucy almost 
started from her chair, and a deep flush came across her dark cheek.
“No— no; you have done no wrong. I was only joking. It is we who 
have done wrong in leaving you to yourself— you who are the greatest 
stranger among us.”
“I have been very well, thank you. I  don’t care about being left alone. 
I have always been used to it.”
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“Ah! but we must break you of the habit. We  won’t allow you to make 
a hermit of yourself. But the truth is, Miss Robarts, you  don’t know us 
yet, and therefore you are not quite happy among us.”
“Oh! yes, I am; you are all very good to me.”
“You must let us be good to you. At any rate, you must let me be 
so. You know,  don’t you, that Mark and I have been dear friends since 
we  were seven years old. His wife has been my  sister’s dearest friend 
almost as long; and now that you are with them, you must be a dear 
friend too. You  won’t refuse the ofer,  will you?”
“Oh, no,” she said, quite in a whisper, fearing that tears would fall 
from her tell- tale eyes.16
By the time I reach this passage in my reading, I have a  mental image 
of Lady Lufton’s long drawing room at Framley Court, even though the 
details Trollope provides are pretty sparse. We know  there is a sofa, a 
piano, a  table where Lucy sits “as far away from the piano as a long room 
would permit,” but I am left to my own imagination to provide the rest. 
The passage begins with an example of the narrator’s descriptive mode: 
“ There she sat.” It rapidly modulates into an example of the narrator’s 
extraordinary ability to enter into the imaginary subjectivities of most of 
the characters: “Thinking in her heart how much happier she would have 
been at home in the parsonage.” “Thinking in her heart” seems to be the 
narrator’s locution for unworded thinking. That modulates quickly again 
to an example of indirect discourse, in which, as I have said, the narrator 
transposes the character’s interior monologue into third- person past tense. 
“She was not made for society; she felt sure of that; and another time 
she would let Mark and Fanny come to Framley Court by themselves,” 
is a transposition of “I am not made for society; I feel sure of that; and 
another time I  will let Mark and Fanny come to Framley Court by them-
selves.” In indirect discourse, the reader gets two minds superimposed, 
that of the character and that of the narrator. The latter has telepathic 
knowledge of what the character is saying to herself or to himself. In-
direct discourse generates, always, to some degree, however slight, an 
ironic distance from the character. Lucy, that distance leads the reader 
to think, is being a bit silly in denigrating herself, however much we are 
meant to admire her maidenly modesty, her reticence, and her sense of 
being of a lower class than the other guests. The irony in the indirect dis-
course indirectly tells the reader all that. It gives the reader an outside 
perspective on Lucy’s interiority. The efect would be quite dif er ent if 
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Lucy’s thoughts  were given as interior monologue, like Molly Bloom’s so-
liloquy in Ulysses.
The indirect discourse for Lucy is picked up on the next page, when I 
start my citation again  after a break: “She made up her mind fully, then 
and  there, that she was quite unfitted by disposition for such work as this. 
She cared for no one, and no one cared for her.17 Well, she must go through 
it now; but another time she would know better.”
Lucy’s  bitter meditation is interrupted by Lord Lufton’s speaking qui-
etly to her from  behind her as she sits alone turning the leaves of a book 
of pictures with her back to the room: “ ‘Miss Robarts,’ said the voice, ‘why 
have you cut us all?’ ” What follows is a characteristic example of Trollope’s 
brilliant use of what the Greeks called “stichomythic” dialogue, the rapid 
give and take of dialogue, often brief questions and answers. No careful 
reader can fail to note that what begins as apparently just polite conversa-
tion soon becomes something almost approaching lovemaking, or at least 
serious flirtation, on Lord Lufton’s part: “ ‘His [Mark Robarts’s] wife has 
been my  sister’s dearest friend almost as long; and now that you are with 
them, you must be a dear friend too. You  won’t refuse the ofer,  will you?’ 
‘Oh, no,’ she said, quite in a whisper.”
The passage I have cited is a good synecdochic sample of the mixture of 
narrative discourses that characterizes Framley Parsonage in general, and 
the rendition of the love story between Lucy Robarts and Lord Lufton in 
par tic u lar. It is aty pi cal in having only one brief example at the beginning 
of the frequent short or sometimes quite long interpolations of descrip-
tion, or of ethical interpretation and judgment, or of ruminative digression 
by the narrator’s speaking for himself in his own voice, in direct address 
to the reader.  Here is one example: “That girls should not marry for money 
we are all agreed. A lady who can sell herself for a title or an estate, for an 
income or a set of  family diamonds, treats herself as a farmer treats his 
sheep and oxen— makes hardly more of herself, of her own inner self, in 
which are comprised a mind and soul, than the poor wretch of her own sex 
who earns her bread in the lowest stage of degradation [that is, becomes 
a prostitute].”18
Trollope’s quite distinctively brilliant use of the major forms of Victo-
rian narrative techniques continues throughout the vari ous episodes telling 
Lucy’s story.  These episodes are distributed at uneven intervals through 
the novel.
In the next episode in the series  after Lucy and Lord Lufton first meet, 
Lady Lufton warns Fanny Robarts that her son Lord Lufton may be spend-
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ing too much time talking intimately to Lucy. This is followed in the same 
chapter by Fanny’s warning to Lucy against “flirting” with Lord Lufton19 
(ch.  13, “Delicate Hints”). Then comes chapter  16  in which Lord Lufton 
makes his first proposal to Lucy and she tells her lie in refusing him, since 
she is deeply in love with him: “ ‘Lord Lufton,’ she said, ‘I cannot love you’ ”20 
(“Mrs. Podgens’ Baby”).
Five chapters  later comes the episode in which Lucy flogs the pony Puck 
(a significant Shakespearean name) when she is driving the pony carriage 
with Fanny. She does this in exasperation at hearing that Lord Lufton is 
prob ably to marry Griselda Grantly, thereby giving away to Fanny that she 
is secretly in love with him (ch. 21, “Why Puck, the Pony, Was Beaten”). 
The next episode in the series shows Lucy confessing in a self- mocking 
irony (“It was his title that killed me.”)21 her love for Lord Lufton to her 
 sister- in- law Fanny Robarts and confessing also that she lied to him: “I 
told him a lie”22 (ch. 26, “Impulsive”). Five chapters  later Lord Lufton tells 
Lucy’s  brother Mark that he loves Lucy and intends to come the next day 
to propose to her again, a visit Lucy refuses (ch. 31, “Salmon Fishing in 
Norway”).
In chapter  34, “Lady Lufton Is Taken By Surprise,” Lord Lufton tells 
his  mother that he means to make Lucy his wife. In just the next chapter, 
“The Story of King Cophetua,” Lucy out- smarts Lady Lufton and tells her 
that though she is deeply in love with Lord Lufton and he with her, she 
 will only agree to marry him when Lady Lufton asks her to do so. In chap-
ter 41, “Don Quixote,” Trollope shows Fanny Robarts defending Lucy to 
Lady Lufton: “I have not given any advice; nor is it needed. I know no one 
more able than Lucy to see clearly, by her own judgment, what course she 
 ought to pursue. I should be afraid to advise one whose mind is so strong, 
and who, of her own nature, is so self- denying as she is.”23 Chapter 43, “Is 
She Not Insignificant?” tells how Lady Lufton tried unsuccessfully to per-
suade her son, Lord Lufton, that Lucy is too “insignificant” to be his wife. 
In chapter 46, “Lady Lufton’s Request,” Lady Lufton gives in and asks Lucy 
to marry Lord Lufton: “And now I have come  here, Lucy, to ask you to be 
his wife.” Lucy sends by Lady Lufton a one word message to him, “simply 
yes.”24
Chapter 48, “How They  Were All Married, Had Two  Children, and Lived 
Happy Ever  After,” tells how Lucy, shortly before her marriage, refuses 
to admit to Lord Lufton that she lied to him when she told him she could 
not love him: “ ‘Ludovic, some conjuror must have told you that.’ She was 
standing as she spoke, and, laughing at him, she held up her hands and 
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shook her head. But she was now in his power, and he had his revenge 
[presumably an embrace and kiss]— his revenge for her past falsehood and 
her pres ent joke.”25
This recapitulation is no substitute for reading the novel, but it  will give 
my readers some sense of the way the course of this true love does not run 
smooth, but has a happy ending nevertheless. Readers  will also see from 
the chapter numbers that the episodes telling the story of how Lucy came 
to marry Lord Lufton are distributed throughout the novel at intervals of 
about five chapters.  These episodes are interspersed with many chap-
ters about the other plots. They are, moreover, included in dif er ent serial 
sections. The initial Victorian readers would have received Lucy’s story 
with two dif er ent kinds of interruption along the way.
Lucy’s story turns on several dif er ent kinds of speech acts or performa-
tive utterances.26 I  shall now conclude this chapter with a brief commen-
tary on  these. Each would merit a lengthy analy sis and elucidation. Each 
performative in Trollope’s telling of Lucy’s story works diferently. Lord 
Lufton’s iterated proposals to Lucy are speech acts. They force her to re-
spond in some way, even if only by silence. Lucy’s lie to Lord Lufton is a 
speech act, as, in a dif er ent way, is her confession to Fanny that she loves 
Lord Lufton dearly and has lied to him. Lucy’s “verdict” that she  will marry 
her suitor only if Lady Lufton asks her to do so is a performative utterance 
that forms a turning point in the story. Any utterance that can be called 
a “verdict” is a speech act, a use of words to make something happen, in 
this case to put the ball in Lady Lufton’s court, so to speak. Lady Lufton’s 
ultimate request to Lucy, followed by Lucy’s ratifying “simply yes” are two 
more speech acts. Lucy’s refusal to confess her lie to Lord Lufton is, in a 
somewhat strange way, yet another performative. As J. L. Austin recognized, 
speech acts take many dif er ent forms, sometimes quite peculiar ones that 
may masquerade as apparently statements of fact, “constatives.”
A lie, a confession, a proposal of marriage, a “verdict” or decision, a 
request, a “yes,” with its implicit, “I promise to do that,” a refusal to con-
fess: each of  these is a dif er ent way of  doing  things with words, not a con-
stative assertion. Each difers from the  others in its mode of working, but 
each demands some kind of answering response from the person to whom 
it is spoken. For example, Lord Lufton goes away in deep disappointment 
and dejection when Lucy says, “I cannot love you.” Her lie works as an effi-
cacious speech act. It makes something happen.
Lucy’s love story, as you can see, proceeds through a cascade of per-
formative utterances that make salient the ethical issues her story raises. 
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 These issues are made explicit in the novel,  either by the narrator or by 
one or another of the characters. Most obviously Lucy’s story turns on 
the question of  whether or not a lie is ever justified, as well as on the per-
formative force of her assertion that she  will only consent to marry Lord 
Lufton if his  mother asks her to accept him: “Tell him, that if his  mother 
asks me I  will— consent.”27 This is a speech act in the sense that it forces 
Lady Lufton to respond in one way or another. Lady Lufton must  either 
accept or refuse.  Doing nothing is a virtual speech act in response. Magna 
est veritas. The novel repeatedly, in the vari ous plots, stresses the impor-
tance of strict truth- telling and the perfidy of lying. Mr. Sowerby, for ex-
ample, is a congenital liar. He is punished as a consequence: “It is rogu ish 
to lie, and he had been a  great liar.”28
J. L. Austin affirms, truthfully enough, that all performative statements 
have a constative dimension, and vice versa. A true statement is a classic 
example of a constative utterance, since it is in correspondence with an 
extraverbal state of afairs. Its performative dimension is minimal. A lie is 
a peculiar form of speech act. Its constative value is nil, since it does not 
correspond to a true state of afairs. Its performative force, however, can 
be decisive if it is believed. When Lucy replies to Lord Lufton’s proposal 
with her “I cannot love you,” her lie is an efficacious speech act  because he 
believes her and goes away disappointed and, as he says, “wretched.” She 
is motivated by “pride,” which forbids her to endure Lady Lufton’s violent 
disapproval and her inevitable belief that Lucy has entrapped Lord Lufton, 
that she is, as she thinks to herself, a “horrid, sly, detestable, underhand 
girl.”29 The  whole Lucy Robarts love story turns on the consequences of 
her lie and on the question of  whether a lie is ever justified. This is the 
chief ethical question her story forcefully dramatizes.
 After uttering her lie to Lord Lufton, Lucy goes to her room, throws 
herself on her bed, and asks herself, in another example of the indirect 
discourse so pervasive in the novel: “Why— oh! why had she told such a 
falsehood? Could anything justify her in a lie? Was it not a lie— knowing 
as she did that she loved him with all her loving heart? But, then, his 
 mother! and the sneers of the world, which would have declared that she 
had set her trap, and caught the foolish young lord! Her pride would not 
have submitted to that. Strong as her love was, yet her pride was, perhaps, 
stronger— stronger at any rate during that interview. But how was she to 
forgive herself the falsehood she had told?”30  Later on she says to herself, 
“And now she had thrown all that aside  because she could not endure that 
Lady Lufton should call her a scheming, artful girl! Actuated by that fear 
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she had repulsed him with a falsehood, though the  matter was one on 
which it was so terribly impor tant that she should tell the truth.”31
This ethical dilemma comes up explic itly again  later on in the novel, 
when Lucy tells all her story up to then to Fanny, with a mixture of solem-
nity and self- deprecating irony:
“I lied to him, and told him that I did not love him.”
“You refused him?”
“Yes; I refused a live lord.  There is some satisfaction in having that to 
think of, is  there not? Fanny, was I wicked to tell that falsehood?’
. . .  
“I know that it is better as it is; but tell me—is a falsehood always 
wrong, or can it be pos si ble that the end should justify the means? 
 Ought I to have told him the truth, and to have let him know that I 
could almost kiss the ground on which he stood?”
That was a question for the doctors [meaning Doctors of the Church, 
theologians, or, by analogy, interpreters of the ethical dimensions of lit-
er a ture, like me] which Mrs. Robarts would not take it upon herself to 
answer. She would not make that falsehood  matter of accusation, but 
neither would she pronounce for it any absolution. In that  matter Lucy 
must regulate her own conscience.32
That is the question, all right: Is a lie ever justified? Fanny’s appeal to 
Lucy’s conscience is not sufficient. At least it does not satisfy me. Kant’s 
famous example is about the person who, according to Kant, should not lie 
when asked  whether a fugitive has taken shelter in his  house, even though 
telling the truth  will likely lead to the capture or death of the fugitive. For 
Kant a lie is never justified.33 And yet Lucy’s falsehood was uttered for the 
most high- minded and self- denying of reasons.
I think in the end that Trollope, or Trollope’s narrator, leaves it to the 
reader to decide this ethical question. That question presides over the 
 whole of the Lucy Robarts’s plotline. It arises for Mark Robarts when 
he learns that Lord Lufton has proposed to Lucy and has been refused, 
but intends to ask her again: “And then, he would have said, Lord Lufton 
would have been the last to fall in love with such a girl as his  sister. And 
now, what was he to say or do? What views was he bound to hold? In what 
direction should he act?”34
To tell the truth, I’m not sure what my own judgment is about Lucy’s 
lie. It is a question for the doctors to decide. But a return in conclusion to 
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Lucy’s other determining speech act may help me reach a decision, or at 
any rate may clarify to some degree what is at stake.
Lucy’s “Tell him, that if his  mother asks me I  will— consent” can be 
seen in at least two ways, as can her story as a  whole. What she says is 
characterized by the narrator in the formal language of a courtroom deci-
sion. It is a “verdict,” that is, etymologically, “true speech,” or “saying the 
truth”: “Such was her verdict, and so confident  were they both [Mark and 
Fanny Robarts] of her firmness—of her obstinacy Mark would have called 
it on any other occasion,— that neither of them sought to make her alter 
it.”35 A  little earlier, the narrator says of Lucy, “She had still, in some per-
versely obstinate manner, made up her mind against that result [becom-
ing the next Lady Lufton].”36 On the one hand, Lucy believes, or thinks she 
believes, that Lady Lufton  will never consent. Her verdict is an example of 
the meek self- denial and modesty that we commonly associate with Victo-
rian heroines. On the other hand, it can be seen as a brilliant ploy by the 
highly intelligent and strong- willed Lucy Robarts to fulfill her love and 
marry Lord Lufton. Lufton knows that his  mother, who loves him inor-
dinately,  will eventually give in and welcome Lucy as his  daughter- in- law. 
Lucy, the reader is encouraged to imagine, may have known Lady Lufton 
well enough to have foreseen somewhere “in her heart of hearts” that out-
come. Her verdict certainly works as a “felicitous speech act,” in Austin’s 
phrase, to produce that result.
Lucy’s  whole story is double in that way. On the one hand, it is a prime 
example of the typical Victorian, fictional love story in which the mod-
est, self- denying maiden keeps her love secret, but nevertheless in the end 
marries her beloved and above her class origins. She thereby, through her 
 children, participates in the reassignment of money and class that was 
the way Victorian society renewed itself. On the other hand, many hints 
and details indicate that Trollope is actually critical of the ideological as-
sumptions of that standard plot. The satirical parallels with such models 
as Scott’s The Bride of Lammermoor and, more explic itly, the ballad of “King 
Cophetua and the Beggar Maid.” The latter is used as the title of the chap-
ter in which Lucy confronts Lady Lufton and wins the  battle of  wills with 
her by invoking once more her verdict.37 Trollope’s narrator uses to some 
degree in telling Lucy’s story the ironic distancing that, as I have said, is 
intrinsic to indirect discourse. That distancing is also pres ent in the con-
spic u ous irony that is constantly used by Lucy herself in telling her story, 
especially in the way she tells it to Fanny:
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“What you tell me so surprises me, that I hardly as yet know how to 
speak about it,” said Mrs. Robarts.
“It was amazing, was it not? He must have been insane at the time; 
 there can be no other excuse made for him. I won der  whether  there is 
anything of that sort in the  family?”
“What; madness?” said Mrs. Robarts, quite in earnest.
“Well,  don’t you think he must have been mad when such an idea 
cane into his head? But you  don’t believe it; I can see that. And yet it is 
as true as heaven. . . .”
. . .  
“And what  shall I do next?” said Lucy, still speaking in a tone that 
was half tragic and half jeering.
“Do?” said Mrs. Robarts.
“Yes, something must be done. If I  were a man I should go to Switzerland, 
of course; or, as the case is a bad one, perhaps as far as Hungary. What is 
it that girls do? they  don’t die nowadays, I believe [as Lucy Ashton does, 
melodramatically, in The Bride of Lammermoor].”38
The Lucy story in Framley Parsonage is two stories in one: the first is a 
straightforward version of the typical Victorian love plot. The other, pres-
ent in the irony of language and in the ironic allusions to famous previous 
examples of such stories, deconstructs, if I may dare to use that word, by 
way of its rhe toric, the “straight” story. It puts the solemnity of that story 
radically in question. It does so subtly but unmistakably, if the reader fol-
lows the clues given by the “poetics” of Framley Parsonage, that is, the way 
 things are said. Poetics are opposed to “hermeneutics,” that is, the identi-
fication of what  things are said by way of overt thematic statements. The 
novel’s poetics reveals it to be a devastatingly comic parody of the conven-
tional sentimental love plot, as well as a brilliant rendition of it. Lucy’s 
story in Framley Parsonage superimposes and interweaves two dif er ent 
narratives. It is, to use the vernacular, a “twofer,” two for one.
That duplicity is exposed in the double meanings of Lucy’s word “con-
juror.” The happy marriage of Lord Lufton and Lucy Robarts is based on 
a lie kept secret by Lucy from her husband to be. It is a permanent secret 
between the two. The happy ending is founded on a falsehood that Lucy 
refuses to confess that she has uttered. The figure of speech she uses in 
making that refusal seems extremely odd, if you think a  little about it: 
“ ‘Ludovic, some conjuror must have told you that.’ She was standing as she 
spoke, and, laughing at him, she held up her hands and shook her head.” 
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Lucy’s word “conjuror” is only used jestingly. The narrator calls it a “joke.” 
It is a lighthearted figure of speech. I know of no evidence that Trollope 
believed words could, as Shakespeare’s Hotspur puts it, “call spirits from 
the vasty deep.” Nevertheless, Lucy’s use of the word is highly suggestive. 
Speech acts are,  after all, like a conjuror’s sleight- of- hand tricks. They make 
something happen with words, by an “abracadabra!” or an “open sesame!”
Conjuror, as well as meaning “magician,” which every one knows is some-
one  adept at misleading prestidigitations, also means someone who invokes 
spirits by magic spells or incantations. The Latin con or com, “with,” plus 
jure, “swear” means “to swear with.” The word also means, as early as the 
1580s, when used in the phrase “conjure up,” “cause to appear in the mind 
as if by magic, by invocation, or spell.”39 Lucy’s “conjuror”  will have revealed 
her secret lie, by conjuring it up within Lord Lufton’s mind. Lord Lufton 
 will then be able to read the magician’s words or can read what is betrayed 
in Lucy’s holding up her hands and shaking her head, in an act of conjura-
tion or perhaps of banishment, exorcism: “Now you see it, now you  don’t.” 
And of course the narrator as conjuror or spirit medium has conjured up 
for the readers, with words used as invocations, all the characters, events, 
and settings of the novel. “I hereby invoke Lucy Robarts.” In par tic u lar, the 
narrator has told Lucy’s secret to the reader by way of reporting his magi-
cal, telepathic knowledge that she has confessed her lie to herself in interior 
monologue and in overt speech to Fanny Robarts.
I claim to have shown in a salient example how the ethics of lit er a ture 
works in my interpretation of it. Have I fulfilled my ethical obligation to 
tell the truth about Framley Parsonage? This I can never know for sure, as 
is the case in all realms of ethical responsibility, decision, and action. I can 
only say truthfully that I have done my conscientious best.
My version of the relation between ethics and lit er a ture, as this chapter 
shows, is dif er ent from Ranjan Ghosh’s “The Ethics of Reading Sahitya,” 
though resonances exist. Our book’s final pair of chapters constitutes a con-
cluding demonstration of two ways to think lit er a ture across continents.
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 Every tradition and system of thought and knowledge belonging to a 
par tic u lar culture and community must begin by ofering its ideas and 
thoughts to the other; this welcome and potential indulgence creates op-
portunities to experiment with such oferings, inspiring our walking the 
untrodden paths. “Taking” is the openness to accept and assimilate what 
 others have to ofer and this also initiates a separate level of coordina-
tion and contact. Giving and taking unleash a variety of “circulation”— 
the complexity emerging out of constraints and enablings— generating a 
host of entanglements in our enunciation and enframing of lit er a ture. 
Our life of dialogue, which began about fifteen years ago, was inscribed 
in a poetics of taking, a poetics about how close we could get to listen-
ing to lit er a ture and listening to each other’s thinking about lit er a ture 
across canons, continents, and cultures. The book, promoting positions 
that  were conflationary and contrastive, combined an astute and genuine 
listening that enabled a patient growth of the other, an encouragement to 
get tolerant with the other, in a domain of altogether, a togetherness that 
we suppose flourished  because we realized our separation in communi-
cation, dislocations in convergences. Our transactional listening to each 
other has, hopefully, opened lit er a ture as a demo cratic community where 
readers are welcome to install and invest their inputs through a separate 
level of listening that may not be docile always.
The book, then, is an out- of- habit proj ect. Streams of thought on an ex-
uberantly wide range of issues  will rush onto the reader’s encounter with 
the book, a ceaseless across- momentum of thoughts and positions, an 
unavoidable yet cheerful obligation to listen to multiple voices and vocab-
ularies made available through a cele bration of literary thoughts and com-
munities. Such acts of listening are a challenge to our habitual encounters 
ranjan ghosh
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with books usually authored, edited, and coauthored. The Miller- Ghosh 
presence and the authors’ interface at  every juncture of the unfolding is 
a way to alert the reader about two books building in conjunction, in col-
loquy, listening to each other in their mutual substantiation and relish-
ing the inability to author and authorize the final word on a par tic u lar 
subject, be that ethics or world lit er a ture or teaching lit er a ture or reading 
poetry. This  will leave readers in the midst of three books, one by Ghosh, 
another by Miller, and the third by Ghosh- Miller. The chapters  were not 
just intended to follow each other but coexist. Our voices  were individ-
ual and collaborative; our consciousnesses  were singularly articulated and 
participatory. So the book  will make the readers see the disturbance that 
dialogism brings, a pro cess of thinking where diference becomes under-
standing. Arguments across a variety of subjects, colored and informed by 
dif er ent kinds of training and intellectual establishments, do not have an 
impositional totality, for Hillis and I germinated this proj ect knowing our 
indentificatory and ideological diferences and kept discovering ourselves 
productively as we progressed through time with meticulous mapping 
and scrupulous patience. Dialogism, conversational becomings at dif er-
ent levels of literary afect and epistemic concretizations, is the pith of 
this proj ect and it prevented us from overlaying the carefully crafted can-
vas built over the last four years with our literary prejudices. Dialogues 
through chapters and other modes of innumerable exchanges made us 
rethink our positions and perspectives and become accommodative about 
the impetus and impingement of the other. The book is formally “one from 
many” constructed out of co- particulars, and  every chapter can be sign-
posted as Miller- Ghosh.
Are we directing readers to a  future of lit er a ture? Perhaps not. To call 
on a  future is to allow a settlement on a bolus of steady accretion, a pen-
ultimate point of lit er a ture’s evolution that is more telic than configura-
tive. What, perhaps, we ended up  doing, to an extent, is stirring the pot, 
bringing the sedimented to the surface and allowing the once settled to 
sink away in the stir at dif er ent points in the container. Our dyadic and 
dialogic investments went beyond the stir also, ensuring fresh forma-
tions on the meaning- efect of lit er a ture, the world in world lit er a ture, the 
teaching- afect of lit er a ture, ethics and postaesthetics of lit er a ture, and 
many other issues. Sitting by the fireplace in the play house of lit er a ture, 
we have also allowed  things to grow in silence. Perhaps this silence is what 
the book urges on its readers, triggering their own explorative ways; the 
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meditation that the book is intended to generate efectuates the stirring 
of continents and the silences that such stirrings have left  behind rather 
unavoidably for readerly ascension and tenancy.
Becomings are secret, as Deleuze and Guattari  were right to observe. 
The book’s being is its becoming.
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